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Æ B U B  AND Dl O m S U B  v’,




ill the Introduction we attempt to set the stage, as 
it were, by redressing the still predominantly negative 
balance of who Nietzsche was (Chapter One), and by estab­
lishing a few signposts on which we may be able to take 
our bearings for an accurate reading of what he was about 
(Chapter Two). We claim that Nietzsche is a sensitive 
moralist, in the sense of one who asks and attempts to 
answer questions of value, ethical questions; and we re­
view briefly his own attitude to the answers to such ques­
tions provided by five of his predecessors : Pascal, Goethe^
Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer•
Part I is intended as an extended analysis of the 
starting point of Nietzsche*s work— -the death of God. We 
begin by taking a critical look at several interpretations 
of Nietzsche’s pronouncement of the death of God, before 
attempting our own theological interpretation (Chapter 
Three). We then endeavor to show that ha assumed God’s 
death, rather than trying to prove it; that it was, for
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him, not a question of metaphysics, but a cultural, his­
torical event* Nietzsche is concerned, not with the ex­
istence or non-existence of God, but with his life and 
death— and the consequences of his death (Chapter Four).
Part II is designed to lay bare what is perhaps the 
most important of these consequences, namely the problem­
atic nature of morality. We see Nietzsche struggling both 
aesthetically and psychologically with Schopenhauer *s ques^ 
tion— Has existence any meaning at all?— a question which 
now, after the death of the old "answer," had to be raised 
(and answered) anew. In Chapter Five we discover that 
morality was understood by Nietzsche as having a double 
slgiiificanco Î every moral demand system can serve both as 
a guide to the passions men consider most powerful, and as 
a means of controlling and harnessing those passions* We 
also gat our first glimpse of what will develop into the 
most fundamental concept of Nietzsche’s philosophy, his 
will to power monism. Chapter Six sets out from an expo­
sition of Nietzsche’s typology of morality, continues 
through whet is undoubtedly his single most important dis­
covery in the realm of values, namely, the Instinct of 
conscience, and culminates in his plea for a remissive 
conscience, that is, a conscience based on and aimed 
toward fulfillment rather than continence.
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In Part III we try to be more explicit about how 
Nietzsche envisaged the creation of this remissive con­
science . After pointing out that his doctrine of the body 
provides the clue to a synthesis of the best in both bib­
lical monism and classical dualism in his own (diatomic) 
Dionysian monism, we make a case for Nietzsche’s recom­
mendation that we again begin to take our senses seriously, 
not as a final court of appeal but, at the very least, as 
a regulative hypothesis in questions of value (Chapter 
Seven). We then move from the body to the earth to dwell 
in detail upon Nietzsche’s teaching of eternal recurrence 
both as a "scientific" and as a "religious" hypothesis, and 
conclude that in its latter form, it is not unlike Jesus’ 
teaching of the Kingdom of God in the Sermon on the Mount. 
The correlate of eternal recurrence, amor fati, leads us to 
a further consideration of Nietzsche’s diatomic monism, with 
its conception of creation arising out of agon, in this case 
the creation of a remissive conscience based on the body and
Hipin»i.*nw<r.iwiWfwni V
the earth, and directed toward affirmation, fulfillment and 
responsibility.(Ohapter Eight).
In the penultimate chapter (Chapter Nine) we begin to 
draw together what has gone before by analyzing the formula, 
"Dionysus versus the Crucified." We discover that "the
Grucified" was understood by Nietzsche as the embodiment
of ressentiment, envious, rancorous aggression, and intend- *    ' ' *
ed by him to symbolize the negation of life from which as­
cetic morality draws its strength. On the other hand, we 
find that "Dionysus" is the symbol of Nietzsche’s matured, 
affirmative will to power monism which contains within it­
self its own "control mechanism"— the instinct of conscienot 
Outside the realm of the symbolic and in that of ethics, 
Dionysus is the Ubermensch, a humanly realizable ethical 
ideal— but only for the few. We end this chapter by crit­
icizing Nietzsche for this elitist ethic which derives, not 
from his own doctrine of man (which is thoroughly "demo­
cratic") but from his Greek (Platonic) theory of society; 
in short, from his unexamined aristocratic bias, which con­
ceives of human relationships as resting on principles of 
domination and respect, but which cannot account for human 
goodness. Not that Nietzsche does not acknowledge human 
goodness, mercy, and love. He does, but only "outside" his 
own schema, namely, in Jesus. Nietzsche is interested in 
Jesus as a man and in his way of life, and it is this way oj 
life that he defends as being Christian. We look at Dos­
toevsky’s Prince Myshkin and at the original use of the 
word "idiot" in an attempt to ascertain the sense in v^ ?hich
•5*
Nietzsche wae referring to Jesus as an idiot* Our con­
clusion is twofold? that Nietzsche was pointing to pity 
as the peculiarly Christian expression of love; and that, 
for him, Christianity is possible only in private* We are* ^  ^ <:«V»w%mMn«ritTS*ninwuwwfrA
thus constrained to reject Nietzsche’s otherwise very able 
and sympathetic portrpyhl of Jesus as incompatible with 
the Jesus of the New Testament, whose way of life is con­
spicuous neither for its pity nor for its privacy (Chapter 
Ten).
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1. On handling dynamite
I am a tetogag. Qt e 3 M  MâlQES... • •
I am not a man? I am dynamite.^
— Nietzsche
I
Norman 0. Brown has written, "Nietzsche is not 
systematic nor even consistentj and still ha Is the best
point of departure," What Brown says is true* And yet 
it must be added that Nietzsche is still little more than 
an enigma# even to those who read him and draw upon his 
wealth of insights into Just about everything of interest 
to intelligent men and women today. Nietzsche is in" 
again; the new wave of his popularity has yet to reach 
its crest* Recent studies of Nietzsche have been more 
cautious than their predecessors# and because of them*
And they are# on the whole# positive in their approach 
to Nietzsche, We may take as the symbolic beginning of 
the new wave of popularity Thomas Mann’s address# "Nietzsche* 
Philosophy in the Light of Contemporary Events#"3 i^ hich he 
delivered in Washington# D* 0. on April 29# 1947* Whether 
or not we share Mann’s view of Nietzsche as the aesthete par 
excellence# we can surely agree with his claim that NietzscK 
"must accept being called a humanist*.*"
6When Nietzsche proclaims : "God Is dead"— a
decision which for him meant the hardest of all 
sacrific6s--in whose honor# in whose exaltation 
did he do so other than of man? If he was, if 
he was able to be, an atheist, then he was one, 
no matter how pastoral and sentimental the word 
sounds, because of his love for humankind*5
It is in this spirit that all that foliotas here is written* 
As the two brief quotations which stand at the head 
of these introductory remarks suggest, Nietzsche’s glad 
tidings are dynamite, which is to say, not necessarily de­
structive but definitely highly explosive. Men have not 
always understood this fact, as witness the uses to which 
Nietzsche was put in the half-century from his "discovery" 
in the mid-l890’s to the beginning of this, his third bid 
for understanding* Me cannot allow ourselves space for a 
detailed look at the changing attitudes to Nietzsche in 
those turbulent years, but it may be beneficial here at the 
outsat to say a word about the reception of Nietzsche’s 
works in Britain and America.
II
The first of Nietzsche's writings to appear in English 
was Thus Snoke Zarathustra. It was translated, though 
poorly, by Alexander Tille, a German professor in the 
University of Glasgow, and published in London in 1896.
In the same year a second volume^ appeared in a good 
translation by a scot, an independent scholar, Thomas 
Common. These were followed, at first rather sporadically.
7by translations of several other of Nietzsche*s works,' 
until In the years 1909*11 the first full translation of 
all of Nietzsche*s writings Into English appeared under 
the personal supervision and at the financial expense of 
a London physician, Oscar Levy,®
But many English and American readers had their minds 
made up for them about Nietzsche before Tllle's translation 
was ever published. In 1895 there appeared in New York the 
English version of a book by Max Nordau, a prolific physl" 
clan-oum~writer whose books ware rapidly translated Into 
several languages and who enjoyed a large popular audience. 
This particular effort. Degeneration, was devoured by his 
English-speaking audience (it went through several editions 
within a few months of its first printing on February 22, 
1895)» and thus the legend of Nietzsche as the madpphllosoph 
was launched. Before concluding that Nietzsche was "ob­
viously insane from birth,"^ Nordau invokes what can only 
be called sham psychology, which should have been an insult 
to readers even In 1895, to bolster his assertion that "the 
real source of Nietzsche's doctrine Is Sadism."^® With 
these words the Bnglish“speakJ.ng world was introduced to 
Nietzsches
From the first to the last page of Nietzsche's 
writings the careful reader seems to hear a mad­
man, with flashing eyes, wild gestures and foaming 
mouth, spouting forth deafening bombastj and
8 , .
through It all, now breaking out Into frenzied 
laughter, now sputtering expressions of filthy
abuse and invective, now skipping about in a
giddily agile dance, and now bursting upon the
auditors with threatening mien and clanehad fists. 
So far as any meaning at all can be extracted 
from the endless stream of phrases, it shows, as 
its fundamental elements, a series of constantly 
reiterated delirious ideas, having their source 
In Illusions of sense and diseased organic pro­
cesses ....11
In 1897 Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Professor of 
Logic in the tînlvarsity of Edinburgh, published an essay 
which, though by no means full of praise for Nietzsche,
set the record straight about who he was and what he had
written^ It also informed the English-speaking public of 
Nordau*B mllclous exaggerations and Inventions, and of 
the existence of a cult surrounding Nietzsche's name in 
Germany and Prance. After alluding to the announcement 
"within the last eighteen months (of) a complete transla- d
tlon of his (Nietzsche's) works,"1® prlngle-pattlson acknow­
ledges the fact that Nietzsche's name is already being 
"dropped" by British authors and critics. He continues ;
It might be rash, however, to assume that this 
measure of fame necessarily Implied any vary 
exact acquaintance with Nietzsche's ideas, or 
their relation to the main currents of contemp­
orary thought. An attempt at greater precision 
Is made in the following pages, in the belief 
that, however preposterous Nietzsche's theories 
may be,, his conclusions and the steps by which 
he reached them form an instructive chapter In 
the history of ideas,13
Remaining In this almost reluctant mood, Pringle-pa11Ison
goes on to outline Nietzsche's biography and summarize
his works very briefly, but responsibly and forthrightly,1^
9thus doing much to clear the air of the prejudices 
against Nietzsche held by those who had been introduced 
to him by Nordau, • -
Havelock Ellis’s Affirmations, which opens with an . 
essay on Nietzsche, appeared in London in 1898. Sills . 
wants neither to praise nor to blame Nietzsche, but "to 
define his personality and influence"Nietzsche Is for 
him "one of the greatest spiritual forces which have ap­
peared since Goethe...
The work he produced between 1877 and 1882 seems 
to me to represent the maturity of his genius.
Morgenrothe. and Die FrOhllphe Wissenaohaft.^  
in form all these volumes belong to the pansée 
literature. They deal with art* with religion, 
with morals and philosophy, with the relation 
of all these to life. Nietzsche shows himself ..
In these pensées above all a freethinker, eman­
cipated from every law save that of sincerity, 
wide-ranging, serious, penetrative, often im­
passioned, and yet always able to follow his own 
ideal of self-restraint.17
Though Ellis cannot restrain himself at times from "praising 
and blaming," from aiming a choice remark here and there 
at "Nletzscheans," he succeeds admirably on the whole in 
presenting a balanced picture of Nietzsche. "His Nietzsche 
is, as he readily admits, the "free-thinker" and "immoralist' 
Nietzsche; but, as he also points out, this Is not all of 
Nietzsche. Above all, "Nietzsche succeeded in being him­
self, and It was a finely rare success
One other brief and long-forgotten positive utterance
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about Mlet^ecbe appeared In the eame year# 1898, in a
memorial volume to the moral phiXoaopber and biographer
of sohopenhauer, Mllliam WalXaee* This book# containing
in the main the re#mining texte of Wallace*a Gifford
Lectures at the University of Glasgow in 1893'"94# included
two short essays# ”Nietxïache’s Criticism of Mora3,lty#'^
and"Thus Spake Earathustra/^ the former being the first
chapter of a detailed criticism of Nietzsche which was
never completed owing to Wallace's sudden death in 1897#
the latter a review of Alexander fille*s translation of
Nietzsche*s book* Again# it is Wallace's tone which dis'"
tinguishea his treatment of Nietzsche fz^ om the prevailing
negative approach* Wallace is not uncritical of Nietzsche#
but neither does he hide his admiration. He closes hia
review article with these words t
Borneÿ indeed# may think that these are poisonous 
opinions and best left in silence and neglect.
But to this it may be rejoined that the growth 
of such opinion is itself a symptom that certain 
corners in the fields of ethics and religion 
have been left to an abandonment which favours 
the upspringing of strange p&ants # with both 
weeds and good grain aaK>ng them, Nietzsche is 
at least always honest# pure# and thorough*19
The next full-length popular study of Nietzsche was 
H. L, Mencken's
which appeared simultaneously in London and Boston in 
1908* facing the title page is the now notorious etching 
of the Nietzsche of the legend# with the swept back hair
and high forehead, veins bulging; the bushy eyebrows, 
accentuating those penetrating, staring eyes ; the full 
moustache hiding the mouth; and, finally, the sage’s toga 
draped about the shoulders. Mr. Mencken has decided that 
"It Is time for the race of Iteirvjln and Huxley to know 
Nietzsche better," and he, in his usual modest and unas­
suming manner, has undertaken this task.
The aim of this book is to translate Nietzsche 
Into terras familiar to everyone--to show the 
exact bearing of his philosophy upon matters 
which every man must consider every day,*^®
Irony aside, it is difficult to conclude that Mencken’s 
"translation" of Nietzsche is anything but an exercise 
in more or less skillful ventriloquism. Nietzsche is for 
Mencken the king of all axiom smashers," "the arch dis­
senter of the age,"®l the blustering and irreverent prophet; 
in short, the Nietzsche of the etching which prefaces the 
book, and thus the perfect mouthpiece for Mencken’s own 
unorthodox opinions on those "everyday matters" from 
Christianity and civilization to women and marriage,®®
It is thus not surprising to find him appearing in print 
only a few years later concluding that Nietzsche is, more 
specifically than before, a prophet of fascism. In 1914 
he wrote, enticed by and toying with the danger of his owp 
words and using them to tickle his readers.
His (Nietzsche’s) one great service was that he 
gathered together the dim, groping concepts behind
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the national aspiration and put them Into super­
lative German— the greatest German# indeed# of 
all time— ao that they suddenly rose up# in 
brilliant elarity# before thousands who had been 
blundering toward them blindly* In brief# he 
was like every other philosopher in the catalogue# 
ancient or moderns not so much a leader of his 
age as its interpreter# not so much a prophet as 
a procurator, 3
There is none of the malice of Nordau*a diatribes in
Mencken's words# but neither are they conducive to an
impartial encounter with what Mletgsche in fact wrote.
Mencken*a book was very popular in the middle of the second
decade of the twentieth century. H© did much to vulgarize#
if not to distort Nietzsche for the Engl1sh-speaking world.
To counter this vulgar!mtion and a number of other 
largely uninformed criticisms of Nietzsche arising out of 
his alleged blameworthinaes for World war I# William M. 
Salter published hia Nletzpcha the Thinker in New York in 
1917* A book which ’’was in substance written before the 
., .war#’’ it la intended as "a contribution to the under" 
standing of him (Nietzsche) Salter# who taught at the 
University of Chicago# had the advantage not only of a 
good commnd of the German language but also of being 
familiar with most of the relevant secondary literature 
on Nietzsche extant--as his extensive notes testify. 
Salter's own interests were ethical, and so it is to 
Nietzsche's view of morality that he devotes the mjor 
part of his treatment. If the Nietzsche who emerges from
. 1 3
Salter's book is unoonvlricingly tame# it must be remem­
bered that it was Intended as an antidote to a oonoeption 
of an equally unconvincingly wild Nietzsche. Salter writes# 
very near the and of his book# "Nietzsche’s fundamental 
problem was humn.. and it is a human# if rather 
too docile Nietzsche who informs Salter’s writing.
With the passing of the war and its propaganda# 
interest in Nietzsche hibernated to await thè next histor­
ical upheaval which implicated Nietzsche in much the same 
way as before# the one exception being that the Nazi 
ideologists openly and systemtioalXy claimed him as their 
own and were thus even more successful than had been their 
predecessors in convincing themselves and the world that 
Nietzsche was# indeed# the glorifier of brute force# a
^hd warmonger.
Ill
To take up our initial topic again# the new wave of 
interest in Nietzsche# though more cautious and less ob*™ 
viouoly grounded in the crude prejudices of the past# has 
nevertheless not altogether escaped inheriting those pre­
judices. There are books being published today# written 
by men too young to have experienced at first hand a 
Nietzsche-legend in action# which betray gross misconcep­
tions of who Nietzsche was and what he was a b o u t . A n d  
there are survivors of a generation which did see the moot
1 4
ferooloua Niatzsche-legend in action who still enjoy a 
large following.^?
In view of these facta# it surely is not out of 
place to try to lay these last ghosts by saying briefly 
just who Nietzsche was before passing on to our main job 
of asking what he was about* My intention Is not to list 
important dates or to recapitulate biographical data# of 
which there is already quite enough*^® Instead I have 
chosen to let some acquaintances and friends of Nietzseh© 
give their impressions of him*
While still a student of the great philologist# Fried­
rich Hitachi# and upon Hitachi's recommandation, Nietzsche 
was offered the chair of philology at the University of 
Basel* H© accepted it# not without misgivings, and Hitachi 
saw to it that he received his doctorate from Leipzig with­
out examination but on the basis of previously published 
material. lie was twenty-four years old. One of his stu­
dents at Basel recalls ;
I didn't expect the professor to storm into the 
room like Professor Burckhardt, thoroughly ab­
sorbed in.the tumult of his thought. I also 
already kfew that a writer's challenging tone 
does not necessarily correspond to his behavior 
in private. But Nietzsche's modesty even humble, 
demeanor surprised me nevertheless. Furthermore, 
he was not of average height, but rather short.
His head sat deep in the shoulders of his stocky 
yet fragile body. The thick opalescent eyeglasses 
and the drooping (mstache deprived hie face of 
that intellectual expression that often lends to 
short men an air of impressiveness. And yet his
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whole personality did not suggest an Indifference 
to outward appearance. It was not a case of the 
closely cropped hair of Jacob Burckhardt; not his 
coarse clothing; not the threadbare almost shabby, 
suit which hung, flapping, on the powerful figure 
of the laughing stoic. No, Nietzsche had adapted 
himself to the current mode. He wore light-colored 
trousers, with a short jacket; around his collar 
fluttered a daintily-tied cravat which was also 
of light color. Not that there was anything con­
spicuous â)out this attire. Nietzsche probably 
tried less to simulate the dandy...than to aspire 
to something artistic in his appearance. This was 
suggested as well by the long hair which framed 
his pale face, if not with looks then at least in 
strands. But how distant from artistic careless­
ness was everything else which characterized this 
manI The small, fashionably-shod feet carried him 
in a heavy, almost tired, gait up to the rostrum. 
Thereupon the figure of the seated man disappeared, 
except for the head, behind the dais. The professoi 
removed his glasses and for the first time I saw 
his eyes--extremely short-sighted, dull, and through 
some peculiarity, affecting only estrangement. Ever 
though the dark pupils appeared unusually large, 
they were nevertheless overshadowed by the whites 
of the eyas up toward the eyelids. This made him 
appear, in profile, somewhat excited, fierce. The 
false impression given by photographs of Nietzsche*. 
In reality, the eye of this kind and gentle man 
never possessed this trait. The Rhine roared to 
fortissimo, and I became worried about how the 
voice of the lecturer would be able to rise aboee 
it, in spite of the closed windows. But precisely 
this experience was what captivated and confused 
me— Nietzsche had a voiceI Not the sonorous voice 
of the public speaker, nor the sharply articulated 
yet basically ineffective modulation which is char­
acteristic of the pathos of some university teachers 
one thing unmistakable about Nietzsche's voice, soft 
and unaffected as it escaped his lips; it eame from 
his soul*. Hence, the strong congenial drawing- 
power which was imparted to the listener, that 
irresistible power which brought home to me ideas 
which, had I merely read them, would have provoked 
me to vigorous disagreement. The magic of this
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voice still holds its power over mal It spreads 
Itself, soothing and moderating the most hetero­
geneous of its utterances. He who knows not the 
interpretive melody of Nietzsche's spoken words, 
only half knows him.®"
Franz Overbeok, radical theologian and probably 
Nietzsche's closest friend. Joined the faculty at Basel
Î
in 1870 and became, by chance, Nietzsche's fellow-lodger.
In the winter of that same year 'they got into the habit 
of taking the evening meal together in overbeok's down­
stairs and somewhat more spacious room. This custom lasted 
throughout the five years during which the two shared the 
same roof and in spite of all the other obligations which 
took them their separate ways,.."®® After Nietzsche's col­
lapse, overbeck said of his and Nietzsche's friendship.
We are both scholarly types who want to get beyond 
themselves; only thus can I explain to myself the 
intensity a>f our friendship in the face of our 
enormously disproportionate talents (on which 
count I am in no doubt about my own inferiority), 
as well as the great differences in our tempéra­
ments. Given these presuppositions, our friend­
ship was easy for neither of us; and yet it was 
there from the start and remained stable through­
out many years, succumbing only to the power of 
the circumstances. ...I offer quite simply ray 
experience— and I do not lay much value in striking 
paradoxes— when I say that our friendship always 
remained shadowless, regardless of the obstacles 
which might have obstructed it. And with this, 
my experience, I believe that I have, in the main, 
also Justly rendered Nietzsche's experience.
My friendship with Nietzsche! I know no other 
name for our relationship, and I would consider 
myself mad were I to allow myself to be mlfilled 
for a moment by the thought of the relation of
teacher to pupil., Of eourse# there la the question 
of the difference in age..,.. I %aa thirty three 
years old when I met Nietzsche# seven years older
than he. That a friendship might develop between
us was hardly to he expected. And yet it happened.
He was and remained my friend and as such my own 
possession whom I felt especially obliged to pro- 
teot from the claims of others. Nietzsche soon 
became for me the most extraordinary person ever 
to cross my lifejs path....31
Overbeok mrried in I876# and Nietzsche left Basel 
in 1879 to begin nearly a decade of Manderjahra character"
ized by the extremes of ill-health and loneliness# on the
one hand, and productiveness, on the other, (it was during 
these years that he completed the bulk of hia writing.) 
During the first few years after his departure from Basel, 
he visited Franz and Ida Overbeok occasionally. She re- 
calls.
Unfortunately I could only seldom display my 
talents as housewife. He preferred to eat 
alone, though he stayed for hours. The only 
thing that really agreed with him was a weakly" 
brewed tea with a few English biscuits. He 
would then sit on the chaise lounge in my 
husband's study or on a certain chair in the 
sitting room with his back to the white stove, 
his glance directed toward my husband, who sat 
opposite him, and the dark curtains. He spoke 
softly and with few gestures, as did we, avoiding 
all noise Inside and outside the doors. Later on, 
when he stayed with us, he was often ill. If he 
was bedfast, strong broths were prepared. If he 
was able to be up, we sat together at the table 
and enjoyed a good dish. I joined them too for 
short walks out to the Neubad or to the Heinrichs" 
garten in the Binningerstrasse where Nietzsche
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stayed in extremely modest lodgings and was on 
good terras with the common people in the house.
In those two tiny rooms he suffered so much that 
we became thoroughly frightened. ,..Nietzsche 
expressed himself in his letters to my husband 
very little about his ideas. That was still done
by word of mouth. They talked a great deal. All
of his moralizlng was done in the Eulerstrasse 
where we lived; his desire to reconstruct good 
and evil on the basis of a new estimate of life, 
views about Christianity and wrlters--even I know 
plenty, and i was involved in only a very limited 
way. Nietzsche hardly was in the room before he 
set off talking and relishing the conversation.32
By summer 1881 Nietzsche had discovered Sils-Marla,
the village in the tipper Engadlne where the climate was
most suitable to a man of such delicate health. He would
alternate between Sils in summer and various outposts farther
south in winter. Stefan Zwelg has painted a prose portrait
of the Nietzsche of these Wanderiahre. And though it is
a fiction, it is by no means false, as can be seen by cop-
paring it to the letters and memoirs of Nietzsche himself
and of the few people who knew him during this time or who
visited him in Sils.
The shabby dining room of a six-franc hotel in 
the Alps or at the Ligurian Sea. Indifferent 
guests, mostly elderly ladles engaged in small 
talk. The gong has just sounded three times, 
announcing lunch. Over the threshold comes a 
slightly bent, unsteady figure with drooping 
shoulders. The "nearly blind one" always gropes 
into strange territory as though he were emerging 
from a cavern. His cleanly-brushed clothing is 
dark, as is his face and his bu#y„ brown, wavy 
hair. Dark as well are the eyes ^ behind his almost 
roundly-ground, thick hospital-glasses. Softly,
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even ahyly# he approaohee, an uncommon silence 
surrounding him. One senses the presence of a man 
Mho lives in the shadows# beyond all chatty socia­
bility, Mho fears everything loud# all noise, with 
an almost neurasthenic anxiety. Politely, with 
exquisitely refined courtaousnees, ha greets the 
guests; politely, with charming indifference, the 
others return the compliment to the German pro­
fessor. Cautiously, the short-sighted man sits 
down at the table; cautiously, he tests each dish 
to be sure that the tea is not too strong and the 
food not too highly seasoned. For every error in 
diet Inflames his sensitive stomach; every slip in 
the regimen violently upsets his quivering nerves 
for days. Hot one glass of wine, not a glass of 
beer, no alcohol, no coffee at his placei no cigar, 
no cigarette after the meal— notbing stimulating, 
refreshing or relaxing. Only the quick, meager 
meal and a short, urbnne superficial conversation 
in a subdued voice with whomever happens to be at 
the table (as one speaks who for years has been 
unaccustomed to talking and who fears being asked 
too m n y  questions).
Back up to the small, narrow, modest, coldly fur- 
Dished the table piled high with
countless sheets of paper, notes, compositions 
and proofs, but not a flower, no embellishment, 
hardly a book and seldom a letter. Back in the 
corner a heavy, unwieldy wooden coffer, hie one 
possession, containing the two shirts and the 
spare, worn-out suit. Qthereise only books and 
manuscripts, and on a tray countless little bot­
tles and tinctures--against the headaches that 
often make him unconscious for hours, against the 
stomach cramps, against the spasmodic vomiting, 
against the sluggishness of the bowèis, and es- 
pecially, the dreadful remedies for insomnia 
chloral hydrate and Veronal, à frightful arsenal 
of poisons and drugs, and yet the only help in 
the empty stillness of the strange room where he 
never rests except during short, artificially in­
duced periods of sleep. He sits there packed in 
his coat and wrapped up in a shawl (the miserable 
stove throws out no heat, but only smokes) with 
his thick glasses pressed close to the paper; in 
haste his hand with its freezing fingers writes
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words which hie own dim eye can scarcely make oat* 
Hours on end he sits thus and writes until his 
eyes burn and water* It is a rare stroke of good 
fortune in his life when some helper pities him 
and offers to be his scribe for an hour or two*
When the weather is fair the solitary one goes out, 
always alone, always with his thoughts. Never a 
greeting along the way, never a companion, never 
an encounter. Gloomy weather, rain and snow, which 
ha hates and which causes his eyes to ache, holds 
him uncharitably a prisoner in his room. He never 
ventures down to the others, the people. In the 
evening just a couple of biscuits and a cup of 
weak tea before returning immediately to the in*- 
finite loneliness with his thoughts. Hour upon 
hour he sits with the jerking, smoking lamp, and 
still his severely punished nerves do not slacken 
into gentle weariness. Then he grabs the chloral 
hydrate, anything to induce sleep, andfinally com­
pels himself to sleep like the others, the thought** 
less ones, the ones not driven by a demon.
Sometimes he stays in bed for days. Vomiting and 
cramps which all but cause him to lose conscious** 
ness, grating pain in his temples, almost total 
blindness. But no one visits him, no one brings 
him anything, no poultice for his burning fore­
head, no one to read to him or chat with him or 
make him laugh.
And this Ghambre sarnie is the same everywhere.
The names of the cities change often; they are 
called now Sorrento, now Turin, now Venice, now 
Nice, now Marienbad, but the Chambre f%arnle stays 
the same. Always the strange, rented room with 
cold, old, worn-'out furniture, the working*^ tab le, 
the suffering-bad and the unending loneliness.
Hot once in all those long, nomadic years did he 
relax in the company of cheerful friends'; not one 
night did he feel the warm body of a woman pressed 
upon him; never the dawn of fame after the thou­
sand dark, silent nights of workl Qh, how much 
vaster is Hietssehe^s loneliness than the plcturesqi 
plateau of 8ils"Maria where tourists ar© now given, 
between lunch and dinner, to Bea3r*ching out where 
he lived. His loneliness extends over the whole 
world, from one end of his life to the other.
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Now and then a guest, a stranger, a visitor*
But the crust Is already too hard, too strong, 
around the core which yearns for human contact; 
the solitary one heaves a sigh of relief when 
the stranger leaves him once again to his lone- 
liness. "Togetherness" has entirely disappeared 
in fifteen years;3o conversation tires, exhausts, 
exasperates this man who consumes himself and yet 
longs only for himself. Once in a while, for hut 
a moment, a little ray of happiness breaks through 
-"it is music* à production of Carman in a second- 
rate theater in Nice, an aria or two in a concert, 
an hour at the piano. And yet this happiness too 
becomes overpowering, it moves him to tears,"
That from which he has abstained ia lost to such 
an extant that he experiences it as pain— it hurts,
Fof fifteen years he burrows from Chambre mrnle 
to Ohanfe>re rornie. unknown, unrecognised, known 
only to himself""the horrible journey in the shadow 
of big cities, through poorly furnished rooms, 
second-rate hotels, greasy train carriages and many 
sickrooms, while outside on the surface of the times' 
the bustling life of the arts and sciences shouts 
Itself hoarse in the gay mood of a county fair.
Only Dostoevsky* a flight in the almost identical 
years, in identical poverty and identical negli­
gence possesses this same gray, ghostlike aura.
In both cases the work of the titan conceals the 
haggard figure of p#or Lazarus who dies daily in 
his misery and frailty and who is resurrected daily 
by a redeeming miracle of the creative will, For 
fifteen years Nietzsche rises thus out of the cof­
fin of his room and goes down again, from suffering 
to suffering, from death to death, from resurrection 
to resurrection, until finally his high-strung and 
overheated brain shatters. Gollapsed in the street, 
the least-known man of his day is found by strangers. 
Strangers take him up to the strange room in the 
Via Carlo Alberto in Turin. No one is a witness to 
the death of his mind, just as no one witnessed its 
life. Darkness surrounds his downfall, and holy 
loneliness, Unaccompanied and unknown, the most 
brilliant intallectual genius plunges into his own 
night.3#
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Without wishing to detract from this sensitive and moving 
portrait. It must be said in all fairness that at the end, 
Nietzsche was not entirely alone* His friend, Ovarbeck, 
was there. Ha had tar^ avalled to Turin to bring Niatzaeha 
home>
The moment I saw Nietzsche again was an especi­
ally dreadful moment and totally different from 
all that followed y I discovered him cowering at 
the and of his couch reading (as I later found out, 
the last proofs of îââMi£bà..f-enfeEâJjâ6B§£) and 
looking pitifully wasted. He saw me, recognized 
me, bolted toward me, threw his arms around me, 
broke into a flood of tears and sank back onto 
the couch in convulsions. I was so upset that I 
too was unable to stay on my feet. Did the abyss 
on whose brink he stood, or rather into which he 
had fallen, open up In that moment? At any rate, 
nothing like that happened again. By now the 
entire Kino family (Nietzsche*s landlord) was 
present. No sooner was Nietzsche lying there 
moaning and convulsing than he was given the bro­
mine water from the table to drinks Immediately 
he quieted down and laughingly began to tell me 
about the big reception which was planned for the 
evening. With that he had entered the realm of 
delusions from which he never emerged as long as 
he was with me, in which, though still always 
aware of me and others, he was completely shrouded 
in darkness about his own condition.35
The next eleven and a half years saw Nietzsche*s 
condition deteriorate slowly until in August 1900 he died, 
shortly before his fifty-sixth birthday.
This, then, is who Nietzsche was. Kow are we to take 
him? H. L. Mencken said, "Nietzsche* s literalness is the 
hall mark of his entire p h i l o s o p h y ,"36 conversely, Thoims 
Mann said, "Who takes Nietzsche at face value, takes him 
literally, who believes him, is lost* with him in truth
23
it is the same as with Seneca whom he calls a man to whom 
one should lend his ear, but never "trust and faith." 3^ 
Mann is closer to the truth. Nietzsche is not to be tiken 
with grave seriousness nor with tongue-in-cheek; h© is not 
to be swallowed whole nor wholly rejected. It is not a 
case of either/or. He means what he says, but he is also 
a jester. He is the provoker par excellence; he wants to 
be listened to, yes, but more than that he wants sparring 
partners. What follows in these pages is my attempt to 
take Nietzsche on at a few of the points at which I find 
him most provocative,^^ also, I hope, a contribu­
tion to that new, more positive approach to Nietzsche 
mentioned above.
There are scholars today who are of the opinion that 
"rehabilitation of Nietzsche can perhaps go too f a r . " 39 
But, on my view, .Albert Camus was probably right; "In 
the history of the Intelligence, with the exception of 
Marx, Nietzsche’s adventure has no equivalent; we shall 
never finish making reparations for the injustice done 
to h i m . ' O n e  thing is sure. There is no getting around 
Nietzsche, Like it or not, we must go through him. "He 
will disquiet you; he will disturb your dreams; you’ll 
have a lot to swallow ; he won’t taste good to you; you 
won’t be able to digest him; he won’t agree with you.
His readers he will c h a n g e . " B u t ,  than, there may be 
healing in him and his "glad tidings.
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2* From Pascal to Nietzsche
What he (Goethe) aimed at was tota11tv 
he fought against the sundering of . 
reasona sensuality^ feeling, will,..*
--Nietzsche
I
It is commonly said of great men that they are ahead 
of their times. But in the intellectual history of the 
past one hundred years Nietzsche’s untimeliness is surely 
unequalled. A moral philosopher has recently written 
that "Nietzsche in fact stands at the point at which all
the contradictory influences of the nineteenth century are
2brought to bear." Such an appaisal is, if anything, too 
modest In scope. Trying to ferret out all the possible 
influences qxi Nietzsche is much like attem|3ting to pin 
down "Nietzsche’s influence" in the century since he 
began publishing; it would seem that at nearly every turn 
his influence can be felt* This by way of warning.
What follows in this section is highly eclectic and 
deliberately sketchyi it falls also, I hope, into the 
category of a particular sort of intellectual history.
Not in the strict sense of the phrase a history of ideas, 
but based on the assumption that "an idea has no actuality 
until a concrete individual somewhere in time and space 
has produced it from his own mind." Which is but another 
way of expressing what Nietzsche put this ways
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Gradually I have become aware what hitherto every 
great philosophy has been, namely the personal 
confession of its author.and a kind of involuntary 
and unnoticed memoir.,* * ^
Faced with so many "concrete individuals" who made their
mark on Nietzsche, we have chosen to set up a few signposts
on which we may be able to take our bearings for a clear
comprehension of Nietzsche*
II
It is from Nietzsche himself that we take Pascal as 
a fruitful point of departure. In a letter to Georg Brandes, 
the shrillness of which betrays the approach of Nietzsche’s 
final collapse which was at the time of this letter only 
a few short weeks away, two very sane and honest sentences 
stand out*
I believe your words about Dostoevsky absolutely.
I esteem him, on the other hand, as the most 
valuable psychological material that I know. I
am indebted to him in a strange way, however much
he may offend my most basic instincts. Roughly 
my relationship to Pascal, whom I nearly love 
because he has taught me so infinitely much--the 
only iG&lml Christian.5
Whether pascal goes against Nietzsche’s own basic Instincts
is extremely doubtful, probably the opposite is true--
that the longer Nietzsche wrestles with pascal the more
convinced he becomes that he and Pascal are brothers.
That he considers Pascal his imtoh is abundantly clear
from the sparring that goes on between the two from l8Sl
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omard (the time of Dawn when lietzsohe beoomes aware
that Pascal la much more than merely the moat profound 
of the French m o r a l i s t a ) Nietzsche is torn between hli 
desire for victory over Pascal, which would be for him a 
victory over Christianity as well,^ and his desire for a 
blessing from his opponent.
It has been said of Pascal that he is "the strong­
est personality in French literature. Î 8
This personality is revealed in the beliefs and
in the way they are expressed. It is the essence 
of every admirer’s image of Pascal that he was 
both a great scientist and a critic of the ration­
alist philosophy which emerged with the rise of 
moder*n science^ and that he was also a passionately 
religious man whose attitude to faith and to skapti' 
clem was profoundly affected by his being a eel- 
antist and a mathematician* Pascal was not, like 
Newton, a great scientist who retained his faith 
in spite of his science; he possessed both faith 
and the scientific spirit more fully, more passion- 
ately, than most men are capable of. He also felt 
the need to define the place of both in the life 
of man*^
Nietzsche too felt the need to define the place of both 
faith and the scientific spirit in the life of man; it was 
Nietzsche’s recognition of pascal as a brother-in-arms in 
this task that made him seek his blessing. His equally 
strong desire to defeat Pascal can only be understood 
historically, that is by taking into account the historical 
fact of the death of God. As we noticed above, pascal was 
not a man of faith first and a man of science only Inci™
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dentally, no:é vice versa. It can also be said of Nietzsche,
though he was not a man of faith in any traditional sense
of that phrase,that he possessed both faith and the
scientific spirit in equal measure. The unbridgeable
gulf that separated the tvjo men is the death of God, Nor
was it Nietzsche’s intention to try to bridge the gulf,
but 'to accept his (Faecal’e) analysis of reality while
11
circumventing hie conclus ions." i:What. were these eon-
elusions?
Lucien Goldmann has claimed that Pascal’s was a
tragic vision of the world. Following the early Georg
Lukacs, Goldmann understands this to mean
the vision of a world inhere God is no longer pre­
sent, and yet even in his absence life has to be 
lived out by the tragic hero with the eye of God 
upon him. Because God is absent, the hero camnot 
succeed in the world. Because God, though absent, 
still regards him, he eamiot abandon his task, 
is the just man under condemnation....^*^
According to Goldœmi, Pascal’s doctrine of man can be
summed up thus §
...man as we know him is a creature torn apart by 
different tendencies, imde up on every plane of 
antagonistic elements, each of which is both neces­
sary and inadequate? body and Blind, good and evil, 
justice and power, form and content, the g;eometri- 
cal and the intuitive mind, reason and passion, 
etc. ...the essence of man lias in the very facè 
that he can neither choese one of these antagon­
istic elements nor accept tension and antagonism* 
His very nature compels him to strive after a 
synthesis...on all and every plane. But this 
ideal synthesis can never be achieved on earth, 
and can come only from a transcendent being, 
from God.13
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It ia thus obvious that for pascal the wager Is the clue
to life* Only by placing one’s trust, in spite of the
findings of rational science, in a transcendent, hidden 
God, can man, this bundle of otherwise unbearable tensions, 
find rest. Such trust and the ensuing synthesis of antag­
onisms was by no means construed by pascal as an escape
from the world or a flight into asceticism. On the con­
trary, this was his formula for living ,1^  the world* The 
unbearable tensions were not to be resolved by the wager 
but sustained and made bearable*
In my view, pascal’s attitude stems from the fact 
that he carries the idea of the hidden God--or, 
rather, of the God who hides Himself--to the ex­
treme point where he sees God as preventing man
from discovering not only His will but also His
existence. It is precisely because, for m n  in 
his fallen state, the existence of God has become 
a hope and a certainty of the heart~-that is to 
say, an uncertain and paradoxical cartainty--that
man can no longer find a sure and certain refuge
by simply withdrawing from the world. It is in 
the world, or at least in the presence of the 
world, that umn must now express both his rejection 
of any relative values and his quest for values 
that shall be authentic and transcendental.14
Nietzsche*s doctrine of man coincides remarkably with that 
of Pascal, Why, then, was Nietzsche so intent upon cir­
cumventing Pascal’s conclusions?
It is not, as one might think, that Pascal’s conclu- 
Bione were "too Christian" for Nietzsche; rather, Christian 
or not, Nietzsche found them inadequate to the task of
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binding together faith and the soientifio spirit, a task 
which had become infinitely more eomplioated and difficult 
since Pascal owing to the death of God, Whereas Pascal 
could remain unswervingly scientific in his assurance that 
his faith was in a living^ though hidden, God, Nietzsche 
was faced with the immeasurably more precarious and un­
nerving task of remaining rational in the time of the 
death of God* Thus Pascal became his brother-enemy whom 
he was bound to love and overcome,
This leads us, if not chronologically then by virtue 
of the shared dilemma, to Goethe, Erich Heller has written, 
in a terse sentence packed with significance, "Indeed, 
Nietzsche knew who Goethe w a s . "^5 And Goethe was, for 
Nietzsche, the moralist of k n o w l e d g e , It was, generally 
speaking, "the notion of a possible sin of the mind"
(Heller again) which links Pascal, Goethe and Nietzsche*
For a hint as to how Nietzsche conceived of Goethe’s 
morality of knowledge we must draw attention to the quo­
tation which stands at the head of this section*
What he (Goethe) aimed at was totality : he fought 
against the sundering of reason, sensuality, 
feeling, will* * * *^7
It is, then, more specifically, this "sundering of man, 
this reduction of man to his composite parts, this pigeon­
holing of man’s various faculties that Goethe fought which 
makes him Pascal’s heir and Nietzsche's ancestor* And
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this struggle is rooted Im Goethe’a belief that there 
is such a thing as worthless knowledge* Buoh a statement 
ia easily misconstrued. He was not in any sense of the 
word anti-intellectual; but he was convinced of the dangers 
of excessive rationality (the development of man’s mind at 
the expense of &is body, the uncritical belief in knowledge 
for the sake of knowledge). "Truth is what man is meant 
to know"-this is the centre of Goethe’s intellectual ex­
istence."
While perhaps justly being impatient and unsatisfied 
with this "meant" and believing (probably wrongly) that 
the boundaries of knowledge were more clearly defined in 
Goethe’s day than in ours, we nevertheless must take notice 
of what Goethe is saying here, for he has his finger on 
something immensely important both for our understanding 
of Nietzsche and for our understanding of ourselves. Al­
though be is unable to give any simple formula for deter­
mining what man is "meant" to know, we would do wall to 
take with utmost seriousness "his intuitive certainty 
that knowledge can only be true as long as it is not in 
excess of man’s f e e l i n g s , h i s  "belief that evil arises 
from any knowing and doing of man that is in excess of his 
’b e i n g . T h e  question is whether man’s rational faculty 
is to be developed without regard to man as a totality.
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or in Gonjunction with "sensuality, fooling, will/’
Goethe’s unequivocal answer to this question is : "every­
thing that sets our minds free without giving us mastery 
over ourselves is pernicious /’
Our subject is not "Nietzsche’a view of Goethe," 
thus we cannot allot-^  ourselves space for a detailed docu­
mentation of Nietzsche’s conception of bis forebear* Never­
theless, it is essential, both for our clear understanding 
of Goethe as a moralist of knowledge and for our later 
comprehension of Nietzsche’s tlbeimepscii* that we note here 
the development of Nietzsche’s way of viewing Goethe* 
Suffice it to say that it does develop and change from 
an early, conventional misconception of Goethe as serene 
and severe (this la the Goatha-as-Olympian tradition which 
persists even today) to a conception which makes Goethe’s 
own "self-overcomings its very center. This development 
can be thrown into relief by setting three quotations from 
Nietzsche’B works side by side and comparing the first, 
from 1874, with the last two, from I886 and 1888, respec­
tively*
Goethe’s image of man is,..of the contemplative 
man in great style, who is able to avoid languish­
ing on earth only by gathering together everything 
which was and still is important and noteworthy 
and using it to nourish himself, as if life con­
sisted merely of living from on© desire to the 
next. He is not the active mn.... The Goethean 
man is a preserving and conciliatory force.
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The vital point ia that the greatest men may have 
great virtues, but precisely their opposites as 
well* I believe that great men arise from the 
presence of opposites and a consciousness of them
Go a the— not a German event, but a European one; 
a smgnifioent attempt to overcome the eighteenth 
century by a return to nature, by an ascent to 
the naturalness of the Renaissance— a kind of 
self-overcom% on the part of that century. He 
bore its strongest instincts within himself.... 
he did not retire from life, but put himself into 
the midst of it.... What he wanted was totality : 
...h© disciplined himself to wholeness, he created
h i m s e l f . ^ 4
The movement is from Goethe the contemplative Olympian to 
Goethe the tautly-^spanned bow; the latter being the embodi­
ment in the moralist of knowledge himself of his own 
struggle against the temptation to give free rein to one 
part of himself at the expense of his whqle self, and his 
successful coAlning and balancing of the constantly con­
tending "strongest instincts"— "reason, sensuality, feeling, 
will.../'
With the third "signpost," we move out of the realm 
of positive influences on Nietzsche to have a look at two 
men with whom he had to come to terms, simply by virtue 
of their determinative influence on philosophy in general 
in the roughly one hundred years which elapsed between 
1762-63 when David Hume aroused Kant from his dogmatic 
slumbers,and 1866 when Nietzsche discovered Ehnt
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If what Goethe wanted was totality. It was the very 
separation of "reason, sensuality, feeling, will," which 
was "preached in the most horrible scholasticism by KaptY 
an undertaking which is responsible for Nietzsche’s be­
stowing upon Kant the highly unendearing title "the anti­
pode of G o e t h e Not that Nietzsche was unaware of 
Kant’s positive achievement* On the contrary, he even 
expressed his gratitude to him by reminding the readers 
of his %he of
the enormous question mark which Kant wrote on 
the concept of "causality"--not that he doubted 
its very right, as did Hume, rather, on the con­
trary, he began cautiously to fix the boundaries 
of the realm within which this notion has any
meaning at all........ as Germans we share leant’s
doubt about the ultimate validity of scientific 
knowledge and, indeed, about everything i^hich 
can be known eausaliterg the know-able as such 
seems to us of little value
It is Kant whom we must thank for this posture of skepti­
cism in the face of knowledge. What made him Goethe’s 
opposite was certainly not this, but rather his "sundering 
of man which had its roots in Kant’s own unexamined mo,#l, 
prejudice, which, in turn, was grounded in his (again, 
unexamined) belief in God* This God, though he is no 
longer conceived of as the giver of eomimndmants, is 
ultimately there behind the scenes bestowing freedom (with* 
out which the rational man who has imposed moral demands 
upon himself could not do his duty, i.e. fulfill the self-
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imposed commanda), immortality (when happiness X'Sill be 
the reward of the obedient ones), and happiness Itself.
Kant’8 notion of a categorical imperative rested 
upon his "discovery" in man of a capacity to make syn­
thetic & judgments. This led him to ask, "How are
synthetic judgments possible a priori? And what did he 
amwer? EY. «£ a S l S & m . " A n d  this "virtue,"
this capacity which Kant "discovered" (Nietzsche remarks 
that this took place at a time "when it was not yet custom­
ary to distinguish between ’discovering’ and ’inventing,’" 
("finden" und " erfinden"))* 30 made the foundation for 
his new moral demand system* What is more, he went ahead 
to claim, on the basis of his analysis of man’s moral 
consciousness, that the ethical value of an act depends, 
not upon its effects, but upon the motives of the actor; 
in short, nothing is good except the good will. Kant set 
out to find a moral standpoint which transcended both 
authority and experience and "discovered" it in man’s 
autonomous will. That men often fail to do the good is 
not a sign of bad intentions or of questionable motives, 
but of a failure to do their duty. This, then, is how 
Kant separated man’s will off and elevated it to a position 
of Incorruptibility at the expense of the whole man.
Furthermore, his conception of morality as duty, as
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obedience to an ostensibly self-imposed demand(which In
reality is nothing more than an empty abstraction)3^ was
so revolting to Nietzsche that he made it the theme of one
of hie sharpest polemics against Kant.
What could destroy us more quickly than working, 
thinking, and feeling without any inner necessity, 
without any deeply personal choice, without plea- 
aqre--as an automaton of "duty"? This is the very 
recipe for decadence, even for idiocy. Kant be­
came an idiot. And this man was a contemporary 
of Go©that3^
How are synthetic judgments possible % priori? This was 
Kant’s question.
"ax a£ â a z & m , "  h@ said, or at least
meant. But is that really an answer? An explana­
tion? Is it not rather only a repeating of the 
question? 6 * *It is finally time to replace the 
Kantian question, 'How are synthetic judgments 
possible a priori?" with another question, "Why 
is it necessary to believe in such judgments?"
It ia time for us to comprehend that such Judg­
ments must be believed true (falsa though they 
may actually be) in order to preserve creatures 
such as we are* Or to put it more plainly, crudely 
and to the point, synthetic judgments should not 
be possible" at all % prierl~-coming from us they 
are nothing but false judgments. But it must be 
remembered that belief in their truth is necessary 
as a provisional and eye-witness faith that be­
longs in the parspectiva-opties of life.33
The very form of Nietzsche’s question makes it so different
from Kant’a § not "how is it possible" but "why ia it
necessary." Because he was an unavowed metaphysician and
moralist,3"^  leant, faced with a non-moral world inhabited
by moral men, asked how it is possible, and discovered a
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moral (ultlœtaly, religious) capacity In mam (ultimately, 
above mm, .in God) to aoooumt for it* Nietzsche, con­
fronted with the same phenomenon, but being suspicious 
of metaphysics and morals, asked why is it necessary, and 
concluded that men have a need for belief in moral demands 
--a conclusion which lad him, as we shall see later on, 
not to metaphysics but to an analysis of the various moral 
demnd systems man have constructed for themselves; and 
lived by.
Nietzsche’s difference from other naturalistic 
philosophers must be sought first in his profound 
concern whether universally valmd values and a 
meaningful life are at all possible in a godless 
world, and secondly in his impassioned scorn for 
those who simply take for granted the validity of 
any particular set of values which happens to have 
the sanction of their religion, class, society, 
or state. He did not consider it the philosopher’s 
task to develop his ingenuity, or his dieingenu- 
ousness, in "the finding of bad reasons foi*^hat 
we believe on instinct*" Nietzsche himself eon- 
Bidered his opposition to rationalization a major 
point of departure from traditional philosophy; 
and it ia undoubtedly the source of many of his _ 
most far-reaching differences with Kant and H e g e l . 35
This brings us to the second man of major importance
in Nietzsche’s more immediate philosophical past. Of
Hegel, Nietzsche wrote in
We germane are Hegelians, even if there had never 
been a Hegel, insofar as we (in contrast to all 
Latins) instinctively attribute a much deeper 
meaning and richer value to becoming, to develop­
ment, than to what "is"; we hardly believe in the 
validity of the concept of "being." Also insofar 
as we are not inclined to concede to our human 
logic that it is logic as such, the only kind of
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logic (we would much rather persuade ourselves 
that it is only one special ease, and perhaps 
one of the queerest and most stupid, at that)*3^
By "Hegelian" Nietzsche is referring to Hegel’s philosophy
only in a most attenuated manner* It is rather much more
a certain sensibility which he means to convey by calling
himself and his fellow Germans, indeed even his fellovo
Europeans, "Hegelian/’ In his polemical essay. The
Nietzsche writes about this sensibility*
Let us recall that Wagner was young at the time
when Hegel and Schelling were seducing the intel­
lects j that he divined, that he grasped with his 
hands that which only a German takes seriously-- 
the "Idea/’ That is to say, something dark, un­
certain, ominous; as clarity Is objectionable to 
Germans, logic negative* ...Hegel is a mood. and 
not just a German but a European mood as well. A 
mood which Wagner grasped, which he felt he could 
match, and which he made eternalI He merely 
turned it into music; he created for himself a 
style which "meant eternity." He became "Hegel’a 
-music as "Idea/’
And how Wagner was understood I The same kind of 
person who used to rave about Hegel, raves today 
about Wagner; in his school one even composes 
Hegelian! Best of all, Wagner was understood by 
the young German man. Alone the two words "eternal” 
and "meaning" sufficed; they made him feel inimit­
ably good. It Is not music with which Wagner 
conquered the young men, it is the "Idea"; it is 
the enigmatic in his art, its playing hide-and- 
seek behind a hundred symbols, its polyohromy of 
the ideal which beckons and entices these young 
men to Wagner* It is Wagner’s genius for creating 
clouds, his grasping, rambling, sweeping through 
the air, his everywhere and nowhere, exactly the 
same things with which Hegel seduced them* In 
the midst of Wagner’s multiplicity, fullness and 
caprice they are as though justified in themselves 
--"redeemed /’ 37
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At a time when the European Gonseietiea was about to "forbid 
itself the lie of belief in God"38 in the mama of intel­
lectual honesty, Hegel seduced it* Thanks to hie unacknow­
ledged Christian morality, he was able to counter this 
honest atheism and convince his fellow Europeans, for the 
time being, that they were, after all, "redeemed,"
Hegel was its (atheism’s) retarder par excellence* 
in virtue of the gradAiose attempt he made finally 
to persuade us, with the help of our sixth sense, 
the "historical sense/’ of the divinity of ex- 
istenee*^'^
R* F* Beerling has summarized Nietzsche’s critique of
Hegel this way?
When Nietzsche criticizes Hegel for being a 
"retarder par excellence," he is considering his 
system the last dam which could still restrain the 
irresistible atheistic water pressure for awhile* 
**,According to the famous words with which Hegel 
closes his treatise on the
unending pain of the soul occasioned by the death 
of God can only be soothed by perceiving that 
death as the "instance of the highest Idea" and 
by giving religion a "philosophical existence" 
by transposing the empirical suffering of the 
dying God to the height of a speculative Good
Friday,40
Nietzsche’s disagreement with Hegel is probably 
clearest in their contz^asting attitudes to history. Hegel 
believed that the aims and goals of various peoples in the 
many different historical eras could be understood as the 
relative expressions of their desire for and progress to­
ward freedom* He conceived of the task of philosophy as
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the examination and explication of these alma and goals 
in their various historical settings* In other worda^
41
philosophy mas for him basically philosophy of history#
It has been claimed (notably^ by Karl Lomith)^ *'^  that
Hegel*B philosophy (reads philosophy of history) is
esohatologioal in nature* This mould seem difficult to
substantiate in view of the fact that as aha to logy is con-"
earned primarily mith the future and history with the
past, Hegel undoubtedly sum himself as the last in a long
line of philosophers mho almaye looked ItUfe to assess mhat,
in facts had already come to pass# Indeed^ he himself m s
outspoken in this regard*
To say one word about preaching what the world 
ought to be likOj, philosophy always arrives too 
late for that. As thought of the worlds it ap-" 
pears at a time when actuality has completed its 
developmental process and is finished, ,,*The 
owl of Minerva begins its flight while dusk is 
falling#^3
Thus5 Hegel places himself squarely in the tradition of 
those who philosophlgie as the sun Is setting rather than 
at dawn*^^
Nevertheless., what at first glance appears to be an 
impossible olairn^  turns out^ on a closer look^ to be quite 
convincing* History as the thoughtful consideration of 
things past must be set beside history as the unfolding 
of freedom in the world* the self "^actualization of or
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coming"tooonsoloimness of the spirit (Oaiat) * Hegel
writes, in the Introduction to the Jllst^^
It must be observed at the outset, that the 
phenomenon we InvestIgate-"IFnlvege#ly History-"'"
belongs to the realm of Spirit,'^5
* #.the essence of Spirit is Freedom, ,«,Freedom 
is the sole truth of Spirit, ,,*Spirit may be 
defined**,as that which has Its centre in Itself, 
it has not a unity outside Itself, but has already 
found it; it exists in and with Its^f. Spirit
Is Belf-cqntained exis.tpnoe.. How this is Freedom,
exactly
The principle of D.©y.elp.Dme,nt. involves also the 
existence of a latent germ of being— a capacity or 
potentiality striving to realize itself. This 
formal conception finds actual existence in 
Spirit,^7
The goal of attainment we determined at the outsets 
it is Spirit in its Oprapl©,te„nQ_PA.? in its essential 
nature, i.e. Freedom,™Thls is the fundamental 
object, and therefore also the leading principle 
of the development,,,*48
In short, the philosophy of history is, to be sure,
a discipline "after the fact"j but the investigation of 
what has been is very different from a mere critical cata­
loguing of eventsj for the events which are of prim# con­
cern belong to universal history, that is to the realm of 
Spirit, which is self-contained and in the process of be­
coming complete in itself, of fulfilling itself, Universal 
history, the subject of ph&losophy of history, is "the 
progress in the consciousness of freedom," ^'9 freedom being 
both the principle of the progress (Development) and its 
final goal (Completeness).
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This is eschatology, Whieh is to aay that history
is Judged "on the hasis of the final stage*,,,"50 is
also a highly dubious invocation of success as the final
criterion for judging history* For, according to Hegel,
everything that was, was a manifestation of the progressive
self-realization of Spirit,
For Nietzsche’s response to Hegel on this topic of
history, we can do no better than listen to his critique
in the second
I believe there has been no dangerous turning 
point in the progress of German culture in this 
century that has not been made more dangerous by 
the enormous and still living influence of this 
Hegelian philosophy. Truly, the belief that one 
is a latecomer to the world is harmful and de­
grading; but such a belief must appear frightful 
and devastating if one day with a brazen inversion 
it divinizes this latecomer as the true meaning 
and object of all past creation and makes his eon- 
BciouB misery the perfection of the world’s his­
tory. ...History understood in this Hegelian way 
has been contemptuously called God’s sojourn upon 
earth--though this God was first created by his­
tory. He became transparent and intelligible in­
side Hegelian simlls and climbed up all the dia- 
lectically possible steps in his becoming, even 
up to his self-revelation, so that for Hegel the 
highest and final stage of the world-process con­
verged in his own Berlin ex^etenoe. He ought to 
have said that everything after him was merely 
to be regarded as the musical coda of the great 
historical rondo, or rather, as simply super*"- 
fluous. He did not say that. Instead he has 
implanted in a generation thoroughly leavened by 
him a respect for the "power of history which 
turns into a naked admiration of success and an 
idolatry of the factual nearly every moment--into 
whose service the very mythological and very Germn 
expression "taking the facts seriously" has been
4  8
drawn. But whoever has once learned to bend his 
back and bow his head before the "power of his­
tory" will in the end nod his "yes' like a 
Chinese doll to every power, be it a government 
or public opinion or a numerical majorityj his 
liütîs will keep time to whatever " power" pulls
the strings.51
It will not suffice to say that Nietzsche is here merely 
polemioizing against "the ’influence* of Hegel— less 
against Hegel’s own philosophy."52 the paragraph 
immediately following the one just cited, Nietzsche 
writes,
I would say that history emphasizes, "once upon 
a time"I morality, "you ought not" or "you should 
not have. Thus history becomes a eompendiuoi of 
actual immorality. How grave an error he would 
commit who regarded history as the judge of this 
immorality’53
He who is in error hare is, of course, Hegel himself#
True, the Young Hegelians did transform Hegel’s "meta­
physical historicisra" which was essentially "retrospective 
and reminiscent" into a "historical f u t u r i s m . " B u t  this 
transformation is not what Nietzsche is criticizing. 
Rather, he sees Hegel’s eroor as two-folds on the one 
hand, in that he conceived of history as the realm of 
Spirit instead of as a compendium of immorality; on the 
other, in that he relied completely on this Spirit to be 
a limiting and correcting agent, to be in fact the only 
true judge of immorality*.
An unpublished note from the time of aaymgjGmâ_an& 
Evil reads thus :
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Kants a realm of moral values, withdrawn from 
us, invisible, real.
Hegels a demonstrable development, a becoming
visible of the moral realm#
We choose to be deceived in neither the Kantian 
nor the Hegelian manner. W© no longer believe, 
as they, in morality and thus have no need to 
establish philosophies in order that the validity 
of morality may be mlntained.55
Finally, then, Nietzsche traces the considerable positive 
achievements of both Kant and Hegel to a shared unques­
tioned belief in morality.
You see, a critique of the ideal itself was leveg. 
undertaken, rather only a critique of the problem 
of where the contradiction to the ideal comes 
from, why the ideal still has not been reached 
or why^it is not demonstrable in the world at 
hand.
To proceed, as we now must, from Hegel to Schopen­
hauer would seem quite a giant step, in spite of the fact 
that the two philosophera were contemporaries, Schopen­
hauer just does not seem to "fit in nineteenth century 
German philosophy nor in our Introductory survey from 
Pascal to Nietzsche. Be that as it may, he did exert a 
major influence on Nietzsche, as well as on two genera­
tions of philosophera who came of age between roughly the 
middle and the end of the nineteenth century. The path 
from Hegel to Schopenhauer is, to say the least, crooked 
and fairly difficult to follow. In fact, it has been 
followed by only a few historians of ideas,57 thus leaving
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the Impression "that nothing significant had taken place 
batwann Hegel’s death and the revitalization of Kant 
But something very significant indeed had taken place in 
those years, namely a radical theological-political- 
philosophical movement which took its impetus from Hegel.
It was the failure of this movement, of Bruno Bauer and 
Max Stirner, of Ludwig Feuerbach and Mosea Hess, Arnold 
Huge and Karl Marx, to make its various critiques and de­
velopments of Hegel heaid that preceded and perhaps even 
in some sense caused the revitalization of Kant, whose 
most popular exponent was Arthur Schopenhauer.
One might legitimately say of Schopenhauer what 
Nietzsche said of Hegel, that he was a Sffiâ» The pre­
vailing sense of alienation and helplessness in the 1850’s 
was, in large measure, the result of the failure of the 
Young Hegelians, and it was this mood that Schopenhauer 
had unwittingly captured and embodied in his writings 
even while young students from all over Europe were 
flocking to Berlin to sit at the feet of his arch-enemy, 
Hegel. This mood, along with a thorough-going atheism, 
was what brought Nietzsche under the spell of Schopenhauer 
upon his discovery of him as a student in Leipzig in l86g. 
Nietzsche’s personal account of this discovery, though 
not related in any direct way to the philosophical dead-end 
referred to above, may give \m some insight into the rea­
sons for Schopenhauer’s delayed popularity.
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It wae during this time that X lived in a state 
of helpless indeeiBion, alone with certain painful 
experiences and disappointments, without any 
real principles, %'üithout hope and without a single 
pleasant memory. My sol© endeavor from morning 
till night was to put together a suitable life 
for myself. How imagine how the reading of 8chop- 
enbauer’s chief work must affect a man in such 
a condition. I found this book one day in old 
man Bohn’s second-hand bookshop, took it in my 
hand, never having seen it before, and leafed 
through it. I do not know what demon whispered 
to me, "Take this book home with you." It hap­
pened, at any rate, contrary to my usual habit of 
avoiding haste when buying books. When I got 
home, I threw myself on to the couch with my 
newlyacquired treasure and began to let that 
energetic and gloomy genius work on me. Hera 
every line cried renunciation, denial, resignation| 
here I saw a mirror in which I beheld the world, 
life and my own nature in terrifying grandeur. 
...here I saw sickness and health, exile and re­
fuge, hell and heaven.59
As a young man Nietzsche’s opinion of Schopenhauer 
changed vary little. But by the time Dawn was published 
(l88l), he had become very critical of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy, though his respect for him as a teacher and 
a man of intellectual courage never waned. Schopenhauer 
asked the question, "Has existence any meaning at all"
And his own answer looked something like this.
Life is blind will, pure and simple. This blind 
will strives for existence, which is to say it strives 
toward its goal which is appearance as phenomenon, be­
coming object. The visible form of life which is will 
is matter. Being blind, life as will is cruel, taking 
no thought for what it destroys as it races headlong to
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self-fulfillment. In short, life is suffering. Kant 
was on the right track when he admitted that life is 
essentially non-moral. But by making law and duty the 
central notions in his conception of ethics, he cancelled 
out his own best insight. For no amount of argument could 
succeed in convincing Schopenhauer that phrases such as 
"absolute obligation" and "categorical imperative" ware 
anything but useless unless they were grounded, as they 
had originally been, on divine authority. Kant set out 
to establish an a prioribasis for morality and ended up
speaking about conformity to law— doing one’s duty.
Everything he wrote on ethical topics was shot 
thx^ough with the ideas of command, reverence, and 
submission.... presiding, in fact, over all
Kant’s theories broods the conception of an ora­
cular legislating Reason, frequently elevated to 
the status of a hypostatized independent entity 
hidden in the recesses of the human soul, and ^ 
forever issuing infallible judgments and decrees.
Schopenhauer’s alternative is at one© aesthetic and 
ethical. Our sole attitude to life must be, not intel­
lectual, as Kant had thought, but contemplative. All 
intellectualizing is but a gratuitous attempt to forget 
what we will be forever reminded of, namely that life is 
blind will. Only by contemplation, total resignation and
a denial of the will to live can we hope to be redeemed
from a life of suffering. Asceticism thus becomes, in 
Schopenhauer’s alternative, not an act of self-mortifica­
tion, but an expression of man’s desire, in the face of 
life as the cruel drive of the World-Wili toward self-
53
realization, to be free.
We shall have moi»e to say later about Nietzsche’ 8 
critique of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of life as blind will 
Let it be said at this point in the interest of brevity that 
Nietzsche came fairly early to find his teacher’s answer as
unconvincing as Kant’s and Hegel’s before him.
Schopenhauer’s own answer to this question (Has 
existence any meaning at all?) was--forgive me-- 
overly hasty and juvenile, merely a compromise, a 
standing still and getting stuck in just the Chria- 
tian-ascetle moral perspectives the^  belief In MblÊh 
M È  M m  Klmxi along with the belief in
We should already beeable to discern a recurring pattern in 
Nietzsche’s dissatisfaction with his predecessors. As he 
delved into their "answers" he found again and again Chris- 
tian morality and the Christian God. He noted in the early 
i860’8:
Basic insights Kant, as well as Hegel, as well 
as Schopenhauer; the skeptical-epochal approach, 
as well as the historielzing, as well as the 
pessimistic, are of moral origin. I saw no one 
who would have, dared a cri^iqix© of, rnoml v^ta 
Jb5jâS!mSa.« • • •
Schopenhauer, for all "his unintelligent fury against 
Hegel" and his revealing critique of and caution toward 
Kant, shared their unexamined belief in Christian morality 
and the God from which It derived Its authority. "But he 
posed the q u e s t i o n , And that question is what 
captivated Nietzsche in 1865 and which his entire philo­
sophy is an attempt to answer.
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(October 1964), p. 72.
13) Lucien Goldmann, The Hidden God, trans, Philip Thody 
(London; Routledge & ICegan Paul, 1964), pp. 218-19.
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15) Hellerg op« eit.^ p, 106.
16) "Faust’s Damnation: The Morality of Knowledge"
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S b e J .|lM -^È ÎJ » j;Q u rn ^  ( London :
Seeker & Warburg; 1966)  ^ whieh; together with 
"Goethe and the Idea of Scientific Truth" and 
"Nietzsche and Goethe' (both of which appear in 
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strating the affinity between Goethe and Nietzsche 
in their approach to the problem of the relation 
between faith and the scientific spirit.
17) metzsche; WerkO; II; p. 1024.
18) Heller; DijRinhe^;:W,. ..j’ P*. 30
19) Ibid.; p. 104.
20) Heller; Journay..., p. 36
21) Quoted by Heller; ibid.; p. 36.
22) Nietzsche; Werka^ 1% p. 3l6.
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24) Ibid.; II; p. 1024.
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Blunok writes ; "It was here (in F. A . Lange’s
which Nietzsche read
for the first time as a student in Leipzig in the 
summer of 1866) that he received probably hie first 
impression of Kant’s work; which he then completed 
with ICuno Fischer’s two-volume book on Kant."
27) Nietzsche; MerkBs II; p. 1024.
5 6
28) Ibid.; p. 226.
29) Ibid.; p. 575.
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31) Nietzsche; p. 1172: "Nothing ruins us more
profoundly; more Intl mately; than every  ^imperson'el ' 
duty; every saorifice to the Moloch of abstraction."
32) Ibid.
33) Ibid.; p. 576* Freud’s later formulation of the 
Question concerning the illusory character of 
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"Since men are so little amenable to reasonable 
arguments and are so entirely governed |ry their 
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Illumion trans. W. D. Robsovi-Scott (Anchor Books 
paperback ed.; Garden City; Hew York: Doubleday;
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34) Ibid.; Ill; p. 564: "To assert that existence as 
a whole depends on things of which we can know 
nothing; precisely because it is advantageous to 
be incapable of knowing anything about them; was 
Kant’s naivet©; whieh itself was the result of the 
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35) Walter ICaufmana, Mâfeiaâlio^Jllllfîsaaîa§£i.JMSÜ2loSiii 
Antlohulst (Meridian Books paperback ad.j Cleveland
& Mew York; The World Publishing Co., 1956), ÏP. S6'*87.
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37) Ibid., pp. 924-25.
38) Ibid., p. 227.
39) Ibid.
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Compare also Wolf-Dieter Mars oh, 
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Hegals vielzitierte *2waideutlgkelt’ besteht 
nun dariii; dass fur Ihii aua jener Erfahrung des 
unendlichen Schmerzes-^-an der ungleiehzeitigeii 
Situation sowie an der Yerborgenheit Gottee--aln 
’Moment* des slob iselbst entausarmlen ’Geistea* 
geworden 1st; dasaen Hüekgang ins Absolute soboii 
Im Hervorgehen aus slob angelegt 1st, Im ’Galst 
des ühristentuma* hlase es nooh: ’Bas Harausgaban 
des Gottlichan let rmr eine Entwioklung; daas es; 
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The Death of God.
3. What :l3 It, and what has it meant?
Nietzsche's first step is to accept 
what he knows. Atheism for him goes 
without saying and is " constructive 
radical." I
— “Gamus
But with respect to the mortality of beinigs of 
the kind, I have heard a tale from a man who Is 
neither a fool nor an idle talker - from that 
Aemlllan the rhetorician, whom some of you know 
well; Spltherses was his father, a townsman of 
mine, and a teacher of grammar. This man (the 
latter) said., that once upon a time he made a 
voyage to Italy, and embarked on board a ship 
conveying merchandise and several passengers.
When it was now.evening, off the Eohlnad Islands, 
the wind dropped, and the ship, carried by the 
current, was come near paxlj most of the pas­
sengers were awake, and many were still drinking 
after having had supper. All of a sudden,a voice 
was heard from the Isle of Paxl, of some one call­
ing 'Thamus' with so loud a cry as to fill them 
with amazement. This Thamus was an Eyptian pilot, 
known by name to many of those on board. Called 
twice, he kept silences but on the third summons 
he replied to the caller, and the latter, raising , 
yet higher his voice, said, "When thoa comast over 
against palodes, announce that the great Pan is 
dead." All, upon hearing this, said Bpltherses, 
were filled with consternation, and debated with 
themselves whether it were better to do as ordered, 
or not to make themselves too busy, and to let it 
alone. So Thamus decided that if there should be 
a wind he would sail past and hold his tonguej but 
should there fall a calm and smooth sea off the 
island, he would proclaim what he had heard. When, 
therefore, they were come over against palodes, there 
being neither wind nor swell of sea, Thamus, looking 
put from the stern, called out to the land what he 
had heard, namely, "That the great Pan is dead:" 
and hardly had he finished speaking than there was 
a mighty cry, not of one, but of many voices mingled 
together in wondrous manner. And inasmuch as many
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persons -mere present then; the story got spread 
about in Home; and Thamus was sent for by Tiberius 
Oaesars and Tiberius gave so much credenee to the 
tala that ha made enquiry and research concerning 
this Ban; and that the learned men about hi#; v^ ho 
were numerous ; conjectured he was the one that was 
born of Hermes and Penelope#
This is a portion of chapter XVII of an essay in Plu­
tarch* a MoralSi "On the Gassation of OraclesPlutarch is 
relating a discussion which took place between two guests 
of his at Delphi; Demetrius the grammarian and Claombrotus 
the Lacedemonian, concerning the reason for the widespread 
decay and extinction of oracles• The saga of the death of 
Pan^ told originally by the father of the elderly and re­
spected rhetorician referred to by Oleombrotus, is introduced 
into the diacussion as evidence for "the mortality of beings 
of the kind," and in response to a protest from one of the 
Interlocutors that "to suppose in their ease deaths. as if 
they were mere men, seems.♦♦too bold and uncivilized a 
theory."3
But it is not the response of shock of this young man 
to the thought that gods too die, but the question itself 
being disouaaed by Plutarch’s guests which is of interest 
to us - the possible reasons for the cessation of the 
oracles, or more loosely, the death of the gods. And more 
Instructive for our purposes than a reiteration of the 
arguments forwarded in the discussion Itself is a passage 
in Heinrich Heine’s assay on Ludwig Bôrne. Before recalling
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thé tale from Plutàpch's Morals. Haine writes of Jesus,
How swaeti this God-îàanl How one-sided the hero 
of the Old Testament appears In comparison with 
him'. Moses loves his people with a touching fervorj 
like a mother he provides for the future of bis 
people. Christ loves mankind, that sun enveloped 
the entire earth with the warming rays of its love; 
What a soothing balm for all the Wounds of this
world are his worlsl What a healing spring for all
sufferers was the blood which flowed on Golgothaî 
The white marble Greek gods were spattered with this 
blood and fell ill with inner dread and could never 
again recover. Of course, most of them were already 
being consumed by chronic Illness* and the shook 
only hastened their death. The first to die was Pan.
This image of the death of Jesus hurrying the serene
Greek gods to their deaths is captivating - as is so much of
Heine. But who is this great pan? Heine has more to say.
The day is young and in spite of all the melancholy 
skepticism with which my soul torments Itself, 
curious inklings steal upon me. Something extra­
ordinary is now happening in the world. The sea 
smells of baking, and the cloud-monks looked so sad 
last night, so depressed,
I strolled lonesoraely along the beach at dusk. A 
solemn silence reigned all round. The highly arched 
sky resembled the vault of a Gothic church. Like 
countless lamps hung the stars therein, but they 
burned dismally and flutterlngly. Like a water- 
organ thundered the ocean wavesj stormy chorales, 
grievously despairing, and yet occasionally also 
triumphant. Above me, a gay procession of white 
cloud formations, which looked like monks, all 
trailing along with bowed heads and doleful express­
ions, a sad procession. It nearly looked as though 
they were following a corpse. Who is being burked? 
Who has died, I said to myself. Is the great Pan 
dead?^
Is this Pan still one of the "white, marble, Greek 
gods'.' 4 In the midst of Images of a Gothic cathedral, an 
organ, chorales, mourning monks?
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Eostatic %lth memories of the Prenoh Revolution and
hopes for a revolution In Germany, Heine relates another
of his visions*
I am no longer able to sleep, and the bizarreat 
night'"faces chase through my overexcited mind#
Waking dreams whlch stumble over each other so that 
the forms blend fantastically and, as in a Chinese 
shadto-play, shorten themselves, dwarflike, then 
lengthen themselves again gigantically— it’s enough 
to drive one mad, In this state of mind I sometimes 
feel as though my limbe stretch immensely and I fun 
from Germany to France and back again, as if with 
frightfully long legs. Yes, I recall that last night 
I ran in ouch a manner through all German provinces 
and territories and knocked at the doors of my friends 
and disturbed the sleep of the people. They some­
times stared at me with amazed glassy eyes, so that 
even I was shocked and did not know immediately what 
I actually wanted and why I woke them! Many fat 
Philistines who snored repulsively I poked porten­
tously in the ribs, and yawning they asked, ^%hat 
time Is it"? In Paris, dear friends, the cook has 
crowed, that is all I know, Beyond Augsburg, on 
the way to Munich, I eneoiantered a nu#er of Gothic 
cathedrals which seemed to be fleeing# I myself, 
tired of so much running about, finally began to 
fly and in this way flew from one star to another#
They are not populated worlds, as others dream, but 
only shining spheres, desolate and infertile# They 
don’t fall, because they know not on i^ hat to fall#
They hover up there in the greatest embarrassment,
I even got into heavenj the gate and the door stood 
open, Long, high, far-echoing halls with old-fashioned 
gilding, completely empty, except for an old servant 
here and there in powdered wig and faded red livery 
sitting in a velvet armchair, slumbering lightly. In 
some rooms the doors were removed from their hinges; 
in other places they were tightly looted and sealed 
three times with large round official seals besides, 
as in houses where a bankruptcy or a death has oc­
curred, Finally I came into a room where a thin, old 
man sat at a desk and rummaged in high stacks of 
paper. He was dressed black, had snow-white hair 
and a wrinkled business-face, and he asked me in an 
undertone what I wanted. In my naivete I thought
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hlm to be the dear Lord God, and I spoke to him 
eonfidentiallys "Oh, dear Lord God, I would like 
to learn to thundarj I know how to make lightning, 
oh; teaoh mo to thunder tool" "Don’t speak so 
loudly," replied the thin old man. severely, turning 
his hack on me and continuing to rummage through 
his papers, "That’s the registrar," whispered one 
of the servants clad in m â  who rose from his easy- 
chair yawning and rubbing his eyes.
Fan is dead I^
Heine leaves ua, one feels,perhaps intentionally, with 
this aiAlguous great pan. We can be sura that the great Pan 
is not only the first of the "white marble Greek gods" to 
die. Ha is that - and more. Nor Is he the Christian God, 
perhaps the death of the great Pan can be taken as a naradigm 
of the death of the Christian God,
Before leaving Heine, we must listen to another provo­
cative passage written some six years before the references 
to the death of the great Fan#
Our hearts are filled with dreadful pity--lt is old 
Jehovah himself who is preparing to die, We have 
known him so well, from his cradle on, in Egypt 
where he was brought up among sacred calves, croco­
diles, holy onions, ibises and cats. We have seen 
him bid adieu to these playimtes of his childhood and 
the obelisks and sphinxes of his native Nile valley 
and become the little god-king of a poor little shep­
herd people, with his own temple-palace to live in.
We saw later on how he came into contact with the 
Assyrian-Babylonian civilisation and laid aside his 
a11-too-human passions and no longer .spewed forth 
wrath and vengeance, at least no longer thundered at 
every triviality. We saw him emigrate to Home, the 
capital, where he renounced all national prejudices 
and proclaimed the heavenly equality of all races, 
and with such fair phrases formed an opposition to 
old Jupiter and plotted until he reached a position 
of power and ruled the city and the world, urbem et
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ortiem. from tha Capitol on high. Wa gatu how ha 
became more and more spiritualized* how he moaned 
meekly* how he became a loving father, a fit end 
of all humanity, a benefactor of the world* a phll- 
anthroplat“"lt was all to no avail.
Do you hear that little bell ringing? Kneel down* 
they are bringing the sacrament to a dying God.'
Heine is more specific here. He tells us explicitly
that "it is old Jehovah himself who is preparing to die,"
that is to say the God of deism, deism meaning for Heine
the opposite of pantheism and best characterized by the
"otherness" of God.®
Is this than perhaps what Nietzsche means by the
death of God? There can be little doubt that he had read
these passages by Heine* whom he greatly admired and with
whom he liked to compare himself.^ Is it a certain image
of God, what Heine calls the God of deism* the otheriiorldly,
distant, condescending God that Nietzsche claims has died?
If so* someone might not unjustly complain, he would have
done well to soften his language a bit. "Death" is perhaps
not the best choice of words to describe the "inaccessibility"
of a distant God, We might agree* while feeling that such
a counsel of moderation would have fallen on deaf ears in
the case of Nietzsche; or we might entertain the possibility
that he was fully aware of both the intent and the possible
effects of his words and that he meant precisely what he
said.
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Before looking in detail at what soma of Nietzsche's 
critics and followers say he meant by the death of God, 
a word of warning is in order. Those who comb Nietzsche's 
works and notes and letters in search of that one sentence 
or paragraph which spells out in so many words what "God 
is dead" means are bound to be disappointed. Not only did 
Nietzsche have an aversion to spelling things out in this 
manner, reducing them to their examinable skeletons, skill­
fully perhaps, and methodically, but without the slightest 
hint of subtlety or playfulness; he must have also felt that 
there are some things— experiences, sensibilities— which 
cannot be expressed skeletally. This must have been the case 
with the death of God. For though it stands at the basis of 
his thought, betakes it for granted. He believes it and 
asserts it, making no attempt to prove it. Two of his refer­
ences to Schopenhauer are enlightening in this regard.
Schopenhauer was, as philosopher, the first avowed 
and inflexible atheist we Germans have had....
The non-divinity of existence was regarded by him 
as something given, tangible, indisputable; he 
lost his philosopher's composure and flew into a 
rage every time ho saw someone hesitate and beat 
about the bush on this point. At this point rests 
his whole integrity: unconditional candid atheism
is precisely the nrellmlnarv condition for his posi­
tion...10
It was atheism that led me to Schopenhauer,^^ However, 
much Nietzsche's atheism differs from Schopenhauer's atheism 
(and it differs considerably), there can be little doubt
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that he saw himself as the direct heir of Schopenhauer's 
"unconditional candid atheism," and that this was for -him as 
for Schopenhauer "the preliminary condition for his position."
That Nietzsche assumes rather than explains the death 
of God must not become a Justification for our failing to 
ask what he meant by it. It should serve to remind us, how­
ever, that he deemed the working out of the consequences of 
God's death and the positive requirements for living in the 
world without God more important than expending time and 
energy telling his readers what he was certain would become 
common knowledge and bemoaning the fact that God is dead—  
a lesson in priorities which, had it been learned early 
enough, might have spared us much of the literature and 
philosophy, art and theology of desperation, crisis, and 
alienation.
II
The central source for Nietzsche's proclamation of 
the death of God is the extended aphorism in The Gay soisBoc» 
"The Madman." Although this passage is by now familiar to 
everyone who has ever heard of Nietzsche, it is magnificent 
nonetheless.
Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern 
in the bright morning hours, ran to the market 
place, and cried incessantly, "I seek God'. I seek 
'." As many of those who do not believe in God
were standing around Just than, he provoked much 
laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did 
he lose his way like a child? said another. Or 
is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on 
a voyage? or enjigéated? Thus they yelled and 
laughed. The madman Jumped into their midst and 
pierced them with his glances,
"Whither is God" he cried. "I shall tell you.
We have killed him— vou and I. All of us are his 
murderers. But how have we done this? How were 
we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the 
sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did 
we do whan we unchained this earth from its sun? 
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving 
now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging 
continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all 
directions? Is there any up or down left? Are 
we not straying as through an Infinite nothing?
Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it 
not become colder? Is not night and more night 
coming on all the while? Must not lantso® be lit 
in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of 
the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? 
Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition?
Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains 
dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the 
murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves?
What was holiest and most powerful of all that 
the world has yet owned has bled to death under 
our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us?
What water is there for us to clean ourselves?
What festivals of atonement, what sacred games 
shall we have to Invent? Is not the greatness 
of this deed too great for us? Must not we our­
selves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? 
There has never been a greater deed; and whoever 
will be born after us— for the sake of this deed 
he will be part of a higher history than all 
history hitherto.
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at 
his listeners; and they too were silent and stared^ 
at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lan­
tern on the ground, and it broke and went out.
"I coma too early,' he said than; "my time has not 
coma yet. This tremendous event Is still on its 
way, still wandering"-lt has not yet reached the 
ears of man. Lightning and thunder require time, 
the light of the stars requires time, deeds require 
time even after they are done, before they can be 
seen and heard. This deed is still more distant 
from them than the most distant stars— apd yet t.heg 
tiâvâ âmm #  âàsMâMÊSL."
It has been related further that on that same day 
the madman entered divers churches and there sang 
his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to 
account, he is said to have replied each time,
"What are these churches now if they are not the 
tombs and sepulchers of God?"12
It will be useful, for the sake of comparison, to ask 
some of Nietzsche's critics and expositors how they read 
Nietzsche's words, 'God is dead." Although there are points 
at which the various interpretations converge, the points 
of divergence are by far more numerous. Thus to avoid the 
Inevitable arbitrariness of grouping interpretations, I 
have simply ordered them chronologically.
Wiedarkehr des Glqiohen appeared in 1935 (a revised edition 
was published in 1956, including an appendix "On the History 
of Nietzsohe-Interpretation 1894-1954," which had not been 
printed in the original edition because it was considered 
"intolerable" and "undesirable" in the Germany of 1935) 
Though it could not be distributed openly at the time, it 
appears in retrospect as a breath of fresh air in the midst 
of an atmosphere saturated with the stale polemics of 
"official Nazi interpreters."^ For Lowith, "the doctrine
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of eternal reourrenoe la the key to Nletgiaoha'a philosophy/'^5
and he uses this doctrine to Illuminate the connection he
sees between the death of God^ nihilism^ and eternal recur***
rence, Lowith understands the death of God to mean **the
resurrection of the man who is in charge of himself and
who commands himself* and whose most extreme freedom is
16his 'freedom to die.'” The Chrlatlan God has died* leaving 
man free, free* that Is* from the moral imperative 'thou 
Shalt." But this freedom also has its negative aspectj 
it is a "desert of freedom" in which man would rather will 
Nothing than not will at all.^7 is in this "intermediate 
state of freedom to choose, when it seems "as though all 
gravity has disappeared from t h i n g s , t h a t  man will will 
either se1f-overeoming, through the eternal recurrence of 
all things (the tibermensoh^ or self-satisfaction (the "last 
man").
The SteiatlaB 8a&, the m m  facing nothingness,
and the wil?. ^  eternal recurrence characterize 
Nietzsche's system as a whole as a movement from 
"thou Shalt" to the birth of "I will" and then to 
the rebirth of "I am" as the 'first movement' of 
an eternally recurring existence in the midst of 
the natural world of all living things.
Lowlth's Interpretation of Nietzsche can be illustrated
nicely by Zarathustra's speech, "On the three metamorphoses."
Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: 
how the spirit becomes a camels and the camel, a 
lions and the lion, finally, a child.
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Thera Is much that Is difficult for the spirit, 
the strong reverent spirit that would bear much: 
but the difficult and the most difficult are what 
its strength demands.
%'hat is difficult? asks the spirit that would bear 
much, and kneels down like a camel wanting to be 
well loaded. What is most difficult, 0 heroes, 
asks the spirit that would bear much, that I may 
take It upon myself and exult in my strength? Is 
it not humbling oneself to wound one's haughtiness? 
Letting one's folly shine to mock one's wisdom?
Or is it this: parting from our cause when it
triumphs? Climbing high mountains to tempt the 
tempter?
Or is it this: feeding on the acorns and grass of
knowledge and, for the sake of truth, suffering 
hunger in one's soul?
Or is it this: being sick and sending home the 
comforters and making friends with the deaf, who 
never hear what you want?
Or is it this: stepping into filthy waters when
they are the waters of truth, and not repulsing 
cold frogs and hot toads?
Or is it this : loving those who despise us and
offering a hand to the ghost that would frighten 
us?
All these most difficult things the spirit that 
would bear much takes upon itself; like the camel 
that, burdened, speeds into the desert, thus the 
spirit speeds into its desert.
In the loneliest desert, however, the second meta­
morphosis occurs : here the spirit becomes a lion
who would conquer his freedom and be master in his 
own desert. Here he seeks out his last master: 
he wants to fight him and his last god; for ultimate 
victory he wants to fight with the great dragon.
Who is the great dragon whom the spirit shall no 
longer call lord and god? "Thou shalt" is the name 
of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion
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says* ''I shalt" lies in his #ay
sparkling Ilka gold* an animal covered luith scales| 
and on every scale shines a golden "thou shalt*"
Values* thousands of years old* shine on these 
Beales I and thus speaks the mightiest of all 
dragons § "All value of all things shines on me.
All value has long been created* and I am all 
created value. Verily* there shall be no more 
% i l l l . Thus speaks the dragon.
My brothers* why la there a need in the spirit 
for the lion? Why is not the beast of burden* 
which renounces and la reverent* enough?
To create new values— that even the lion cannot 
do; but the creation of freedom for oneself for 
new creatlon^^'^that is within the power of the 
lion. The creation of freedom for oneself and a
$sacred No" even to duty "-for that* my brothers 
the lion is needed. To assume the right to new 
values """that is the most terrifying assumption for 
a reverent spirit that would bear much. Verily* 
to him it is preying* and a matter for a beast of 
prey. He once loved "thou shalt" as most sacred : 
now he must find illusion and caprice even In the 
moat sacred* that freedom from his love may become 
his prey : the lion is needed for such prey.
But say* my brothers* what can the child do that 
even the, lion could not do? Why must the praying 
lion still become a child? The child is innocence 
and forgetting* a new beginning* a game* a self- 
propelled wheel* a first movement* a sacred "Yes"" 
For the game of creation* my brothers* a sacred "Yes" 
Is neededs the spirit now wills bis own will* and 
he who had bean lost to the world now conquers his 
own world.
Of three métamorphosés of the spirit I have told 
you: how the spirit became a camelj and the camel*
a lion; and the lion* finally* a child.
Thus spoke Zarathustra. And at that time he so-
journed in the town that is called The Motley Cow.
There is probably no other single passage in all of MietEscha* 
writings which could serve better than this one as a precis 
of what he was trying to say.
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In words reminiscent of Augustine*s admonition* "Love
and then do as you please," Zarathustra lament© elsewhere*
"Alas* if only you understood my words, *do whatever you
will, but first be capable of willingl*"^^ It is from the
lion that man must learn this lesson--to say "I will," to
create freedom for himself for new creation* to assume the
right to new values.
Naked* pure "resolution," to one thing as to 
another* to everything as to nothing character- 
isses the ability to will as. #uoh in the inter"-
mediate state of nihilism, tiîhich already imnts, 
but as yet does not know what it wants.
Es& Ëm Mm hmUmmm is  soâMss,
i m W A  s£ ia Saâ. 3
Thus* Lowith. This posture is* however, only transitory| 
it is impossible to rest here for long. A move must be 
made, and the choice is between nihilism and " the game of 
creation," that is, the overcoming of nihilism by willing 
the eternal recurrence of all things. For Lowith, eternal 
recurrence is " the new ’gravity’ in a fleeting existence; 
thus a clear connection emerges between the death of God* 
nihilism, and the eternal recurrence of the same."
In sum, Lowith sees Kietssohe setting out from the 
death of God, "a datum whose significance lay less in the 
fact itself than in its nihilistic consequences, " and 
arriving, in the end, at a proclamation of his theory of 
eternal recurrence* which for Lfewith is "an avowed substitute
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for religion..an escape froat despair: an attempt to
leave ’nothing* and arrive at ’something.
Karl Jaspers’ Nietzsche. Einfuhrun^ in daa Verstandnis 
aeines Philosonhiqrens (1936)^^ is a puzzling book. Jaspers 
wrote In the proface to the first edition something to the 
effect that we dare not just ’'read” Nietzsche, i.e. facilely* 
carelessly, superficially. Nietzsche is more demanding than 
that ; he requires that we live with him, so to speak; read 
him and then ruminate, then read him again and ruminate again 
— which is all true, not only of Nietzsche, of course, but 
perhaps especially of Nietzsche. However, by the time we 
approach the end of this, at times fascinating but on the 
whole exceedingly unreliable, treatment, we encounter in 
so many words #hat we sensed all along: Jaspers "discounts
Nietzsche’s ideas as absurdities"; "’philosophy’ is given 
up in favor of ’philosophizing;’"^® that is, jaspers is 
interested not in what Nietzsche said, but in "participating 
in the essence of hia life and thought.
Jaspers sees Nietzsche as "the last of the great philo­
sophera of the past"3^ (as does Heidegger, though in a 
different sense, as we shall seebelow), the emphasis being 
on "the past." ¥e are, thinks Jaspers, at a turning point 
in history, a "reversal in which everything seems destined 
to vanish as a result of the self-destruction of the will
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to truth. This reversal is identical with the self-annulment 
of morality the death of God."3^ * Jaspers agrees with 
Nietzsche that all great things destroy themselves through 
an act of aelf-annulment. And it is as such an act that 
he Interprets the waning of the will to truth, the power of 
morality* and belief in God,
It is significant for our purposes to emphasize that 
it is the waning of a belief in God that concerns Jaspers, 
not the death of God. Or, to put it another way, the death 
of God concerns him only as a psychological phenomenon, as 
something that happens to the belief, that is, in the soul 
of the believer, and not to God. In a section obviously 
influenced by Kierkegaard titled "The present Age," Jaspers 
paraphrases Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God 
with the words, "unbelief has become a reality."3^ in answer 
to the question— why does Nietzsche say that God is dead?—  
Jaspers can only say, "he speaks in p a r a b l e s . "33 when 
Nietzsche is not speaking syn#olioally, his own answer to 
this question takes the form of an inquiry into the historical 
origins of contemporary nihilism, and that answer looks some­
thing like this, according to Jaspers.
Nietzsche believed that the meaninglessness and frag­
mentary character of life in his time was "rooted in
by’B very definite (i.e. moral) interpretation
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of the world," The Christian religion, along with Platonic 
philosophy, had served as a sort of ©top-gap for men faced 
with the devastating realization that "becoming serves no 
purpose and that it is not controlled by an all-pervasive 
u n i t y *"35 stop-gap character is beat described as a
condemnation of the world of becoming as illusory and an 
invention of a "true" world* the wo%*ld of being (later.
Being) that lies somewhere beyond the flux of this ima^nary 
world. This particular fiction proved quite adequate for 
some two thousand years. Only in most recent times has 
this "moral" fiction too been called into question. It 
is in our own day, Jaspers is saying of Nietzsche, that 
this way of looking; at our world and shaping It (or iiBagining 
its being shaped), i,e. Truth, Being, God, has died* What 
Is more, this "reversal" is the result of Christianity’s 
own will to truth at all costa which probes and probes, 
allowing no illusions, only to discover that its own very 
foundations were built on the moral fiction that Truth 
exists, that life h^^ a meaning to be discovered, a goal 
to be reached, that there is Something or Someone shaping 
and guiding it all. Now only nothingness remains, and a 
conviction that one has been deceived.
If this interpretation of Nietzsche sounds a bit too 
"existentialist," we need but recall that Jaspers is, on 
his own admission, intentionally philosophizing, not
7 7 :
expounding. But* though Nietzsche is not Kierkegaard* 
and though Jaspers * tone is much more that of Kierkegaard 
than of Nietzsche* his account of the failure of the 
Flatonic-Christian ^^eltanachauum: is a faithful rendering 
of Nietzsche’s views on the origins of nihilism. That it 
considers only part of what Nietzsche means by the death 
of God* we have already noted* for although Jaspers ad­
mitted, aa early as 1938* that "Nietzsche intended to 
diagnose a present reality/’ and that he did not "limit 
himself to a psychological statement about the rise of 
unbelief" but was observing a fact/*3^ jaspers himself 
never is able to get the two— the psychological and the 
historloal--realities together. The death of God is only 
a metaphor useful in pointing to the fact of the rise of 
unbelief. It would not be true to say* however* that Ood 
is dead* i.e. as a statement of fact, therefgpe, unbelief 
is on the rise. Rather* belief in God is waning, and when 
it is totally exhausted, God will be dead.
Finally, jaspers takes the proclamation of the death
of God, not as something Irrevocable, but as a challenge
issued by Nietzsche.
Actually the statement expresses the tension 
engendered by the realization that it is possible* 
and also it signifies, like a call in the last 
hour, an awareness of the uncertain direction 
that things are taking.
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It may also be said that this statement initiates 
a new and higher humn reality ooneaived as a 
way of thinking that impels mmn upward* or it 
may serve to arouse us to do all the more reso­
lutely anything that %"^ ill refute it and #us 
gain the assurance that God is pot, dead.3f
In the and, Jaspers would Ilka it both ways--God is dead,
but not quite. But of one thing he is certain; we must
become aware of 'the uncertain direction that things are
taking." We must confront the "void," gaze into the "abyae,"
in order all the more resolutely to participate in the new
upward-directed, higher humn raility. This is Jaspers and
Mow the third major interpretation of Nietzsche’s
proclamation of the death of Ood is that of Martin Heidegger.
The saying, "Ood Is dead," meanss the trans­
cendental world is without effective power. It 
is not life-giving. Metaphysics, that is for 
Nietzsche, western philosophy since Plato, has 
come to an and, Nietzsche understands hia own 
philosophy %a the counter-movement to mataphyeies, 
i.e. for him. Platonism.
Heidegger goes on to say.
As a mere counter-movement it necessarily ramins, 
as does everything "anti" in nature, bound to the 
essence of that against which it moves, Nietzsche’a 
countermovement against metaphysics remains as the 
mere inversion of metaphyaioa, inescapably entangled 
in metaphysics in such a way that metaphysics 
constricts itself and is not able to reflect its 
own essence. Therefore that which takes place in 
and as metaphysics itself remains hidden from it 
and through
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These two short paragraphs might serve to frame Heidegger’s 
view of Nietzsche. To be sure, he has written and lectured 
extensively on Nietzsche (his leeturea* though published 
only In 1961, together with cIlscuBsions composad between 
19^ 1-0 and 1946, were delivered in Freiburg In the years 
1936 to 1940)* but the only honest conclusion that can be 
drawn from his later utterances about Nietzsche is that 
he is only expounding, enlarging, repeating again and again 
his initial conviction: 1) that with the death of God,
Nietzsche was referring to the death of western, i.e. 
Ohristian-Platonic, metaphysicsj and 2) that though bis 
observation was acute and to the point* he failed to ex­
tricate himself from western metaphysics and get beyond 
bis negative judgment to something positive.
According to the literal meaning this title 
(metaphysics) speaks of nothing other than the 
knowledge of the Being (âM.H) being 
which (Being) is distinguished by its apriority 
and which was understood by Plato as Idea, with 
Plato’s Interpretation of Being as Idea, meta- 
nhya.ics, therefore begins. It sets for posterity 
the pattern of western philosophy. Xli. bibtojcy
-physics. And because metaphysics begins with the 
$nterpr8tation of Being as "Idea" and this Inter­
pretation remains determinative, all philosophy
since Plato is Idealism in the literal sense of 
the word* that Being is sought in the Idea, in 
the realm of ideas and ideals. Seen from Plato’s 
vantage point, it can be said that all western 
philosophy is Platonism. Metaphysics* Idealism* 
Platonism mean essentially the same. They remain 
determinative even where counter-movements and
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Inverslorn make themselves felt. Plato becomes 
the prototype of the philosopher in the history 
of the west, metzsohe not only 
his philosophy as the inversion of Platonism; 
Nietzsche’s thought was and is. everywhere only 
a dialogue with Plato, and often a quite con­
flicting one.39
To put it aa simply as possible, Heidegger sees Nietzsche 
as having performed a negative task— to which he* Heidegger, 
sees himself as providing the positive counterpoise.
Nietzsche’ a gravest error— so* Heidegger--was to re­
spond to the death of X'jestern metaphysics with a vision 
of man as the one who must create whatever value there is 
in a world now cut loose from its traditional value- 
bestowing mooring in PlatoniG-Christian metaphysics. That 
"we come too late for the gods and too early for Being, 
Heidegger is the first to concede. Êut— and this is where 
he and Nietzsche are worlds apart--ours is unquestionably 
a time of the âMâfiââ of God and of ^or Being.
Heidegger is emphatic in his insistence that we must wait 
for the word from Being-itsalf. He warns us, in a manner 
reminiscent of the best of the prophets of the theological 
liberalism and neo-orthodoxy of three decades ago, of the 
slippery ground of human pride and the tricky underhanded- 
ness of the idols. Beware* he seems to be saying, of 
beginning with man when God is absent * Better to wait in
patience atid in yearning for God’s return. Heidegger’s
4l
"Being" is what Hietzaoha would call a shadow of God.
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What is more* Heidegger’s Being is a shadow in two 
senses : it is but a vestige of the God of Christianity*
lacking in substance, in flesh and blood; and it is dark*
For offering us atones for bread, he may be excused; he 
is not the first and will certainly not be the last. But 
his invitation to darkness and his celebration of the dis­
closing power of dread; his conviction that it is only by 
"press(ing) inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of
hp
nothingness" that we can begin to get beyond nothingness| 
his glorification of the very old and the very and*
in this connection* his reliance for authority on "the 
oracular obscurity of the pre-8ocratics,"^'^'^'--all this must 
be seen for what it is, namely, symptomatic of Heidegger’s 
commitment to the tradition of radical Irratiomlism* which* 
in Germany* reaches back to Holderlin and Novalls at the 
end of the eighteenth century
And if Heidegger is a theologian in spite of himself* 
aa Walter Kaufmannwould have it, he is a theologian of a 
particularly reactionary kind, (the only kind of theologian 
Kaufmann will allow)* Heidegger does. Indeed, bear, as 
we have already noticed, a certain resemblance to theologians 
of the not too distant past; but in his repudiation of 
rationality and his invocation of the pre-Socratics, he 
reminds one of a kind of latter-day Duns scotus (on whom
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he did hie dissertation),^*^ with his appeal, almost in
spite of his sharp intellect, to the authority of the church
and a univocal concept of being* necessary and contingent,
in the face of the unreasonstble and improbable. In fact*
one suspects that the "medievalness" of Heidegger’s thought
rests in great measure on his unacknowledged use of the
method of ana logy--of which* more l a t e r .
God is not dead for Heidegger. Nietzsche’s words
provided a useful tag which Heidegger could "Interpret."
But his interpretation meant also a taming* a diluting* a
re-interpretation of Nietzsche’s words into Heidegger’s
words; "God is dead" became "God is absent"; "we must
begin with man as value-areatoz-*" became "we must be patient
and wait and recall our origins and yearn for the new word
to be spoken by Being,"
Because we hark back to Nietzsche’s saying about 
the ’death of Ood*’ people take such an enterprise 
for atheism. For what is more ’logical’ than to 
consider themn who has experienced the ’death of 
Ood’ as a Godless p e r a o n . ^ o
It is Holderlin who is Heidegger’s "master*' not Nietzsche.
And although* to my knowledge* Heidegger has never quoted
these particular lines of Holderlin’s* he might have* as
they stand implicitly at the head of his own thought;
"To be sure* the gods do live; but above our heads* up
there in another world Nietzsche said* 'God is dead."
50These two utterances are as different as night and day.
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In 1950 there appeared what Is considered by many 
the best treatment of Ki®tesChe extant, Walter Eaufmann's
successfully combines erudition and a readability uncom­
mon among Nietzsche interpretations. Despite the fact 
that i%ufmann's evaluation of Nietzsche is probably a bit 
too "Apollonian” (the full weight of this judgment will be 
felt in subsequent chapters wherever Ebufroann's views are 
taken up5 suffice it to say here that he stresses especially 
Nietzsche's kinship with Socrates and Hegel), this work 
provides a necessary counterweight to the unquestionably 
more prevalent view of Nietzsche as irrational1st.
In his experience and proclamation of the death of 
God, Nietzsche reminds Kaufraannof the Old Testament 
prophets.
He felt the agony, the suffering, and the misery 
of a godless world so intensely, at a time when 
others were yet blind to its tremendous conse­
quence, that he was able to experience in advance, 
as it were, the fate of a coming generation,51
In keeping with this comparison, Kaufmann speaks of man­
kind as having "lost God."^® That is to say, "we have 
destroyed our faith in God. There remains only the void.
We are falling. Our dignity is go%e. Our values are 
lost."^^ It is true, as Kaufmann says, that "Nietzsche's 
pronouncement does not at all purport to be a dogmatic 
statement about a supersensible reality: it is a declaration
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of what h© takes to be a historical cultural fact.” It 
Is "an attempt at a diagnosis of contemporary civilization, 
not a metaphysical speculation about ultimate reaNty.”^
Does Kaufmann ever say what he thinks the outcome of 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis is, what Nietzsche means by the 
death of God?
What Kaufmann takes Nietzsche to mean is, I think, 
implicit in the few brief quotations above. To take first 
his statement about man, mankind has lost God, More, we 
have not merely lost him in some mysterious, 'inexplicable 
way, we have destroyed our faith In God. Though Kaufmnn 
often speaks of both the loss of values and the loss of 
faith in God, it would be unfair to him and misleading to 
say that he equates the two. The loss of faith in God 
definitely precedes (and causes) the loss of values. Nihil 
ism, ”this sense of the utter bleakness of life and the 
'dlsvaluation' of all values,” fqllows upon and as a con­
sequence of "the modern loss of faith in God...."55 and 
”to escape nihilism" Kaufmann concludes,"..,1s Nietzsche’s 
greatest and most persistent problem."5"
While being in complete sympathy with KHufmann's 
evaluation of Nietzsche's efforts as being a positive 
response to the threats of nihilism, we cannot allow what 
Kaufmann calls "the modern loss of faith in God" to pass 
for an adequate definition of Nietzsche's pronouncement
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that "Clod le dead." Mietzaohe la apemklng of a Xoas* 
to be aure; but the loae be deaouibeB is a losa by death. 
Kaufimnn’ a eomparleon of Nietzsobe with the prophets of 
the Old Testament holds true in a certain sense only (as* 
indeed* î^ufmann admits* but for very different' reasons). 
For the Old Testament prophets* there was never a question 
of God’s death— he oould be hiding himself* he could be 
silent. The metaphors of absence and silence are very 
different from that of death. There Is a finality in 
Nietzsche’s proclamation which would have been impossible 
for the prophets. "God Is dead. God remains dead."^*^ 
Kaufmann says * with regard to these wo3?ds* " this is the 
language of religion* and paa^tloularly of Ghristianitys 
the picture is derived from,the Gospels.*.. Nietzsche* 
of course* infuses a new meaning into this old picture* 
while yet implying that God once was alive."5® Precisely$ 
But to this implication* Kaufmann’s subsequent Interpreta­
tion fails to do justice. We m y  be foi’*ced to conclude 
that Kaufmann’s description of the death of God as "the 
modern loss of faith" is a religious statement as well as 
Nietzsche’s* though a considerably less bold one. Or 
perhaps it would be more accurate to say Kaufmann’s Is a 
psychological statement about man’s faith* or lack of it* 
which* however* ignores the no less important living, or 
dead* God. While not wishing to engage in metaphysical
speoulatlon about a supersensible reality, we must make it 
quits elear that Nietzsche, having diagnosed his own civili­
zation, pronounced the death of God, in all its finality. 
That there was a loss of faith on the part of the men who 
make up that civilization, was by no means unimportant, 
but its importance lay in its usefulness as a symptom of 
something elaqs the event of the death of God— not the 
non-existence of Sod, but his cultural, historical death.
Kaufmann*s interpretation brings to mind the more 
overtly religious, thought not altogether dissimilar re­
formulation of Nietzsche's words by Martin Buber, Although 
he is not, strictly speaking, a critic of Nietzsche, Buber 
was fasdnated by him from an early age and, as his writings 
show, he wrestled with Nietzsche all his life. In a col­
lection of lectures published in 1952 under the revealing 
title, Bolipse of God. Buber wrote that Nietzsche's "deci­
sive utteranoeiis the cry that 'God is dead,'"5® But far 
from being a statement about God, "this proclamation means 
only that man has become incapable of apprehending a reality
absolutely independent of hlmb;elf and of having a relation-
60
ship with it..," The fault is, as with Kaufmann, man's; 
the blame (and presumably the guilt) rests with man, Man 
failed on two counts— in his ability to apprehend God and 
to have a relationship with him, Nietzsche's cry, or as 
Buber says in a gross overstatement and somewhat derisively
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e l s e w h e r e * © h o u t *  Clod Is dead/* has nothing 
whatsoever to do with God. Baber* more thoroughly steeped 
in the Old Testament than Nietzsche ever was* responds in 
true prophetic fa^on "that the living God is not only a 
self-revealing but also a self-concealing for evi­
dence of which he refers the reader to Isaiah 45:15* those 
words which altarmtely tormented and comforted Pascal and 
which doubtless have eased the mind and heart of many a man 
of faith puzzled by the apparent absence of God. For Buber* 
the only dignified response to ‘such a concealmnt* such 
a divine s i l e n c e * " endurance. In the context of a 
traditional theological warning against niaking of God an 
object among other objects, Buber says.
It would be worthier not to explain it to oneself 
in sensational and incompetent sayings, such as 
that of the "death" of God, but to endure it as 
it is and at the same time to move axistentially 
toward a new happening, toward that event In which 
the word between heaven and earth will again be 
heard.^^
Even if one disregards the scornful tone of this proposal 
and the intolerance it expresses, it remains beyond doubt 
that Buber is talking about something vary different from 
what Nietzsche meant when he said, "God is dead."
Buber’s reformulation of the death of God into the 
"eclipse of the light of heaven, eclipse of God" is signi­
ficant; "an eclipse of the sun la somthing that occurs 
between the sun and our eyes, not in the sun itself.
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"The eclipse of the light of God is no extinction; even 
tomorrow that which has stepped in between may give way." 
This would have been an admirable confession of faith in 
the past; but today it necessarily leaves us unsatisfied 
and Buspicioiia*““-eapaoially when it is coupled with chast­
ising remarks about "the human responsibility for the 
eclipse" which must be borne by him "who refuses to submit 
himself to the effective reality of the transcendence as 
such,' which "lives intact behind the wall of darkness 
Eugen Fink, in his Nietzsches Philosophie (I960), 
interprets Nietzsche’s pronouncement of the death of God 
as a sibling* not to nihilism* but to the übermensch.
...after the death of God* the proper language of 
man is no longer the naming of the gods* the invo­
cation of the holy--it is now the speech of man to 
man; the invocation of the highest human possi­
bility is the teaching of the Übermensoh. w
Fink is explicit in his declaration of what he takes 
Nietzsche to mean by "God," "’God’ means for Nietzsche 
the embodiment of all other-worldly i d e a l i t y . E a r l i e r  
he describes the death of God as "the end of all ’ideality’ 
beyond man* an objective transcendence. 4, ® As for man* 
he has used and misused the earth for the purpose of adorn­
ing his conception of the "other- world. Gontrary to this*
the tlbermensah. who knows about the death of God* 
that is* who knows about the end of the idealism 
which was lost in the beyond* recognizes in the 
ideal other-worldly only a utopian reflection of
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the earth ; he gives the earth back what has been 
boiTowed and stolen from It; he renounces all 
other-worldly dreams and turns to the earth with 
the same ardor that was previously aimed at the 
dream-world.
There is nothing being said here that has not already
been said in previous evaluations of Nietzsche ; what is
new* however* is Pink’s highly original exegesis of
Nietzsche’s vision of what may happen* of what is possible
now that God is dead. Pink sees the parable "On the Three
Metamorphoses" culminating in the yea-saying* plavinR child—
the creator of new values.
The actual and original nature of freedom ae a 
scheme of new values and value-world© is touched 
upon in the metaphor of play, playing is the 
nature of positive freedom. With the death of 
God, the risky and playful character of human 
existence is revealed. The creativeness of man 
is playing. The change of man into teermensoh 
is not a mutational jump of a biological sort in 
which a new race of beings suddenly appears above 
homo j^apienB. This change is a metaaiorphosls of 
finite freedom, its retrieval out of self-aliena­
tion and the free breakthrough of its play- 
character.
Man is essentially a creator.73
Despite Fink’s inability ever to free himself fully 
from the negative conception of Nietzsche advanced by 
H e i d e g g e r , 74 does offer us a novel treatment of Nietzsche’ 
concept of play which will figure later.on in our discussion 
of Dionysus. He also reminds us of one of ^arathustra’s 
seldom-quoted admonitions, "X beseech you, my brothers, 
lâmïa ^  eagtb,...!"— which follow© hi© asser­
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tion that "the f?b,ermeriseh is the meaning of the e a r t h . "75
Nietzsche does not put man in God’s pXa.ee; he 
does not divinize and idolize finite existence*
In Ood’s place* in the place of the Christian 
God and the Flatonic realm of Ideas he puts the
Without a doubt, the most detailed and thorough study 
of Nietzsche’s terse proclamation is Eugen Blser’s "0ott
seipB; (19S2)* which sets itself the apparently quite simple
èask of addressing Itself to the "question about the genuine
meaning of the saying ’God is d e a d * ’"^7 then fulfills its
self-appointed task for three hundred ten pages! This is a
philological-philosophical-^theological treatment done by a
Roman Catholic which probes Nietzsche’s words from every
conceivable angle (one sometimes wonders whether Bieer does
not* in fact* expect too much from this* admittedly explosive*
short sentence)* giving equal attention to style* context*
content* method* and point of view,
Siser claims that "it is not so much the ideality of
God" which Nietzsche finds offensive as the "idea of God
embodied in C h r i s t i a n i t y T h e  problem of the existence
of God is passed over by Nietzsche in two senses.
First of all in a position tMjE side of it* in 
which only the ideal aspect of God is under dis­
cussion* while the quasbion of his existence 
remains more or less open.’-^
In that the expression* "God is dead*" is meant to criticize
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the Idea of God, It can only be said to be exercising its
critique "this side" of the problem of God's existence.
At the same time, however. It denotes the op­
posite position beyond the problem of the exis­
tence of God, which forbidsodlscusslon of it as 
superfluous and antiquated.
In this second sense, the discussion of the problem of 
God's existence is superfluous owing to Wietssohe's parti­
cular genealogical explanation of the origin of belief in
God* and antiquated beoauee of his contention that the 
emergence of such an "explanatory" method signalled the 
beginning of a new phase in which atheism could for the 
first time legitimately make a clean sweep of all arguments 
for the existence of Ood. As Nietzsche himself put it in 
pawn.4 in an aphorism under the title, ‘The historical refu­
tation as the final one,"
Formerly one tried to prove that God does not 
exist; today one shows how the belief that God 
exists could arise and whereby this belief ac­
quired its gravity and importance. A counter- 
proof that God does not exist becomes thereby 
superfluous. Formerly* whenever one had refuted 
the alleged "proofs for the existence of God," 
the doubt remained nevertheless whether proofs 
better than the ones Just refuted could not per­
haps be found. In those days, the atheists did 
not know how to make a clean sweep.
Biser concludes from this, "what alone can be deduced from
this with certainty is Nietzsche’s peculiar indifference
What is it then exactly that Nietzsche means by the 
death of God? If it is not the existence but the idea of
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Qod whloh receives the brunt of his criticism, just what
Is this Idea? According to Blser,
the problem of God poses itself for Nietzsche, 
not primarily from an ontological point of view, 
that Is, not as a question about the content of 
being, but rather from a noetic point of view as 
the problem of the IGeal counter-projeo-tlon M  
all reality. "God" Is for him, as he never tires 
of emphasizing, above all the deepest "out" that 
life, sublimated Into Intellect, inflicts upon 
Itself, the greatest "objection" to a being still 
at one with Itself, and therefore the exponent of 
8, £om sS. toward èh&. separation 2f
knmina â M  balms..
What Nietzsche therefore thinks must be destroyed Is
ZÊâlm ag, Jfeoaa thought-forms §yod Irrevocable 
a s a m  oL go.n@.qlg.nm Hhlsli amn anchored in tng.
I d m  gal § M  enforced I M  cohesion of 
fflpaning a M
In other words, negatively understood, the death of Qod
means, as Blser's sub-title makes clear, the destruction
of Christian consciousness. Taken positively. It means
that the Ood-questlon can be legitimately and meaningfully
asked only beyond, or at least outside, the realm of being.
If the thought of God Is still to have any meaning 
...It must necessarily be sought beyond "being" 
and "value," that Is, in the realm of "beyond-being." 
For God begins— in Nietzsche's sense, or at any 
rate, according to his presuppositions— only where 
autonomous thinking, and therefore being as being, 
comes to an and.86
With this last giant step from the negative to the
positive valuation of the death of God (which Is, In Itself,
a step In the right direction, for which Nietzsche himself
set the precedent), Blser has done an about-face which
9 3
causes his book to end antlclltnactloally in that realm 
which, with Its bottomless bag of tricks and Its deceptive 
masks, succeeds In seducing so many otherwise right-headed 
and good-lntentloned Interpreters of the death of Qod.
From this point on Blser speaks variously of "a new dis­
covery of God,"®7 of "the dawn of a new 'Ood-day,«"88 
and of the culmination of Anselm's "demonstration In the 
qualitative leap from the maqdmun) limit.. .aÇ thought to 
the fîîüJSL .^ êâlly. Ë,gg»afe who exjLgtS. Inflaoendently 
thought."o9 Biaer's Qod beyond being and thinking is the 
God beyond the Idols and all human conceptions of God.
He Is a first cousin to both Tillich's God beyond God and 
the God of Barth's "true religion." Blser Is concerned 
to ask the Qod-question In a new way. But for Nietzsche,
It Is,precisely this question which has become unaskable.
There appeared In 1962 a monograph which offers a
fresh approach to Nietzsche— Hermann Weln's Positives
Antlohria.tentum; Nietzsches Chrlstusblld Im Brennnunkt
nachohristllcher Anthropologie. Weln warns us on the first
page of his foreword that what follows Is not a "Nietzsche-
book," not a new interpretation, but a "search. In
Nietzsche the Antl-ohrlst, for the affirmation."50 And
the assumption underlying this search Is that
what Nietzsche failed to achieve with his Zara- 
thustra-lraage— to portray the Ideal of a yea-saying, 
yea-doing man. In a new sense--he achieved superbly
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¥ith his Ohrlst-image* unnoticed by the quarreling 
Interpreters of Nietsiaohe’s anti-Christendom...
The counter-ima(%e— the Christ-lmage of the Anti­
christ Nietzsche--is the lost key to Nietzsche 
as a yea-gayer."
Furthermore, it is the atheism peculiar to Nietzsche—
"an intellectual-historical and anthropolq-gioal atheism"-- 92
that the affirmation is to be found.
Of all the secondary sources considered in this 
section, Weln’s essay stands to suffer most from the 
necessary consideration of but one of its aspects. Mever-
i
thelass, it is the death of Ood that concerns us here, 
and so we must look at it out of context. Wain’s views 
ofi Nietzsche on Jesus are equally intriguing, but of that 
more later.
Weln suggests that the meaning of the symbolic ex­
pression, "God is dead," is "msin’s re-coileotion of himself 
aa the revocation of ’the history of God.’"93 And he ex­
plains the phrase, "the history of God," by referring to 
a beautiful passage from one of Rilke’s letters.
Let us be clear about the fact that man has from 
the earliest times created gods which here and 
there contained only the dead and threatening and 
destructive and horrible, violence, anger, imper­
sonal stupefaction, drawn together in a tight, 
malicious entanglement; the strange, as it were, 
but in this strangeness an admission to a certain 
extent that one noticed it, bore It, even acknow­
ledged a certain secret relationship to it and 
Implication in it— g m  s m  IhljL m  mil; one 
did not know for the present what to do with this 
side of one’s own experience. It was too big, 
too dangerous, too many-sided; it grew out over
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one*8 bead and took on an exceaa of meaning. It 
was impossible always to take along these unwieldy 
and uneneompaB3:lble parts beside the many ezpeeta** 
tlons of an exiatenee organised on the basis of 
stipply and demand;» and so one ag5?eec1 to deposit 
them out there" for the time being. However^ 
because they were surplus^ the strongest-""precisely 
the top strong^ the powerful'"“even violent^ the 
incomprehensible— often aionstroua : how could they^
taken together at one pointy, avoid exerting inf lu-" 
enoe^ , effect^ power^ and dominance^ and that,» from
beyond?94
Underatood thus^ the greatest of all great daeds^, of which 
the madman spoke^ would be,^  negatively^ the murder of Gocl^  
anùÿ positively "finally to * take up' the * God * -named part 
of human senslbi 11 ty-or as Rilke used to say^ finally to 
•realise* one * s own c h i l d h o o d 95 This is symbolic poetry 
which In Wein*s specific use of "symbolic" means it points 
to somethings
But it is also "an event in the history of man^"96 
in the sense that it marks the overcoming of one half of 
the Ohristian-Platonic metaphysical scheme by the other 
half. Christian"*Platonic metaphysics^ as we noted above^ 
has always been oharacterig;edj, according to Miatsssche^ by 
twop until only recently^ not incompatlble efforts : the
effort to make sense of the world and give it a meaning by 
picturing it as divided into the tangible;, changing^ illusory 
world and the eternal, transcendental, true world, and the
effort to arrive at the Truth, at all costs.
"How" the ideal of Truth at all costs gains the 
upper hand over that other-worldly construction.
That is the "event," God. is deadS And we have
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killed him. That "metaphysical," in truth "moral," 
imparting of meaning to the prevailing intelleet- 
ual history is unmasked as illusion, appearance, 
evasion^’^and that, in the service of the discovery 
of truth. The result is, for the sake of intel­
lectual honesty, the nihilistic admission of 
worthlessness and meaninglessness. The history 
of the groat separation" is the "consequence."
But that is by no means the w.tipl.e, of nihilism.
It is the first consequence of the "relentless, 
thorough, fundamental mistrust" which compels one 
to " dig into ^he foundation on which the edifice 
of metaphysics was built. Nietzsche calls this 
foundation "morality."
This digging into one's own foundation exhibits 
the "logic of unconditional questioning for the 
sake of truth. That is, it Is the outcome of the 
cult of knowledge which originally prevailed in 
the Greek and Christian domain, Nietzsche is 
thinking of Socrates and Plato, but also of 
Christ's words, "I am the Truth," as the origin.97
There is, finally, another sense in which the dc±h
of Cod is an historical event. It bears only indirectly
on Nietzsche's words themselves, but directly on his whole
attempt to work out the positive consequences of living
in the world after the death of God ; and because the clue
to this other sense is touched on by Wain, it deserves to
bo mentioned here.
"God" is the cipher for "higher states" which 
are not (yet) made human. They are therefore 
irrational. Through self-estrangement, repres­
sion, and projection, they have eluc^ed man and 
therefore claim power over him"-like powers "from 
beyond," They appear to be superhuman. But an 
inner expansion of man could reincorporate them,98
Or, as Rilke put it.
Sometimes I think to myself how heaven arose, 
and death-^in that we pushed away from ourselves
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What was most precious to ua, because there was 
BO much else to be dona beforehand and because it 
wasn't secure with ue busy ones. Now time has 
passed, and wa have grown accustomed to less. We 
no longer recognize what is our own and are amazed 
at its exceeding greatness. Is that not posBible?99
The last work to receive our attention is even less a
"Nietzsche-book" than the preceding one, dealing, as it
does, not directly with Nietzsche at all, but with the
Christian doctrine of God. It is Thomas J. J. Altizer's
(19S6). Nevertheless,
we are Justiflecl in including A1 tiger here In this context
for at least two reasons ; his writings are unmistakably
informed by Nietzsche, and it is the death of God about
which he writes,.
To confess the death of God is to speak of an 
actual and real event, not perhaps an event oc­
curring in a single moment of time or history,
but notwithstanding this reservation an event 
that has actually happened both in a cosmic and 
in a historical sense. There should be no con­
fusion deriving from the mistaken assumption that 
such a confession refers to an eclipse of God or 
a withdrawal of God from either history or the 
creation. Rather, an authentic language speaking 
about the death of God must inevitably be speaking 
about the death of God himself. The radical 
Christian proclaims that God has actually died 
in Christ, that his death is both a historical 
and a cosmic event, and, as such, it is a final 
and irrevocable event, which cannot be reversed 
by a subsequent religious or cosmic moyement.iOO
Altizer speaks of this event variously as"a forward-moving
esohatological process of redemption, a process embodying
a progressive movement of Spirit Into flash," "a concrete
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and actual daaeent of the sacred Into the profane," and
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as "the forward movement of the Incarnation." He 
does not consider the Incarnation an Isolated event in 
the past which happened once for all, but, along with the 
Crucifixion, as the primary expression of the death of 
God, which is to say, "the forward"moving process of sal­
vation,
There are two senses in which the death of God can
be understood, according to Altizer; what is more, there
is an inevitable correlation between the t«0“-"Qod*a
self-revelation and his self-negation of kenosia."
The God who reveals himself in history is the 
God who empties himself of the plenitude of his 
primordial Being; thereby he actually and truly 
becomes manifest in history and finally history 
becomes not simply the arena of revelation but 
the very Incarnate Body of God. ...Indeed, from 
the Christian point of view, revelation and in­
carnation are inseparable, being but two faces of 
a single process, a process wherein God both re­
veals himself in and becomes incarnate as the very 
opposite of his original Identity.
Although this self-revelation and self-negation of God in 
history will never "assume a final and definitive form," 
but will undergo "a continual metamorphosis,"the con­
sequence of this never-ending process is seen to be the 




In hla emphasis on the "aelf-imfoldlng" of Oocl in 
the world and the reconciliation of differences in a 
m l n s M m W a  Altlzer can perhaps be best
understood as a kind of secular Nicholas of Ouaa. H© is 
concerned that Christians recover an apocalyptic faith 
and return to the esohatological ground of early Christ"* 
ianityi indeed, he speaks on one occasion of the Kingdom 
of Cod as the "esohatological goal" of the kenotic move*- 
ment of the death of Cod (and by "goal," ha means not 
something static, to be arrived at, but rather a "dawning.") 
In sum, the death of Cod means that God died in Jesus 
Christ and dies in history. These are not two deaths, 
but, as we have seen, two expressions of the simultaneously 
self'"revealing, self-annihilating movement of God into 
the world.
Instead of taking Altizer*a use of the word kenoqi,s 
at face value, we would do well to ask how he is using it. 
There are three Christian doctrines (one might include 
Creation as a fourth) which have commonly been interpreted 
kanotieally in the not too distant theological past. Is 
it in connection with Incarnation or Atonement or Christ*" 
ology that Altizer Is using k^no^is? Surely in connection 
with all three. However, while the kanotic theory was more 
or less successful (depending on who employed it) in making 
sense of the doctrines of Incarnation, Atonement, and
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Chriatology In the phase of theological thinking just
prior to the Christian affirmation of the death of God,
it is doubtful that it can he of value to theological
thinking about the death of God*
The gospel of Christian atheism, as Altizer expoiinds
it, contains, indeed, the good news of liberation from
the Spirit and for the flesh; but its "esohatological
goal" is nevertheless short of the affirmation which
Altizer so desperately desires to make. Elsewhere he
has written,
today the task of thought is the negation of 
history, and most particularly the negation of 
the history created by Western man. But this 
negation must be dialectical, which means that 
finally it must be afflrmtion.lOo
He goes on to warn that the religious danger of our
time is Gnosticism," which is based on "a profound hatred
of the world and of existence in the world."
Only one attitude to the world is open to the 
GnosticÎ negation. Nor can this world negation 
be dialectical. It can be nothing less than 
simple, ruthless, ultimate negation.1G7
Being as he is thus bo acutely aware of the (admittedly
threatening) danger of the negativity of Gnosticism,
Altizer wills the death of God with such vehemence that
he throws his dialectical negation off balance and topples
willy-nilly into a simple, ruthless, ultimate affirmation
of the world, which alone cannot liberate us but only lead
us to submission and despair.
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If ever anyone desired to teach us to accept and
affirm the world, it was Nietzsche with his Dionysus.
But ha was also at pains to find a way of shaping and
changing it which would amount to neither submission and
endurance, on the one hand,nor denial, on the other.
How well Nietzsche succeeded remins to be seen.^’^ ® That
Altizer*8 exposition of the death of God falls short of
what even he himself intends can be thrown into relief
by setting two apparently similar, yet very different
rhetorical questions of his side by side.
What can the Christian fear of darkness, when 
ha knows that Christ has conquered darkness, that 
God will be all in all?109
What can the Christian fear of the power of dark­
ness when he can name our darkness as the fulfill­
ment of the self-emptying of God in Christ?110
In the former, the Christian need not fear the power of
darkness because the darkness has been conquered by Christ|
in the latter, the Christian is invited to affirm even the
darkness because it really isn't darkness at all, but a
stage in the kenotie metamorphosis of God. The former Is
lnfo3?med by Nietzsche, the latter by Blake and Hegel.
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Morgan is right in saying that Nietzsche attributed 
the death of God to Christianity's own insatiable 
will to truth which, though originally a quest for 
the Absolute, and satisfied when it came to rest in 
the Absolute, gradually degenerated into "a restless 
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nothing beyond life and nothing lass than it shall 
be accepted. 'The death of God' explains the re­
jection of other-worldly ideals ; they have become 
nihilistic. The fragmentary ones arose because some 
instrument of life was mistaken for its end; some 
part for the whole." (p. II6) One of the most 
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dubiousness of eonsdance as a moral guide. Once 
we discover "that traditional tïîoralife, depends upon 
the existence of a ‘moral world order’ : à God of
righteousness whose will establishes the moral law, 
who speaks through man’s conscience^ who rewards 
obedience and punishes siïîs" then "if ’God is dead,’ 
conscience can no longer olalm to be an oracle of 
living truth..,." (p. 168)
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4. The only humanly possible atheism*
Nietzsche said, "God is dead," and 
that is quite different from saying, 
"God does not exist," that is, he can™ 
not be, does not exist, will not be, 
and never lived. On the contrary, he 
lAias alivel And this is at least the 
only humanly possible atheism, the only 
form of atheism accessible to men*^
-™Franz Overbook
I
These "words of Franz Overbeck are of g;reat value for 
our understanding of Nietzsche's pronouncetmnt of God's 
death. Overbeck's point is quite simple, but profound in 
its simplicity. The proclamation of God's death is not 
to be taken as a catalyst to arguments Ebout the existence 
of God, which are invariably as boring as they are useless. 
Nietzsche himself says, speaking not about God in parti­
cular at this point, but about the metaphysical world in 
general.
It Is true, there could be a metaphysical world; 
the absolute possibility of it can hardly be
resisted.........but one can do nothing at all
with it, to say nothing of allowing happiness, 
salvation and life to depend on the spider- 
spinnings of such a possibility. For one could 
assert nothing at all about a metaphysical world 
except its otherness, an inaccessible, incompre­
hensible otherness. It would be a thing with 
negative characteristics. Even if the existence 
of such a world were proven beyond all doubt, it 
would be certain that this knowledge would be 
the most irrelevant knowledge of all, still more 
irrelevant than the knowledge of the chemical 
analysis of water woyld be to a seaman facing 
the peril of a gale.
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so also with attempts to prove the existence or non™ 
existence of Ood« Not God is or is not or never was or 
never could have been, rather God lived and died. God 
is dead. As Overbeck so rightly perceived, this is an 
expression of the only humanly possible atheism.
Ab we saw in the preceding section, this statement 
has had different meanings for different people. It has 
been interpreted philosophically, psychologically, histo­
rically, and from the viewpoint of the history of religions. 
And it has been interpreted away by those who were af­
fronted and threatened by it as the aberrant utterance of 
a feeble-minded philosopher. Let us attempt, with the aid 
of Fraud's myth of the primal horde, a theological inter­
pretation.
II
Freud's theory of the phylogenesis of man, namely
"his reconstruction of the prehistory of mankind from
the primal ho3X3e through patricide to c i v i l i z a t i o n , " 3
has been Ignored out of existence or vehemently rejected
by most of Freud's heirs as being unscientific, by which
they apparently mean that there simply is no evidence to
prove that Freud was "right," that his reconstruction is
the "correct' one. But what appears at first glance to
be such a glaring exception to Freud's otherwise iron rul% 
of integrity in such matters deserves olose3r» scrutiny.
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If Freud's hypothesis is not corroborated by 
any anthropological evidence, it would have to 
be discarded altogether, except for the facè that 
it telescopes, in a sequence of catastrophic 
events, the historical dialectic of domination 
and thereby elucidates aspects of civilization 
hitherto unexplained. We use Freud's anthropolo­
gical speculation only in this senses for its 
■âZafoP-Xla. value. '
It is precisely in this way, as an aid to interpretation, 
that I propose to use Freud's myth of the primal horde.^ 
According to Freud's reconstruction, the phylogenesis 
of man began when life was organized by domination, when 
one man succeeded in establishing and sustaining his power 
over all others. This one man was the father, the possessor 
and monopolizer of pleasure, that is, of the desired women 
of the horde, with whom he produced children. The sons 
he then subjugated to his domination by forbidding them 
access to the desired women with threats of death, castra­
tion, or expulsion from the horde.
The similarity of this hypothesis to Nietzsche's 
attempt to account for repression by positing a master- 
slave dichotomy is obvious. Both theories hinge on the 
concept of domination. But Freud's theory is more ingenious 
in that it goes beyond the establishment of domination to 
account for its maintenance and sustenance. Despite the 
fact that both Freud's primal father and Nietzsche's 
master established their domination out of self-interest, 
the primal father was also successful in creating a
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semblance of order on the basis of which the horde be­
came a group. By monopolizing the pleasure, he forced 
the sons to suppress their sexual desires. This "en­
forced abstinence" (Herbert Marcuse's phrase) provided 
the rechanneled energy for the tasks which had to be 
performed if the group was to continue to exist.
The constraint on the gratification of instinctual 
needs imposed by the father, the suppression of 
pleasure, thus not only was the result of domina­
tion but also created the mental pre-conditions 
for the continued functioning: of dominât ion. ^
This can not be said of Nietzsche's meters. The domina­
tion which they established depended solely on their con­
tinued presence and strength. Their domination could not 
outlive them.
But why was the primal father so successful? How 
were the "mental preconditions for the continued function­
ing of domination" created? The next development in 
Freud's hypothesis is the rebellion of the sons against 
the lyrant father, which takes the form of their killing 
and devouring him. After the murder of the father, we 
would normally expect the sons to take advantage of their 
new freedom from domination. And since the rebellion was 
directed essentially against the father's taboo on women, 
it is to be expected that the sons would now break this 
taboo and seek "integral gratification" of their sexual 
desires, a gratification represented by the mother who.
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"for the first and last time, provided suoh gratification."'^ 
To our surprise, something quite different happens. The 
sons form a brother clan, "reinstate" the father to his 
position of authority by deifying him, and agree among 
themselves to uphold the taboo on the women of the horde, 
thus taking upon themselves the task of dominating once 
carried out by the patriarch alone. Why the sudden change 
of plans? Why the refusal or inability of the sons to 
relish the newly-won liberty? Why the reinstatement and 
glorification of a tyrant who had until recently so hardhly 
suppressed his sons and monopolized the women of the horde? 
Fraud cites two reasons, guilt and fear.
According to Freud's theory of the origin of con­
science, the brothers' sense of guilt may justly be called 
the origiipal sense of guilt. It arose out of an original 
feeling of remorse which in turn was the outgrowth of the 
ambivalent feelings of love and hate which the sons bore 
toward their father. In Freud's own words.
When one has a sense of guilt after having com­
mitted a misdeed, and because of it, the feeling 
should more properly be called remose. It re­
lates only to a deed that has been done, and, of 
course, it presupposes that a conscience--the 
readiness to feel guilty— was already in exist­
ence before the dead took place. Remorse of this 
sort can, therefor# never help us to discover the 
origin of conscience and of the sense of guilt 
in general.
But if the human sense of guilt goes back to the 
killing of the primal father, that was after all
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a ease of ' remowe' # Are we to assume that (at 
that time) a eonscianoe and a sense of guilt were 
not, as we have presupposed, in existence.before 
the deed? If not, where, in this case, did the 
remorse come from? There is no doubt that this 
case should explain the secret of the sense of 
guitt to ue and put an end to our difficulties.
And I believe it does. This remorse was the 
result of the primordial ambivalence of feeling 
towards the father. His sons hated him, but they 
loved him, too# After their hatred had been sat­
isfied by their act of aggression, their love came 
to the fore in their remorse for the deed. It 
set up the super-ego by identification with the 
father; it gave that agency the father's power, 
as though as a punishment for the deed of aggres­
sion they had carried out against him, and it 
created the restrictions which were intended to 
prevent a repetition of the deed. And since the 
inclination to aggresslonness against the father 
was repeated in the following generations, the 
sense of guilt, too, persisted, and it was rein­
forced once more by every piece of aggressiveness 
that was suppressed and carried over to the super­
ego. Now, I think we can at last grasp two things 
perfectly clearly; the part played by love in 
the origin of conscience and the fatal inevita­
bility of the sense of guilt, whether on© has 
killed one's father or has abstained from doing 
so is not really the decisive thing. One is 
bound to feel guilty in either case, for the 
sense of guilt is an expression of the conflict 
due to a#ivalence, of the eternal struggle be­
tween Eros and the instinct of destruction or 
death.8
As for the second reason for the brotheW move 
from their newlynuon liberty to renewed domination, fear, 
we need only d3r*aw attention to the fact that, despite his 
harshness, the father had, in fact, succeeded in estab­
lishing and maintaining in his person a semblance of order 
on which the life of the group depended and which now 
threatened to collapse in his absence.
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The assassins, overcome, with guilt at having mur­
dered their father, and haunted by the grox-^ îing apprehension 
that the group which he had created and maintained might 
soon begin to dielntegrate for lack of authority, hurried 
to assuage their guilt and eliminate the threat to the 
group by deifying the father and introjecting their feel­
ings of guilt. The group was preserved and the father 
continued to live and function in the old constraints, now 
introjeoted, in the ruling sons#
Hot all was loss. There was one advantage accruing 
to the members of the group as a result of this putsch. 
Pleasure, heretofore monopolized by the tyrant father, 
was now "distributed" among the brothers* But this small 
advantage was outweighed by the sacrifice that had been 
made, namely that the tyrant broth»s were the objects of 
their own domination. In contrast to their father before 
them, who was the cause of repression in others but him­
self unrepressed, the brothers were both repressors and 
repressed. This is the meaning of the introJaetion of the 
prohibitions once ipposed by and embodied in the father.
It should now be clear that Freud understood the 
maintenance of civilization to depend on guilt and the 
development of civilization to consist of a seesam move­
ment from domination to liberation to domination.
1 1 7
In the development of civilisation, freedom 
bQGomas possible only as ilbe®.M2û, Llbanty
follows domination"^-and leads to the reaffirma­
tion of domination.9
But is this really the last word? Has not something
integral to this myth of the phylogenetic development
of aian been omitted in the conclusion? Is there not one
eonaequence yet to be drawn?
Aside from their feelings of parricidal guilt, there 
are some other guilt feelings which must have caused the 
brothers some sleepless nights as well. As we have noticed, 
the brothers have re-established domination and thus both 
repented their deed and ensured the continued existence of 
the group. However, this is only half the story, and the 
negative half at that. At best, a limited progress has 
been made, certainly not worth the death of the father.
The brothers set out to liberate themselves from domination, 
but achieved only a modified form of domination. And the 
short span of time between prohibitions imposed by the 
father and self-imposed prohibitions was apparently dis­
turbed by doubts about both the "rightness" and the outcome 
of their revolt and plana for the new regime. This all 
amounts to the simple fact that the brothers had betrayed 
themselves 1 They carried out their original intentions 
only to annul their efforts in the end. Surely they har­
bored guilt feelings towards themselves for having failed 
in this venture.
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The overthrow of the king-father is a crime, 
but so is his resteration-^and both are necessary 
for the progress of civilization. The crime 
against the reality principle is redeemed by the 
crime against the pleasure principle; redemption 
thus cancels itself. The sense of guilt is sus­
tained in spite of repeated and intensified re­
demption; anxiety persists because the crime 
against the pleasure principle is not redeemed. 
There is guilt over a deed that has not been 
aooompllEhed: liberation.
This is the one "loose end"--and, indeed, it is an im­
portant one--left unaccounted for in Freud's myth of the 
primal horde. Though the brothers have atoned for their 
original deed (the murder of the father), they are still 
burdened by unredeemed guilt feelings stemming from their 
betrayal of their intended act of liberation.
Although he makes no explicit mention of the unre­
deemed sense of guilt in this context, it is from Freud 
himself that we take our cue to pit this sense of guilt 
against the original sense of guilt which followed as a 
result of the murder of the father. Specifloally, it is 
his theory of instincts which justifies, indeed, which 
compels us to Juxtapose these two senses of guilt.
In this aspect of Freud's thought the key concept 
is antagonism (Freud's ambiya,l.ence). Every humn being 
is the embodiment of a continuing struggle between what 
Freud came to call the life instinct and the death in­
stinct, that is, between the desire to progress, to become 
oneself by freeing oneself from one's ties to the past.
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and the desire to regress, to return to the rest and 
integral gratification of one's desl3?es remembered from 
infancy. This ontogenetic struggle of the instincts is 
parallel to the phylogenetic antagonism between the desire 
for domination and the desire for liberation, which we have 
recounted above. Granting the validity of this analogy 
and recalling the intensity of the strife between the life 
instinct and the death instinct, we are forced to doubt 
the extreme one^sldedness of the struggle between libera­
tion and domination. It looks as though we may not have to 
content ourselves with the inevitability of domination.
Are there any other rays of hope? Yes, one, namely 
the dubiousness of "the fatal inevitability of the original 
sense of g u i l t . I n  the long quotation from Civilization 
and its Discontents cited above, Freud describes in two 
simple sentences what he elsewhere calls the ’’return of 
the repressed," namely his contention that "the Inclination 
to aggressiveness against the father was repeated in the 
following generations," and, thus, that "the sense of guilt, 
too, persisted...." This maybe accurate history, but 
there is no inevitably move from the inclination to ag­
gressiveness to the sense of guilt, "Whether one has 
killed one's father or has abstained from doing so is not 
Ideally the decisive thing." True, in either case, one will 
have wished his death. However, it does not necessarily
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follov^  from thlB that "one is bound to feel guilty in 
either case/* What Freud believed to be fatally inevit­
able Is lAiholly dependent on the remorse felt by the sons 
at having killed (or desired to kill) the father* And 
this remorse Is the result of the ambivalence of feelings 
of love and hate Mhich the sons bore toward the father* 
That they hate him is easy to believe. But that they 
love him is less imaginable. And surely Fraud meant more 
by "love" in this ease than what Herbert Marcuse calls "a 
biological affection^""ambivalent emotions which were ex"- 
pressed In the wish to replace and to imitate the father^ 
to Identify oneself with him# with his pleasure as well 
as with his p o w e r . " I f  by "love" here is meant a com*^  
bination of respect^ fear and a desire to imitate and 
displacethen surely the sons x-^ jould not have been so 
overcome by remorse at having killed their father* Surely 
Freud meant by "love' something more binding than "a bio­
logical affection." To sum up^ the fatal inevitability 
of the sense of guilt depends on the inevitability of 
feelings of remorse^ which in turn depend on the sons’ 
ambivalent love-hate feelings for the father. The role 
played by love in this sbhame is, as Freud himself ad­
mitted, indeed major! perhaps the sense of guilt is not 
as inevitable as Fraud believed it to be.
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Keeping in mind this reconstruct3.on of Freud’s hypo­
thesis of the primal horde, and leaving undeveloped for 
the moment the two rays of hope which can foe derived from 
it--the dependence of a sense of guilt in the parricidal 
sons uponfaellngs of love for the father and the potency 
of the sense of guilt in the brothers for having failed 
to liberate themselves from domimtion^-let us proceed 
to our theological interpretation of Nlet^'sche’s proclama­
tion of the death of God.
Ill
Upon a close lock at Hietsîsche’s statements about 
the death of God— and there aee many besides the popular 
words of the madman"^-we are struck by an ambiguity.
Faithful to his method, Nietzsche is experimenting with 
attitudes, trying: on different views of this phenomenon, 
sizing it up from various perspectives, and he ends up 
saying at least two things about it. One is that "God 
is deadl God remains dead*. And we have killed him!"^3 
The other, " * God is dead ^ God died of his pity for mmn* *"3.4 
Both cases witness to a death of God, the significant 
difference being hg\± he met bis death. In the words of 
the madman, he is m^rdpred and we are his murderers ; 
in the less familiar words of Thus Snoke gîarathustra.
God died, in this particular passage, of pity.
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Thanks to B^reud*s insights concerning the reaction 
of the sons to having murdered their father, we are 
tredding familiar ground in the case of Nietzsche’s 
former proclamation. Nietzsche’s madman, that frantic 
seeker of God, is both afraid of the consequences of 
having killed God and plagued by a sense of guilt. Ne 
recall that the madman tells Iris fellow assassins of 
the chaos he sees encroaching upon them as a result of 
their terrible deed. But these unbelievers, who had 
poked fun at him before for running through the market 
place in broad daylight with a lighted lantern and "seeking 
God," are now silent. They merely gaze at the madman, 
and he sees in their glassy stares their lack of compre­
hension. He shatters hie lantern on the ground and 
laments, "X come too soon...."
Nietzsche h/lmself had come too soon. As early as 
1873:, ' he had expressed his fear of the conséquences of 
the death of God. It was in that year, in the first of 
his Tin timely Meditations,, a polemical essay directed 
against
that he raised a warning finger against an uncritical 
acceptance of Darwin’s discoveries. It will perhaps be 
instructive for us, before proceeding with the develop­
ment of our theological interpretation, to look at this 
os tens :1b ly theological reaction to the death of God and 
Nietzsche’s critique of it.
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In this early essay, Nietzsche, avarlling himself of 
an approach which ho was to use several times again In the 
future, attacked, not Strauss the man or Strauss the theo­
logian, but Strauss the BiMupgsphi 1 is,ter..^^ That is to 
say, his vehemence and aggressiveness were directed against 
a real but invisible danger which could be m d e  vis:lble 
only with the aid of ’a strong magnifying glass"“-in this 
case, S t r a u s s T h e  Bildungsphiligter were advocates of 
a sham culture who were intoxicated by the (falsa) as­
sumption that Germany’s victory over France in the Franco- 
Prussian War was a cultural as well as a military victory. 
Strauss’s The pld^ Faith and The New * published in I872 
and devoured by the "outturally emancipated" readers 
throughout Germany (it was in its sixth printing and be3.ng 
hailed as a classio when Nietzsche wrote his essay) was 
characteristic of the growing mood of certainty among 
citizens of the new lejch that Germany was emerging at 
the center of European culture.
In The Old Faith and The New, Strauss asks and answers 
four questions : 1) Are we still Christians? No. 2) Are 
we still religious? Yes, in that we demand the same piety 
for the All (the universe) as the man of the "old faith" 
demanded for bis God. 3) How do we view the world? 
Optimistically, in terms of scientific positivism. 4) How 
do we order our lives? On the basis of a little Darwin,
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a dash of Goethe and Lessing, and what Karl Barth has
called "a great deal of anonymous, flatly bourgeois
m o r a l i t y T h e  book even contains a quite practical
(and very telling) explanation of how the men of the
"new faith" spend their Sundays* In order to better
understand the reasons for their unexpected cultural
promotion, they engage in historical studies,
which are now being made available even to the 
non-scholarly in a series of historical works, 
written in an attractive and popular national 
stylej in addition, we attempt to extend our 
knowledge of nature, for which there is also 
no shortage of easily understandable resources a 
and finally, we find, in the writings of our 
great poets, in the performances of the works 
of our great musicians, a stimulus for spirit 
and mind, for fantasy add humor, which leaves 
nothing to be desired. Thus we live, thus we 
happily spend our days.3*8
Finally, for the purpose of further clarification, two 
appendices ware added to the book; the one treating Ger­
many’s great poets, the other he*great musicians. This, 
in brief, is Strauss’s confession of the "new faith."
Nietzsche put three questions to Strauss : How does
the new believer conceive his heaven? How far does the 
boldness which his new belief affords him reach? How 
does he write his books? Nietzsche expacts Strauss the 
confessor to answer the first two questions, and Strauss 
the author to answer the last. We shall concern ourselves 
with only the questions directed to Strauss the confessor.
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The first question Is easily answered. But Nietzsche
asks it, because he believes it to be highly signifieant
for our ttnderstanding of a man, to find out how he imagines
his heaven. Strauss is outspoken in his rejection of
"an immortal, heavenly l i f e " the heaven of the "new
believer" is, above all, an earthly heaven. Furthermore,
this heaven is made up of the stuff of the everyday--home,
family, children, work, nation--a11 this and more, the
"more" meaning specifically, continued edification from
the great classical poets and musicians. Of course, the
cultural Philistines do reserve the right to decide just
which of these great men are really "classical" and which
fall to measure up. According to Nietzsche,
they want to know about an artist only insofar aa 
he is suitable for service in their sitting-rooms, 
and they are aware of only two possibilities, 
whiffing and burning.^0
Nietzsche has the answer to his first question* The
cultural philistine
dwells in the works of our great poets and musi­
cians like a worm that lives by destroying and
admiring, by feeding and worshiping, by digesting!
That is his heaven which leaves nothing to be desired I 
The second question--how far does the boldness con­
ferred by this " new faith" r*each?--ia the significant 
question for us# This is the ethical question X'Ohieh de­
rives from Strauss’s own query— how do we view the world?
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--With its blandly optimistic answer in which he lauds 
Da™in as one of the greatest benefactors of mankind.
Once again, how do we view the world? By first renouncing 
Christianity and then by anil a ting the aid of modern 
natural science*
Strauss was right in admitting that after Darwin, it 
was no longer possible to continue to repeat the time­
worn pious phrases eibout God guiding the development of 
man. In his Origcln of the anaciee (l859) Darwin had suf­
ficiently established the principle of natural causation, 
and later, in his Descent of Man. which was first pub­
lished in 1871, he addressed himself to the specific task 
of throwing light on the development of man. By "natural 
causation," Dawln Intended to express two sides of one 
relation. On the side of the organism, natural causation 
referred to the perpetual "struggle for existence" which 
characterizes life preserving itself under unfavorable 
conditions; on the side of the environment, natural 
causation denoted natural selection, i.e. the principle 
by which the environment favors and preserves certain 
qualities useful to the individual.
Both Nietzsche and Strauss were aware that Darwin 
had established the evolution hypothesis. In fact, they 
both agreed with his findings. But the similarity ends
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there, for their reactions to Da™In could hardly have 
been more different. As we have seen, Strauss was super­
ficially optimistic.
He announces with admirable candor that he is 
no longer a Christian, but he does not want to 
disturb any contentment of any sort; it seems 
eontradictory to him to establish an association 
to destroy an association— which is really not 
so contradictory. With a certain rugged satis” 
faction he cloaks himself in the hairy garments 
of our ape genealogists and praises Darwin as 
one of the greatest benefactors of mankind--but 
abashed, we see that his ethics is constructed 
completely detached from the questions how do 
we view the world
Nietzsche, on the other hand, was shaken violently* He
was aware, not only of Darwin’s conclusions, but also of
the as yet undrawn consequences of them, consequences
that probably would deal a death blow to the very culture
the thought themselves to be championing.
Here was Strauss’s opportunity to show us the bold­
ness of his "new faith," But he failed. He missed both 
the unspoken consequences of Darwin’s argument and his 
one chance to be bold. He realized that the "struggle for 
existence" is the law of nature, but he proceeded from 
this realization to stale imperatives about ethics and 
religion.
Strauss has not yet learned that an idea can 
never make men more ethical and better, and 
that preaching morals is just as easy as pro­
viding reasons for morals is difficult; instead.
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it should have been his task seriously to ex­
plain and derive the phenomena of human goodness, 
mercy, love and self-denial, which after all 
exist as a matter of fact, from his Darwinistic 
presuppositions : whereas he preferred to flee
the task of by a leap into the impera-
tive. In this leap, he even hops light-heartedly 
over Darwin’s fundamental axiom. "Forget," says 
Strauss, "at no time that you are a human being 
and not a mere nature being (Naturwesen); at no 
time, that all others are likewise human beings, 
i.e. notwithatancllng all individual diversity, 
the same as you, with the same needs and demands 
as you— that is the essence of all morality,"
"B^orget at no time that you and all that you per­
ceive in yourself and around you is no dis con­
nected fragment, no wild chaos of atoms and 
accidents, rather that everything proceeds ac­
cording to eternal laws out of the origin of 
all life, all reason and all good— that Is the 
assonea of religion,"^3
This is what enraged Nietzsche! Strauss was quit© willing
to reject Christianity, but he insisted on continuing to
preach morals and be religious. He accepted the world of
W j j m  g œ i m  but w&s unwilling to admit
that if existence must be described in terms of struggle, 
then ethics and religion are rendered meaningless,
The theological esoape-hatch in the face of this 
problem, both in Nietzsche’s day and still today, is to 
say that Darwin was of course only concerned with the 
effects of natural selection between variations, not with
the origin of the variations, This is true, but for
theology to move, with a sigh of relief, from that reali­
zation to confident statements about the One Originalor 
and Creator of life is to avoid the issue, not to tackle 
it.
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Me have seen Strauss’s obtuseness in the face of the 
ethical problem raised by Darwin’s findings, but what 
about religion? In what sense can the cultural philistine 
reimin religious and continue to believe in the eternal 
laws of life?
It is by means of a faulty interpretation of some 
famous words of Lessing that Strauss thinks he can keep 
his balance. Lessing’s words can be paraphrased thus $ 
were God to offer all Truth with his right hand and, 
with his left, the constant desire and search for that 
Truth, including of course the stipulation that it could 
never be found, he would humbly request that the contents 
of the left hand be given him. Strauss Interprets these 
words as the expression of the restless desire for inquiry 
and activity. He perceives a hidden meaning in Lessing’s 
words which he thinks serves as the best answer to Schopen- 
hauar’s pessimism, which he considers an insult to man’s 
intellect and feelings. Schopenhauer had spoken of the 
"ill-advised God, who knew nothing better to do than to 
enter into this miserable w orld."Strauss  replies;
"And what if the Creator Himself were also of Lessing’s 
opinion, that striving is to be preferred to undisturbed 
possession?"Here Btrauss stands in his self-made maze 
of metaphysics, with a God who chooses to forgeit the 
Truth itself for the unending and always erring search for
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Truth, Why does he not admit that Darwin has success- 
fully knocked the supporting buttresses from beneath our 
belief in a Creator and providential God? Why does he 
not confess that the whole edifice of our ethical stan­
dards has come crashing down about us? Because he is 
afraid! The boldness of his "new faith" is not there,
A a Nietzsche put
does not dare honestly to say ; I have lib­
erated you from a supporting and compassionate 
God ; the ’universe* is only a rigid gearing 
machine, be careful that it does not crush you!
He does not dare it, therefore it is the witch’s 
turn, namely metaphysics# Straussian metaphysics 
is, however, for the philistine, pref63?able to 
Christian metaphysics, and the image of an 
erring God is more sympathetic than that of a 
miracle-working God# For he, the philistine pg 
himself, errs, but he has never worked a miracle.
A more honest response to the challenge of Darwin might
have been some such confession as this*
We have left the land and boarded ship! We 
have demolished the bridge behind us--what is 
more,, we have demolished the land behind us I 
Mow, little ship, take care! Beside you lies 
the ocean. It is true, it does not always roar; 
and now and then it lies there like silk and 
gold and a vision of goodness. But there will 
come a time when you will apprehend that it is 
Infinite and that there is nothing more fearful 
than infinity. Oh, the poor bird which felt 
itself free and now thrusts itself against the 
walls of this cage! Woe unto you if homesick- 
ness for the land should befall you, as if there 
would have been more freedom there--and there is 
no "land" anymore!^f
Nietzsche had indeed come too soon with his warning
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that the consequences of God’s demise could be fearful 
as well as promising. He too was met with blank stares 
and unhearing ears# But his madman understood. He 
was afraid— and guilty.
The madman asks his accoiiplicea,,
How shall wOg the murderers of all murderers^ 
comfort ourselves? What was holiest and most 
powerful of all that the world has yet owned 
has bled to death under our knives# Who will 
wipe this blood off us? What water is there 
for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of 
atonement^ what sacred games shall we have to 
invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too 
great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods 
simply to seem wortlyof it? There has never 
been a greater deed ; and whoever will be born 
after us--for the sake of this deed he will be 
part of a higher history than all history hith­
erto
Beginning with the last question and moving to the firsts 
must we not become gods ourselves to be worthy of this 
deed? we cannot become gods. Is the gravity of this
dead tot too great for us? Yes^ it is too great* What 
kinds of propitiatory celebrations must we now Invent?
We must invent holy celebrations of self-sacrifice and 
repentance. With what water could we cleanse ourselves? 
With the pure water of forgiveness# Who will wash the 
blood from us? God the Father and forgiver of sins.
How can we comfort ourselvesj, the murderers of all mur­
derers? By reinstating the Father to his position of 
authorityj, and by atoning for our deed through repentance
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and the a c c e p t a of his forgiveness# And the "higher
history"? In what sense are we to understand the history
which follows the death of God to he "higher" than the
history which preceded the deed? In the sense that it
is only after the death of the primal father that the
brothers agree among themselves to perpetuate the taboos
which the father had enfox*oed by supresslon and domina-
tioiijy thus preserving the order on which their life as a
greup depended # In aborts, this agreement to self-imnosl-
tipn of prohibitions and constraints is the bii*th of
civilization.
o #,in a strict sense, civilization begins only 
in the brother clan^ when the taboos^ now self- 
imposed by the ruling brothers^ Implement re- 
preBs3.cn in the eommon interest of preserving 
the group as a v^ hole,
Thisf then^ would be the most obvious interpretation of
the killing of God, using Freud’s myth of the primal
horde, that is, to see the consequences of the dead as
being a subtle interplay of the sons’ sense of guilt,
being itself a product of remorse which Is a result of
the faelingjs of lev© that overwhelm them after they have
committed the pa.rrioic1al crime, and their fear of the
possible outcome of their crime, namely the collapse of
the order which the father had established#
But there is yet another feasible interpretation
of the murder of God.
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It la at this point that we must pick up one of 
the loose ends left dangling at the and of our recon­
struction of Freud’s hypothesis of the phylogenetic 
history of mn, namely the dubiousness of the inevitab­
ility of the sense of guilt, (see p.118 above) As we 
recall, even Freud admitted that the sense of guilt in 
the sons was dependent upon their feelings of love for 
their father which overcame them after his death at their 
hands as a feeling of remorse. From this dependence 
emerges, at least theoretically, the possibility of a 
remorseless murder# If we take the word "remorse-less," 
not in its figurative sense, i.e. most commonly connoting 
cruelty, viciousness, etc., but literally "free from 
feelings of remorse*’ and therefore guilt-less (the sense 
of guilt depends on feelings of remorse), we are con­
fronted with the killing of God from a totally different 
perspective. This remorse-less murder would of course, in 
the end, mean the absence of any feelings of love on the 
part of the sons for the father, in this case, since we 
are looking at the murder of God, the absence in ourselves 
of feelings of love for God, the Father*
But is this not stretching the point a bit too far? 
Isn’t this really an outrageous impossibility? I think 
not, at any rate not for Nietzsche. (And not only for 
Nietzsche. One need only think of the frightful Images
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of God In much of the art of the past hundred years-" 
from Kafka’s Inapproachable Inhabitant of ZWjCagilm. to 
Ingmar Bergman’s aggressive spider In "Through A Glass 
Darkly" — the shear nuaiber of which forbids our disregarding 
them as the Isolated products of a few sick men.) It is 
not unusual to find in Nietzsche’s work such references 
to God as " j a i l e r , "30 as"a God for the ailing, a ’Saviour,’1| 
For Nietzsche, God was the embodiment of everything con­
trary to life itself, a castrator of man--indead^ one 
might say, the primal father become ruthless, seeking 
revenge from his sons for his murder *
The Christian conception of God— God as god of 
the sick, God as a spider, God as apirit--is one 
of the most corrupt conceptions of the divine 
ever attained on earth * It may even represent 
the low-water mark in the descending develop­
ment of divine types. God degenerated into the 
contradiction of life, instead of being its trans­
figuration and eternal Yes I God as the declara­
tion of war against life, against nature, against 
the will to live! God-^the formula for every 
slander against "this world," for every lie about 
the beyond"! God--the deification of nothingness, 
the will to nothingness pronounced h o l y ! 32
Similarly, this time in the context of an attack on
morality.
-natural morality— that is, almost every 
morality which has so far been taught, revered, 
and preached--turns, conversely, against the 
instincts of life ; it is condemnation of these 
instincts, now secret, now outspoken and impudent 
When it says, "God looks at the heart," it says 
No to both the lowest and the highest desires of 
life, and posits God as the enemy o£. life. The
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saint In whom God delights is the ideal eunuch*
Life has come to an end where the " kingdom of
God" begins#33
If we, on the one hand, are not threatened by these in­
dictments, but, on the other, do not share Nietzsche’s
views at this stage, we may fairly ask, not "is Nietzsche 
right or wrong"?, not "is God really that way or isn’t 
he"?, rather, taking Nietzsche at his word, "how did God 
get that wayf?
According to Fraud, as we have already noted, "the 
inclination to aggressiveness against the father was re­
peated in the following generations The phylogenetic 
history of man is a history of the return of the repressed. 
What happened for the first time when the brothers in that 
mythical primal horde agreed among themselves to repress 
their desires for integral instinctual satisfaction has 
happened again and again since the "original" founding 
of the brother elan, and it continues to happen. The 
return of the repressed and its r©-p#pr@ssion is the 
stuff of which civilization is made. In other words, 
what these first "brothers" did and what we do for the 
sake of our life together, appears to be identical. But 
the appearance is misleading, for there is one major dif­
ference, a difference which will help us understand how 
the primal father, that domineering and hated figure who
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nevertheless commanded a certain respect and inspired a 
certain awe in his sons, degenerated into a God who ap­
peared to men like Nietzsche as the vengeful castrator 
of his own sons.
Let us examine again a portion of the long quotation 
from wblch ocoupled us
above *
And since the inclination to aggressiveness 
against the father was repeated in the follow­
ing generations, the sense of guilt, too, per­
sisted (now comes the aignificant assertion), 
and it was reinforced once more by every piece 
of aggressiveness that was suppressed and car­
ried over to the super-ego.35
Here Is the solution to the puzzle» It (the brothers’ 
sense of guilt) was reinfoïined, added to, every time a 
"brother/* a "son," to use the idiom of the myth, sup­
pressed his feelings of aggressiveness toward the "father/* 
That is to say, the father, the super-ego, the receptacle 
and emlDodiment of all our "thou shalt not’s," in short,
large, jjgcrga^ t^ ie agLm ggŒÊG Ihâl 
Eâ# the "sons/* the "brothers/* dae^ra§aiâ* This is how 
God became a castrator of men* The more "civilized" we 
became, the stricter we were forced to become with our- 
selves ; and the stricter we became with ourselves, the 
crueler and more demanding became our God* Finally, the 
pain was too great, the cruelty unbearable. He had 
pushed us too far. If we were not fully to suffocate
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beneath his smothering, stifling aonstralnts, we would 
have to fight back* It bad become a ehoioe between his 
life and ours. In desperation, wa killed him*
The remorse-born-of-lova which ia the origin of a 
sense of guilt might well be thoroughly lacking in such 
a situation# Such an eruption of the desire for self- 
preservation could feasibly be void of the after-effects 
of a sense of guilt* What then would be the likely re­
action of these murderers-out-of-desperatlon? Their 
fathers and their fathers’ fathers sacrificed their liberty 
for new domination* But it was their guilt and fear that 
brought about that sacrifice* Surely these guilt-less 
murderers would not reinstate that which they hated so 
passionately and which nearly cost them their own lives? 
Probably not, but it is Just as unlikely that they could 
react at all positively to their newly-won freedom# Pre­
cisely because they were so "low" such a short time ago, 
because they had been exiled for so long, getting by, 
vegetating, existing only by being forced to take a bare 
minimum of risks, they would no doiabt find it impossible 
to adjust immediately to a life lived d a n g e r o u s l y , 36 
responsibly, to the full * And immediate adjustment would 
be compulsory * They would have no time to spare in taking 
charge of and responsibility for the whole lumbering mon­
ster of civilization, until recently controlled by the
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Iron hand of their father and without their participation, 
lest it take advantage of the death of its strong œster 
to play havoc with the established order and turn it into 
chaos. These guilt-less murderers are doomed, I fear, 
to that chaos. They will never master in time the con­
trols left vacant by their father. It is no simple feat; 
it demands concentration, the willingness to take risks, 
and above all, agility.3? Th^se guilt-less sons have 
suffered too long; the years of extreme repression have 
disfigured them and disabled them. It is asking too much.
IV
So much for two possible interpretations of 
Nietzsche*s words about the murder of God. Are either 
of them viable options for us? Does either describe our 
situation? Is either a faithful rendering of our experi­
ence of the death of God? X think not. For though we 
must in all honesty admit that God is dead, we are neither 
aware of a sense of guilt for having been involved in his 
murder (as in the first interpretation) nor does our feeling 
of guiltlessness correspond to the utter helplessness and 
inability to react positively to M s  death experienced by 
the desperate murderers in the second interpretation 
above. In short, we may draw one negative conclusion 
from our experience of the death of God, namely that 
we have not killM. him. How he has died for us remains
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to be seen* If the madman cannot help ub, perhaps 
Zarathustra can.
It Is In Thus Spoke Zarathustra that Nietzsche'a
statements about God having died (as opposed to his
having been murdered as in both instances above) are
most prevalent. Hear the words of Zarathustra as he
reflects "On the pitying"i
Alas, where in the world has there been more 
folly than among the pitying? And what in the 
world has caused more suffering than the folly 
of the pitying? Woe to all who love without 
having a height that is above their pityI
Thus spoke the devil to me once : "God too has
hie hells that is his love of man." And most 
recently I heard him say t h i s " G o d  is dead;
God died of his pity for
This same thought is taken up again later in a eoiiversa-
tion between Zarathustra and the last pope--"Retired",
Mot long, however, after Zarathustra had got 
away from the magician, he again saw somebody
sitting by the side of his path; a tall man in
black, with a gaunt, pale face; and this man dis­
pleased him exceedingly. "AlasI" he said to his 
heart, "there sits muffled-up melancholy, looking 
like the tribe of priests; what do tim. want in 
my realm? How now? I have scarcely escaped 
that magician; must another black artist cross 
my way so soon--some wizard with laying-on of 
hands, some dark miracle worker by the grace of 
Ood, some anointed world-slanderer whom the 
devil should fetch? But the devil is never where 
he should be; he always comes too late, this 
damned dwarf and clubfoot!"
Thus cursed Zarathustra, impatient in his heart, 
and he wondered how he might sneak past the black 
man, looking the other way. But behold, it hap­
pened otherwise. For at the same moment the
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seated man had already spotted him; and not 
unlike one on whom unexpected good fortune has 
been thrust, he jumped up and walked toward 
Zarathustra»
"Whoever you may be, you wanderer," he said,
%elp one who has lost his way, a seeker, an old 
man who might easily come to grief here. This 
region is remote and strange to me, and I have 
heard wild animals howlingi and he who might 
have offered me protection no longer exists 
himself* I sought the last pious man, a saint 
and hermit who, alone in his forest, had not 
yet heard what all the world knows today."
"What does all the world know today?"asked 
Zarathustra. "Perhaps this, that the old god in 
whom all the world once believed no longer lives?"
"As you say," replied the old man sadly. "And I 
served that old god until his last hour. But 
now I am retired, without a master, and yet not 
free, nor ever cheerful except In my memories.
That is why I climbed these mountains, that I 
might again have a festival at last, as is 
fitting for an old pope and church father^'-for 
behold, I am the last pope— a festival of pious 
memories and divine services. But now he him­
self is dead, the most pious ûîan, that saint in 
the forest who constantly praised his god with 
singing and burning. I did not find him when I 
found his cave; but there were two wolves inside, 
howling over his death, for all animals loved 
him. Bo I ran away. Had I then come to these 
woods and meunteins in vain? Then my heart de­
cided that I should seek another man, the most 
pious of all those who do not believe in God-- 
that I should seek Zarathustra!"
Thus spoke the old man, and he looked with sharp 
eyes at the man standing before him; but zara­
thustra seized the hand of the old pope and long 
contemplated it with admiration. "Behold, ven­
erable one!" he said then; "what a beautiful 
long hand! That is the hand of one who has 
always dispensed blessings. But now it holds 
him whom you seek, me, Zarathustra. It is I, 
the godless Zarathustra, who speaks: who is more
godless than I, that I may enjoy his instruction?"
I 14 1
Thus spoke Zarathustra, and with his glances 
he pierced the thoughts and the thoughts behind 
the thoughts of the old pope. At last the pope 
began, "He who loved and possessed him most has 
also lost him' most now ; behold, now I myself am 
probably the more godless of the two of us. But 
who could rejoice in that?"
"You served him to the last?" Zarathustra asked 
thoughtfully after a long silence, "You know 
how he died? Is it true what they say, that pity 
strangled him, that he saw how fi§il hung on the 
cross and that he could not bear it, that love 
of man became hie hell, and in the end bis death?"
The old pope, however, did not answer but looked 
aside, shy, with a pained and gloomy expression,
"Lot him go!" Zarathustra said after prolonged 
reflection, still looking the old man straight 
in the eye. "Let him goI He is gone. And al­
though it does you credit that you say only good 
things about him who is now dead, you know as 
well as I he was, and what bis ways were queer,"
"Speaking in the confidence of three eyes," the 
old pope sakd cheerfully (for he was blifÉ in one 
eye), "in what pertains to God, I am--and have 
the right to be— more enlightened than Zara­
thustra himself. My love served him many years, 
my will followed his trill in everything, A good 
servant, however, knows everything, including: even 
things that his master conceals from himself. He 
was a concealed god, addicted to secrecy. Verily, 
even a son he got himself in a sneaky way. At the 
door of his faith stands adultery,
"Whoever praises blBi as a god of love does not have 
a high enough opinion of love itself. Did this god 
not i-jant to be a Judge too? But the lover loves 
beyond rev^ ard and retribution,
"When he was youngs this god out of the Orient^ 
he was harsh and vengeful and he built himself 
a hell to amuse his favorites. Eventually^ 
however^ he became old and soft and mellow and 
pitying^ more like a grandfather than a father, 
but most like a shaky old grandmother. Then he 
sat in his nook by the hearth, wilted, grieving
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over his weak legs^ weary of the worlds weary 
of willing^ and one day he choked on his all- 
too-great pity."
"You old pope," Zarathustra interrupted at this 
point, "did you see that with your own eyes?
Surely it might have happened that way--that 
way, and also in some other way. When gods 
die, they always die several kinds of death.
But— well then*. This way or that, this way and 
that— he is gone*. He offended the taste of my 
ears and eyas; I do not want to say anything 
worse about him now that he is dead.
"I love all that looks bright and speaks honestly. 
But he--you know it, you old priest, there was 
something of your manner about him, of priest*s 
manners he was equivocal. He was also indis­
tinct. How angry he got with us, this wrath- 
snorter, because we understood him badly! But 
why did he not speak more clearly? And if it 
was the fault of our ears, why did he give us 
ears that heard him badly? If there was mud in 
our ears--well, who put it there? He bungled 
too much, this potter who had never finished his 
apprenticeship. But that he wreaked revenge 
on his pots and creations for having bungled 
them himself, that was a sin against ^ood taste. 
There is good taste in piety too; and it was 
this that said in the end, "Away with spohi a god*. 
Rather no god, rather make destiny on one's own, 
rather be a fool, rather be a god oneselfI"
"What is this I hear?" said the old pope at this 
point, pricking up his ears. "0 Zarathustra, 
with such disbelief you are more pious than you 
believe. Some god in you must have converted 
you to your godlessness. Is it not your piety 
itself that no longer lets you believe in a god? 
And your overgreat honesty wilt yet lead you 
beyond good and evil too. Behold, what remains 
to you? You have eyes and hands and mouth, pre­
destined for blessing from all eternity. One 
does not bless with the hand alone. Wear you, 
although you want to be the most godless, I 
scent a secret, sacred, pleasant scent of long 
blessings; it gives me gladness and grief. Let 
me be your guest, 0 zarathustra, for one single 
night*. Nowhere on earth shall I now feel better 
than with you."
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"Amenl So be itI" said Zarathustra in great 
astonishment. "Up there goes the way, there 
lies Zarathustra*s cave. I should indeed like 
to accompany you there myself, you venerable one, 
for I love all who are pious. But now a cry of 
distress urgently calls me away from you. In 
my realm no one shall come to grief; my cave 
is a good haven. And I wish that I could put 
everyone who is sad back on firm land and firm 
legs.
"But who could tkke yqur melancholy off your 
shoulders? For that I am too weak. Verily, we 
might wait long before someone awakens your god 
again. For this old god lives no more! he is 
thoroughly dead."
Thus spoke Zarathustra.39
I have quoted the entire conversation between Zarathustra
and the last Fope because I think that we need to become
as familiar with it as we have become with the oft-qu#èd
madman passage, and because I am sure that there are some
clues in these words to a better understanding of our
experience of the death of God.
The last pope, unable to speak about the reason for 
his grief, however, hints at it when he refers to "what 
all the world knows today." After Zarathustra hazards 
the guess that it is because God is dead, the last Pope 
brings himself to admit that this is the reason and adds 
that he had served him till his death. This unexpected 
confession from the last pope gives Zarathustra the op­
portunity to find out whether what the devil had said 
about God’s death was really true or mere gossip. He
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asks If it is true that God strangled on his pity for 
man. At first the last Fope, reminded again by these 
words of the death of his master, cannot answer. But as 
Zarathustra becomes less pressing, the last pope mellows 
and begins to speak about his many years of faithful 
service to God. As for his death, the last Fop© neither 
confirms nor denies what the devil told Zarathustra. God 
died of pity, yes, but of pity for man or of self-pity?
He became "like a shaky old grandmother. Then he sat in 
his nook by the hearth, wilted, grieving over his weak 
legs, weary of the world, weary of xiïilling, and one day 
he choked on his all-too-great p i t y T h e  cause of God’s 
death was pity, and in view of the ugliest man’s indict­
ment of God--"His pity knew no shame : he crawled into my
dirtiest nooks""^ *^ --this description seems plausible ; but, 
according to his servant, he had grown cranky and senile 
and weary of life before he choked on pity. This concep­
tion of God having grown old and weak bears remarkable 
similarity to Philip Rieff’s hypothesis that "the cultural 
’super-ego’ has aged into a fussy critic of the energetic 
(the ’id’)."'^*'^ Furthermore, according to Hieff, "It is 
the impotence of the cultural super-ego rather than the 
potency of the id that is the crucial fact of our time." 
That is to say, in theological jargon, not that men have 
become more potent, but that God has become impotent.
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It Is not my Intention to quibble about the order 
of this sentence^ but X am convinced that the course of 
one development in the theology of the past t^enty-five 
years has been in the direction of an affirmation of 
b^th the potency of men .and the impotence of Goclp the 
former perhaps necessarily preceding and^ in some sense^ 
causing the latter. It is doubtless most usefulfor 
the sake of clarity5 to look in some detail at this devel* 
opmentj taking as its symbolic beginning Dietrich Bon- 
hoeffer’s letters from prison in which he discusses the 
coming of age of the world and God>s being edged more and 
more out of life. In this way we shall arrive at a 
theological lnteppx'*etation of the death of God which 
conceives of that death both in terms of God’s dvinp: 
and of his having been killed by man^ specifically by 
western^, Christian tmn; but of this latter, more in the 
section below on the ascetic ideal.
In the best full-length study of Bonhoeffer’s 
thought to date, John Phillips shows how the themes of 
secularism and the historical emerge in Bonhoeffer’s 
Etliics, and how Bonhoeffer is unable to decide just how 
the Christian should view the historical process of
secularisation/^ *^'
In most instances in the Ethics, secularism 
has a pejorative sense. Secularism leads to the
abyss and means, if its relentless march is 
not halted, the ultimate destruction of history. 
But Bonhoeffer can also recognise a better 
secularism.
In the prison letters Bonhoeffer sets forth this line of 
thought, but by now it appears in a somewhat different 
light.
The time when men could be told everything by 
means of words, whether theological or simply 
pious, is over, and so is the time of inward­
ness and conscience, which is to say the time 
of religion as such. Me are proceeding towards 
a time of no religion at all : men as they are
now simply cannot be religious anymore.
Our whole nineteen'^hundrad-year'^old Christian 
preaching and theology rests upon the religious 
premise of man. What we call Christianity has 
always been a pattern'"-perhaps a true pattern-- 
of religion. But if one day it becomes apparent 
that this a priori ’premise’ simply does not 
exist, but was an historical and temporary form 
of human self-expression, i.e. if we reach the 
stage of being radically without rellgion--and 
I think this is more or less the case already--- 
--what does that mean for Christianity?
New at this point is Bonhoeffer*s conviction that the
historical process, which he bad described (and seen as
dangerous) in the Ethics. is leading to a time of no
religion.
’Being radically without religion*, a stage at 
which man has arrived through the course of 
human history, calls into question the apolo­
getic basis upon which Christian preaching and 
theology has been built. As we have seen, the 
Ethics identified secularism with godlessness, 
against which the church had to contend with 
all its strength and in the face of which found 
itself allied with a ’better secularism’. But 
here he is willing to explore ’a time of no 
religion at all’..., *^7
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And the result of his explorations is the honest admis™ 
sion, *^ It means that the llnehpin is removed from the 
whole structure of our Christianity to date,..
Phillips makes two helpful observations about Bon­
hoeffer ’8 explora tions,
First, one suspects that such pictures of a 
’better secularism* as that which Bonhoeffer 
sketched in the Ethics have here been discarded 
as part of what is meant by ’religion*, Chris­
tianity can no longer be content simply with 
allying herself with * last survivals of the age 
of chivalry,* Secondly, Bonhoeffer is attacking 
the kind of apologetic which assumes that all 
men are innately religious-™that it is the task 
of the apologist to expose and make articulate 
the ’religious basis’ of the life of every man 
and of the world in which he lives, *9
The latter point is crucial, more crucial, indeed, than 
many Christian theologians are willing to admit— even 
today when Bonhoeffer has become so popular (or is it 
be.paupe^  he hhs become so popular that such a devasta­
ting critique as he is leveling here can be trivialized?) 
Bonhoeffer is not exaggerating when he says that the 
whole of Christian preaching and theology rests on the 
religious a priori in man,^0 ^ premise thought to be 
intrinsic to man and universal. From this it follows 
that if we are confronted with evidence that this premise 
is neither intrinsic nor universal, i,e, if religion is, 
in fact, disappearing, then *‘the linchpin is removed from 
the whole structure of our Christianity to data,.,,^* A
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more thorough pulling of the rug Wrom beneath the feet 
of Christianity can hardly be imagined I
Bonhoeffer*B reaction to this collapse is, as we 
have seen, different from his reaction in the Ethics,
HiB admiaaion that "there is no longer any need for God 
as a working hypothesis, whether in morals, polities or 
science, Nor Is there any need for such a God in religion 
or philosophy (Feuerbach),’' is followed with the words, 
the name of intellectual honesty these working hypo­
theses should be dropped or dispensed with as far as 
p o s s i b l e . " Bonhoeffer is outspoken in his rejection 
of all brands of apologetic which find it necessary first 
to convince men how bad off they really are and how ter­
rible a place the world is before offering them "salvation" 
from themselves and the world. In the letter of July l6, 
1944, just quoted, Bonhoeffer uses some form of the word 
"honesty" (Hedliohkeit) five times in the course of two 
brief paragraphs in a plea in many ways reminiscent of 
that other advocate of Intellectual honesty, Nietzsche.
"And the only way to be honest is to recognize that we 
have to live in the world etsi deus pofi daretur"--even 
if there were no God,5^
I am aware that Bonhoeffer is deliberately empha­
sizing this "even if". Nor is it my intention to twist 
something out of hie words that just is not there. Boil-
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hoeffer is not proelaiming the death of O-od. He is 
saying, quite simply, that we must for the sake of in­
tellectual honesty, live in the world gyen 4£  there were 
no Oocle And this we must do "before G o d "  1^3 Yet, it is 
surely plain to anyone who does not have a particularly 
reactionary theological ax to grind that it is a very 
short distance indeed from Bonhoeffer*s "even if" to a 
proclamation of the death of God.
This is not the place for a further explication of 
Bonhoeffer*s radical thoughts. Suffice it to say, in 
his own words, "The question is, Christ and the world 
come of In that July l6 letter, Bonhoeffer comes
to the conclusion that by coming of age, the world has 
rid itself of a false conception of God, that of a deus 
ex machina, and is now thus free to live before the true 
God, the God of the Bible, the weak and suffering God 
who needs our help in the w o r l d .55 This biblical God,
God on the Cross, is the only God who can help-^and only 
as long as we act as though we do not need His help.
This, I take it, is the meaning of Bonhoeffer*a statement, 
"Now that it has come of age, the world is more godless, 
and perhaps it is for that very reason nearer to God than 
ever before."5^
To be sure, God is still very much alive for Bon­
hoeffer. But I think we must admit that there is in 
these late formulations a clearly discernible wavering.
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On the one hand, Bonhoeffer is certain that we have 
coma of age, that is, that we actually do not need God’s 
"help" anymore, yet he also aays, "God 1b weak and power™ 
lees in the world, and that is exactly the way, the only 
way, in which he can be with ue and hel,p us." (my italics) 
And again3 "God is teaching ue that we must live as men 
who can get along very well without him. God allows him- 
self to be edged out of the world and onto the cross."57 
Which is to say that God is still in some mysterious way 
in command after all. These statements clash glaringly 
with Bonhoeffer’s earlier statements that "what we call 
’God’ is being more and more edged out of life, losing 
more and more g r o u n d "5^ and that "God is being increas­
ingly edged out of the world, now that it has come of 
a g e . "59 these eases, it is not that God is allowing 
himself to be edged out of life, but, quite simply, that 
the world, in the process of its coming of age, edges 
God out.
In sum, we have seen in Bonhoeffer the move away 
from an omnipotent God (the Lordship of Christ in Ethics 
is conceived of as triumphant), a need-fulfiller upon 
whom man was reliant, at least in "ultimate" situations, 
to a God whose reserve of power has dwindled noticeably, 
indeed, whose power can be described only in terms of 
weakness and whose help can come to man (or can it?) only
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when man acts as if he does not need it and instead 
stands by God in his suffering. The next move, admittedly 
a step beyond Bonhoeffer but unthinkable without him, 
is the Christian affirmation of the death of God and full 
participation in the life of the world come of age. This, 
then, is that theological development of which I spoke 
which affirms both the potency of men and the impotence of 
God and sees men* s growth to maturity as the cause of the 
weakening and death of God,
Perhaps it is worth noting before moving on that 
there is no shrillness in this affirmation, no arrogance. 
On the one hand, God has died, not been killed, therefore 
there is no guilt, no ,naed, reinstate him as an act of 
repentance. On the other hand, men have come of age, 
they are not h e l p le s s A s  Bonhoeffer put it, in his 
first reference to the maturity of the world, "To the
6o
maturity of man belongs precisely responsibility,"
Men may be afraid of the consequences of God * s death, 
but, though not arrogant, they have a kind of chastened 
confidence that they will be able, not alone, each on 
his own, but together, with each other’s help, to handle 
those problems they used to hand over to God--even the 
ones they once called "ultimate." This is the only 
humanly possible atheism. In it lies the possibility 
of real liberty.
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Truly, we philosophers and "free spirits" feel, 
upon hearing the news that "the old God is dead", 
that we have been touched by the rays of a new 
dawn; our heart overflows with gratitude, aston- 
ishment, misgiving and expectation. The horizon 
seems to us, though, granted, not bright, at 
last open once more; finally our ships are al­
lowed to put to sea again, to put to sea in the 
face of every danger. Every risk of him who 
knows is permitted again. The aea, our sea, 
lies open again; perhaps,there has never before 
been such an "open sea."
Just how Nietzsche chose to navigate in this new 
"open sea" will concern us later on. For the present 
we must continua to assemble the tools which will help 
UB understand Nietzsche’s positive advance. We have 
seen that he assumed the death of God rather than trying 
to prove it I and we discovered, in our theological inter­
pretation, that the death of God is the harbinger of the 
possibility of real liberty. Before saying how Nietzsche 
envisaged the features of this liberty, one question; 
remains to be answered ; liberty from what? Or, in 
keeping with Nietzsche’a metaphor, in what sense is the 
"open sea" also fraught with danger? Why is the horizon 
not bright? Why the misgivings? To answer this question, 
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II. Morality as a Problem
5. The ascetic ideal and will to power.
To â£© and p,Qlmt oat the problem of
moralityI that seems to me tha new task 
and main point.
All in aXl^ the ascetic ideal, with Its 
sublime moral cult^ this most ingenious^ 
most resolute and dangerous systématisa™ 
tion of all means of debauching the emo­
tions under the protection of holy motives, 
has etched itself onto the whole history 
of mankind in a frightful and unforgettable 
way “ and, alas, jnot oply onto its history.
I can think of scarcely anything else more 
destructive of the health of the European 
race than this ideal. One could, without 
exaggerating; call it the esseQt,ial âti." 




Nietzsche wrote in Egce Homo, looking back at his 
work. Dawn : "With this book begins my campaign against
morality."^ Here at the outset we must, without digressing 
into a discourse on the strategy of Nietzsche’s "campaign," 
remind ourselves of the mood in which it was undertaken.
The very word "campaign" suggests, in keeping with 
Nietzsche’s predilection for explosive language, a mili­
tary man, armed to the teeth, going to war against, in 
this case, morality. Leaving aside the, in any case 
unanswerable, question of whether this is what Nietzsche 
wanted it to connote, it is, in fact, not what he means 
to say. For he immediately goes on to describe his
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"campaign" in somewhat more detail by saying of EMEs
Mot that there is the slightest scent of gun- 
powder in it. One will detect very different 
and much more agreeable aromas in it, assuming, 
that is, that one’s nostrils are refined enough. 
Neither large nor small arms. Though the effect 
of this book is negative, its means are not, 
these means from which the effect follows as a 
consequence, not as a cannon shot (ml#, eln 
Schlusa. nicht wle elm KaEgnanqchussJ, That one 
takes leave of the book with a healthy caution 
against everything that has been revered, even 
worshiped, under the name of morality, is not 
inconsistent with the fact that no negative word 
appears in the entire book, no attack, no malice 
.... Morality is not attacked, it is simply
left out of considération.4
Mow that we know the spirit in which the campaign was 
undertaken, we may asks why is morality ignored| or, 
rather, considered only for the purpose of analysis and 
critique? The answer to this question is simple, the 
path leading up to it less so. But first, the answer.
With the death of God, morality ceased to carry the 
weight it had when God was alive, lending support to and 
providing authority for morality. The death of God meant 
the demise of the dominant moral demand system as well; 
the two, God and moral values, though not one and the 
same, were inextricably bound together. It meant, in 
the words of Bonhoeffer, not about God but with regard 
to the religious a priori. "that the linchpin is removed 
from the whole structure of our Christianity to date..."5
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This fact, that with the death of God the moral values 
which were grounded in him (in effect, just about every 
"western value from Socrates to the present) became 
sapped, hollow, was recognized by only a very few among 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries, among them Dostoevsky and the 
radical Young Hegelians* And this recognition is the 
source both of Nietzsche’s attacks on philistines from 
David Strauss to George Eliot,^ who sought to "shore up 
the superstructure of Christian morality'' ^  in the face 
of the death of God, and of his call for a revaluation 
of all values* In sum, just as Nietzsche did not call 
for the murder of God but found him dead, so also he did 
not launch an all-out attack on perfectly stable moral 
values in order to destroy them and replace them with 
values of his own liking; rather, he comprehended the 
full significance of the death of God as encompassing 
as well the collapse of morality, and set about revaluat™ 
ing all values* And this revaluation consisted of evalu­
ating the moral demand system which had determined men’s 
lives for two thousand years (Nietzsche calls it "Christ- 
ian-Flatonic") with a view to discovering whether it is 
a useful and desirable guide to men’s lives in the present 
and therefore to be reaffirmed in the name of a new 
estimate of life, or useless and undesirable and thus to 
be allowed to disappear without lament* So much for the
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"answer" to the question posed above. Now let us attempt
to walk the path leading up to It*
Nietzsche attempted to answer the moral question
arising out of the death of God with an honesty and
thoroughness seldom achieved in the past. As we have
seen, Pascal and Goethe set a precedent in this matter.
Schopenhauer’s integrity allowed him to put the moral
question at its most radicals "Has existence any meaning 
8at all?" But his virtue was not thoroughness and the 
providing of answers. Thus Nietzsche was left with the 
question and the nagging conviction that the traditional 
answers, including that put forward by Schopenhauer, had 
been discredited by the death of God#
II
"In what form shall life be justified? That Is the 
essence of the moral question#"^ The first of Nietzsche’s 
answers ëo the moral question was consciously amoral; it 
was aesthetic. The Birth of Traced?/ (1871) which contains 
Nietzsche’s unconventional ideas on the origin of both 
tragedy and the scientific spirit of inquiry (the latter 
of which will occupy us further in Chapter 6) was written 
out of a deep distrust of morality
My instinct, as a life-affirming instinct,
turned a m i  net morality in this questionable 
book, and set up a valuation and doctrine of 
life diametrically opposed to it, a purely 
artistic, anti Chris'^  doctrine#
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Looking back on The Blrtb of Tragcedv in I886, Nietzsche 
said of it :
One can guess at what point the big question 
mark was placed on the value of existence* Is 
pessimism inevitably a sign of decline, decay, 
miscarriage, of weary and weakened instincts...? 
Is there such a thing as a pessimism of st^ngth' 
.. .What was the meaning of the trapzio myth for 
the Greeks during; their best, strongest, most 
courageous period? What of the colossal pheno­
menon of the Dionysian and the tragedy to which 
it gave birth? On the other hand, could that of 
which tragedy died, namely Socratie morality, 
dialectics, the moderation andcheerfulness of 
the theoretical man ™ could not precisely this 
80eratism be a sign of decline, fatigue, sick­
ness, of instincts in anarchic? dissolution? 
...And inquiry itself, our science, what meaning 
does all inquiry have when viewed as a symptom 
of life? To what purpose ™ or wcTse, whence 
comes science? Is scientific inquiry perhaps 
only dread and evasion of pessimism? A subtle 
self-defense against ™ the ti^ uth? Morally 
speaking, something like cowardice and deceit? 
Amorally speaking, shyness?3-l
Already in the first sentence of the text, Nietzsche 
tells us that it is to the Apollonian-Dÿonysian duality 
that art owes its continued existence* Creation is a 
result of competition, strife, struggle (agon), and 
creativity is passion, controlled and reehanneled. Seen 
separately, Apollo is the god of form, of the dream 
world, and of healing, while Dionysus is the formless
one, the god of music and dance and intoxication.
Apollo, as the god of all plastic powers, is 
at the same time the god of prophecy. He who 
is etymologieally the "lucent one" ("ââ-ll^MUdgl. 
the deity of light, rules over the fair illusion 
(rScbein) of the inner fantasy-world as well.12
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Dionysian stirrings, in whose intensification 
the individual vanishes in complete self- 
forgetfulness, are awakened either through 
the influence of the narcotic potions of which 
all primitive peoples and nations speak in 
hymns, or through the violent approach of 
spring which permeates the whole of nature with 
joÿ.^o
But before moving too quickly to an examination
of these two particular deities, we must first ask about
the Olympian gods in general. Is it possible to make
general statements about the inhabitants of Olympus,
and, if so, what can be said about them? To the first
question, Nietzsche answers with an unequivocal "yes."
To the second he says that the Olympians impress us with
neither high intellect nor duty. We are not reminded
of asceticism. What we are immediately aware of, what
in fact nearly overwhelms us. Is the exuberance of their
existence. In them, life overflows I
This, however, is only one side of the coin, and
he who sees this side only can never know the Greeks nor
understand their art. The other side of this coin is
revealed in a Greek legend about life.
An old saga has it that King Midas hunted a 
long time in the woods for the wise Silertus. 
companion of Dionysus, without being able to 
catch him. When he finally had fallen into 
the King’s hands, the king asked him what he 
thought to be the best and most excellent thing 
for man to do. Stiff and stubborn, the deiTion 
remained silent, until finally, compelled by 
the king; to speak, these words burst forth in
1 6 7
shrill laughter : "Ephemeral wretch, child
of chance and toil, why do you force me to 
tell you what would be moat advantageous for 
you not to hear? That which Is best for you 
is quite inaccessible to you - not to have been 
born, not to be, to be nothing. But what is 
second-best for you is - to die soon*"l4
How can such a view of life be related to the triumphant
Olympians?
It was only by means of the artifieally constructed 
goda of Olympus that the Greeks, who were well aware of 
tha evils in the world, were able to live at all. As 
the legend shows, the Greeks were far from shallow and 
superficial in their creation of these "overcoming" gods. 
On the contrary, precisely because the Greeks had had 
a careful look at the world and human existence, their 
gods were "overcoming" gods, gods that justified human 
existence by living it themselves - what Nietzsche 
rather sarcastically calls ",,,the only satisfactory 
theodicy ever lnvent@d,"15
It is hare that we move back from the general to 
the particular, that is, from the Olympians, first to 
Apollo, god of prophecy and healing, and interpreter 
of dreams, To help us understand Apollo as the inter­
preter of dreams, Nietzsche asks us to abstract from 
our own reality and to view our own existence, as well 
the existence of the empirical world, "...as the
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idea of the original Oneness^ produced anew each 
I n s t a n t , " T h a t  is to say, we are to think of our­
selves and our world as the stuff of the dreams of the 
original Oneness, the ground of being. For it is be­
cause of this Being’s longing for illusion and its 
achieving of illusion in its dreams that it is able to 
redeem itself. It is now of course clear what place 
the dreams which are the fulfillment of oui?, longing for 
illusion have in this scheme. They are the dreams of 
dreams, the illusions of illusions and therefore an even 
higher form of fulfillment of the original desire for 
illusion. This movement from illusion to further illu­
sion, this creative^^reductive process "...is the original 
act of the "naive"artist and at the same time of all 
Apollonian culture."
It will now be apparent to what extent the Dionysian 
spirit appeared unruly and barbaric to the Apollonian 
Greeks, with their doctrine of redemption by illusion.
But strange though it was, it served to remind the 
Greeks of the reality, of the suffering and evil so 
basic to their existence. Despite the unpleasantness 
of being reminded of what they keew to be true, but 
tried so hard to keep hidden, the Greeks discovered 
the Dionysian spirit to be as essential to their lives
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as the Apollonian element. And so these two radically
hostile spirits locked horns and began their struggle 
for the Greek mind. Intermediate victories were claimed 
by both contestants, but these were always only temporary, 
Apollo dominated only until Dionysus swept back to over­
whelm his forces; Dionysus could hold sway only until 
Apollo returned with his rigid, but discreet, comfort of 
Illusion. Both voices were heard
enhanced the other. Sut this is not the whole story. 
Indeed, it is only the budding of what will later flower 
into "...the dramatie dithyraat) and tra&e#..».
the common goal of both drives..."^9 Yes, each of these
elements is striving towards the same goal and it is 
their very sti*uggle that is leading them to it. But 
how is this possible? How does Nietzsche envisage this 
movement from strife to creation?
To answer these questions we muet dig back a bit 
further still to the very seed of this struggle ™ music, 
or perhaps more exactly, a musical mood. To help us 
here, some words from Schiller concerning what he experi­
enced before beginning to compose :
With me a sensation is there first, X'siithout 
any definite and clear subject; this develops 
only later on. A certain musical frame of 
mind comes first, and only after follows the 
poetic idea,
It is this "musical frame of mind" which Nietzsche
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take8 to be essential to the composition of lyrlo 
poetry, And he concentrates on folk song (in contrast
to epic poetry^ which :Ib completely Apollonian) as 
"..,the classical Instance of a union between Apolbnlan 
and Dionysian I n t e n t i o n s . " His justification for 
this concentration is his conviction that the Dionysian 
spirit 1b the precondition of folk poetry. In the 
medium of folk poetry^ the effort is made on the part 
of language to imitate music. The uneven and irregular 
imagery of folk poetry is no doubt distasteful when 
viewed from the vantage of Apollonian epic. But it is 
precisely its Irregularity^, along with its atrophic 
form;, which allows the melody of folk song to give 
birth to poetry. Hare is what Hietssohe calls "..,the 
only possible relation between poetry and musle^ word 
and sound.,, I word j, image ^ and idea now seek for an 
expression analogous to music and thus experience the 
power of music
In other words^ within this admittedly dualistlc 
scheme^ we have^ on the one hand;, wordsimages^, ideas^ 
all belonging to the realm of symbols^ representatives^ 
appearances ; on the other hand j, there is sound, music 
which is Independent of words and concepts^ in touch 
with reality and powerful to an extent that appearances 
could never be.
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The cosmic symbolism of music can in no way 
be exhaustively treated by language because 
music refers symbolically to primordial contra-* 
diction and paiU;, thus symbolising a sphere 
which is above and prior to all appee?ranceo 
Over against musicevery appearance is only 
analogy,.,,^3
ThiS; then^ is the seed of which we just spokethe
seed of the struggle between Apollo and Dionysus which
was to lead to the birth of tragedy and the dramatic
dithyramb;, namelythe imitation of the language of
mus i c,
To sum up;, at the root of Nietssche’s examination 
of Greek culture is the pessimism of Dionysus^ lucidly 
expressed in the legend about King Midas, Dionysus 
represents the reality of which the Greeks were only 
too aware and at which a sustained look was unbearable.
It is Apollo who makes reality tolerable by overcoming 
itj that isj by masking it with illusions ; in shorty, 
by sublimating it.^5 But in the process of masking 
reality^ Apollo becomes a part of it. He overcomes 
Dionysus only insofar as he (Apollo) hides him (Dionysus) 
with himself (Apollo). Yet;, as we have seen^ he is also 
violently opposed to Dionysus.
Whether Nietzsche’s effort to show that tragedy 
was born out of music was successful or not is open to 
questionand it is not within the range and purpose of 
our deliberations to offer an answer. However, a basic
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critioism must be leveled against his final formulation. 
Nietzsche failed in his attempt to keep the Apollo- 
Dionysus tension while, at the same time, talking of 
the two spirits as enhancing each other. In Nietzsche’s 
later philosophy, as we shall see, this difficulty is 
resolved, but at this early stage he is unnecessarily 
confusing because of his insistence on holding to 
Schopenhauer’s (and, before him, Kant’s) dualism of 
will and idea (noumena and phenomena). This dualism 
can operate as long as Apollo and Dionysus are two 
distinct spirits, held together by the tension generated 
by the conflict between them. But it is incongruous 
with Nietzsche’s conception of a Dionysian monism, and 
at this early stage he attempted to hold on to both of 
them.
What does become clear in The Birth of Trapiedv. 
despite the failure of this particular attempt to ex*- 
p3?ess it; is that creativity is the product of agon, 
strife. The very language of this book is the language 
of struggle. The unruly Dionysus becomes creative only 
as he is harnessed by Apollo.
This is, essentially, Nietzsche’s conception of 
redemption by illusion-. The pessimism resulting from 
a careful look at reality can become optimism only with 
the help of dreams, those masks of reality. Not suf“
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fering as such, but endurance, or better, the ability
to adjust to what is given, was for the Greek an out-
standing virtue and the essence of wisdom.
Suffering is sometimes said to be an outstand"* 
ing virtue of tragic personages. This view 
derives from the Hebrew-Chr1s11an tradition, 
and is not to foe applied to Athenian tragedy. 
Suffering occurs in Athenian tragedy, and bear­
ing it is a necessity for tragic heroes  ^but , 
endurance is the virtue, not suffering per
An acceptance of life, perhaps even a real affirmation
of life was always an affirmation in spite of the horrors
of existence, and it was only possible because of Apollo
--dream, illusion, sublimation,
III
Hietzsohe now leaves the domin of aesthetics and
approaehes the moral qu^ittlon psychologicallyj that is,
he undertakes an analysis of the origins of moral values,
Hegel had given credence to the theory that ideas
have a history and a traceable development, but moral
philosophers have not been anxious to entertain the
notion that morality too might have a history.
All philosophers required of themselves, with 
a pedantic earnestness that makes one laugh, 
something much more sublime, pretentious, 
solemn, as soon as they began to concern them- 
selves with morality as a science. They 
wanted proof of morality, and every philosopher 
to date has believed that he established that 
proof. Morality Itself, however, was taken 
to be "gèven." ...Precisely because the moral 
philosobhers ware so poorly acquainted with 
moral facts, knowing them in arbitrary extracts
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or random abbreviations, as, for example, the
morality of their milieu, their class, their 
church, their Zeltgelat. their climate and 
region - precisely because they were poorly 
informed and themselves ao uninquiaitive with 
regard to peoples, epochs, the past, they never 
got around to diecovering the real problems of 
morality, which appear only when comparing many 
moralities. In all hitherto existing '^science 
of morality" there was lacking:, as odd as it 
may sound, the problem of morality itself. The 
suspicion that there could be something problem"* 
atie here was missing.^7
For Nietzsche, morality was not given, but problematical.
Thus he wrote in Beyond Oood in the interests
of clarity, of the need for a "typology of morality."^8
There are moralities which are intended to 
justify their originator to other men; others 
which are supposed to comfort him and make him 
content with himself; others with which he 
nails himself to the cross and humiliates him- 
self; still others with which he can revenge 
himself or hide himself or glorify himself and 
set himself above others. This morality helps 
its author to forget something; that one to 
have him or something about him forgotten.
Some moralist© wish to exercise their power and 
creative temper on mankind; others, perhaps 
Kant in this case, say with their moralities,
"that which la honorable in me is that I can 
cmeî” In short, moralities too are only a gign
This Is the first major discovery in Nietzsche’s psych" 
ological probing of morality, that every morality Is an
"evaluation and hierarchy of human drives and a c t i o n s . "30 
Thus, the working out of such a typology was not to be 
done for Its own sake, but solely for the purpose of
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determining the relative value of various moralities.
(Wiatzsehe’B own typology of morality, based on the 
master/slave theory, will occupy us In Chapter 6.)
The second major discovery is this s "The essential 
and invaluable thing about every morality is that It is 
a prolonged r e s t raint."31 This explains why Zarathustra 
calls the table of good that hangs over every people 
"the tablêt of their overcomings."32 gach moral demand 
system Is both a guide to the passions that seem most 
threatening to men and a set of commands created to com­
pel men by their belief in them to "overcome" those 
passions, which is to say, to restrain them and give 
them form. It accomplishes this by "teaching men to 
hate too much freedom and planting in them the need for 
limited horizons, immediate tasksi" it "teaches that the 
mrrowJjag of Derspectlves. ..is a necessary oo%idltlon for 
life and growth."33 Nietzsche la by no means negatively 
disposed toward what he discovers morality to be. That 
morality is necessarily reetrlctive means that an in­
stinct or a drive must learn "to duck and submit, but 
also to refine and sharpen Itself."3^
The essential thing, "in heaven and on earth," 
seems to be, to say it once more, that there 
be prolonged obedience in ^ne direction. From 
that always emerges something for the sake of 
which life on earth is worthwhile.35
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We must now put a question implicit in these 
words to Nietzsche himself: in direction do me^
obey, and what are the consequences of this i^artlcular 
nai:^ ro'wlng of per a poet Ives? His answer to the first 
half of the question we know, namely that we in the 
West have for two thousand years lived according to 
the dictates of the "Ohristian-PIatonic" moral demand 
system which 1b characterized by the excessively re­
pressive means it employs to fulfill its restraining, 
shaping function. In fact, the form given to men’s 
instincts by this morality is a crippled, perverse form. 
And this perve5:^ Bion betrays the secret that the morality 
which bore it is an "An.ti;rpatuml. morality...," a 
morality set ‘'aRainst the instincts of life: it is
the condemnation of these i n s t i n c t s 35 dominant
values in this "Chris t la n PI a to n 1 o" tablet of over- 
comings are ascetic values. We must now turn our at­
tention to an examination of the ascetic ideal which 
is of pivotal importance in Nietzsche’s critique of 
Christian morality.
The fact that the ascetic ideal has meant so 
much to man points to the basic trait of the 
human will, its va^ul ; tfiaa MMM. SL
BSal “ and he would rather will latMM; than 
not will at all. Do you understand me?37
What is the meaning of the ascetic ideal? It means.
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in the traditions of the great religions, poverty, 
humility and chastity "a strict yet high-spirited 
continence. 3 8  Nietzsche himself is fond of ana­
lysing and exposing the bidden motives of what he 
calls "the ascetic prieet,"
This partiality to ostensibly religious nomen­
clature has, in the past, caused Christians generally 
to react defensively to Nietzsche's charges, thus 
missing the significarioe of his very revealing observa­
tions * It would be untrue to say that Nietzsche did 
not mean what he said with regard to the ascetic priest 
But it would foe helpful to bear in mind his practice, 
which we have already encountered,39 of never attacking 
persons but only availing himself of a person "as of 
a strong magnifying glass with which one can render 
visible a general but creeping calamity which it is 
otherwise hard to get hold The general calamity
in this case is the ascetic ideal and the magnifying 
glass the priest, who is also "the theologian" and 
"the philosopher," Ho quotation from Nietzsche kindly 
disposed toward the priests (and there are a few) will 
convince us unless we realize that he is attacking, 
not any real, human priest, nor even the priesthood in
general, but a moral“religious ideal which has domin­
ated the West for centuries.
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"The question at hand la the value which the 
ascetic priest places on our life."^*’^ Life is viewed 
by the ascetic as a bridge to transcendence. It is 
a maze, the only escape from which is through the 
portal by which on© entered; or it is a mistake which 
can be corrected only by a resolute act of will. A 
bridge, a maze, an error “ these img©s are all contrary 
to life. Our earthly existence is denigrated, even 
denied, by the ascetic ideal. Why then has it thriven 
for BO long?¥ Why has the aeoetic ideal not destroyed 
life, or life the ascetic ideal? It must be, in some 
sense, in the interest of life that this ideal has 
held sway. Yet this seems most unlikely. The rigid 
continencje which typifies the ascetic ideal is nothing 
less than "an attempt to use energy to block the very 
sources of energy.
We are faced with a split which Ellis itself 
and which relishes its own suffering, which, 
in fact, becomes more selfrassured and tri"" 
umphant the more its own condition for sur­
vival, namely physiological vitality, dimin­
ishes . "Triumph in extreme agony" - under 
this superlative motto the ascetic ideal has 
always battled....
What possible explanation can there be for this inner
split, this deliberate attempt to pit life against
life? Nietzsche claims that the split is only apparent,
a psycholcg,cal misunderstanding. Ha continues:
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which is trying with every means to hold on 
and atay alive. It poitits to a partial physio- 
logical suppression and fatigue against which 
the deepest instincts of life i^ hich have re­
mained intact battle untiringly and with new 
means and devices. The ascetic ideal is such 
a device, contrary to what the worshipers of 
this ideal claim. In it and through it life 
struggles with death and death; the
ascetic ideal is a device for the preservation 
of life, That this device could become so 
powerful and hold sway over man to such an 
extent,,.especially wherever civilization and 
the taming of man was carried out, points up 
a very important facts the Biorb 1,dity. of man 
to-date, at least of tamed man; the physiologi­
cal struggle of man with death (more exactly, 
with weariness, longing for "the end").
The ascetic priest is the embodiment of the 
longing to be something else, somewhere else; 
in fact, he Is that longing at its most in- 
tense, its most arduous and passionate. Yet 
precisely the power of his longing is the 
chain which binds him to this life. And Just 
because of this, he becomes a tool which must 
work to create better eonditiom for this life. 
With this he strengthens the entire
flock of defeated, ill-humored, wretched, self- 
tormentors of every kind whom he leads instinct* 
iveXy, as a shepherd. You will already under­
stand what I means this ascetic priest, this 
apparent enemy of life, this nemtor - it is 
Just he who belongs to the really formidable 
c g m a m l m  forces of llfe.44
Were the source of these words not known, one would
be quite Justified in assuming them to be a paraphrase
of Freud’s theory of instincts.
Both Nietzsche and Freud were seeking an explana­
tion for the apparent inner split In man, the pitting 
of life against life; or, in Freud’s terms, repression.
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Both worked, out explanations which, as we have Just 
noted, are in many ways reimrkably similar to each 
other, but which also diverge at a few very oruoial 
points. One of these points of divergence is in their 
differing explanations of the phenomenon of eonscience 
(Nietzsche) or super-ego (Fraud). It will be important
for our later deliberations^'^ to have this divergence 
before us. Thus we must first trace the development 
of the theories on which the explanations of coneeienee 
or BUper-ego ware based. That Is, for Nietzsche, the 
theory of will to power, and for F r e W , the theory of 
Instincts,
IV
rSuppoFje, finally, that we succeeded in ex­
plaining our entire instinctual life as the 
development and Bpeoialization of on© basic 
form of will - namely will to power, which 
is my thesis - and that all organic functions 
could be traced back to this,.,.then we wou^d 
have earned the right clearly to define al,l 
effective energy as mill M
By the time Nietzsche wi'ote these words in Be.voncl Good
âaâJIlll (1886) the theory of will to power was fully
developed and its implications being worked out. It
was not a principle which Nietzsche merely adopted and
used; it had emerged, been born, out of his attempt to
explain the behavior of men. And what had become, by
the mid-l88o’s, a monistic hypothesis, began as a
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dualism, perhaps best expressed In terms of the agon 
of Dionysus and Apollo in which
we examined above.
The next phase in the developaient of the theory
and the first explicit mention of will to power is
in a note which reads:
Fear (negative) and will to power (positive) 
explain our strong consideration for the 
opinions of men. ’^7
However, as Walter Kaufmixirightly points out, "this
is but a variation of a theme which had been struck
at the begimiing of the third m e d i t a t i o n , "^8 namely,
an attempt to explain conformity aa the result of
either fear or laziness In the note just cited,
Nietzsche la still tidying to explain conformity, this
time as resulting from fear and will to power. Yet
this is not tb§. will to power, but only a kind of
will to success which Nietzsche considered a negative
t e n d e n c y T h e  psychological experimenting with
fear and power continues through
Dajll. and It was during this period
of expe3?imentation that the will to power is mentioned
explicitly for the second time, this time in a note
in which Nietzsche insists that
the ancient Greeks frankly admitted their will 
to power. This sudden association of the will
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to power with the Oreelcs was one of the most 
decisive steps in the development of this con­
cept into an all-embracing monism.
Nietzsche had previously considered the contest 
(agon) the most fruitful concept for any analysis 
of Greek culture. ...now it occurred to him 
that the contest itself was a manifestation of 
the will to power.
Indeed, it looks as though Nietzsche, without realizing 
it as yet, is tracing a%l human behavior to a single 
principle. If he is successful, he will have to admit 
that his earlier dualism is reducible to a single source. 
Without being himself fully aware of where his experi­
ments are leading, Nietzsche speaks in the Dawn of the 
striding for excellence as a striving to ovem^jhelm 
one’s neighbor. This strikes a familiar chord from
^he one difference being that 
Nietzsche has moved from an admittedly dualistic scheme 
to a potentially monistic sbhema.
The striving for excellence is the striving to 
overwhelm one’s neighbor, even If only very 
indirectly or only in one’s own feelings or 
even in dreams. There is a long line of degrees 
of this secretly desired overwhelming, and a 
complete list of these would almost amount to 
a history of culture from the first still 
grimace-like barbarism to the grimace of over­
refinement and pathological ideality. The 
striving for excellence brings with it for the 
neighbor - to name only a few steps of this 
long ladder: tortures, then blows, then terror,
then anguished amazement, then wonder, then 
envy, then admiration, then elevation, then joy.
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then gaiety, then laughing, then ridicule, 
then derision, then scorn, then the dealing 
of blows, then the inflicting of tortures : 
here, at the end of the ladder, stands the 
ascetic and martyr. He experiences the supreme 
delight, as a consequence of his striving for 
excellence, in benefiting himself precisely 
from that which his opposite on the first rung 
of the ladder, the barbarian. inflicts upon 
the other, on whom and before whom he wishes 
to distinguish himself. The triumph of the 
ascetic over himself, bis introverted eye 
which sees man split into a sufferer and a 
spectator and which henceforth looks to the 
outside world only for the purpose of gathering 
from it wood fox'^ his own funeral pyre, this
last tragedy of the striving for excellence,
in which there remains only one person who 
chars himself - that is the deserving ending 
which belongs to this beginning; both times, 
unspeakable delight at the sight of tortures. 
Truly, this delight, viewed as the livliest 
feeling of power, has perhaps been nowhere 
greater on earth than in the souls of super­
stitious ascetics.52
We are presented with the picture of a ladder of de­
grees of power; on the bottom rung stands the barbarian,
on the top, the ascetic. Nietzsche seems to be experi­
menting with quantities of power. He is saying that 
the barbarian is at the bottom of the scale because he 
has the least amount of power, and the ascetic is at 
the top because he is the most powerful. There can be 
no doubt about it, Nietzsche is thinking of power in 
terms of power over oneself. The ladder of culture is 
conceived of as a process from the inflicting of torture 
on others to the inflicting of torture on oneself; in
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short, from the barbarian to the ascetic. But
Nietzsche shudders at the thought of how the next
rung of the ladder might look.
Could this cycle not begin once more from the 
beginning...? That is, to hurt others in order 
thereby to hurt oneself in order thereby to 
triumph anew over oneself and one’s pity and 
to revel in the uttermost reaches of poi'^ er?-^ 3
We are left to assume that Nietzsche’s foray into the 
realm of quantitative power standards was brief. In 
fact, Nietzsche himself adds evidence to this assumption 
when he speaks unequivocally of "the demon of p o w e r . "5^ -^ 
Finally, near the end of Dawn„ Nietzsche, having, as 
we have seen, not consciously adopted a monistic hypo­
thesis, says 2
Still one lies on one’s knees before strength - 
according to the ancient habit of slaves ™ and 
yet, when the degi?ee of worthiness of beinR 
honorte is to be determined, only dagree 
qZ reason in strength is decisive : one must
measwe in how far strength has been overcome 
by something higher and now serves that as 
its tool and means’.55
Power is a demon, reason is "something higher," reason
is in. power, and the standard of value is no longer the
quantity of power but ââ^âi. a£ Z§Moja IS â&SâûSMl''
This could be only a variation of the original dualism. 
In that ease, Dionysus would still be Dionysus (intox­
ication, fox’mless striving), and Apollo would still be 
Apollo ("something higher," the form-giver) the slight 
difference being in Apollo’s method; whereas in The
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Birth of Tmgedv he gave Dionysus form by sublimating 
him, masking him, he now controls him by giving him 
m£lon.aj.^  form.
My hypothesis is, however, that something very dif­
ferent is meant by these words. To be sure, Nietzsche’s 
assertion that one must measure to what extent strength 
has been overcome by means of something higher and now 
serves that as its tool can be interpreted dualistieally. 
However, there is only a colon separating this statement 
from Nietzsche’s previous assertion that "only the da- 
o£ 32§S.S2B. in is deolslve." He Is eon-
fronting strength with the question of value, denying 
that it has any innate value, but that its value lies 
in the degree to which it has been successfully con­
trolled, in Nietzsche’s language, "overcome." But now 
comes the really decisive questions how does Nietzsche 
envisage this overcoming? As an imposition from "out” 
side," whether from dream and illusion or reason? On 
the contrary, it Is a s.§,l.f-overcoming.5 6  
We m y  recall that in 
Nietzsche had tried an intorpretatiosi of Greek culture 
on the basis of a contest between Dionysus and Apollo 
in which the unruly Dionysus became creative only to 
the degree that he was masked, i.e. sublimated, by 
Apollo. We saw that Nietzsche was unable successfully
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to both show how Apollo "overcame" Monysus and yet 
keep the tension necessary for the continuance of the 
contest. Further on, we saw that Nietzsche’s first 
experiment with a potentially monistic scheme came to 
naught because of its quantitative power standard 
which could explain man’s striving for excellence only 
at the cost of extreme sublimation. In other words, 
the use of a quantitative power standard means that 
the value of man’s striving for excellence is deter­
mined by the degree to which Apolloreigne supreme, as 
in the ascetic. In such a scheme, the movement awav 
from "grimaca-llke barbarism was ensured, but so was 
the movement toward "the grimace of overrefinement and 
pathological ideality" the bodiless, lifeless ascetic 
as the most excellent (reads powerful) man. But now 
both the dualism (Apollo vs. Dionysus) and the monistic 
quantitative power standard (Apollo) have been dis­
carded in favor of a Dionysian monism, will to power.5^
Let us now look, for the sake of comparison, at 
Freud’s theory of instincts, second in notoriety only 
to Nietzsche’s theory of will to power.
Repression Is one of the several "psychic snares" 
(Philip Rieff’s phrase) which endangers the path from 
wish to wish-fulfillment In the mind. It is the 
(almost always faulty) mechanism by which the human
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mind ohoeaas to "forget" something which it does not 
wish to "remember." It is the "false bottom" of the 
mind below which "memory really b e g i n s . In Freud’s
own words 3
One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse 
may undergo is to meet with resistances the 
aim of which is to make the impulse inopera­
tive. Under such conditions...the impulse 
then passes into the state of renre^sian.
Repression is a preliminary phase of condemna­
tion. something between flight and condemnation 
. ...»9
. • .tha mmmmsm a£ Usa âiiisii. m
ihâ a£ sil§.sS,lM aW. tegBios ssjiâÊMSE
smk QÎ.
But the repression, at first successful, does 
not bold.... The rejection of the idea from 
conseioBsnesB is obstinately maintained,...
So, the final form of the work of repression 
....is a sterile and never-ending etruggle.61
Mow to the question why men refuse to remember certain 
things, why they strive to incapacitate certain in­
stinctual impulses I in short, why men command and obey 
themselves.
Freud’s theory of the instincts developed as an
attempt to explain the fact of repression.
This goal immediately explains two formal 
characteriBties of the theory of instincts.
The Freudian theory of the instincts is per­
sistently dualistic because it starts from 
the fact of conflict in mental life and aims 
at explaining that fact.
Secondly, the Freudian "instinct" is a border­
land concept between the mental and the biologi­
cal, because Freud is seeking an explanation of
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man as neurotic or repressed in termg ii^ hlch 
would relate man’e specifically human character­
istic (repression) to his animal (bodily) 
nature.
In the several stages of the development of this theory, 
two factors remained constants the instincts are com­
mon to all animal life, and they are mutually antagon­
istic (Fraud’s "ambivalence").
Up to 1914 (the publication date of Freud’s paper 
"On Narcissism"), Freud conceived of the antagonism in 
the mind to be between the sexual (reproductive) in­
stinct and the instinct of self-preservation (the ego 
impulses). This was analogous to the antithesis of the 
pleasure-princlple and the reality-prineiple. With the 
emergence of the concept of narcissism, however, which 
Freud was forced to see as Including the instinct of 
self-preservation, the original conception was called 
into question. Narcissism and the reproductive instinct 
are but two forms of the same sexual instinct (libido). 
Freud was still convinced by the fact of repression that 
there must be a "second" instinct, probably an ego in” 
stinct, which opposed the sexual libido. It was
at about this time (that) he had repeatedly 
observed a game played by his eldest grandson, 
who kept carrying out over and over again 
actions which could only have an unpleasant 
meaning for him -^^otions relating to his 
mother’s absence.
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These observations caused him to question even further 
the validity of his earlier pleasure-reality (pleasure- 
pain) antithesis. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," 
before relating his observations of his grandson, Freud 
recapitulates what is to be understood by "pleasure 
principle."
In the psychoanalytical theory of the mind we 
take it for granted that the course of mental 
processes is automatically regulated by "the 
pleasura-prineiple"s that is to say, we be­
lieve that any given process originates in an 
unpleasant state of tension and thereupon de­
termines for itself such a path that its ulti­
mate issue coincides with a relaxation of this 
tension, i.e. with avoidance of "pain" or with 
production of pleasure.v4
To imke this assumption even clearer, he continues s
The pleasure-principle is deduced from the 
principle of constancy; in reality the prin­
ciple of constancy was inferred from the facts 
that necessitated our assumption of the pleas™ 
ure-principle. ...this tendency on the part 
of the psychic apparatus postulated by us may 
be classified as a special ease of Fechner’s 
principle of the ^êMâîîSX. toiasââ âMMlAÊl...
But now, confronted by evidence which contradicted this 
tendency toward a relaxation of psychic tension, e.g. 
the repetition of war dreams, the increase of sexual 
tension, Freud suggests that perhaps "there really 
exists In psychic life a repetition-compulsion which 
goes beyond the pleasure principle,"Freud has os­
tensibly discovered the antagonist of the sexual in­
stinct. But in what sense are we to understand it as
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"going beyond" the pleasure principle?
As is common knowledge, Frcmd coneidered the dream
a wiBh-fulfillment, a principle which he was nox^j forced
èo doubt by the appearance of the tendency to repeat
"unpleasant" experiencos. This tendency must serve
some purpose other than wish-fulfillment.
When the dreams of patients suffering from 
traumatic nexxroaes ao regularly taka them back 
to the situation of the disaster, they do not 
thereby, it is true, serve the purpose of wish- 
fulfillment,.but we may assume that they 
thereby subserve another purpose, which must 
be fulfilled before the pleasure-principle can 
begin its sway. These dreams are attempts at 
restoring control of the stimuli by developing 
apprehension, the pretermission of X'^ hieh caused 
the traumatic neurosis. They thus afford us an 
insight into a function of the psychic appara­
tus, which without contradicting the pleasure- 
principle is nevei^theless independent of it, and 
appears to be of earlier origin than the aim 
of attaining pleasure and avoiding "pain."67
Hepetition-compulslon must be considered instinctual 
because it is an internal impulse, the function of which 
is to "bind" unpleasant experience® x^ hlcb have been 
"forgotten’ but which threaten, in the relaxed state of 
sleep, to erupt into consciousness in the d r e a m . 6 8  % %
is "beyond" the pleasure principle in the sense that it 
is independent of and more fundamental than the pleasure 
principle, that is, its work must be done before the 
pleasure "principle can begin to operate. But it also 
has "a daemonic character" in that "there is no contra­
diction of the pleasure principle," rather, "the repeti-
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tion..*is itself a source of p l e a s u r e . . .."69 Thue, 
given on the one hand, the Instinctual nature of the 
compulsion to repetition, and, on the othex'» hand, its 
earlier origin than the sexcual instinct (pleasure prin­
ciple)^ Fraud must concede to himself that his concep­
tion of the very character of instinctual life must 
be alteredo
According to this, an imtiBML wmOJ. M  a 
teMencg, lumte in livlm ormiiM imjLtev im% 
m U l O E  It t o w e r t h e  of an
. .70
This "expi'^ esBioii of the conservative nature of all 
living b e i n g s"71 brings 'Frreud again dangerously close 
to a monistic theory of the instinctual life, but now, 
not as in 1914 with a monism of life, but x-^ ith a monism 
of death. If al2 instincts are conservative in nature, 
aimed at regression^, then death must, indeed, be the 
goal of life.
However, this is not the whole story. The sexual 
instinct, though admittedly conservative, is not duped 
completely by the death instinct into becoming its 
handmaiden.
e. .not all the elementary organisms thatixtake 
up the complicated body of a higher form of 
life take part in the whole path of evolution 
to the natural and, i.e. death. Some among 
themi, the reproductive cells, probably retain 
the original structure of the living substance 
and, after a given time, detach themselves from 
the parent organism, charged a-s they are with
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all the Inherited and newly acquired instinc” 
tive disposition®. Possibly it is just those 
two features that make their Independent exist­
ence possible. If brought under favorable 
conditions they begin to develop, that Is, to 
repeat the same cycle to which they owe their 
origin, the end being that again one portion 
of the substance carries through its develop­
ment to a finish, while another part, as a new 
germinal core, again harks back to the begin™ 
ning of the development. Thus these repro™ 
duetive C€)lls operate against the death of the 
living sxibstance and are able to ivln for it 
what must seem to us to be potential immor­
tality, although perhaps it only means a 
lengthening of the path to death. Of the 
highest significance is the fact that the 
reproductive cell is fortified for this func­
tion, or only becomes capable of it, by the 
mingling with another like it and yet differ­
ent from it.
There is a group of instincts that care for 
the destinleB of these elementary organisms 
which, survive the individual being, that con™ 
cern themselves with the safe sheltering of 
these organisms as long as they are defense­
less against the stimuli of the other x^ orld, 
and finally bring about their conjunction with 
other reproductive cells, These are collect­
ively the sexual instincts. They are conserva- 
tive In the same sense as the others are, in 
that they reproduce earlier conditions of the 
living substance, but they are so in a higher 
degree in that they show themselves especially 
resistant to external influences, and they 
are more conservative in a wider sense still, 
since they preserve life itself for a longer 
time. They are the actual life-instinets; the 
fact that they run counter to the trend of the 
other instincts which lead towards death indi­
cates a contradiction between them and the 
rest, one which the theory of neuroses has 
recognized as full of significance. There is, 
as it were, an oscillating rhythm in the life 
of organismss the one group of instincts 
presses forward to reach the final goal of
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life as quickly as possible, the other flies 
back at a certain point on the weiy only to 
traverse the same stretch once more from a 
given spot and thus to prolong the duration 
of the journey.73
This, then, is Freud’s theory of instincts in its 
final form - life against death - two violently op­
posed forced locked in combat.
Me noted at the end of Section III above the 
similarity between Nietzsche’s theory of will to power 
and Freud’s theory of Instincts. But now that we have 
the developments; of both theories before us, a basic 
dissimilarity appears. Nietzsche has developed a 
Dionysian monism, Freud a thorough-going dualism. 
Nietzsche’a final formulation of the theo3?y of will 
to po'wer is, to be sure, monistic, but it is a dia­
tomic monism which he describes, a two-irr*oneness; 
not reason and but reason in power. ¥hat he
might mocin by "reason" in this context will be the 
subject of a discussion in the following chapter. 
Suffice it to say at this point, with Nietzsche,
" .. ..QBlE â®EEiâ. .o£ r g m n  la is decisive s
one must measure in how far strength has been over­
come by something higher and now serves thért as its
tool and means I"74
Both men m^re seeking an explanation for ropres™ 
sion, conflict, strife. By its very nature, repression
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presupposes opposed forces; thus, the similarity 
between Nietzsche’s theory of reason in power and 
Fraud’s theory of life and death instincts. The dif­
ference is in Nietzsche’s postulation of two-ln-oneness 
And this difference, though slight, will have conse™ 
Quences out of all proportion to its slightness when 
we follox-j it through Nietzsche’s theory of the develop- 
ment of conscience, to which we must now turn.
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knows itj but he bides it like a bad conscience-- 
why? Out of fear of the neighbor, who demands the 
conventional and disguises himself in it* But 
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”’Ovox-^eoming’ as a translation of them indu &m. and 
’self-overcoming’ for â§lkiMMmlndiinE Is admittedly 
inadequate-^but self-Burpassing, self-transcending, 
and self-conquest seem no better, though each sug­
gests something of the connotation of the German 
word.
57) It is important that we are aware of the scone of 
the theory of will to powex"®* Thaugh we have fol­
lowed the development of the theory in oi**dar to 
determine its value as an aid to excplaining human 
behavior, to leave the impression that it is solely 
a psyeholog;ical theory would create, at best, a 
very one-sided picture. For, as Arthur Danto puts 
it, " Will -1 o -"pow er was to have been the constructive 
idea with which he (Nietzsche) was to x’eplace all 
of what had heretofore passed for philosophy and 
much of what had passed as science*" (Arthur C.
Danto, (Wew Yorks Mac-
millan Co., 1965). p. 2l4). We must at least note 
therefore some of the ” cosmic implications” of the 
theory of will to power.
Nietzsche intended to publish a systematic pre­
sentation of the ”cosmic implications” of his theory 
of will to power. Many of the notes of his late 
years of sanity bear evidence of his attempts to 
wox’k out these implications. Arthur Danto has 
ordered Nietzsche’s thoughts on this subject, which 
are strewn throughout the published material and 
the unpublished notes. Ha claims neithex^ that this 
is the oi^der that Nietzsche intended in his projectec 
book, nor that it is the only way to order Nietzsche 
random thoughts. But he has taken the thoughts and 
Nietzsche’s intention to wox*k them out in a system­
atic way seriously, and his reeonstx’*uction is both 
plausible and convincing. I can do no bettor than 
reproduce hia ax-^ gumant here in its broad outline.
As we have seen, Nietzsche has, in the course of 
the discovery of will to power at the root of all 
life, become more and more suspicious of opposites 
and has adopted a Dionysian monism as an hypothesis 
for driving what appear to be several causes to one
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caixs©* Still, this all sounds fairly old-fashioned 
and harmless, surely not a theory that could change 
the entire course of the way we do cm? intellectual 
work, indeed, of the way we live our lives, as 
Nietzsche expected it would do. But let us have a 
closer look. In Beyond ,0ood anti.._.E.vil,p the first 
published work to follow Thus Spoke 2ayathustra. 
Nietzsche writes :
Assuming that nothing is "given” as real except 
our world of desires and passions, that we cannot 
go down or up to any other "reality" except the 
reality of our drives--for thinking is only the 
relation of these drives to one another--is it 
not allowed to make the expex^iment and pose the 
question whether this "given" does not suffice 
to understand the so-called mechanistic (or 
"material") world as well? I do not mean as an 
illusion, a ”semhlance”. an "idea” (in Berkeley’s 
oi’ Schopenhauer’s sense), rather as belonging to 
the same range of reality as our affecto-^as a 
more primitive form of the world of affects in 
which everything which latex^  branches off and 
develops into Qx-^ ganic processes is still ân a 
powerful unity ...as a kind of instinctual life in 
which all the organic flinctions are still bound up 
together with self ""regulation, assimilation, nutri­
tion, secretion, and metabolism--as a nx?e-form of 
life? In the end it is not merely permissible to 
make this experiment, it is, seen from the conscience 
of methodology, demanded* Not to assume several 
types of causality until the experiment to get along 
with only one has been driven to its very limit (to 
the point of absurdity, if I may say so)* That is 
a morality of methodology which one may not evade 
today--it follows "by definition” as a mathemati­
cian would say* The question is, in the end, 
whether we really acknowledge the will as effective, 
whether we believe in the causality of the will**.. 
(Nietzsche, pp. 600-601)*
Nietzsche wants to experlisent further with his new 
hypothesis* If we begin with the assumption that 
will to power, "the wox'^ ld of our passions and desires 
is all that is given, then we must try to understand 
the "material" world as well on the basis of this 
given. The inorganic world could then be conceived
!>
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of as "a nre-form of life,” that Is, as a primitive 
form of life in which the inorganic and the organic 
functions have not yet been differentiated, but are 
still bound up together in some sort of unity. 
Finally, Nietzsche admits that the real question in 
such an experiment is ’whether we believe in the 
causality of the will," by which he means whether 
we believe in causality at all.
This reminds us very much of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche 
has been careful to distinguish between his ow%i 
position and the positions of Berkeley and Schopen­
hauer . He has warned us that ha does not understand 
the material world as a "serifolance" or an "idea," 
but as "a Dre-form of life." Nevertheless, when 
he says that the question is really whether we 
believe the will to be effective, we are suspicious 
of Schopenhauer’s influence. Our suspicion is, in 
fact, without grounds, and it is perhaps wise to 
see why before proceeding.
We may recall from our introductory remarks on 
Schopenhauer (Introduction 2, XI) that what he 
meant by "will" was a kind of natural force which 
exists beyond conscious life as the absolute reality, 
of which matter is but the visible appearance. 
Further, this will strives for existence, that is, 
it attempts objectification because to appear as 
phenomenon is the highest form of life. But because 
it is a blind natural force constantly seeking ob- 
jectiflcation, it pushes us from behind, so to speak. 
Even those of our actions which we call "free" are 
mere expressions of the drive of the world-will in 
its attempt to actualize itself. Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism is the result of this vieti) of the world.
His proposed solution to this dilemma cannot concern 
UB here, except to mention that he conceived salva­
tion in terms of negation of the "will to existence" 
through total resignation.
There is an obvious difference between what Schopen­
hauer called "will to existence' and Nietzsche’s 
will to power. Schopenhauer begins, with One Will 
and sees the world as its manifestation, Nietzsche, 
on the other hand, disdains "the unprovable teaching 
of One Will," (Ibid., p. 104) and exposes Schopen­
hauer’s belief in it as an "after-effect of the 
oldest x^eligiosity."
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.o.the, belief in the will, as in the cause of 
effects, is the belief in magically active powers... 
Schopenhauer, x^ îith his assumption that everything 
that is there is only something willed, has raised 
an ancient mythology to the. thronei he apparently 
never attempted an analysis of the will, because 
he belieyââ in the simplicity and directness of 
all willing.... (Ibid., pp. 128-29).
For Nietzsche, there is no such thing as the "will 
to existence," because there is will only where there 
is life. That which does not exist cannot will, and 
that which does exist cannot will existenee--it has 
existen08I With his belief In One Will in many forms, 
Schopenhauer bad drained both the content and the 
goal from willing, thereby destroying the character 
of the will.
...what (Schopenhauer) calls ’’will" is merely 
an empty word. It is still less a question of 
a "will to life," for life is only a particular 
ca^ e, of the will to power^ it is completely 
arbitrary to assert that everything strives to 
change over to thi^ form of the will to power. 
(Ibid., Ill, pp. 750-51). (Of. also p. 518;
Schopenhauer’B basic misunderstanding of the %ill 
(as though desire, instinct, urge were the essential 
in the will) is typicals devaluing of the will 
until unrecognizable. Similarly, that of willing; 
attempt to see in wanting^’no-more, in "being sub­
ject Mij:hq%k goal and intentional (in "the pure 
will-free subject") something higher, indeed t^he 
higher, the valuable*)”
Against this bac%i^ound it la èesential that we take 
notice of what Nietzsche considers to be the ingredi­
ents of willing.
Volition seems to me, above all, something ^mpllr' 
G§,t§â, something that is a unity as a word only. 
...in every willing there is first of all a plural­
ity of feelings.... Just as feeling, indeed many 
kinds of feeling, is to be recognized as an ingre­
dient of the will, so also thinkings in every 
willing-act there is a commanding thought--and one 
st not suppose that one is able to separate this
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thought out of "willing," as if will would thon 
still remainî Thirdly, will is not merely a 
complex of feeling and thinking, but above all 
a paspio.n (A.ffekt) % namely, the passion of com- 
mand.*.. A man who liill^^ -^ commancla a something 
in himself that obeys or of which he believes that 
it obeys* (Ibid., II, pp* 581-82).
Volition then is neither simply without content and 
goal, nor is it a mechanistic process. It is a 
complex combination of feeling, thinking, and, per­
haps most important., the passion of ooimmnding.
This necessary aside has taken us back into the realm 
of human volition» prior to making this distinction 
between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, we were trying 
to understand in what sense the belief in the esiuBaliti 
of the will is so important* The answer to this 
question lies in these words* If we believe in the 
causality of the will,
* * * then we must, experiment with the hypothesis 
of the causality of the will as the only one*
"Will" can naturally effect only "will"--not 
"matter"* * * *
***one must risk the hypothesis that wherever 
we recognize "effects," will is effecting will, 
and that cwerything that happens mechanically 
(Nietzsche is referring here to physics, his 
mechanics"), insofar as energy is at work, is 
just will-power, will-effect* (Ibid*, p* 601)*
It should now be more obvious how fundamentally 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the causally operative 
Mill differs from Schopenhauer’s understanding* Will 
can effect, not "roaterial" (Bêoffel, but only will*
His hypothesis is this: that effects must be traced,
not to causes in the traditional sense, but to other 
effects, 1*0* wills * In order to understand what 
Nietzsche means by this interaction of wills upon 
wills, we must look at some words of his concerning 
physios.
Mechanics formulâtes sequences of phenomena, 
for semiotie purposes, by means of expressions 
which relate to the senses and to our psychology.
0ogo, that every affect la a motion; that where 
there la motion, something moves, etc* It does 
not touch upon the (real) causal power*
The mechanistic world is imagined in the only way 
in which the eye and the touch can make a world 
understandable to themselves (i.e., as moved).
And, 30 that it may be calculated, causal entities 
are invented, "things” (atoms) whose effect remains 
constant....
0?hese are illusorys the mixing in of numerical 
concepts, thing concepts (subject concepts), activity 
concepts (separation of causal entities from effects) 
the concept of motion. In all of those are our 
visual and psychological (prejudices).
If we eliminate all these trimmings, there remain 
no things, but (rather) dynamic quanta, in a rela­
tionship of tension with all other dynamic quanta. 
Their being (Wesepj consists in their relationship 
to all other quanta, in their "affect" upon these.
The will to power is not a being, and it is not a 
becoming. It is a nat,hos. This is the most elemen­
tary fact out of which an effect, a becoming, first 
results. (Ibid., Ill, p. 778).
Physics, as we know it, is an agglomeration of fic­
tions useful in making the world intelligible. That 
is, it has been useful, its usefulness depending 
upon a bej.iaf in the causality of the will (in 
Schopenhauer’s sense), a belief which Nietzsche is 
now exposing as based on visual and psychological 
prejudices.
The physicists believe, in their way, in a "true 
world," a stable, atom™systematization in fixed 
movements, alike for all beings, so that for them 
the "apparent world reduces itself to the access­
ible side of the general, and inevitable general, 
existence (8ein), for every being (Wqspn) according 
to its kind (accessible and also arranged--made 
"subjective"). But they thereby mistake themselves. 
The atom that they fix is inferred according to the 
logic of that parspectlvlsm of consciousness
is therewith also
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itself a subjective fiction* The picture of the 
world that they sketch is not essentially different 
from the subjective picture of the world; it is 
merely constructed with more thoroughly thought 
out senses, but, by all means, with our, senses * * * « 
(Ibid., Ill, pp* 704-705).
The invention of causal .e,nt;lties. to explain experi­
enced effects remino nevertheless invention* The 
will to power can therefore not be conceived as a 
being, a thing*
The attributes of a thing are effects on other 
"things” : if one imagines other ’'things” as
absent, a thing has no attributes, i.e. there _ia
m  m s k  th.ij}s .as a miiboM o| M e
i*e,, there is no suoh thing as a "thing in itself*
(Ibid., pp. 502-503).
The "thing in itself" is a fiction, as, indeed, are 
all ”thingso" We must try to think in terms of 
dynamic quanta, of a world of effects only. But 
these effects must foe thought of neither as the 
effects of any-thing;, nor ub effecting some'“thing*
We must try to imagine 0^ %  effects and in an undif­
ferentiated unity, not entities, and not separated 
from one another, bsing Nietzsche’s language, effects 
are not the effects of will to power, they a,re, will 
to power* The suggestion made by Danto that "an 
effect might be regarded as the impact of will upon 
will, not the shokk of thing upon thing,” clarifies 
Nietzsche’s point considerably. Danto goes on to 
add the comforting words :
We might find it hard to grasp this idea, but 
Nietzsche would attribute this to the repellent 
power of our sub jeot “’predicate grammar * It would 
be difficult to put it in a sentence which would 
not mislead, because of the sentence structure, 
if nothing else* (a * Danto, op* cit., p. 220).
If #0 have followed Nietzsche so far and are willing 
to admit With hira that the concepts of thing and
being are no longer useful fictions for interpreting
the world, we must now face the puzzling fact that 
Nietzsche is equally unwilling to grant that will to
power can be understood as a becoming. It is, in
his own words, "a pathos*"
è 9 •
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In a passage, a portion of which was Quoted above, 
in which Nietzsche is dealing with the physicists’ 
belief in a "true world," he notes something which 
may help us understand what he means by "pathos*"
And finally they (the physicists) have left some 
thing out of the constellation without knowing 
It s just the necessary Derspectivism* by virtue 
of which ovary power center XKm.ft.zQ>iitTOm), and 
not only man, constructs the entire remainder of 
the world from its point of view, i.e., measures 
it, feels it, forms it according to its power*
They have forgotten to figura this perspective 
setting power (2er8pakMj^eQ,%setg@^e, Em&L) Into 
the "true world"--in common languages being a 
subject.
Perspectivisra is only a complex form of specificity. 
My idea is that each specific foody strives to be­
come master over the whole of space, and to spread 
out its power--its ?k111 to power*'’*^repelling what­
ever resists its expansion. But it strikes con­
tinually upon a like endeavor of other bodies, and 
ends by adjusting ("unifying") to those who are 
related closely enough to it: in EM. .thgll
Goms,pire £ogeth^ io pjowe^ . And thus the process 
continues.*.. (Nietzsche, We;cke, III, p. 705).
This is perhaps the most concise short definition of 
what Nietzsche is driving at. The world is made of 
"power centers" ov> "will points" (Millens-punktatim m n ) 
forces or power quanta, each of which strives "to be­
come fester over the whole of space." Since all 
power quanta are striving for the same "end," namely, 
more power, expansion, incorporation, they repel each 
o¥ber and make the adjustments necessary for continuing 
their striving in the face of mutual resistance.
However, this interpretation does not lead Nietzsche 
to pronouncements about the "laws of the universe."
If something happens this way and not that, 
there is still nothing of "law," or "principle," 
or "order," but only the worlclng of power quanta, 
whose nature consists in exercising their power 
upon every other power quantum. (Ibid., p.776).
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Nietzsche has not fallen into the trap of the 
scientists whose "beliefs" he has thrown doubt 
upon. He realizes that interpretations are in­
variably fictions which are useful in explaining 
certain otherwise Inexplicable phenomena* He has 
not claimed to have arrived at the Truth, but only 
at a truth, i.e., one intarpr0tation--no doubt 
among many--which, however, takes into account the 
perapactivism of the subject who interprets* Me 
are impressed not only by the modesty of his claims, 
but by his honesty in the face of spurious beliefs-- 
where we would have lease expected theml
This brief statement of the "cosmic lmplioatio%iB" 
of the theory of will to power has afforded us at 
least a glimpse of the extent to which Nietzsche 
thought his theory would rennovate ou3? ways of 
seeing the world, thinking about it and talking 
about it. These implications will be helpful later 
when we direct our attention to Nietzsche’s theory 
of eternal recurrence. (See Chapter 8).
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6* The right to make promises and the instinct 
of conscience.
To rear an aniiml with the rlEllt 
M m  la that not precisely
the paradoxical task which natxir© has 
set itself with regard to imn? And is 
this not man’s true problom?i
I
In Section III of the preceding chapter we noted 
that the major discoveries emex^ging from Nietzsche’s 
psychological probing of morality were two ; that every 
morality is a sign-language of the passions, and that 
the essential feature of every morality is that it pro­
vides for long obedience in one direction. Further, we 
saw that this ”one direction” In the specific instance 
of our own "Christian-Platonic” historical past was an 
ascetic direction, one eharaetex^ized by continence and 
a pitting of life against life - for the sake of pre­
serving life. By way of introduction to Nietzsche’s 
theory of conscience, we must now bring in the first of 
his majore discoveries about morality, only alluded to 
above. Let us consider Nietzsche’s working; out of a 
typology of morality, bearing always in mind that it is 
a means to an end, a tool indispensable for determining 
the value of morality,
II
What confronts us in Toward a Genealogy of Morals
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in th© form of a treatise composed of three extended 
aphorisms is the matured statement of Nietzsche’s hypo­
thesis eoneerning the provenance of moral values, the 
product of a project begun in Human. A11-1oo-Eutmn.^
The question is still one of value*
The point is to travel through the huge, dis­
tant, and completely hidden land of morality, 
morality as it actually existed and was actu­
ally lived, with all sorts^of new questions in 
mind and with new eyas...*3
Under what conditions did man invent the value 
judgments good and evil? A^d what value have 
ifctiX? Have they inhibited or enhanced man’s 
growth? Are they a sign of distress, impover­
ishment, degeneration of life? Or do they,
on the contrary, betray plenitude, power, a 
will to life, its courage, confidence, its 
future? ■*
In the first extended aphorism, "’Good and Evil,* 
’Good and Bad,’" Nietzsche delves into the history of 
moral value judgments. He approaches the problem in a 
manner consciously different from that of "th© English 
psychologists, whom we have to thank for the only
attempts made thus far to produce a history of the
origin of morality,,,,"5 Because they approach this 
historical problem unhistorieaXly, it is not surprising 
that theix’ findings are less than convincing* For in- 
stance^ in an effort to explain the genealogy of the 
value judgment "good," they proceed according to a 
utilitarian principle, claiming that altruistic actions
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were originally approved by those to whom they were 
useful. Later on^ the reasons for calling them good 
were forgotten; not, however, the habit of praising 
them. The movement is from usefulness to habit, via 
the forgetting of the original reasons for approval. 
Moreover, they are fond of searching for the origin of 
moral values from the standpoint of the dichotomy of 
egoism/altruism, that is, by assuming rather than 
Questioning the association of egoistic deeds with the 
Judgment "bad" and altruistic deeds with "good." An­
other, more consistent but no less unconvincing, version 
of the utilitarian approach is represented by Herbert 
Spencer who considers "good" and "bad" as Judgments 
summarizing and sanctioning precisely the "unforgotten 
and unforgettable experiences of the mmùal a m o H m l  
and the harmful imnractical
Now it is obvious to me, first of all, that 
this theory begins to search for the origin 
of the concept "good" in the wrong place. The 
Judgment "good" is not made by the ones to whom 
"good" is done I Rather, it is "the good" them­
selves, that is, the noble, the mighty, the 
aristocratic and high-minded who took themselves 
and their actions to be good, namely as being 
of the highest rank, in contrast to all that 
was mean, low-minded, base and plebeian. It 
was out of this m È h m  âa&WïSÊ. that they 
first assumed the right to create new values 
and give them names. What was utility to them?»
Here we have Nietzsche’s master/slave concept which de­
rived from his etymological study of the term "good" in
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various languages. It receives a final formulation in
Beyond Oood and Evil, which was published just prior to
Toward a OenealoCT of Morals.
In a tour of the many finei^  and coarser morali­
ties which have ruled or still rule on earth I 
found certain traits regularly recurring to­
gether and bouAd up with one another : until
at length two basic types were revealed and 
a basic distinction emerged* There is master 
mo.ral.lty. and slave fflor&lit.V, - I add at once 
that in all higher and mixed cultures attempts 
at mediation between the two are apparent and 
more frequently confusion and mutual misunder­
standing between them, and sometimes their 
harsh juxtaposition - even within the same 
man, within one soul. The various moral 
evaluations have arisen either among a ruling 
order...or among the ruled, the slaves and de­
pendents.,.. In the former case, when it is 
the rulacs who determine the concept "good,” 
it is the exalted, proud states of soul which 
are considered distinguishing and determine 
the order of rank. The noble man separates 
from himself those natures in which the opposite; 
of such exalted proud states appear; he de­
spises them. It should be noted at once that 
in this former type of morality the antithesis 
"good" and "bad" means the same thing as "noble" 
and "despicable" - the antithesis "good" and 
"evil" originates elsewhere* The cowardly, 
the timid, the petty, and those who think only 
of narrow utility are despised, as are the 
mistrustful,.those who abase themselves, 
the dog'^like type of man who lets himself be 
ill-treated, the fawning flatterer, above all 
the liar - it is the fundamental belief of all 
aristocrats that the common people are liars... 
It is immediately obvious that designations of 
moral value were first applied to men, and only 
later and derivatively to actionss ...The noble 
type of man feels himself to be the determiner 
of values; ha does not need to be approved of; 
he judges "what harms me is harmful in itself," 
...he creates values...such a morality is self- 
glorification. In the foreground stands the
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feeling of plenitude, of power which seeks to 
overflow, the happiness of high tension..**
The noble m n  honours in himself the man of 
power, and also the man who has power over 
himself, who understands how to speak and how 
to keep silent, who enjoys practising severity 
and harshness upon himself and feels reverence 
for all that is severe and harsh... It is the 
powerful who understand how to honour, that is 
their art, their realm of invention. Deep 
reverence for the old and traditional...., 
prejudice in favour of ancestors and against 
descendants is typical of a morality of the 
powerful;.,. It is otherwise with the second 
type of morality, slave morality. Suppose the 
abused, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those 
uncertain of themselves and weary should mor­
alises what would their moral evaluations have 
in common? Probably a pessimistic mistrust 
of the entire situation of man will find ex­
pression, perhaps a condemnation of imn together 
with hia situation. The slave is suspicious 
of the virtues of the powerful : he is skepti­
cal and mistrustful... of everything "good" 
which is honoured among them.., On the other 
hand, those qualities which serve to lighten 
the existence of the suffering x^ ill be brought 
into prominence and flooded with lights here 
it is that sympathy, humility, friendliness, 
come into honour - for here these are the most 
useful qualities and virtually the only means 
of enduring the burden of existence. Slave 
morality is essentially the morality of utility< 
Here is the source of the famous antithesis 
"good"and "evil" - power and dangerousness 
were felt to exist in the evil, a certain 
dreadfulness, subtlety and strength which 
could not be despised..
Of decisive significance for our purposes is Nietzsche's 
claim that morality derives from two basic sources. As 
he put it in a preliminary formulation in Human. All- 
too-Human. "The concept good and evil has double ante­
cedents, namely, on the one hand, in the soul of the
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dominant tribes and castes..., on the other, in the 
soul of the oppressed, the powerless."9
...the basic concept is always "aristocratic," 
"noble," in the class sense, from which there 
developed, of necessity, the concept "good" 
in the sense of "spiritually aristocratic," 
"noble" in the sense of "spiritually noble," 
"spiritually privileged" - a development that 
always runs parallel to that other which fin­
ally changes "base," "plebeian," "mean," into 
the concept " b a d
That is to say, tha valuations emerging from a master 
morality have their source in a spontaneous "yes" to 
life and self, from which subsequently is derived the 
notion "bad." In contrast and parallel to this devel­
opment the value Judgments of a slave morality are 
essentially ra-active and arise from an original "no,"
"and this no is its creative aet."^^ "Evil" is thus 
at the root of slave ethics, and only what is not evil 
is "good."
On the basis of hia discovery of the double origin 
of all moral values - good/bad and good/evil - Nietzsche 
concludes that in their battle for ascendancy, the 
valuations "good/evil" have undoubtedly won the day, 
so much BO that we hardly notice that there is a second 
set of valuations engaged in the struggle. This he 
calls the "slave revolt in m o r a l s , t h e  triumph of 
the priestly caste (Judaism-Christianity) over the 
noble caste of blond beasts. With this change in the
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oocupaney of the "master” position comas the Inversion 
of the aristocratic values of the noble beasts of prey 
- "a robust sensuality; blooming, rich, escuberant health; 
and everything needed to preserve them : war, adventure,
hunting, dancing, tournaments, and everything that in­
volves string, gay actions*"^3 With the accession of 
the priests to the aristocracy, these values were dis­
placed by poverty, humility and chastity - "the whole 
anti-sensual.,.metaphysics*"^4
It was the Jews who, with frightening consist­
ency, dared to invert the aristocratic value 
equation - good, noble, mighty, beautiful, 
happy, beloved-of-the-gods - and cling to it 
with the tenacity of the deepest hatred (the 
hatred born of impotence)% "Only the miserable 
are good, only the poor, the impotent, the 
base; only the suffering, the needy, the sick 
and ugly are pious and blessed i for them only 
is there salvation. But you, you noble and 
mighty ones, you are to all eternity the evil 
ones, the cruel, the covetous, the ravenous, 
the godless, and you will thus be eternally 
cursed and damned I" ¥© know w,hg has inherited 
this Jewish inversion of values.15
There is from the very outset something un­
healthy about such priestly aristocracies *.. 
Humanity is still suffering from the after­
effects of these naive priestly cures. ... 
in all fairness it should be added, hox'^ ever, 
that it waB on the soil of this ^mg^ïtialDC 
dangerous form of human existence, the priestly 
form, that man became for the first time an 
iEta,pasting anlml; that here, as never before, 
the human soul acquired depth and became w;Leke_d 
in a sublime seme - and it is of course in 
these two respects that man has proved his 
superiority over the other beasts.1^
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Though it is quite obvious that Nietzsche is taking a 
vary negative, one-sided view of historical Judaism and 
Christianity, and of rabbis, priests and pastors, it 
would be to miss the equally obvious force of his in­
sights to take issue with him on these points which, for 
rceasons that x^ ill become clearer only after we have the 
next extended aphorism before us, are strictly incidental 
to the argument. ¥e must proceed from the origin of 
moral values to the origin of conscience; oi? to be more 
precise, from the phylogeny to the ontogeny of conscience 
Nietzsche's early essay on the value of history for 
life begins thus %
Observe the herd grazing there* It does not 
know what yesterday is, or today. It roams 
about, eats, reâts, digests, roams further, 
from morning till night, day in and day out; 
its joys and woes bound by a short line to the 
stake of the moment, it is neither melaneholy 
nor bored* This is difficult for man to take, 
for though he may parade his humanity before 
the animal, nevertheless he is envious of the 
animal's bliss* He too wants, just as the 
animal, to live neither in boredom nor in pain - 
but in vain, for he does not will as an animal 
wills* Man may ask the animal ; Why do you 
not tell me of your happiness, but simply stare 
at me? The animal wants to answer, and says : 
it is because X always foi-get immediately what 
I wanted to say - but then be forgets this 
answer too and falls silent, which makes the 
man wonder*
Ho xAionders about himself too, about his in­
ability to learn to forget and his perpetual 
hanging on to the past. Regardless how far or 
how fast he runs, this chain runs with him* It
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:1b a miracle, the moment - here In a flash, 
gone In a flash; nothing before, nothing after; 
and yet it returns as a ghost to haunt the 
quiet of a later moment* Continually a leaf 
breaks loose from the x^ heel of time, flutte}?s 
away, then flutters suddenly back into the lap 
of man* Whereupon the man says, "I remember," 
and envies the animal xuhich forgets immediately 
and sees every moment literally die, sink back 
into the mist and the night, extinguished for­
ever* Thus the animal lives 
for it goes into the present like a number, 
leaving no remainder; it knows not how to play 
a part or conceal something* It appears at 
every moment exactly as it is, and can be thus 
nothing but honest. Man, on the other hand, 
resists the ever~'growing burden of the past *
It weighs him down and bows his shoulders j it 
hinders his gait, this invisible and mysterious 
load, which he can, for show, deny and which, 
in fact, he enjoys denying in the company of 
his friends - for the purpose of awakening 
their envy* Therefore, it moves him, as though 
he were re-minded of a lost paradise, when he 
sees a herd grazing, or nearer still, a child 
that still has no past to disown but only plays 
in blissful blindness between the fences of past 
and future. And yet his playing must be inter­
rupted ; all too soon will he bo called away 
from forgetfulness. Then he will learn to 
comprehend the words "once upon a time," that 
watchword with which struggle, suffering and 
satiety set in to remind man what his exist­
ence really is - an imperfect tense that will 
never become a present. When death finally 
brings the longed-for forgetfulness, it brings 
simultaneously to an end the present and ex­
istence itself, thus sealing the knowledge 
that existence is but a continuous "has been," 
a thing wiich lives from its own self-denial, 
self-cons ump t ion, se 1 f - con t r a, d 1 c t i o n, 17
The second part of $QwarC-§„iiSûmlaSX_oOto "'Guilt5
'Bad Conscience,' and Related Matters," opens on a
similar^ though somewhat less melancholy, note.
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To rear an animal with the right to make
promlseB, - Is that not precisely the paradoxi­
cal task which nature has set itself with 
regard to man? And is this not man’s true 
problem? i8
If we consider the strength of the forgetfulness of 
the animal, the fact that man is the unforeetful animal 
seems all the more remarlmble. For this natural for­
getfulness is not merely an inability to remember, but 
an active choosing; not to remember, without which "there 
could be no happiness, no gaiety, no hope, no pride, 
no p r e s e n t T h a t  which distinguishes the man- 
animal from all other animals is this faculty by which 
in certain oases, the natural, healthy, device of 
forg;etfulness may be suspended. Again, not a passive 
inability to be done with something but "an active not 
.^ishinE. to be done with something, a willing again and 
again of a thing one© willed, a veritable memory, of the 
Kill". . *" Hovj has this come about? What is the 
origin of this faculty?
It is a late product of a long training in the 
"custom character of morality*" (Sittlichkeit der 
Sitte)
Morality (sittlichkeit) Is nothing other than 
(that is, nJthïmlEre than) obedience to 
customs (Sitten), of whatever kind ; and customs 
are simply the customary (herkommlieh) way of 
acting and valuing* ^
"Egoistic" and"altruistic" is not the basic
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contrast which led men to distinguish between 
moral and Immoral, good and evil; rather it 
was subjection to custom, law, and release 
from
What is custom (Herkommen)? A higher authority 
which one obeys, not because it commands us to 
do what is most useful, but because it commands 
...Who Is the most moral (der 
On the one hand, be who fulfills the lax^  most 
often.».. On the other, he who fulfills it 
under the most difficult conditions* The most 
mox’al man is he who sacrifices himself most 
to custom (gitto)o ...the individual should 
sacrifice himself - thus demands the custom 
character of morality.^3
With the help of the custom character of morality, a
long, cruel process which Nietzsche places in man's
pre*histopical past, an unpredictable, incalculable
animal was made predictable and calculable. The next
link in this chain is historical imn, "this liberated
one who really ,can make promises," and who possesses,
by virtue of his new "long, infrangible will...his
criterion of values as well."24
The proud awareness of the extraordinary 
privilege of raspotisibi 11 tv, the conscious- 
ness of this rare freedoiji, this power over 
himself and his fate, has sunk into the 
depths of his being and become an Instinct, 
the dominant instinct. What will he call 
it, this dominant instinct, assuming that 
he will want to give it a name? There is no 
doubt, this sovereign man will call it his 
conscience.^5
Let us repeat these final words so as not to miss 
their impact : man's proud awareness of the extra­
ordinary privilege of responsibility, of being able
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to make and keep pror^ iiseB^  of having control of him'" 
self and his fate^ has beoome an I m a M m i  “ & &  âSliMnll 
lïïSÊiEetl
Before easing any more about thia inBMp late- 
blooming:, positive phenomenon of conscience XTîhîch has 
become an Instinct^ we imst askj, with Miet%sche : what
about bM, conscience^ the consciousness of guilt? 
Nietzsche makes the highly original claim that "the 
moral term guilt (Schmid) had its inception in the very 
material term owe (Schulden) Further^ he claims
that ” punishment^ as compensation, developed quite 
independent of any ideas about freedom of the will...
In primitive times wrongdoers were punished as repay 
ment for damage suffered g not because they were be­
lieved responsible for theii^  actions « The answer to 
the question as to the origin of the connection between 
damage done and compensation (the pain of the wrongdoer) 
is "that it arose out of the contractual relation be- 
tx^ 'een creditor and debtor.. .which harks back to the 
basic forms of purchase^ sal©:, exchange^ barter and 
t r a d e " ( T h i s  may remind us, though Nietzsche does 
not use this specific eœmple, that in biblical usage 
"redemption' is related to the concrete act of ox^ing 
or paying a sum of money or bartering goods or psDoperty,
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When Me'# Testament writers speak of "a ransom for 
many" (eis In Mark 10i45) or of "being boi%ht with a 
price" (as in I Corinthians 6:20; % s23), their words 
are understood in a nev^  mythical sense only by virtue 
of their being grounded in the common language of the 
marketplacen See, by xmy of comparison, the very dif­
ferent, unm^thical use of the same words in Exodus 21:30, 
We noticed in passing above that the custom char­
acter of morality was a long, cruel process. We should 
now be better able to understand why this is so. Both 
guilt (punishment of self) and punishment (of others), 
understood as reveal themselves as war­
rants entitling one man to exercise cruelty on another, 
the punisher in the former ease being one-»*© ancestors, 
in the latter, one’s felloxD men»
Let us iiBke sure we understand the logic of 
this whole method of compensations - it is 
strange, to be sure. An equivalent is deter­
mined, so that the creditor receives, in place 
of compensation relating directly to the loss 
suffered (that is, instead of an equivalent 
in money, land or property of some sort), a 
kind of pleasure as repayment....^9
"Inflicting pain" was accepted as equivalent to "ex­
tracting payment" "in the sense that causing someone to 
suffer was extremely pleasurable...."3^
To behold suffering gives pleasure, to cause 
suffering greater pleasure still ™ that is a 
hard statement, but an old and pox\ierful huiian, 
all-too'"human axiom... .31
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Here we have. In the Jargon of psychoamlysîB, the 
maaoehlsm/sadlBra complex.
does one create a memory for the human 
animal? How does one Impress something on 
this partially dull, partially scatterbrain 
intelligence, this incarnation of forgetful­
ness, in such a way that it stays?" This 
ancient problem, as one might imagine, has 
not been solved with delicate words and means. 
Perhaps, in fact, there is nothing more ter­
rible and sinister in the whole of man’s pre­
history than his mnemotechnica. "One brands 
something on the memory in order to make it 
stay; only that which does not cease caHElng 
pain xifill be remembered" - that is an axiom 
of the oldest (and, unfortunately, most enduring 
psychology on earth. ...it is the past, the 
longest, deepest, hardest past that surges up 
in us whenever we become "serious." Whenever 
man has thought it necessary to create a memory 
for himself, it never occurred without blood, 
martyrs and sacrifices. The most gruesome 
sacrifices and pledges (to which the sacrifice 
of the first-born belongs), the most repulsive 
mutilations (castration, for example), the 
cruelest rituals of all religious cults (and 
all religions are basically systems of cruelty) 
all these have their origin in that instinct 
which divined pain to be the most powerful aid
to mnemonics.32
Concentrating for a moment on the notion of punishment, 
Nietzsche points out a common misconception concerning 
the second aspect of it (the first being the "dram" 
itself, i.e. watching or causing suffering), namely 
its purpose. The most geneiBl utilitarian purpose of 
punishment is thought to be that of awakening in the 
wrongdoer a sons© of g;uilt, "pangs of conscienea."
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c • .but this is to raiss the mark with regard 
to the actual facts and to psychology today ™ 
and how much more so when one considers man’s 
longest history, his pre-historyl. Genuine 
pangs of conscience are extremely imve among 
criminals and convicts ; prisons and penitent!- 
aries are not the breedihg-plaees of this 
species of gnawer, ...By and large, punish­
ment hardens and cools, it concentrates, it 
sharpens the sense of alienation, strengthens 
the power of resistance, ,..if we consider 
the millenia of man’s pre-history, we may con­
clude, without hesitation, that it is precisely 
punishment which has most effectively r.aJiar^ ded 
the development of the sense of guilt - at any 
rate with regard to the victims of punitive 
authority. Let us not underestimate the extent 
to which the criminal is hindered from per­
ceiving his deed, his way of acting as repre­
hensible w  such by his viewing of the Judicial 
and legal proceedings. For he sees exactly 
the same kind of actions perpetrated in the 
service of Justice and then sanctioned - 
perpetrated with a good conscience. Spying, 
deception, bribery, the setting of traps, the 
whole tricky, crafty art of police and prose­
cutors; not to mention the premeditated and 
cold-blooded despoiling, subjugating, insulting 
imprisoning;, torturing, and murdering repre­
sented by the various types of punishment ; in 
short, actions considered by no means objection 
able and vile as, such by his Judges, but only 
in specific instances and under certain condi­
tions . "Bad conscience/' this most uncanny 
and most interesting plant of our earthly 
vegetation, did not grow from this soil. In 
fact, for a very long time Judges and peno­
logists x^ e^re not even aware that they were 
dealing with a "guilty" parson, but only a 
trouble-maker, an unaccountable piece of mis­
fortune, Likewise, he X'^ho was punished sensed 
no "inner torment, but rather viewed his pun­
ishment as a piece of misfortune, a sudden 
occurrence of something unexpected, a terrible 
natural disaster like a plunging, crushing 
rock, against which there is no s e l f - d e f e n s e , 33
There can be no doubt that we must look for 
the real effect of punishment in a sharpening
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of man’s shrewdnessg an extension of his 
memory, in a will henceforth to proceed more 
cautiously, distrustfully, secretly, in the 
realization that one is just too weak to ac­
complish certain things, in a kind of improve­
ment through self'"orltiGlsm. The primary 
achievement of punishment, for both men and 
animals, is an increase in fear, the sharpen­
ing of prudence, the controlling of the pas­
sions . Thus, punishment map, but it
does not make him "better." On the contrary, 
probably the opposite is closer to the truth. 
(Misfortune sharpens our wits," it Is claimed. 
To the degree that it sharpens our wits, it 
also makes us bad. Luckily, it often Just 
dulls US.)34
Having thus laid the necessary groundwork by dis­
crediting the notion of efficaciousness of punishment 
in calling forth a sense of guilt, Nietzsche now offers 
his own hypothesis concerning the o3?igln of bad con­
science
1 take bad conscience to be the deep sickness 
which man contracted under the pressure of the 
most profound transformation be has ever 
undergone - that transformation in X’^hich he 
found himself once and for all under the spell 
of society and freedom. Not unlike what must 
have happened to the sea animals vjhen they 
were forced either to become land aniîBals or 
to perish, these semi-animals, happily adjusted 
to the x^ilderness, to war, to roamimg and ad­
venture, suddenly found all their instincts 
devalued, "unhinged." They now had to x^ alk 
on their feet and "carry themselves," x^hereae 
the water had always carried them before. A 
dreadful heaviness x^eighed upon them. They 
felt inept for the simplest movements ; in this 
nevj, unknown x^ orld, they could no longer count 
on thel3? old guides - the regulating, trust­
worthy, unconscious drives. They were reduced 
to thinking, deducing, calcxxlating, linking 
up cause and effect - those unhappy creatures.
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reduced to their consciousness,' their 
scantiest and most unreliable organl I doubt 
that there has ever been a worse feeling of 
misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort. 
Besides, these old instincts had not suddenly 
stopped making their demands! It was only 
difficult and seldom possible to fulfill them. 
In the main, they were forced to seek new and 
at the same time covert satisfactions. All 
instincts which do not discharge themselves 
outwardly turg_ lïmïïâ.. This Is what I call 
main's (Ïejü=.am^ ll&lmï!£) • with
this there begins to grow in man x^ hat one later 
calls his "soul," The entire inner world, 
originally meager and tenuous, expanded, took 
on depth, breadth and height to the degree 
that the discharge of man’s drives was inr. 
hib.itM.* Those terrible bulx^ jarks with which 
the polity protected itself against the old 
instincts of freedom (punishment belongs es­
pecially to these bulwarks) caused all of the 
instincts of the wild, free, roaming man to 
reverse themselves, to M m  OH m m  himself. 
Hostility, cruelty, the Joys of the chase, 
of raids and destruction - all this turning 
iMard against the possessor of such instincts 
himself, that Is the origin of "bad conscience" 
This man, who, lacking external enemies and 
opposition and confined to the oppressive 
narrowness and regularity of custom, impat­
iently tore into himself, persecuted, gnawed 
on, disturbed and mishandled himself; this 
animal that one x^ ants to "tame," hurling it­
self against the bars of its cage; this de­
prived one, consumed by his longing to return 
to the desert, who is compelled to make an 
adventure of himself, a torture^^chamber, an 
insecure and dangerous wilderness - this fool, 
this passionate and desperate prisoner xijas 
the inventor of "bad conscience,"35
The presuppositions of this hypothesis con­
cerning the origin of bad conscience are two. 
First, that the transformation was not gradual, 
not voluntary, nor was it an organic growing 
into new conditions, but a break, a leap, a 
compulsion, an inescapable misfortune which 
could neither be struggled against nor even
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resented. Second, that the fitting of a 
heretofore uninhibited and shapeless people 
into a rigid form could be maintained, as 
indeed it was begun, only X'^ lth violence; that 
the oldest "society" therefore began as a 
frightful tyranny, a eruebing and ruthless 
machine, and continued to operate as such un­
til the rax^J material of tribe and semi-animal 
x-^as not only kneaded and made docile, but 
also actually given form. I used the word 
"society," but it is obvious what I mean - 
a pack of blond beasts, a race of conquerors 
and masters, organized for 'war and possessing 
the power to organize others, unhesitatingly 
laying its claws upon a perhaps numerically 
far superior, but as yet formless wandexdng 
people. In such a mariner \ms "society" begun 
on earth0 I take it that the fanatic theory 
that has it beginning x^ Jith a "eontx^act" is 
thus disposed of.36
With this brief excursion back into the phylogeny of 
conscience, xiie are reminded of the presuppositions of 
Nietzsche’s general argument, namely the master/slave 
dichotomy. In sum, bad conscience is, then, a sick­
ness contracted by man thrust into civilization, made 
into a spcial animal, forced to manipulate (sublimate) 
his natural unconscious drives rather than having them 
gratified unconsciously.
One last phase of this development remains to be 
elucidated. We noticed in our treatment of the custom 
chax’aeter of morality that morality is, in essence, 
not the useful xisay of acting, Judg;ing, living, but 
simply the customary, traditional way. Further, we 
saw that consequently guilt, understood as compensation.
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amounts to a consclouBriegis of failure to live, act
and Judge in a way prescribed by custom, X'iîhieh is to
say, in keeping with the prescriptions of one’s an-
castors. ‘Every failure to "keep the ancestral few"
adds to the debt owed one’s forebears.
The fear of the ancestor and his power, the 
sense of indebtedness to him, necessarily 
increases, according to this crude logic, 
in direct proportion to the increase in the 
power of the tribe; that is, to the extent 
that the tribe itself becomes more victorious, 
more independent, respected and feax-ed. Never 
the other way around! ..«If one follows this 
crude logic to its end, the ancestors of the 
r^ightieBt tribes are pushed back into the dusk 
of divine mystery and inconceivability - the 
ancestor is^finally, necessarily, transfigured 
into a gLqd..'^*
Hox'^ ever, as is often the case xiîitb myths, man’s belief 
that he was indebted to the gods did not x^ ;ane with the 
decline of his primitive morality generally. Not only 
did man’s sense of guilt remain, it also increased 
cumulatively until his debt was seen as "unredeemable 
by any act of atonement."38 The "moralizatlon" of 
guilt, that is, the dissociation of the debtor (man) 
from the creditor (God) by making bad conscience a 
purely subjective phenomenon represents an attempted 
inversion of this cumulative backlog and buildup of 
guilt 0
Mow the prospect of final redemption m u ^  be 
closed onceand for all ; now man’s gaze must 
bounce off, bounce back hopelessly from a
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brazen imposBilbillty; now "guilt" and "duty" 
iBu,s„t tuî^ n against - whom? There 1b no • ^
doubt, first of all against the "debtor"
When this happens, when man, having reached the extreme
point of realizing that his debt is unpayable and oasti*
gating himself by Internalizing it, there is only one
remaining; move - to turn on the "creditor" himself.
Mith this last move man curses bis origins or nature
or existence itself and begins to long for a different
sort of life, an after-life, or simply an end to life,
...suddenly we stand face to face with the 
paradoxical and ghastly expedient which brougbt 
tempomry relief to suffering humanity, 
Christianity’s stroke of genius: God sacri­
ficing himself for man, God himself repaying 
the debt, God as the only one capable of re-
deeming what had become irredeemable for man
- the creditor sacrificing himself for his 
debtor out of love (can you believe it?), 
out of love for bis debtèrî^Q
To be sure, the debt, unpayable by man, is paid - by
God, But at the same time, because it is God who
paid the debt by Bacrificing himself, the sacrifice
only finalizes man's indebtedness - to God. This is
why Nietzsche calls this solution paradoxical. And,
as he also rightly says, it can bring no more than
"temporary relief to suffering humanity/* Man will
not be forced to introJoct his sense of guilt; the
link between the subjective bad conscience and the
"creditor" is once againrestablished, so that man may
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cease cursing bis existence. However, the link has 
been reforged in such a way as to seal and make in­
controvertible man's eternal debt to God.
Nietzsche sumroarizes his hypothesis on the origin
of bad conscience thus t
...this inventor of bad conscience made use 
of religion in order to drive his own mar­
tyrdom to its ghastliest extreme. A debt 
against gojd. - this thought became his instru­
ment of torture. He focused in "God" the 
ultimate opposites that he could find to his 
own insatiable animal instincts and made 
these instincts themselves a sin against God 
(as hostility, rebellion, revolt against the 
Lord,*’ the 'Father," the Creator of the 
world). He stretched himself on the contra­
diction "God" and "Devil." He projected all 
of his denials of himself, of nature, of 
the naturalness and concreteness of his being 
out of himself as an affirmation; as being, 
concrete and real; as God, the holiness of 
God, the Judge and executioner; as beyond, 
as eternity, as eternal martyrdom, as hell, 
as immeasurable punishment and guilt. This 
is a kind of imdness of the will in spiritual 
cruelty which is positively without parallel, 
Man's wil,l to find himself irredeemably 
guilty and reprehensiblej his will to think 
of himself as being punished, with no hope 
of the punishment ever being able, to absolve tiie 
debt of guilt; his will to infec;t and poison 
the deepest foundatlon^of things with the 
problem of punishment and guilt in order to 
bar his own escape from this monomaniaeal 
maze onoa and for all; his wi_ll to erect an 
ideal"""^ the "holiness of God"--so as to have 
close at hand evidence of his own absolute 
unworthiness. Oh, what a mad, unhappy beast 
man is I What notions occur to him, what 
monstrosities, what paroxysms of nonsense, 
what beastly ideas burst fo:rth in the moment 
he is hindered in the slightest from being a
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feâSM. Q.S. ap-tip-nl ... There is so much horror
in man I The earth has too long been a mad­
house !
It would rseem that man is condemned to destroy himself
with his bad eonseience, for the next "turning inward"
of guilt is bound to be even more vehement than the
last and now God, the only one capable of paying
such an enormous debt, is dead. Nevertheless, this
treatise does not end on a negative note,as indeed
the first treatise did not, Nietzsche does not venture
at all far into the future, but he does drop a few
hints which suggest that he may see a way out.
Let us add at once that,,.with the phenomenon 
of an animal tmnied in upon itself, taking 
sides against itself, something so new and 
deep, so unprecedented, puzzling, confusing 
%ML appeared on earth that the
earth itself was substantially altered,
.••he (man) aroused an interest, created a 
tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as though 
something were being heralded in him, some­
thing prepared ; as though man were not a goal 
but a way^ an episode, a bridge, a great 
promise .4'^
There can be no doubt that bad conscience is 
a sickness, but in the sense that pregnancy 
is a slGkneBB.43
One final touch remains to be added before we 
can comment on the two sections from Toward a Genealogy 
of Morals which we have just reviewed, namely the 
setting alongside Nietzsche'b theory of the develop­
ment of conscience of Freud's notion of s u p e r - e g o .44 
In doing this, we shall let Freud apeak for himself.
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A super-ego must be presumed to be present 
wherever, as In the case of man, there Is a 
long period of dependence In childhood*45
The long period of childhood, during which the 
growing human being lives in dependence upon 
his parents, leaves behind it a precipitate, 
which forms within his ego a special agency in 
which this parental influence is prolonged*
It has received the name of lauperrJi^ P,* 46
The super-ego is, then, a late product, a further devel­
opment of the ego resulting from the prolonged infancy 
of the human child* At "about the age of five," that 
is, at the end of "infancy,"
A portion of the external world has, at least 
partially, been given up as an object and in­
stead, by means of identification, taken into 
the ego - that is, has become an integral part 
of the internal world* This new mental agency 
continues to carry on the functions which have 
hitherto been perfo3?med by the corresponding 
people in the external worlds it observes the 
ego, gives it orders, corrects it and threatens 
it with punishments, exactly like the parents 
whose place it has taken. W© call this agency 
the Buperregg and are aware of it, in its Judi­
cial functions, as our ^onscionee.47
The parents' influence naturally includes not 
merely the personalities of the parents them­
selves but also the racial, national and family 
traditions handed on through them as well ae the 
demands of the immediate social milieu which 
they represent. In the same way, an indivi­
dual's super-ego in the course of his develop­
ment takes over contributions from later suc­
cessors and substitutes of his parents, such 
as teachers, admired figures in public life 
or high social ideals.4'
It is a remarkable thing that the super-ego 
often develops a severity for which no example
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has been provided by the real parents, and 
further that it calls the ego to task not only 
on account of its deeds but just as much on 
account of its thoughts and unexecuted inten™ 
tiens, of which it seems to have knowledge. We 
are reminded that the hero of the Oedipus leg­
end too felt guilty for his actions and punished 
himself, although the compulsion of the oracle 
should have made hira innocent in our judgment 
and in his own* The super-ego is in fact the 
heir to the Oedipus complex and only arises 
after that complex has been disposed of* For 
that reason its excessive severity does not 
follow a real prototype but corresponds to the 
strength which is used in fending off the temp­
tation of the Oedipus complex* ...the super© 
ego continues to act the role of an external 
world towar'ds the ego, although it has become 
part of the internal world*49
...the super-ego takes up the kind of inter­
mediate position between the id and the external 
world; it unites in itself the influences of 
the present and of the past* In the emergence 
of the super-ego we have before us, as it were,
an example of the way in which the present is
changed into the past.50
All of the elements of Nietzsche*s "conscience" are
accounted for. It would seem that "conscience" and
"super-ego" correspond exactly* Both develop late in
man's history; both» are a turning inward of *mn'a desire
for satisfaction of his impulses; both have their source
in will to power (Nietzsche) or id (Freud) and become
differentiated by turning against and dominating their
source ;51 both bind m n  to his past by performing the
judicial function of commanding obedience to the demands
of that past.
There is, however, a difference. It is in the M_nd
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of obedience demnded by conscienoe and super-ego. 
Super-ego, as heir to the Oedipus complex, is by defini­
tion repressive, "...its chief function remains the 
limitation of satisfactions."52 %t is sublimation that 
Freud sees as providing "a way out, a way by which the 
claims of the ego can be met without involving re- 
p r e s s i o n . "^3 g-at sublimation necessarily involves an 
abandonment of sexual aims ; it " consists in the in­
stinct’s directing itself towards an aim other than, 
and remote from, that of sexual gratification; in this 
process the accent falls upon deflection from the sex­
ual a i m . "54 vocabulary of limitation, repression
and deflection belongs to the language of the ascetic 
ideal. Freud’s "answer" to repression was sublimation; 
but sublimation, as Freud conceived it, however suc­
cessful in providing an alternative to the destructive 
repression of the instincts, was forced to pay the high 
price of desaxualization. Only by becoming more ascetic, 
only by redirecting our desires toward non-sexual grati­
fications could we hope to escape the crushing weight 
of the severe super-ego.
But is this a "way out"? Both B¥eud and Nietzsche 
were aware that man’s sense of guilt (resulting, as we 
have seen, from the demands of super-ego or conscience) 
is c u i m l a t i v e  ^ Freud’ s conception of sublimation
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Will provide a way out of this dilemma only if we 
agree to forfeit our bodies ; for his prescription of 
more and more sublimation in the face of a emulative 
build-Up of repression can only lead, by way of a 
progressive desexua1izatlon of the body, to "pure 
intelie 01ua1i ty."56
We are now in a position to return to Nietzsche's 
theory of consciance and the clues it may contain for 
a "way out" which does not end in Freud's theoretic 
and therapeutic pessimism*
III
Hoi'o are we to read the first two extended aphor­
isms of Toward a Genealogy of Mora1b. which occupied
our attention in the preceding section? How are we 
to construe Nietzsche's claim to have traced the moral 
judgments "good and bad," "good and evil" to a master 
elite and a pack of slaves, respectively? The move­
ment between the first and second parts of Nietzsche's 
treatise is, ostensibly, from the provenance of moral 
values in history to their provenance in mii % in short, 
recalling that ultimately the issue in question is the 
value of ethics, the wrth of moral values, a movement 
from the phylogenetic to the ontogenetic development 
of conscienoe.
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But is this, in fact, what transpires in Toward a
It is doubtful* Regardless whether 
we are affronted by the theory that all our value judg­
ments are traceable to an original pre-historic value- 
bestowing horde of masters and slaves, or just made 
uncomfortable by it, Nietzsche's claim to have "dis- 
covered" it in our past fails to convince. Yet it 
would be difficult to deny that the content of the 
theory otherwise rings true and is much more useful 
in determining the origin and worth of our value Judg­
ments than, for example, a utilitarian approach. How 
is this to be explained?
Nietzsche (like Freud, though to a lesser extent) 
was a psychological determinist.57 jje saw his own work 
as paving the way to a time when "psychology would again 
be recognized as queen of the sciences...."58 As we 
have seen, Nietzsche began with nmn and set out to find 
an explanation for the inner split in man (repression) 
which was making him sick (neurotic). His search led 
him to an examination of snan's various moral demand 
systems which he discovered to foe both a sign-language 
of man's passions and a table of his ovex^eomings. And 
these moralities could be narrowed clown and separated 
into two basic types - master moralities and slave
2 3 6
moralitiese We need not retrace Nietzsche*s steps 
any further* His self-appointed task was to account 
for repression; repression is conflict, and conflict 
presupposes at least two opposing forces. Nietzsche 
was compelled to Msume the existence of these two 
forces, and to this end he posited (almost certainly 
believing that he had discovered it) the oiaster/slave 
dichotomy. ïïndorstood in this way, Nietzsche's whole 
account of the development of human conscience does 
not stand or fall with the credence of the master/slave 
theory, as the structure of
Morals would suggest* On the contrary, the second 
part of the treatise, in which Nietzsche deals with 
the development in the individual, is essential to an 
understanding of the first in which the subject is the 
"historical" development. Phylogeny is analogous to, 
indeed, a projection of ontogeny; psychology is the 
queen of the sciences, on the basis of which the other 
sciences " not the least of which is history ” are to 
be understood. Conceived in this way, we are not con­
strained to discard the first part of the treatise, 
but, taking the primal horde of masters and slaves 
symbolically (as, indeed, we took Freud's primal horde 
in Chapter 4), it provides a useful aid to understanding
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not history, but the psychology of the development of 
man’s conscienoe which is, after- all, our theme in this 
chaptero
We may recall that both parts of Toward a GenealoCT 
Qf...,MqralB contained an apparently indefensible note of 
hope* In the former, after lamenting that "Hum^xnity is 
still suffering from the after-effects of these naive 
priestly cures," MlaÈzsühe admits that, nevertheless, it 
was only on this soil that nan has been able to develop 
into an interesting creature, and thus "proved his 
superiority over the other boasts."59 Likewise in the 
latter, he speaks of bad conscience as "a sickness, but 
in the sense that pregnancy is a sickness/’ In what 
sense can bad eonscienocj he said to be the harbinger 
of hope? How can sickness be the mother of the "superb 
health" which Nietzsche believes would reverse the devel­
opment of bad conscienoe?
In order to get at the answer to these questions 
we must clear up one point of confusion in Nietzsche’s 
account of the development of conscience. It would 
seem that in bis discussion of this development Nietzsche 
is describing two distinct phenomenci - conscience and 
bad conscienceo This would be corroborated by his (as 
we now Icnow) subsequent claim that the pre-history of
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the moral valuatloiiB "good and bad," "good and evil"
ÎB a doul/le history. Conscience is a memory of the will, 
an ability to remember and thus to make promises ; bad 
conscience is a eonseiousness of guilt. Nietzsche is 
himself confused here, and thus confusing to hia reader. 
To he sure, after having tx^ eated conscience, on the 
whole positively, as the human privilege of responsi- 
foility, Nietzsche refers to bad conscience as "that 
somber phenomenon../*6l (my italics) Despite 
this explicit reference, the two are, in fact, not 
separated by Nietzsche - not even nominally : bad^
conscience la a kimd of conscience. Nowhere in the 
remainder of Nietzsche's discussion does he give us 
reason to believe that he is ti*©atiiig two separate 
phenomena «
Assuming this to be true, let us confront the
question Just posed - in what sense can bad conscience
be said to be pregnant with possibility? - and remind
ourselves of Nietzsche’s hypothesis concerning the
origin of (bad) conscience.
I take bad conscience to be the deep sickness 
which man contracted under the pressure of the 
most profound transformation he has ever under­
gone - that transforînation in which he found 
himself once and fo'c all under the spell of 
society and freedom. Not unlike what must have 
happened to the sea animals when they were 
forced either to become land animals or to
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perish, these semi-animals, happily adjusted 
to the xvllderness, to war, to roaming and ad­
venture, suddenly found all their instinots 
devalued, "unhinged." They now had to walk on 
their feet and "carry themselves," whereas the 
water had always carried them before* A dread­
ful heaviness weighed upon them. They felt 
inept for the simplest movements; in this new, 
unknown world, they could no longer count on 
their old guides - the regulating, trustworthy, 
unconscious drives. They were reduced to think­
ing, deducing, calculating, linking up causa 
and effect - these unhappy creatures, reduced 
to their "consciousneBs/’ their scantiest and 
most unreliable organl I doubt that there has 
ever been a worse feeling of misery on earth, 
such a leaden discomfort. Besides, these old 
instincts had not suddenly stopped making 
their demands! It was only difficult and seldom 
possible to fulfill them. In the main, they 
were forced to seek new and at the same time 
covert satisfactions. All instincts which do 
not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward. 
This is what I call man's introjeetion (Yerin- 
aaiiilsM iis) ,^ 2
This in&tlnsl a£ feaeâaab violently made latent
this suppressed instinct of freedom, 
driven back, imprisoned in roan's inner self 
and forced to vent itself upon itself - that 
is the beginning of bad conscience.^3
These are the words of a master psychologist describing,
not man's social-historteal past, but his individual-
psychological past; in short, the trauma of birth which,
as Freud knew, is a long, cruel process beginning rather
than ending with the physical aeparation of the body of
the child from the body of the mother. That this is a
description of birth is supported by the insight which
is without a doubt the most audacious and simultaneous1y
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the most enlightening of the entire treatise : that con-
science is an instinct - the dominant instinct!
During the birth and prolonged infancy of the 
human child (both physical and psychological; that is, 
as psychoanalysis has it, "up to the end of the first 
period of childhood, till about the age of f i v e " ^4 
the as yet undifferentiated will to power (Nietzsche) 
or id (Freud) is forced to split and turn on itself, 
not for the purpose of repression but because the drives 
of the will to power or id, in their new surroundings, 
cannot always be satisfied directly. Thus the con­
science (Nietzsche) or super-ego (Freud) splits off 
from the will to power or id and takes up a position 
of mediation between it and the new external world, 
making demands on the will to power oi? id in such a 
way that, if not directly, then indirectly, the drives 
of will to power or id can be satisfied. Again, we 
would seem to be at the dead-end of Freud's pessimism, 
if the two men are in such total agreement on the 
origin of conscience.
But no. The difference we noticed previously was 
in the kind of obedience demanded by Nietzsche'b "con­
science" and Freud's "super-ego." Conscience is for 
Nietzsche an instinct, that is, a given, inescapable,
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unavoidable part of our human make-up* For Freud too, 
though he never called it an instinct, the super-ego 
is a comparatively late but inevitable development 
it is also, as heir to the Oedipus complex, inevitably 
repressive in character. Mot so for Nietzsche, And 
this is why be can be hopeful. This is why conscience 
as we know it (and as Freud thought it had to %e) is 
a sickness, but also pregnant with possibility for the 
future *
Conscience âs an instinct is a fact that cannot 
be ignored* This is not to say, however, that this 
instinct is not malleable* On the contrary, "Conscience 
changes according to the environment In which we liva/’®^ ' 
At this point Nietzsche's psychological determinism ends. 
Conscience, theoretically (though this is a practical 
impossibility) "neutral" at birth (i.e. given, but as 
yet unformed), develops in a direction determined by 
"the environment in which we live." This "environment," 
as Freud knew, consists at the earliest level of parents, 
meaning, as we have seen, that "The parents’ influence 
naturally includes not merely the personalities of the 
parents themselves but also the racial, national and 
family traditions handed on through them as well as the 
demands of the immediate social milieu which they re­
present."^7 other words, the social-historical-
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cultural milieu into which a child is born and in which 
he grows shapes his conscience in accordance with the 
particular moral demand system under which it operates. 
(This should help us to appreciate more fully the ra­
tionale which motivated Nietzsche to a critique of 
ëQLEâJLitZ.) Freud assumed that this "parental influence 
oI Micaspity; amounted to a compendium of restrictions - 
and there is undeniably much historical evidence to 
support his assumption, his own time providbg a choice 
example. And because he did not shrink from drawing 
the consequences of this assmxiption, he ended in pessi­
mism. But Nietzsche, though fully aware of the m s s  
of evidence to the contrary, made a claim for the pos­
sibility of a remissive conscience «
Man has, as a result of the 'long, cruel process" 
of infancy during which he is dependent on and molded 
by oBhers, acquired a conscience, a memory of the will. 
What kind of conscience it is, what sort of things he 
wills to remember depend upon who the "others" are and 
under what kind of moral demand system they live and 
act and Judge. In the preceding chapter we saw that 
the dominant morality in our time and in our past has 
been an ascetic morality which, though it gave man a 
purpose, a meaning, a will, if allowed to have its way.
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Will deprive us of our 'bodies and lead us into a
wasteland of pure intellectuality*
Apart from the ascetic ideal, œn, anima 
has had no meaning at all. His earthly exist**» 
ence had no goal. The question - what is man? - 
was left unanswered* The will to man and the 
earth was lacking. In the wake of every great 
hunmn destiny, the refrain rang even louder - 
"In vain" : EWZÊlü lies the slgnlfieanee of
the ascetic ideal - that something was missing  ^
that a bottomless abyss surrounded man; he knew 
not how to justify himself, how to define and 
affirm himself; he suffered, from the problem of 
his meaning* He also suffered from other things, 
being on the whole a liick animal * But suffering 
itself was not his proble#;rather it was the 
fact that he had no answer to the gnawing ques­
tion - "To. what epd. suffering?" Man, the most 
courageous animal and the most accustomed to 
suffering, does not deny suffering; he wants it, 
he seeks it out, on the condition that it can 
be given a meanin/y* a purpose. The meaningless­
ness of suffering, not the suffering itself, 
was the curse that afflicted mankind. And the 
ascetic ideal offei^ed it a meaning I It was 
its only meaning to-date* Any meaning is bet­
ter than no meaning at all; the ascetic ideal 
was in every sense the "faute de miepx" par 
excellence. In it suffering was lpte;i%r#ed.; 
the frightful emptiness seemed filled up; the 
door to all suicidal nihilism was shut* The 
interpretation - there can be no doubt “ brought 
new suffering with It, deeper, more inward, 
more poisonous, more life-consuming suffering; 
it brought all suffering under the perspective 
of guilt. But in spite of all that, œ n  was 
sayed thereby; he had a meayiing,. He was no 
longer like a leaf in the wind, a plaything of 
folly, of "absurdity. ' From now on he could 
will something, no matter at first what or why 
or how he willeds will itself was saved *
One cannot deny, however, just what it was that 
this willing which took its guidance from the 
ascetic ideal expressed: this hatred of the
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human, the animal, the aiatei’ial; this loathing 
of the senses avid of reason; this fear of hap­
piness and beauty; this longino: to be rid of 
all illusion, change, becoming, death, wishing, 
of longing itself* All this means, let us at­
tempt to grasp it, a w m  to mMxLmmëâ.^ a 
will against life, a revolt against the very 
foundations of life - yet it is and remains a 
Hill;l And, to repeat at the end what I said 
at" the beginning, man would rather will MothinE. 
than nq,t will at all.60
It remains here to ask how Nietzsche was Justified in
making a claim for the possibility of a new conscience
based on a remissive morality. And this takes us to
his theory of sublimation*
IV
We know that Freud's theory of subli-mation was 
inadequate to the task of discharging pent-up bodily 
drives in at least two closely related senses s in that 
sublimation entails the deflection of those drives to 
non“bodily fulfillment, which is to say, deBexualizationj 
and in that, to the efetent that the drives are left 
unsatisfied, their backlog increases cumulatively. How 
is Nietzsche's theory different?
In a Vïote above on the " cosmic implications" of 
will to power we quoted Nietzsche's conjecture about the 
possibility of the existence of"a pre,“form of life," 
by which he meant "a more primitive form of the world 
of affects in which everything which later branches off
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and develops into organic processes is still a povjer- 
ful unity,, *as a kind of instinctual life in wlhich all 
the organic functions are still bound up together i^ ith 
self-regulationj assimilation^ nutrition^, secretion^, 
and raetaboliseu e. Granted, Miets^sehe %as t^ 'jrlting 
about the "mechanistic (reads material) -world" in this 
passage; nevertheless, his approach is, as be himself 
reminds us in Scce Homo, looking back at Beyond Good and 
Byi.l in which the words above appear, psychological 
Thus, our suspicion that Nietzsche is describing indi­
genously human developments and then reading them into 
the non-human animal and physical universe (as he did 
before, into history) is not ungroundedMay we not 
take this "pre-form of life" to be the undifferentiated, 
unified animal life which precedes divided, neurotic 
human life? Assuming this to be a legitimate way of 
reading these words, let us clear the imy to an under­
standing of Nietzsche*s theory of sublimation by point­
ing out what it is that distinguishes this pre-form 
of (animal) life from the life of the human animal 
by focusing on Nietzsche’s posture as an anti-Darwinian^ 
Nineteenth century biologists and philosophers up 
to and including Darwin and Spencer x-^ ere at one in the 
view that life is essentially passive, that is, adaptive
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Nietzsche mentions at one point,
• •aour current instincts and fashions «.^which 
would rather come to terms with the absolute 
contingency, even the mechanistic meaningless- 
ness of all events than with the theory of the 
development of a will to power in these event^^
Darwin had described the evolution of the species in 
terms of a struggle for existence and natural selection. 
X\Tith the former he was referring to the adaptation of 
an organism to its environment; "natural selection" 
denoted the process by which the environment tended to 
favor certain qualities of the organism. Spencer was 
in full agreement with Da?rwin* s formulation of the 
process of natural selection, which he, however, pre­
ferred to call "the survival of the fittest." And he 
xuas anxious to lay great stress on the fact that life 
is essentially a continuous adaptation of inner rela­
tions to external impressions made on it. The organism 
continually adjusts itself to its environment and to 
changes introduced to it from the outside, thus pre­
paring itself to meet subsequent changes and thus to 
survive them. (It is worth mentioning in passing that, 
in a similar way, Freud believed life to be basically 
conservative. "Though they (the instincts) are the
ultimate cause of all activity, they are by nature
71conservative,"* ' )
As we discovered in our examination of will to
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power, Nietzsche saw life in a very different light.
The influence of "external Gircumstances" in 
Darwin is absurdly overesyjrMMs the essence 
of the life process is precisely the prodigious 
organizing power creating forms from within, 
which takes advantage of, exploits the "oxter- 
nal circumstances* *. .72
Of particular importance here is Nietzsche* s emphasis
on the forming, creating; force which accompanies the
will to increase, and which also comes from x^ithino
Further along in a section of
Morals, already cited Nietzsche writes, in an allusion
to "the democratic aversion to anything that dominates
or wishes to dominate,"
...it seems to me that this prejudice has 
already become master over the whole of 
physiology and the life sciences. To their 
detriment, of course, in that it has conjured 
away one of their basic concepts, namely that 
of 8Lctivlt%, and put in its place, in keeping 
with the prejudice, the concept of "adaptation,*' 
that is, a second-rate activity, mere re­
activity. Life itself has even been defined 
as an ever more purposeful inner Eidaptation 
to external circumstances (Herbert Spencer). 
This is, however, to misconstrue the very 
essence of life, its WJLl to ^power. It is 
to overlook the priority of the spontaneous, 
aggressive, assailing. Interpretive, directive, 
shaping pox*ijers, upon whose effect "adaptation" 
only subsequently supervenes. It is to deny 
the dominant role of the highest functions of 
the organism itself, in which the vital will 
appears active and form-giving.73
Here is the difference between primitive, unified ani­
mal life and detached, divided human life. The dominant
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role of will to power in human life la that of shaping, 
"creating forma from XfOlthin," or in the words of Zara- 
thustra, "self-overcoming," i.e. commanding and obeying
oneself.
I pursued the living; I walked the widest and 
the narrowest paths that 1 might know its 
nature, with a hundredfold mirror I still 
caught Its glance when its mouth was closed, 
so that its eyes might speak to me. And its 
eyes spoke to me.
But wherever I found the living, there I heard 
also the speech on obedience. Whatever lives, 
obeys.
And this is the second point: he who cannot
obey himself is commanded. That is the nature 
of the living.
This, however, is the third point that I. beards 
that commanding is harder than obeying; and 
not only because he who commands must carry 
the burden of all who obey, and because this 
burden may easily crush him. An experiment 
and hazard appeared to me to be in all com­
manding | and whenever the living commands, 
it hazards itself. Indeed, even when it com­
mands itselfp it must still pay for its com'" 
mantling. It must become the judge, the avenger, 
and the victim of its own lax^ . How does it 
happen? I asked myself. What persuades the 
living to obey and command, and to practice 
obedience even when it commands?
Hear, then, my word, you who are wisest. Test 
in all seriousness whether I have crawled into 
the very heart of life and into the very roots 
of its heart.
wrhere 1 found the living, there I found will 
to power; and even in the will of those X'^ho 
serve I found the will to he master.
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That the weaker should serve the stronger, to 
that it is persuaded by its own x^hich
would be master over what is weakei'* still : this
is the one pleasure it does not want to renounce 
And as the smaller yields to the greater that it 
may have pleasure and power over the smallest, 
thus even the greatest still yields, and for the 
sake of power risks life. That is the yielding 
of the greatest 5 it is hazard and danger and 
casting dice for death.
And where men make sacrifices and serve and 
east amorous glances, there too is the will to 
be master. Along stealthy paths the weaker 
steals into the castle and into the very heart 
of the more pox^erful - and there steals power.
And life itself confided this secret to me : 
"Beholds" it said, "I am EfelSà mmt. a l m m
overcome lis.al.f. Indeed » you call it a will to
procreate or a drive to an end, to something 
higher, farther, more manifolds but all this 
is one, and one secret,
"Rather would Î perish than forswear this; and 
verily, where there is perishing and a falling 
of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself
- for power. That I must be struggle and a 
becoming and an end and an opposition to ends
- alas, whoever guesses what is my will should 
also guess on what crooked paths it must pro- 
ceed 0
"Whatever I create and hox^ever much I love it - 
soon I must oppose it and my love; thus my 
will wills it. And you too, lover of knowledge, 
are only a path and footprint of my will ; verily 
my will to power walks also on the heels of 
your will to truth,
"Indeed, the truth x-^as not hit by him who shot 
at it with the word of the ’will to existence* t 
that will does not exist. For, what does not 
exist cannot x-gill; but what is in existence, 
hox'Æ could that still want existence? Only where 
there is life is there also will; not will to 
life but - thus I teach you - will to poxMer,
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"There is much that life esteems more highly 
than life Itselfj but out of the esteeming 
speaks the will to pox\ier."
Thus life oiiee taught me; and with this I 
shall yet solve the riddle of your heart, you 
who are wisest,*
To help us understand what self-over coming* as sublimation
might mean, let us first look at what it does not mean.
Walter Kaufmann offers us an apparently identical
but actually very different interpretation of self-
overcoming as sublimation. He sets the stage for his
interpretation by posing two questions : how would
Nietzsche picture the overcoming of the impulses? And
how would he handle the special problem - which lie
touched on earlier - of a monistic, i.e. self-overcoming?
He rightly isolates the problematic nature of stiblima-
tiovi when be asks,
Can one properly speak of the sublimation of 
one and the same impulse? Instead of doing 
one thing, a man does another - and the con­
tinuity of the original impulse seems prob­
lematic, '5
He thinks one can speak of the sublimation of one and 
the same impulse^ by admitting that the energy of an 
impulse is nondescript and that its definition is de­
pendant upon its objective. As Nietzsche maintained 
of will to power, it remains constant throughout, re­
gardless bow often its manifestations vary.
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other words, not only the energy remains 
but also the objective, power; and those so- 
called objectives which are canceled are only 
accidental attributes of this more basic stri­
ving: they are, to use one of Nietzsche’s
favorite terms, mere "foregrounds."76 (I have 
translated Vorform as pre-form")
Kaufmann proceeds to pit this theory of sublimation
against that of Freud, concluding that
Nietzsche did Viot decide to reduce the will to 
power to a sexual libido^g for sexuality is that 
very aspect of the basic drive which is can" 
eeled in sublimtion and cannot, for that reason^ 
be considered the essence of the drive. Sexu­
ality is merely a foreground of something else 
which is more basic and hence preserved in sub­
limation: the will to poxx^ er. The feeling of
potency is essential, while its sexual mani­
festation is accidental,.,,77
Kaufmann summarizes the answer to his first question - 
how would Nietzsche picture the overcoming of the im­
pulses? - by saying
Our impulses are in a state of chaos, ,,.No 
man can live without bringing some order into 
this chaos. This may be done by thoroughly 
weakening the whole organism or* by repudiating 
and repressing many of the impulses : but the 
result in that ease is not a "harmony," and 
the physis is castrated, not "improved," Yet 
there is another way - namely, to "organize 
the chaos" : sublimation allows for the achieve­
ment of an organic harmony and leads to that 
culture which is truly a "transfigured physis-.^ B
In order to reconstruet Kaufmann* s answer to his 
second question how is self'“overcoming (now, sublima­
tion) possible if only one force, will to power, is
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Involved? - we must assume that, though Nietzsche is
definitely operating with a monistic hypothesis, it
is impossible to make sense of the metaphor "self-
overcoming"' "witbaut tx^ o elements,
...the simile of overcoming.«.implies the 
presence of two forces, one of which over­
comes the other. " Self "^overcoming" is con­
ceivable and meaningful when the self is 
analyzed into tx^;o forces, such as reason and 
the inclinatiovus « Apai?t from such a duality, 
apart from the picture of one force as over­
coming and controlling another, self-overcoming; 
seems impo3sib le.79
Nietzsche is, then, for Kaufmann, not a dualist, not
just an ordinary monlst, but a dialectleal monist.
The crucial question arising from Kaufmann’s
argument at this point is : the sudden appearance
of reason as the second of the "two forces" motivating
"the self"? Kaufmann attempts to answer this query by
claiming that reason is a derivative of will to power.
Reason is the highest manifestation of the 
will to power, in the distinct sense that 
through rationality it can realize its ob­
jective most fully, ,,.While Nietzsche thus 
comes to the conclusion that reason is man’s 
highest faculty, his view is not based on 
any other principle than the power standard. 
Reason is extolled not because it is the 
faculty which abstracts from the given, forms 
universal concepts, and draws inferences, 
but because these skills enable it to develop 
foresight and to give consideration to all 
the impulses, to organize their chaos, to 
integrate them into a harmony - and thus to 
give man power: poxr»?or over himself and over
nature.80
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Two elements are operative, aecording to Kaufrimnn, 
a lower (impulse, inclinations) and a higher (reason, 
rationality), but because both are manifestations of 
the same will to power, we must speak of the over­
coming of impulse by reason as self-ov@rcomlng. i.e. 
sublimâtion. This is the formula for what Kaufmann 
(drai'ilng on Aristotle's ElçjotmoJhmiLJâthic.s for support) 
calls acting "rationally on instinct."^
In other words, the truly rational man need 
not go to war against his impulses. If his 
reason is strong enough, he will naturally 
control his passions. He is, without being 
ostentatious, an ascetic - insofar as he does 
not yield to his impulses - but instead of _
extirpating them he masters and employs
In conclusion, Kaufmann quotas one of Nietzsche’s notes
dealing with this matter which is meant to clinch his
argument, but X'ühich, on the contrary, best shows up its
fallacy. ¥e will use this quotation as a springboard
to our critique of Kaufmann’s position.
The whole conception of the rank of the 
passions : as if it were right and normal to
be led by reason, while the passions are con­
sidered abnormal...and nothing but desires 
for pleasure. Thus passion is degraded 1. as
if it were only in unseemly oases, and not 
necessarily and always, that which activates; 
2. insofar as it is taken to aim at something 
which has no great value, namely mere amuse­
ment .
This misunderstanding of passion and reason,
as if the latter existed as an entity by itself
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and not rather as a state of the relations 
between different passions and desires j and 
as if every passion did not contain in itself 
its own quantum of reason.^3
Kaufmann*s intention to convinoe his reader that 
Nietzsche was iiqt an irrationalist is, when not explicit 
never far beneath the surface of his work. And on the 
whole it has done much to clear the air of at least the 
attacks on Nietzsche based on ignorance. But In the 
specific instance with which we are now dealing, Kauf­
mann* s good intention leads him to introduce reason 
uncritically into the discussion as the second of the 
**two forces" in the process of self-overcoming. His 
assumption that because the traditional dualism of rea­
son and impulse had been discredited, and because for 
Nietzsche life was essentially will to power, Nietzsche 
would have to ground the previously separate pair in 
his monistic will to power, is unfounded. He is right 
in saying that because of the death of God, Nietzsche 
"felt obliged also to question the supernatural origin 
of reason," and that "he had to account for reason in 
terms of will to p o w e r . " B u t  Nietzsche gives us no 
cause to assume that reason will necessarily be one of 
the two forces in his self-overcoming will to power.
In fact, the contrary is true; his questioning of rea­
son goes deeper than the negative discovery that it is
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not of supernatural origin. Moreover, he makes it all 
but imposBibieiaottoassume that it is the instinct of 
eonscienee which is that agent of will to power by 
which it overcomes itself.
Nietzsche was indeed no irrationalist. But neither 
did he extol rationality as "man’s highest faculty."%
He did identify "the h.atrecl of reason with bad intel­
lectual conscience,"®^ (my italics) as Kaufmann puts 
it; but this did not drive him to the opposite, equally 
dangerous extreme, of a belief in reason. Reason was, 
for Nietzsche, as we noted above, "a state of the rela­
tions between different passions and d e s i r e s . " H i s  
questioning of reason led him to the discovery that 
"trust in reason...is, as trust, a moral phenomenon."®® 
Furthermore, Kaufmann’s assertion that "the truly ra­
tional man...will naturally control his passions" 
fails to do justice to what is anything but a "natural" 
process, in the sense implied here, namely "effortless" ' 
"if his (man’s) reason is strong e n o u g h F o r  both 
Nietzsche and Freud, the "socialization" of man and the 
sublimation of his instincts which offers the only 
healthy alternative to outright repression of them is, 
as we have noticed, a long, cruel, painful process.
If we wish to understand how Kaufmann mistook con­
science for rationality, we must look at two key words.
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avid both of which Kaufmann renders
as "reason" (which he uses interchangeably with "ra­
tionality"). He himself points outs "This evaluation 
of fieiit. is so vital a point in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
that one cannot overlook it without misapprehending 
Nietzsche’s t h o u g h t O e i s t  is admittedly an ambig­
uous word (there are at least a dozen possible equival­
ents in English of the noun form alone), the translation 
of which must depend largely on the context in which 
it is used. In this case, hoi^ever, Nietzsche has told 
us explicitly, in the course of one of his "Anti-Darwin" 
polemics, how he uses the word.
One must need spirit to acquire spirit; one 
loses it when one no longer needs it. Who­
ever has strength dispenses with spirit....
It will be noted that by "spirit" (Geist) I 
mean caution, patience, cunning, simulation, 
great self ""control, and everything that is 
mimicry.... 9^ (This translation is, with the 
exception of one slight alteration - I have 
rendered Vorsicht "caution" instead of "care"
- Kaufmann’s own.)
The negative tone of this passage is unmistakable.
There can surely be no doubt that what Nietzsche means
by OelBt is not "reason" but "mimicry," or, to use
other possible English equivalents of Geist. "witj*
"imagination,** "cleverness." And what Darwin meant by
"mimicry" is the process by i h^ich an organism assumes
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the x'^eeamblance of its environment or another organism 
for purposes of proteetion. "Foresight (translated 
"eare" in the passage just oitod) and patience, and 
above all ’great self-mastery*" are, to be sura, 
"according to Nietzsche, of the very essence of (|§Ast."93 
But far from lauding them as the clue to the self- 
overcoming of will to power, Nietzsche satirizes them 
- "Whoever has strength dispenses with G § i s ; t T h i s  
is the point.
And yet not i#r,el% strength is important. For, 
as we heard Nietzsche say in what is only now revealing 
itself as the passage which holds the key to an under­
standing of self-overcoming as sublimation, "whan the 
degree of mi&Mjlâàs of helm. ImmmiÉ is to be deter­
mined, only the deg^ree of reason in eteength is decisive: 
one must measure in how far strength has been overcome 
by something higher and now serves that as its tool and 
meanst"strength (will to power) is worthy of being 
honored only to the degree that it has been overcome 
and given shape by the reason (Yernunft. not Geist) 
which is in it - ^elf-overcoming.
In what sense are we to understand "reason" in 
this context? In an unpublished note cited by Kaufmann 
(note 84 above) Nietzsche refers to "the misunderstanding
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of passion and reason XlmimMi.)/ as If the latter
existed as an entity by itself, and not rather as a 
state of the re'iations between different passions and 
desires ; and as if every passion did not contain in 
Itself its own quantum of reason (VernunftJ ." Here 
we have a similar use of reason in strength or passion. 
Zmrnm&t, though less ambiguous than Seist, can also be 
rendered into English by several different equivalents: 
reason and intellect, but also judgment, discernment, 
understanding. It is my contention that it is in the 
latter sense that Nietzsche is using Yernunft in these 
passages, that is, loosely rendered, in the sense of 
"being reasonable,‘ exercising discretion, "using 
good sense/'
In tracing the development of Nietzsche’s theory 
of conseleneo, we came to see conscience as a part of 
will to power which Is forced to split off during the 
time when men are being "mde sociable," i.e. during 
infancy, and take up a position as mediator between will 
to poweï» and the external world. On the basis of this 
development we can now claim that "the degree of reason 
in strength" is another way of saying "the degree of 
conscience in will to power." In short, decisive is 
the extent to which the impatient and intemperate de­
mands made by animal-man’s will to power have been
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brought under the guiding, shaping, molding influence 
of "something higher.’ namely, that dominant instinct, 
conscienceB
Perhaps the single most unconvincing aspect of
Kaufmann*8 argument for the self-overcoming will to
DOW or as the overcoming of the impulses by rationality
is that it leads straight to the dilemma which drove
Freud to pessimism - the progressive desexualization
of the body and pure intellectuality (reine G-eis.tig-
fetfe)• Kaufmann rests his argument on the proposition
that ’’Sexuality is not b a s i c H e  continues, in
passage cited above,
Nietzsche did not decide to reduce the will 
to power to a sexual libido ; for sexuality is 
that very aspect of the basic drive which is 
canceled in sublimation and cannot, for that 
reason, be considered the essence of the drive 
Sexuality is merely a foreground of something 
else which is more basic and hence preserved 
in sublimation; the will to power. The 
feeling of potency is essential, while its 
sexual manifestation is accidental....97
To say that libido is an accidental manifestation of
an essential will to power is to take Freud too
seriously (that is, too narroiuly, too literally)




Libido iB an expression taken from the theory 
of the emotions. VJo call by that name the 
energy...of those instincts X'v'bich have to do 
with all that may be comprisad under the word 
"love*" The nucleus of what we mean by love 
naturally consists (and this is what is com­
monly called love, and what the poets sing of) 
in sexual love with sexual union as its aim.
But "we do not separate from this "• what in any 
case has a share in the name "love" - on the 
one hand, self-love, and on the other, love 
for pa3?ents and children, friendship, and love 
for humanity in general, and also devotion to 
concrete objects and to abstract ideas. ...¥e 
are of the opinion, then, that language has 
carried out an entirely Justifiable piece of 
unification in creating the word "love" with 
its numerous uses, and that we cannot do better 
than take it as the basis of our scientific 
discussions and expositions as well....9o
And for Nietzsche, as the following chapter is designed
to show, will to power in men can be conceived of only
in terms of their bodies. Suffice it to say here what
"the awakened and the knowing" say In T M s._aDoke.Zara-
thuatm: "bod, am I entirely, and nothing else,.,."99
Or, better, let Nietzsche speak for himself: "There is
BO unspeakably much more in that which has been called
’body’ and ’flesh’; the rest is only t r i m m i n g . " A s
we sa%v in our comparison of Nietzsche’s will to power
and Freud’s theory of instincts, libido and will to
power are identical. It is not a matter of "sexuality"
in Freud versus "power" in Nietzsche; both men "start
with the body and use it as a guide" because of their
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conviction, to use NletzBobe*s words, that "it is the 
much richer phenomenon, which affords clearer observa- 
tions. Belief in the body is easier to confirm than 
belief in
The overcoming of the impulses by rationality, 
whether dualistically or clialectically, is the pre­
scription offered by the scientific^ sbholarly spirit 
who, all appearances to the contrary, warms himself 
at the fire of the ascetic ideal. The absolute will 
to truth with which Nietzsche characterizes the sci­
entific spirit is motivated by
the belief, M  tM MMSilO. lAiW. 1J5S,§1£* • «the
belief in a metaphysical value, the value of 
tui,3th as such as founded in and guaranteed by 
that ideal alone (it stands or falls with that 
ideal). There is, strictly speaking, no such 
thing as science "without assumptions *" The 
thought of such a science is unthinkable, 
paralogiatic. A philosophy, a "faith, must 
always precede it to give it a direction, a 
meaning, a method, a right to exist. .... 
science itself now requires a justification 
(which is not to say that one can be found)* 
Let us look at the most ancient and the most 
modern philosophies with this question in 
mind * In none of them is there an awareness 
that the will to truth itself requires a 
justification* Here is a gap in every philo­
sophy. Why is that? Because the ascetic 
ideal has always been the master of all
»  6NW#aww*'*«t*w#v*w**s»i<»
philosophy; because truth was given - as 
Being, as God, as Truth; because truth was 
never allowed to become a problem. Do you 
understand this "allowed"? From that moment 
on in which belief in the ascetic ideal is 
denied, there. Is a üew aaob.lem - the problem 
of the value of truth. The will to truth
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requires a critique,,.  ^ the value of truth 
must tentatively be sailed Irito guestlgn.
*, let no one epefik to me of science
when I ask for the natural antagonist to the 
ascetic ideal, when I ask: "Where is the
opposing will which expresses an opposing 
j^deal?" For that, science is not nearly 
independent enough. It needs in every way 
an ideal, a value-creating power. In whose 
service it may believe in itself; science 
itself never creates values. Its relation 
to the ascetic ideal is in no way antagonistic 
In fact, it would probably be nearer the truth 
to say that it provides the driving force foz^  
the inner inte.rpr6tatlon of the ascetic ideal., 
The contradiction and struggle of science 
with the ascetic ideal has, upon closer 
exaraimtion, no bearing at all on the ideal 
itself, but onl^ on its effects, its veils 
and masks, and on its occasional hardening, 
petrifmttion, and dogmatization* Science 
sets the life of the ascetic ideal free again 
by denying what is exoteric to it. These 
two, science and the ascetic ideal, stand on 
common ground.,.namely the same over-estima­
tion of truth (or more accurately, the same 
belief that the value of truth is .inestimable, 
and that truth is not susceptible of criti­
cism); and this makes them inevitable allies. 
Therefore, if they are to be opposed, they 
can always only be opposed and called into 
question together. .An assessment of the 
value of the ascetic ideal entails unavoid­
ably an assessment of the value of science, 
and It is time we woke up to this fact!
Even physiologically, science rests on the 
same ground as the ascetic ideal. A certain 
impoverishment of life is necessary in both 
instances - the passions must be cooled, the 
tempo slowed, dlaleetics put in place of in­
stincts, earnestness stamped on face and 
gestures (earnestness, this unmistaliable sign 
of a more laborious metabolism, of life 
struggling, working harder)* .. *No, ** modern 
science" .. .is for the time being the bes.t^  
ally of the ascetic ideal, precisely because 
it is the least conscious, least willing, most 
secret and most sub(tèrranaan of allies 1102
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The ratlomlizatlon of will to power was not the
"way out" Nietzsche envisaged for man, who suffers
and atrophies, or intelleotualizes his aggression in
the straitjacket of bad conscience. At the end of
Humap . A11-too-Human Nietzsche describes the ascetic
ideal and its perverted progeny thus;
Man has had many chains put on him in order 
that he might learn to stop behaving like a 
beast. And really, be has grown milder, more 
spiritual, more Joyful, more circumspect than 
all other animals. But he still suffers from 
having borne his chains and from having lacked 
fresh air and free movement for so long. These 
chains - I repeat it again and again - were 
those heavy and pregnant erro3?s of moral, reli­
gious and metaphysical conceptions. Mot until 
he has recovered from the chain-disease has
Mi *mj lAttarVaiSr <i rMiWe"»
the first main goal been reached - the séparatio' 
of man f 1^*0m beast. We are now in the midst of 
removing the chains, and we must exercise the 
gr*eatest care.^ ^3
These chains have, as we have seen, made man into an
animal with a memory of the will, a creature possessing
the unique privilege of responsibility, the ability to
make promises. But until he can throw off the chains
and recover from having borne thorn, he will not be free
to exercise to the full his new memory and privilege.
And for this he needs a new kind of conscience.
Man has looked far too long on bis natural 
inclinations with an "evil eye," so that they 
have become for him intimately connected with 
"bad conscience." A converse endeavor is con­
ceivable..., namely the associating of the 
unnatural inclinations - all those aspirations 
to a beyond, everything anti-sensual, anti-
2 64
instinctual, anti-natural, anti-animal; in 
short, the hitherto existing ideals, which 
are altogether hostile to life and slanderous
of the world - with bad c o n s c i e n c e *194
We must unlearn this bad conscience Just as 
we learned it.195
What Nietzsche means by a new kind of eonscienee is
the subject of Chapter 8* But first we must follow
up "The Clue of the Body" - Nietzsche’s alternative
to pure intellectuality*
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III* The Clue of the Body®
7* der Lelb--the physiological doctrine of the body
They despised the body; they did not take 
it into account* Even more, they treated 
it as an enemy ® Their mdness was the 
belief that one could carry a "beautiful 
soul" around in a monstrous cadaver,^
Is there any mistake more dangerous than 
despising the body?'^
“-Nietzsche
When will the harmony return, when will 
the world recover from the one-sided 
striving for spiritualization (Eergeistl- 
gxang), the insane error by virtue of which 
both the soul and the body fell 111?*^
“-Heine
I
Nietzsche's courageous insistence on treating
morality as a problem led him into the equally little-
explored territory of man as a problem* Under the
rubric, "Man as a Problem to Himself," Reinhold Niebuhr
has written:
If man insists that he is a child of nature 
and that he ought not to pretend to be more 
than an animal, which he obviously is, he 
tacitly admits that he Is, at any rate, a 
curious kind of animal who has both the inclina 
tion and the capacity to make such pretentions * 
If on the other hand he insists upon his unique 
and distinctive place in nature and points to 
his rational faculties as proof of his special 
eminence, there is usually an anxious note in 
his avowals of uniqueness which betrays his 
unconscious sense of kinship with the brutes*
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oB*the very effort to estimsita the significance 
of his rational faculties implies a degree of
transcendence over himmelf which is not fully
defined or explained in what is usually eon- 
noted by "reason." For the man who weighs the 
importance of his rational faculties is in some 
sense more than "reason" and has capacities 
which transcend the ability to form general 
concepts*^
This way of posing the problem, while appearing at 
first glance to be little more than a neat summary of 
the traditional question concerning the seemingly para­
doxical simultaneity of man's eongruity and incongruity 
with the other animals, turns out upon closer examination 
to be a much more fruitful way of putting it* For in 
Niebuhr's formulation there are three facets of the
problem, not just the usual two* First, man is an
animal; second, man is the animal which can sublimate 
his animality rationally; finally,however, man is able 
to back away yet ag;aln from himself, this time trans­
cending, observing, contemplating even his own ration­
ality® Thus, it is not man's rational faculty that 
distinguishes him from the other animals, but his 
"special capacity of standing continually outside him­
self in terms of indefinite regression®"^ This is, 
one way of stating the Biblical (that is, spiritaial 
and monistic) view, in contradistinction to the 
classical (that is, rational and dualistic) view® And
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it avoids the negative judgment placed on the body in 
consequence of the classical mind/body dualism® As 
Niebuhr puts it, "The Bible knows nothing of a good mind 
and an evil b o d y I n d e e d ,  the Biblical creation story 
in Genesis 1 is unequivocal in this regard in its asser­
tion that "God saw everythimy that he had made, and behold 
It was V M Z  KQoâ."T
The consequence of this conception of the world 
upon the view of human nature in Christian 
thought is to allow an appreciation of the 
unity of body and soul in human personality 
which idealists and naturalists have sought in 
vain. Furthermore it prevents the idealistic 
error of regarding the mind as essentially good 
or essentially eternal and the body as assentiall 
evil. But it also obviates the romantic error 
of seelrlng for the good in man-as-nature and for 
evil in man-as-spirit or as reason® Man is, 
according to the Biblical view, a created^and 
finite existence in both body and spirit.
Q?hat man is a unity of body and spirit is, I submit,
what Nietzsche is suggesting with his use of the word
"body" (mm).
II
In the two preceding chapters we glanced at 
Nietzsche's breedings on the origin of the scientific 
spli>J.t (Wlâiâl»seM£M.lfibkQi.t) ? his dissatisfaction with 
science (Wiasenschaft) and its practitioners, "theoreti­
cal man," and his conviction that man's rational facul­
ties, while by no means unimportant, only brushed the
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surface of the life of man. It is perhaps worth dwelling 
a bit long^er on what tends to be a sore point of mis­
understanding about Nietzsche, namely, that he was no 
irratiovialist *
His was an Intuitive mind, which, contrary to our 
popular prejudices, is not to say "unscientificHe 
had many good things to say about science and the 
scientific spirit, among the most revealing for his 
own outlook being theses
That which is bast and healthiest in science, 
as in the mountains, is the keen air that 
blows in it
On the whole, scientific methods are at least 
as important a result of research as anything 
else® For the scientific spirit is based on 
insight into method....
He speaks 8lsQi'iheï*e of the "gJjiljgtm m  a£
which can be frightening to the uninitiated, but 
which the initiated treasure for the clarity, the 
lucidity it affords*
Nor are such sentiments limited to Nietzsche's 
so-called middle positivistic period*" Science is, 
throughout Nietzsche's work, a method, a way of doing 
one's intellectual work, a means, but never an end in 
itself* As we heard him say already, "science itself
1 O
never 03:»eates values *" ^  Thus it is the belief of 
science in itself, and the moral trust fostered by
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this belief that scievioe is more than a method; that
it can, after debunking our "childish" beliefs, put
other beliefs in their place, which Nietzsche sees as
having a pernicious effect both on science and upon
the way we view and live our lives*
«..there is no alternative; we must again do 
everything for ourselves, and only for ourselves 
(We must), for example, measure science against 
ourselves with the questions what is science . 
to, us? Not, however: what are we to science?-^ ^
It is, in short, the tyranny of science, the uncritical
kmllGf in science, the imbility to see science as a
to which Nietzsche objects.
John Wren“Lewis has recently taken up this point 
in his criticism of "the classical approach to the 
teaching of science (which) allows even soma scientists 
...to go on thinking of scientific theories as 'explana­
tions of phenomena', in which the gods and spiritual 
forces of occult tradition are simply replaced by quanta, 
force-fields and the like, whereas a proper emphasis on 
method would make it clear that the modern theories are 
never more than models to suggest new lines of practical 
action, and therefore capable of being discarded at any 
time in favour of radically new models in a way which 
would be impossible if they were attempts to express 
the hidden truth behind phenomena,"*^ 5
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Wren-Lewie also places renewed emphasis on the 
view, the originality of which he erroneously (as we 
know, having listened to Nietzsche) attributes to 0® P. 
Snow, that it is precisely the exu.erim%ta.l. method of 
modern science that is the crucial factor.
It does not mean 'proving your theories 
experimental test'® It is a commonplace in 
philosophy that nothing can ever be proved by 
experimental test, because an infinite number 
of tests would be required ^ What you can do 
is to dlBprove theories, and the essential 
feature of the experimental method is that it 
sets up artificial situations especially de­
signed to disprove the chosen theory if pos­
sible. This, and this alone, makes radically 
new departures and developments in theory 
possible, but it carries an implication 
namely, .that. ex,i.agiease Ig. It^ell rgUahlâ 
JSBQElMse jîM t m m  &t SHE M SM .
m il Mi-*-®
The concluding italicized words could have been written 
by Nietzsche himself.
Besides his positive utterances about science and 
the spirit of inquiry, there is also the negative 
evidence that Nietzsche, though he agreed that man is 
the sick animal, did not seek the origin of that sick­
ness in man's propensIty to think, calculate, conceptu­
alize, deduce. The last century-and-a-haIf have seen 
men as dissimilar as Soren Kierkegaard, D. If. Lawrence, 
and Wilhelm Reich defend the thesis that it is precisely 
man's consciousness that is the culprit. In his review.
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Kierkegaard begins, "Our age is essen­
tially one of understanding and reflection, without 
p a s s i o n . H i s  brilliant analysis of this passionless 
rafleetion discovers it to be envious ("the idea of re­
flection ie.o.envy.. ♦ and "a snare in which one is 
c a u g h t . ..."-^-9 Lawrence too, while not confining man's 
sickness strictly to reflection, believed that sin began 
with consciousness.
When Adam want and took Eve, the apple,
he didn't do any more than he had done many a 
time befox^e, in act. But in consciousness he 
did something very different. Bo did Eve. Each 
of them kept an eye on x^ ihat they were doing, 
they watched what was happening to them. They 
wanted to KNOW. And that was the birth of sin. 
Not it, but KNOWING about it. Before the
apple, they had shut their eyes and their minds 
had gone dark. Now, they peeped and pried and 
imagined. They watched themselves. And they 
felt uncomfo3:»table after. They felt self- 
conscious. So they said, "The ac_t is sin. Lot's 
hide. We've sinned."
Reich shared with Kierkegaard the Hegelian method of
analysis, with Lawrence the idealization of the orgasm.
Philip Kieff has written, paraphrasing Reich:
...man began to think when he felt threatened 
by his own instinctual energies, perceiving 
them as alien. To protect himself against his 
own inner fright, the poor primitive hedged 
himself round with ideas. He began to philoso­
phize, and so m d a  himself ill. The tuxniing of 
reasoning toward itself induced the first emo­
tional blocking in *mn. In short, at the moment 
he began to philosophise, man became the sick 
animal, thinking his disease,^ -**
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For Nietzsche, as we sought to show in the preceding 
chapter, it is not thinking nor even the consciousness 
that encompasses thinking which is the source of man's 
disease. Man did not fall ill when he began to reflect, 
to know, to think, but when he was forced into the 
mould of sociability; in Nietzsche's langiiage, when his 
will to power was compelled at birth to turn against 
Itself, when conscience emerged as arbiter between his 
will to power and his new sux^roundings*
But let us end this paz^enthetio warning about 
branding Nietzsche an irrationalist and delve a bit more 
deeply into his reasons for thinking it necessary to "get 
beyond" rationality® Let us place rationality in its 
larger context and lock at Nietzsche's views on cons pious­
ness. an exercise which will provide the necessary prelim­
inaries for a look at what he means by "body*"
To begin by restating the above warning in this 
broader context: Nietzsche Is not a prophet of the 
unconscious, at any rate not in the negative sense usu­
ally implied by that label. His statements that conscious 
ness is man's "scantiest and most unreliable organ, 
that consciousness is superficial,"'^'^ are to be read, 
not as negative praise of the unoonsclous, but as criti-
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ci sms of our ’’ridiculous ovor-estimation and misunder-
p/t
standing of consciousness/’ '
Consciousness is the latest development of the 
organism, and consequently also the most imma­
ture and poz^ îerlesB part of It. Countless errors 
spring from cons clous ties s which cause an animal, 
a man to perish sooner than would he necessary,
"in spite of fate," as Homer says. If the pre^“ 
serving bond of the instincts were not extremely 
more powerful, it (consciousness) could not 
serve the whole as regulator® With its wrong- 
headed judging and day-dreaming, with its super­
ficiality and gullibility; in short, with its 
consciousness rmn would have to have perished.
Or, rather, without the former, the latter would 
long since have ceased to exist. ...One thinks, 
hor*e is the essence of man, that about him which 
is enduring, eternal, final, most originalI One 
believes consciousness to be a fl3/mly given 
quantityI Denies its growth, its failures I 
Takes it to be the "unity of the organism'll 
This ridiculous ovez^-estimation and misunder­
standing of consciousness results in the advan­
tageous binderinr^ of an ovorly-hasty development 
of consciousness. Because men believed them­
selves already in possession of eonsclousness, 
they took few palas to acquire it - and it is 
no different todayI It is still an entirely new, 
barely recognizable only just beginning
to daîüH upon man: to."â®ifeoâx (mZBmslglkmâ) SÜE
jcnowledge and make it instinctive,
According; to Nietzsche, conseiouBnesa is a product of
human need, the need to commun!cates "...the development
of languag;e and the development of consciousness...go
hand in and consequently, consciousness belongs
not to man's individual existence but to his social exiat’^
enea- ''CSM clouiaiesj. is . Ï M  âSÈiM. Ib â l £OMSi2M-2
H©sg Is. useful. " It follows, then, that consciousness.
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as but one of the facets of the human need to communieate,
cannot be appealed to ao an arbiter of values; much less
SO rationality, which is but a part of consciousness,
...tba largest part of conscious thinking must 
be classified as instinctual activity, even in 
the case of philosophical thinking* We will 
have to change our views on this, just as we 
changed oux^  minds concerning heredity and "in­
herited cbaractex'istlce"Consciousness" is 
just as little o|z,p.osecl to the instincts in any 
decisive sense as the event of birth is of im™ 
portance to the whole process and progress of 
heredity* Most of the conscious thinking of a 
philosopher is secretly guided and canalized 
by his instincts. Even behind all logic and 
its apparent freedom of movement stand value 
judgments; or, to put it more plainly, physio­
logical demands for preserving a certain type 
of life.28
The unconscious veiling of physiological needs 
in the mask of the objective, the ideal, the 
pi^rely intellectual, goes to alarming lengths* 
t have often asked myself whether, considering 
everything, all philosophy to-date has been no 
more than an exposition of the body and a mis- 
m â e m M O â l E B  °£ tw. badz. ...it is possible 
to see all those audacious follies of meta­
physics, especially its answer to the question 
concerning the value of existence, as symptoms 
of certain bodies•.®*^9
Consciousness is a ineariB, no more and no less; and
insofar as it is useful as an aid to the enhancement
of life, it should be employed. But on no account should
it be mistaken for a criterion foi» assessing the value
of life, not to mention the "highest" criterion. Even
to conceive of it as a separate "organ" over against the
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uneonseiouB, except for purposoB of amlyslB, distorts 
the wholeness of man and creates the illusion of divided 
life.
We philosophers are not at liberty to distinguish 
between body and sou), as ordinary people do; 
still less are we at liberty to distinguish 
between soul and intellect. We are not think­
ing frogs, not dispassionate objectivity- and 
recording-devioes with bowels suspended. We 
must continually give birth to our thoughts in 
pain and impart to them, as a mother, every­
thing we have in us of blood, heart, fire, joy,^ 
passion, torment, conscience, fate and destiny
The antithesis, eonsciouB/unconseiouB, was, of 
course, not invented by Freud. "The discovery of the 
unconscious by self-conscious man occupied some two 
centuries, roughly from 1700 to 1900."31 And psycho­
analysis was, in a sense, the culmination of "the new 
interest in the problem of consciousness and the role 
of the unoonsclous,"32 emerged in the last decade
of the nineteenth century. The antithesis itself was, 
nevertheless, given currency by Freud and is today, as 
a result of his attempt to understand human mental pro­
cesses in terms of this dichotomy, la.rgely taken for 
granted. Freud's own definitions of "conscious" and 
"unconscious" were theses
Mow let us call "conscious" the conception 
which is present to our conseiousnesB and of 
which we are aware, and let this^be the only 
meaning of the term "conscious."33
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The term unoomolouB ® ® .deslgmtes not only 
latent ideas in general, but especially ideas 
with a certain dynamic character, ideas keep*" 
ing apart from conselousness in spite of their 
intensity and activity*3*
As the wording of the latter definition shows, for 
Freud, the unconscious "is infoOTed alt-oays in negative 
terms," it is "all that unconsciousness is not*"35
This division of man into two spheres and the con­
comitant belief, expressed in Freud's contention that 
the goal of psychotherapy is to make the unconscious 
eons clous; that is, that the patient, knowing-: (read: 
conscious of, aware of) the good, will also do the good, 
reveals the indebtedness of psychoanalysis, indeed, of 
the whole of psychotherapy, to the classical doctrine 
of m a n . 36 Before taking a closer look at Nietzsche's 
body-monism, let us examine, first and briefly, the 
Greek oixlgins of this dualism, and second, the Biblical 
origins of "western" monism.
Ill
The classical psyche/body dualismST received many 
different formulations, dating probably from Anaxagoras' 
distinction between mind and amtterSS and kept alive 
by thinkers who belong to what may be called, for our 
purposes, the Flatonic-Enlightenment tradition*
Socrates endeavored un suc c es s fui1y to convince 
his fellows "that the psyche was the seat of the moral
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and Intellectual faculties and of far greater importance 
than the b o d y ."39 piato seconded his master's conviction 
by harking back to the Pythagoreans and reaffirming their 
mysticalToligious belief in the immortality of the soul. 
Even for Aristotle, though he did recognise that a study 
of life must begin not with metaphysics but with physics 
and physiology, "The doctrine of form and matter has the 
last word."^^ "...it is as if the body were the instrument 
through which a particular life or soul expresses itself. 
What is more, it was his belief in nous ("by reason I 
mean that by which the soul thinks and Judges"*^^) as the 
one faculty of the human soul that is separable from the 
body and that enters from the "outside" and is immortal 
and d i v i n e , ^^ 3 ^hich both placed renewed emphasis on the 
Socratie notion of the supreme importance of the psyche 
and left the way open for a subsequent spiritualizing 
and intellectualizing of man accompanied by a devaluing 
of his body - a project, it must be admitted, carried 
out not only by humanists in the PlatonlC’-Enlightenment 
tradition but by Christians as Nietzsche summed
up this project and its consequences in a brief outline 
headed "The colossal errors" s
1, The absurd oyerziestimtion of oomciousness,. 
making of it a unity, one reality: "spirit"
(Geist^. "soul," something that feels, thinks, 
wills,
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2* the intellect as caueeo particularly wherever 
purposefulness, sysèem, co-ordination appear* 
3o consciousness as the highest achievable form, 
as the highest type of being, as "Ood*"
4* the will introduced wherever there Is effect* 
5® the "true world" as the world of the mind 
(saiafiisa Msli.) Ï aoeesslble through the .facts 
of consciousness*
6* knowledge (Erkenntnis)* wherever it appears, 
absolutely as a faculty of consciousness *
Consequences :
all progress is progress to consciousness ; 
every retrogression, to unconsciousness 
(becoming unconscious was considered a 
relapse to annetites and senses * as a 
Eeaaatoa. to begtiailM.). 
one draws nearez» to reality, to " t)?ue being, 
through dialecticsj one moves away from it 
through the instincts, the senses, physios
(MaatealaoMs).
to dissolve a man into spirit would be to make 
him Gods intellect, will, goodness - one* 
all g;god, must originate in spirituality, must 
be a fact of consciousness* 
progress in M&terlng man can only be progress 
toward becoming consclous.'^U
As we noted above^ ) these errors are still very
much with us today. We lake the division of man into
two spheres for granted both at a common sense level
and in the study of human behavior* But, as one
historian of ideas has recently argued.
It may...be wrong to think of two realms 
which interact, called the conscious and the 
unconscious, or even of two contrasted kinds 
of mental process* conscious and unconscious, 
each caiîsally self-contained until it hands 
over to the other. There may exist, as I 
believe, a single realm of mental processes, 
continuous and mainly unconscious, of which
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only certain transitory aspects phases az^ e_ 
accessible to immediate conscious attention
The assumption that man is a unity in this sense was
shared by Nietzsche and has its roots in the Biblical
view of man.
In the interest of clarity, let us say what this 
Biblical view of imïi is. And let us do so by looking at 
the only New Testament writer who gave any theological 
signlflcance to the doetrclne of the body - paul*^'^ To 
call Paul's doctrine of man "Biblical" is not to suggest 
that he is the only New Testament writer who had 
thoughts about man, but it is nevertheless Justified 
by the fact that "the basic categories with which he 
works derive from the Old Testament view of m n  and 
presuppose the questions and interests upon which that 
view rests
Like Aristotle before him and Nietzsche after him, 
Paul's doctrine of m n  was physiological. But unlike 
Aristotle, for whom, as we have seen, the doctrine of 
form and matter was equally as important as physics and 
physiology, a part of Paul's theological legacy was the 
Hebrew notion of the wholeness of mn. The Hebrews had 
but one word, basar, to refer to the whole man, bodily 
man, fleshly man. They had no conception of the Greek 
dichotomies of form and matter, the whole and its parts.
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the body and the soul* In fact, there Is no precedent 
in the Old Testament for Paul's decisive separation of 
the two words, "flesh" (sa:ra) and "body" (som) ; both 
derive from the Hebrew, bas.ar, which "stands for thef  * * * * *  wwrnnwii* wwefmew y
whole life-substance of imn or beasts as organized in 
corporeal form."^‘9 The seeming simplicity of this out­
look cannot be attributed to a naive psychology * Far 
from it. We are still "discovering" today what Hebrew 
psychology intuited many centuries agoI It was not 
naivete, but a different mentality, which needed only 
b,asar to talk about both ^nd For this mental­
ity, "Man does not have.,, a body, he is, ^ body* He is 
flesh-animated-by-3oul, the whole conceived as a psycho­
physical unity®,. Hex»© we have the roots of that
unity of body-and-soul which is the Biblical doctrine 
of man.
In Paul this unity does not break down, but mul­
tiplies. B.asa.r, man as a vitholeness, becomes both "flesh" 
and "body," each^ however, not complementing the other 
but being itself ,t|ie whole,. Man as "flesh" refers to 
"the whole body, or, better, the whole person, considered 
from the point of view of his external, physical exist" 
o n c e ."5^ Man as "flesh" is characterized by Paul as 
being both weak, impotent, infirm, and mortal, fleeting.
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Bubject to death* Man as "flesh" is man as he difg^is 
from God. Man as "body," while being "in the flesh," 
that is, subject to weakness and death, carries the 
possibility (as man as solely "flesh" does not) of new­
ness, which is to say, of strength and victory over death, 
Again, as with man as "flesh," 4:he "body" is not some­
thing smn has, but something he is. "Indeed, B,gma is the 
nearest equivalent to our word 'personality'."5^
The difference between "body" and "flesh lies in 
the alterability of the former. "Body" is not liian as 
he differs from God, but man, as Genesis has it, created 
in God's image* "The body may in all I’sspects be 
Identified with the flesh of ain and death, but the two 
are not in all respects ide^t^l. . ..in essence sarx 
and designate different aspects of the human rela­
tionship to God. While sarx stands for man, in the 
solidarity of creation, in his distance from God, gjoma 
stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made 
for G o d *"^3 Man as "flesh" can be changed to become 
man as "body." Or, to put it another way, the flesh-body 
can be transformed into the spirit-body - which, again, 
is not to say, with the Greeks, that man is a duality.
Mo, man is still a unity, "flesh" and "body," flesh-body 
and spirit"body, "Each stands for the whole man differ-
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entiy regarded - man ae wholly perishable, man as 
wholly destined for
To say how Paul conceived this transformation 
would take us away from our theme, the body, and into 
a treatise on the doctrine of the Atonement. With 
this summary of the Biblical doctrine of ûian, let us 
move on and ask in what sense Nietzsche's doctrine of 
the body can be said to be a unity of body-and-soul®
IV
"Nietzsche views man largely in what 1 may call 
a physiological lig;ht/’55 These words of William Salter 
go straight to the heart of Metzschè's doctrine of 
the body® Nietzsche has been called a materialist; 
and in the general sense of one who concerned himself 
"only with the material t^ orld - the x^ îorld of phenomena, 
the only world we know,"5^ this is understandable and 
to the point, in that it serves the negative purpose of 
reminding us that Nietzsche conceived of materialism 
as an ungrounded belief - "the prejudice about iratter®"57 
Yet it is also apt to obseii?re the positive point about 
the clue of the body
In order to view man in a physiological light, one 
must begin from the premise that "the sense organs are 
not phenomena in the manner of idealist p h i l o s o p h y ® "
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Earlier on Nietzsche has been quite explicit in ex- 
plaining "Why we are not. idealists
Formerly philosophers were afraid of the senses. 
Have we perhaps forgotten this fear all too 
much? We are all seiisua,lists today, we philoso­
phers of today and tomorrow, not according to 
theory, but in practice; whereas those before 
us thought they could be lured by the senses 
away from their world, the cold realm of "Ideas," 
onto a dangerous southern island where, they 
feared, their ph11osophar-virtues would melt 
away like snow In the sun. "Wax in the ears" 
was, back then, almost a prerequisite for philo­
sophizing. A genuine philosopher no longer 
hears life, insofar as life is music; he dj^ tiies. 
the music of life - it is an old philosopher- 
superstition that all music is siren's music.
Now we today are inclined to judge precisely 
in the opposite manner (which could be just as 
false)^ namely, that .Mea§,, with all of thaii*^  
odd, anaemic appearance, and not even in spite 
of this appearance, are much more secluetive 
than the senses. They have always lived from 
the "blood" of the philosopher, they always 
consumed his senses, and if you can believe me, 
his "heart" as well. These old philosophers 
were heartless; philosophizing was always a 
kind of vampirism. Do you not sense in figures 
such as Spinoza something deeply enigmatic and 
uncanny? Do you not see the drama being per*" 
formed here, this ever-inereasing nallor, the 
ever more ideal abandonment of the senses? Do 
you not suspect that somewhere in the background 
fehere is a long-hidden blood-sucker which began 
with the senses and now leaves behind only bones 
and clattering? i mean categories, formulas,
, In sum : all philosophical idealism 
to-date was something of a sickness, where it 
was not, as in the ease of Plato, the caution 
of an over-abundant and dangerous health, fear 
in the face of senses, the prudence
of a shrewd Sooratio. Perhaps we moderns are 
simply not healthy enough to r@,guire Plato's 
Idealism. And we do not fear our senses because
■“ • * 6 0
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A b so often, Nietzsche leaves the sentence dangling by 
that telling dash which, far from leaving his reader 
suspended in uncertainty, reveals his intention beyond 
any reasonable doubt® Idealists at their best provide 
the best evidence that ideas too can be seductive.
Yet it would be rash, as Nietzsche is quick to
warn, to rush from this insight, valid as it is, to the
opposite extreme and uncritically en#race the senses.
He is leading us to the conclusion that the easy either/or
of senses and ideas, body and mind, is simply no longer
a helpful or even defensible distinction. We must learn
to taka "Sensualism at least as a regulative hypothesis,
which is not to say as heuristic principle®"
Dangerous distinction between "theoretical" 
and^raotica 1 for instance, in Kant, but 
also in the ancients. They act as thoug;h pure 
intellectuality put the problems of knowledge 
and metaphysics before them; they act as though, 
regardless of the theoretical answer, the 
practice is to be judged according to its own 
standard*
Against the former assumption I direct my 
psychology g£ phlloaoBherB.* Their estranged 
calculation and their "intellectuality" is only 
the last, palest impression of a physiological 
fact. All spontaneity is absolutely missing. 
Everything is instinct® Everything is canalized 
from the very beginning.
Of the second assumption I ask whether we do not 
know a way to good actions other than good think­
ing. The latter is an act; the former presupposes
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thinking. Have we the ability to judge the 
value of a way of life other than as the value 
of a theory, by induction, by comparison?
Naive men believe that here we are better off, 
here we know what is "good"; the philosopheras 
repeat it after them. Our conclusion is that 
there is a belief present here, nothing more,
...Mot to live by two different standards I
Mot to separate theory and practicel^^
We need gge set of values, gpe, standard for judging life;
not a double standard, because life is not divisible
but a unity. And to devise such a standard we must
begin where we are, namely, with "a physiological fact,"
as Mittzsche Just put it; which, let us keep reminding
ourselves, is not to say that we should "let our senses
have the last word" or "give free rein to our instincts,"
with all the chaos connoted by such statements. This
would be to take our senses as our heuristic principle,
an undertaking as wrongheaded as the more common adoption
of pure intellectuality or pure spirituality as the sole
guideline and final eoui»t of appeal in questions of
value. Mo, each is too simple and dangerous on its own.
We must attempt the far more complicated task of using
our senses as a "regulative hypothesis"; we must listen
to our bodies.
Point of departure : the body and physiology.
Why? We get the right idea about the character 
of our indi vidua1-uni ty (Sub J ekt-Einhei t). 
namely, as a ruler at the head of a commonwealth
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(not aa "aoiJila or "life forces" ) ; as lell aa 
about the dependence of this ruler on the ruled^ 
and the conditions of the ranking order and 
division of labor advantageous to both the in-" 
dividual and the #hole. We learn that the living 
unities corae into being and die continually^ 
that there is nothing eternal about the ’’indivi'" 
dual” (8uh;Wkt)  ^ that the struggle expresses 
itself in obeying and commndinga and that a 
dynamic setting““of“boundaries"*to“-po't^ er belongs 
to life^ ‘The certain ignorance in inhieh the 
ruler is kept concerning single tasks*, even 
disturbances of the whole community^ belongs 
to the conditions under which ruling is possible. 
In shorty we see that not-knowing, getting a 
rough picture of somethings simplifying and 
falsifying;, the perspectival too is to be valued. 
That which Is most important;, howeverp is that 
we understand the ruler and ruled to be g£ a 
k;lnjg,p ^11 feelingp willing^ thinking^ and that 
wherever we divine or see moveraent in the body^ 
we learn to infer an accompanying invisible life. 
Movement is a symbol for the eye ; it points to 
that which is felt^ willed, thought.
Asking an individual about himself and all self-- 
reflection of the spirit has its dangers in that 
it can be advantageous to give a false, inter­
pretation of oneself. Therefore we question 
the body and reject the evidence of the height­
ened senses. If you willg we aim to discover 
whether the ruled^themselves cannot eommunioate 
with us directly.^3
In one of the very few references to the body in 
the massive corpus of secondary literature on Hietssche^ 
Karl Jaspers writesj "Nietzsche calls the form and 
life of man his body. This is not merely the anatomical 
corpus a and certainly not the cadaver^ but the uneon- 
8clousj, all-encompassing vital functions in their 
e n t i r e t y B u t  Jaspers' positive comment is cancelled
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by his assertion that "it is not clear x^ hat in the end
is meant by ' b o d y . H e  endeavors to understand
Metjssche's utterances about the body methodologically^
only to conclude that they add up to "only an inclina”"
tion to allow a biological way of thinking constantly
66
to pass for insight."
It Is surely clearer than Jaspers' claims #hat 
Mietsssche means by "foody." We can agree with Jaspers* 
positive observation that Hietssehe is speaking of man's 
life when he uses the x^ ord "body." (Etymologieally;, 
in both Old High German and Middle High German^, ;yeib. 
was synonymous with &e^i - life* And aurally the 
relationship between the German I^ eib and the English;, 
"life^" is still preserved*) George Morgan has suggested 
that "body" may be taken metaphorically* "What we or­
dinarily call "the body" is only the best metaphor for 
the real Interplay of forces "which composes our nature. 
When Hietssehe speaks of "the body" it is well to remem" 
her that he may mean it In this metaphorical s e n s e *"^7 
Anda commenting furthex" on Miet%sohe's words which we 
cited above (in note 63)» Morgan writess
Thus Miet^ssche uses the clue of the body to 
suggest a complex relational struetm^Og somei- 
thing manifold and In perpetual flux^ in Bhox-*t 
the hierarchical society already familiar to us 
from his theory of the living organism: the
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self or "subject" is simply the ruling oligarchy 
in this societyc But the members of the society 
borrow from "inner phenomenology"; they all in 
some sense "think" "feel/* " w i l l T h i s  is 
evidently the modification of the old "soul 
hypothesis" which Mietssche desires. Soul and 
body are no longer defined in antithetical 
termsj and the crucial problem is no longer how 
they interact but how both are related to the 
phenomena of sensation and inner consciousness
The societal model Nietzsche provides in the passage to 
x^hich Morgan is referring is decisive for our under­
standing; of his concept of the body as a hierarchical 
relational structure in perpetual fluX;, and Morgan is 
surely right in reminding us of Nietzsche'e metaphorical 
use of Beib. This metaphor guards against both the ex­
tremes of sensualism and idealism x^ ihile incorporating 
the best of each. That is^ the body is neither solely 
"the anatomical cor^puBj"ô9 to borrow Jaspers* fitting 
phrase^, nor intellect or spirit by itself, gara thus tra 
puts it this ways
"Body am I;, and soul" - thus speaks the child. 
And why should one not speak like children?
But the awakened and knoX'^ ing say : body am I
entirelyand nothing elsej and soul is only a 
word for something about the body.
The body is a great reason^, a plurality with 
one sense;, a war and a pea ce ^ a hard and a shop 
herd. An instrument of your body is also your 
little reason^, my brother^ which you call 
"spirit" - a little instrument and toy of your 
great reason.
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"1/" you say^ and are proud of the word. But 
greater is that In which you do not wish to have 
faith "■ your body and its great reasons that 
does not say "I^" but does "i."
What the sense feels^ x^ hat the spirit knows5 
never has its end in itself. But sense and 
spirit would persuade you that they are the 
end of all things: that is how vain they are.
Instruments and toys are sense and spirits 
behind them still lias the self* The self also 
seeks with the eyes of the senses ; it also 
listens X'Olth the ears of the spirit. Always 
the self listens and seeks s it comparasover­
powers^ conQuers^ destroys. It controls^ and 
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tion, thanks, first of all, to that Pole, 
Boscovlch, x-^ ho, along with the Pole, Copernicus, 
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of appearance yet* While Copernicus persuaded 
us to believe, contrary to all common sense, 
that the earth does not stand still, Boscovich 
taught us to renounce our belief in the last 
thing on earth X'ohioh remained "firm" — the belief 
in "substance," "matter," in that bestige of the 
earth, the little lump, atom* It was the great­
est triumph over the senses yet achieved on earth, 
(Nietzsche, Werke*‘ II, pp. ^76t77)
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69) For this, the German, Korper  ^ wiould suffice 1 
Nietzsche himself uses this term for that purpose.
70) Nietzsche, Werke* II. p. ^00* Much of what Nietzsch 
says about the body brings to mind the more recent 
phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau- 
Fonty, at the center of which is the perceiving, 
speaking, meaning-bestowing body* But a comparison 
of the two men would take us too far afield* guffie 
it to cite three random statements from Merleau- 
Fonty which suggest the similarity.
We must reject that prejudice which makes 
"inner realities" out of love, hate, or anger, 
leaving them accessible to one single witness; 
the person who feels them* Anger, shame, hate, 
and love are not psychic facts hidden at the 
bottom of another' s consciousness ; they are 
types of behavior or styles of conduct which 
are visible from the outside. They exist on 
this face or in those gestures, not hidden 
behind them* ^(?he Film and the New Psycho­
logy," Sense and Nop-Sense* trans. Hubert L* 
Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Chicago; 
Northwestern University press, 1964), pp. 52-53.)
one will more surely get to Icnow the essence 
of a society by analyzing interpersonal rela­
tions as they have been fixed and generalized 
in economic life than through an analysis of
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the movements of fragile, fleeting ideas-- 
juBt as one gets a better idea of a man from 
his conduct than from his thoughts. (Ibid., 
"Concerning Marxism," p. 108.)
In the last analysis, our bodies bear witness 
to what we arei body and spirit express each 
other and cannot be separated. (Ibid., "Faith 
and Good Faith," p. 173.)
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8. The î^earlng of eonseîenee to integrity.
Remain faithful to the earth, my 
brothers.*
— 2a ra thus tra
The eternal return is the will and 
vision of an .a.ro..ti.o attitude toward 




In Chapter 6 we sought to show how Nietzsche eon- 
eeived of the origin of conscience as a turning #@ainst 
itself at birth of will to power, and of the groxiîth of 
oonscierice as dependent on the particular environment 
into which a child is born. ConBcietice is an Instinct, 
but not immutableo It is there, from birth, but must be 
shaped, given some sort of form. Traditionally, this 
form has been that of "bad conscience*"
Me had already noted and reviewed in Chapter 5 
Nietzsche's scathing critique of our Western "environ™ 
ment," dominated by the ascetic Christian-Platonic moral 
demand system, t^hich has had as its ideal the extirpa­
tion of passion, the suppression of life, the chaining 
of man's natural inclinations to bad conseienee. Before 
concluding Chapter 6 we heard Nietzsche suggest that 
"A converse endeavor is conceivable...*" It moul# con­
sist in the
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associating of the u n m tarai inclinations - all 
those aspirations to a beyond» everything anti- 
sensual» anti-instinctual» anti-natural, anti- 
animal j in short, the hitherto existing ideals, 
which are altogether hostile to life and slan­
derous of the world - with bad conscience,3
Conscience is not only educable, it must be edu­
cated, The question is : on the basis of what values,
in the name of what? "We must unlearn this bad con­
science just as we learned it."'^  That is to say, not 
In the name of the suppressing of life, but in the name 
of life itself, ,
We began to move away from the inevitable vague­
ness of "life itself" by attesting to pin down what this 
might wean more specifically for Nietzsche. We dis­
covered in Chapter 7 that it had a bodll.v meaning. It 
will be our purpose in this chapter to examine its 
earthly meaning,
T£
There was an emperor who always assured him­
self of the transitoriness of all things, in 
order not to take them too seriously and to 
live among them in peace, everything seems 
to me, on the other hand, of much too much 
worth to be so fleeting, t seek an eternity 
for everything. My consolation is that every­
thing that was, is eternal *• the sea washes it 
up again,5
"Why does Nietzsche value this most dubious doctrine, 
which was to have no influence to speak of, so extrava­
gantly?" Thus Walter icaufmann on Nietzsche's teaching
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of eternal recurrence * Profasaor Kaufmami's judgamnt 
Is not unt5rpical* It hae been^ in fact^ common practice 
among critics to either ignore or dismiss this most 
important^ if not most fundamental^ element in Mietzsche%
f.
entire philosophy* However^ in spite of its offence
to our common sense-, the fact remains that it
Nietzsche's most important teaching^ and it behooves
us to consider it seriously *
This is not as simple as it sounds. No rah ere does
Nietzsche g;ive us a concise exposition of this teaching.
A b usual;) he makes many statements about it^ some of
t^ hich are unquestionably incompatible liith others. One
of the earliest statementsj which takes the form of a
cautious questionlngj^ appears near the and of the ori™
glml edition of in a paragraph headed^
"The Heaviest Burden".
What if a demon crept after you!into your lone­
liest loneliness one day or night and said to 
you : "This lifo^ as you live it now and have
lived Itj^  you must live once more and still 
innumerable times more. And there will be 
nothing new in it^ but every pain and every joy 
and every thought and every sigh and everything 
unspeakably small and great in your life must 
come to you again;, and all in the same order 
and sequence. Just so, this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees ; just so, this 
moment and I myself. The eternal hour-glass of 
existence will be turned over again and again - 
and you with it, you speck of duet!" Would you
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not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth 
and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have 
you once experienced a tremendous moment in 
which you would answer binis ”^ou are a god, 
and I have never heard anything so divine I"
If that thought gained power over you, it would 
change you, as you are, and perhaps crush you. 
The question concerning everything - "Do you 
want this onoe more and still innumerable times 
more?" - would lie as the heaviïsst burden on 
your behaviorI Or how would you have to learn 
to love yourself and life, in order to long 
for nothing more than for this last eternal 
confirmation and sealing?f
Let us approach this "mightiest of thoughts" by
considering in turn two of Nietzsche's own, apparently
irreconcilable, statements about it. In his unpublished
notes we find these sentences :
Let us think this thought in its most frightful 
form : existence, just as it is, without mean­
ing and goal, but inevitably returning without 
a finale in nothingness - "etâEBâl™£aSirJLeasS..’'
That is the most extreme form of nihilism 
nothingness ("meaninglessness") eternally!^
And in glaring contrast, in the section on Thu^jSmke
garathustra in his work, Homo, Nietzsche calls
eternal recurrence "the highest formula of affirmtion
t h a t  can ever b e  a t t a i n e d , "5
As the morSt extreme form of nihilism, as perhaps,
in fact, the inevitable consequence of the nihilism
which he saw descending on man after the death of God,
eternal recurrence appeared to Nietzsche as "the most
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abysmal thought." It repelled him and frightened him. 
Why so? Why did be believe it to be bo Important, and 
thus, so devastating?
Nietzsche himself tells us exactly when and where 
the thought first occurred to him. Although he had been 
familiar since his youth with the classical Greek con­
ception of the cyclical movement of the universe, the 
thought of eternal recurrence peculiar to him presented 
itself in August I881*
It was jotted down on a piece of paper with the 
inscription: "6000 feet beyond man and time/'
I was walking that day through the forest by 
Lake Silvaplana. At a mighty, towering pyra­
midal boulder not far from Surlei I rested. 
There this thought came to me.IG
The calmness of these words - "there this thought came
to me" - must ba attributed to the fact that Nietzsche
is writing in retrospect. Lou Salome and Franz Overbeekj
probably the only two of Nietzsche's friends with whom
he shared his oveMhelming new thought, have recorded
Nietzsche's original response to it as one of horror.
Lou Salome writes that he spoke about it to her "in a
low voice, with every appearance of the most profound 
Î *1horror/' *’ ' Similarly, Overbeck recalls that Nietzsche 
disclosed his revelation to him in whispers.Indeed,
Nietzsche has 2arathustra fear his own thoughts and
speak softly about them. Zara thustra is talking to the
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lame dwarf who symbolizes his archenemy, the spirit of 
gravity :
"stop, dwarfI" I said. "It is I or you %
I am the stronger of us two : you do not know 
my abysmal thought. That you could not bearI"
Then something happened that made me lighter, 
for the dwarf jumped from my shoulder, being 
curious 3 and he crouched on a stone before me*
But there was a gateway just where we had 
stopped *
"Behold this gateway, dwarfI" I continued*
"It has two faces. Two paths meet here ; no 
one has yet followed either to its end* This 
long lane stretches back for an eternity* And 
the long lane out there, that is another eternity 
They contradict each other, these pathsj they 
offend each other face to face^ and it is here 
at this gateway that they come together. The 
name of the gateway is inscribed above : 'Moment*, 
But V: ho ever would follow one of them, on and 
on, farther and farther - do you believe, dwarf, 
that these paths contradict each other eternally?^ '
"Behold," X continued, "this moments From this 
gateway. Moment, a long, eternal lane leads 
ba.ck^ jard ; behind us lies an eternity* Must 
not whatever can walk have walked on this lane
•Hinra
before? Must not whatever can happen have hap­
pened, have been done, have passed by before?
And if everything has been there before - what 
do you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not 
this gateway too have bean there before? And 
are not all things knotted together so firmly 
that this moment draws after it all that is to 
come? Therefore - itself too? For whatever 
ÛêU walk - in this long lane out therre too, it 
gusjt walk once more*
"And this slow spider that crawls in the moon­
light, and this moonlight itself, and I and you 
in the gateway, whispering together, whispering 
of tternal things - must not all of us have been
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there before? And return and walk in that other
lane, out there, before us, In this long dreadful 
lane must we not eternally return?"
Thus I spoke, more and more softly i for t was 
afraid of my own thoughts and the thoughts be­
hind my thoughts.13
On the basis of these first-hand reports, it is 
hardly fair to disregard eternal recurrence as some sort 
of misleading illusion, as was common practice among 
Nazi "interpreters" of Nietzsche's w o r k s N i e t z s c h e  
was reluctant to speak of eternal recurrence at all 
until he could establish its scientific plausibility, 
on the basis of which it might be believed* Without a 
doubt, Nietzsche believed this possible. In fact, at 
one point he toyed with the idea of returning to the 
university for the express purpose of improving his 
inadequate knowledge of ma them tics and the natural 
sciences. He called eternal recurrence "the most 
scientific of all possible hypothesas."i5 This was by 
no means a hoax, and we are not at liberty to pass 
lightly over this aspect of his teaching,Although 
Arthur Danto is surely right in asserting that "very 
likely the exposition of his (Nietzsche's) reasons for 
believing it true are less important for the under­
standing of his thought than his reasons for supposing 
the belief in it to be important," an attempt to expound 
Nietzsche's own reasons for believing it true should
13 14
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be made.™' Such an attempt has been made by Rose
Ffeffer in a recent article bearing the title;, "Sternal
Recurrence i n Hi et zs che ' s Philosophy ^ ®
Near the beginning of Book III of EheJiax^^lMiae,
Nietzsche writes these words:
The total character of the world...is to all 
eternity chaosj not in the sense of the absence 
of necessityrather the absence of order, 
structure, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever 
else our aesthetic human categories are called. 
...Let us beware of saying that there are laws 
in nature. There are only necessities s there 
is no one who commands, no one who obeys, no 
one who transgrasses.^ 9
The world is conceived of as chaotic, which means, as 
he goes on to explain, not that there is an absence of 
necessity, but that there is no pre-ordained order; 
there are no given laws in nature* This by way of back­
ground. The hypothesis itself is based on these pres up 
positions: time Is infinite, space Is finite, the
amount of energy in the universe IM finite, energy is 
conserved and incessantly active.^^
If these presuppositions are interpreted on 
the basis of mechanistic theories of explana- 
tlon and classical atomism, then the conclusion 
could be drawn that Nietzsche's cyclical theory 
refers to particular fixed states which will, 
after a sufficiently long period of time, recur 
in exactly the same, identical way as they have 
already occurred an infinite number of times 
in the past.^1
This Quotation from Miss Pfeffer's article may indeed
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be read as a paraphrase of the conclusiori drawn by all 
other Interpreters who have taken Nietzsche* s theory of 
eternal recurrence seriously« But any euMi interpreta­
tion misconstrues Nietzsche's meaning by failing to take 
sufficiently into account his outright rejection of 
classical atomism and mechanism
Miss Pfeffer submits persuasive evidence to support 
her contention that Nietzsche's conception of eternal 
recurrence was based on a dynamic theory of energy radi™ 
cally opposed to the materialistic theory of atomism 
which envisaged atoms as substantial particles*
Energy becomes the fundamental notion of the 
universe, displacing matter* Activity and 
process become the fundamental concepts* The 
universe becomes a field of force, a field of 
incessant activity. The principle of the con­
servation of energy, which Nietzsche accepts 
as the basis of his theory of eternal recur­
rence, expresses a law of conservation which 
takes place within change and process, a change 
that is not baaed upon a mechanistic, but a 
new, dynaraic, energetic principle*^3
Nevertheless, it vjould appear that the question remains
as to whether eternal recurrence refers to the return
of identical states* But no* This question is now
superfluouso "When it becomes meaningless to speak of
a particular, definite, fixed state of the universe, it
is equally meaningless to speak of the return of such a
O
state*"*=" ' In Nietzsche's own i^ords: "The same quantity
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of energy means something different on a different
level of development.,** Everything has been here
before Innumerable times, insofar as the total field
of energy (Sesamtlage ^er Kraft.©) always returns *
Whether aside from this anything identical has existed,
is entirely indemonstrable*"^'^ To be sure, Nietzsche
does not always appear to be referring to different
levels of development* Indeed, he speaks at times of a
return to exactly the same life. But such inconsistency
can hardly be considered unusual in an age of scientific
revolution*
The eternal recurrence of the same is the 
return of the â§r EmlÏÊ. iD which
energy is constantly formed and constantly 
released. It is the return of the dynamic 
pattern of nature and life which is eternally 
active and eternally the same. The principle 
of conservation does not refer to the conserva­
tion of a static, unchanging, fixed state, but 
it refers to the preservation of the "field 
of energy" which contains within it the ele­
ments of change and activity, of tension and 
release, repulsion and attraction, destruction 
and creation.^'
The principle of the conservation of force (energy) 
which Nietzsche takes as the basis for his theory of 
eternal recurrence is at least as old as Leibniz (with 
his concept of  ^ though it i^ as rot yideif accepted
as a valid hypothesis until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Robert Mayer formulated it in his work. Die
.31/
aMÊ0imGh8.el (1845)» but only aa It proved useful in 
selentlfie investigations In the l840's and 1850's did
it receive widespread recognition. Although it would 
be no more than conjecture to speak of a possible direct 
influence of Mayer on Nietzsche, "It cannot be by change 
that the formulation of the idea of eternal recurrence 
appears in ever -"increasing clarity from I881, the year
28
Nietzsche became acquainted with the work of H. Mayer. 
Whatever else Nietzsche may have thought of Mayer, the 
principle of the conservation of energy provided a base, 
already accepted by scientists, for his theory of eter­
nal recurrence.
Perhaps for the purpose of clarity a word should 
be interjected about an aspect of Nietzsche*s method 
which has, on the whole, been given too little considera­
tion by critics,^9 and which we have thus far only men­
tioned but not e x p l a i n e d ,3CJ By "perspective" Nietzsche 
means precisely what he says. As is nearly always the 
case, he intends the word to retain its common sense 
meaning; to view a thing from a particularly standpoint, 
to chart an object, as it appears to the eye, onto a 
surface - perspective. This perspectival attitude be-" 
comes radical when we realize that it is Nietzsche's
way of viewing everythim’i "All of life rests upon 
appearance, art, illusion, optics, the necessity of 
perspective and of errwr." 31 mother way of saying 
that all of life is perspectival is to say that appear­
ance is reality. The old duality, forwarded by Plato 
and perpetuated by Christianity, which divided the world 
into the real and the apparent is rejected by Nietzsche 
along with the body/soul dualism.
That the value of the world lies in our inter­
pretation* . .that pervades my writings. The 
i^ orld w # h  lliich ge M . m  to, do, is false, i.e. 
is no matter of fact, but a filling out and
rounding off of a meager sum of observations;
it is "in flux"" as something becoming, as a 
falsehood which continually displaces itself 
anew, which never draws near to the Truth s 
for - there is no "Truth."32
There is no Truth, but only truths, that is, "not neces­
sarily the opposite of error but...ènly the position of 
different errors relative to one another."33 "This is 
nothing but relativism," we m y  charge, "that can only 
lead to a dangei^ous subjectivism." "Relative to what," 
might be Nietzsche's rejoinder* "To some absolute stan­
dard which does not exist, and on the basis of which you 
depreciate this so-called world of mere appearance"? For 
this is precisely the point. As long as there is any­
thing "real" to which we and our "apparent" world can
never completely conform, we and our "apparent" world
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Will be disparaged in favor of it. That there may be
some other world, Nietzsche does not deny. In fact,
as we have already discovered, he admits that there is
always that possibility. But, he adds, this is beside
the point, for
one can do very little X'Oith that, much less 
hang happiness, salvation, and life on the 
thin thread of such a possibility. For one 
could testify to nothing but the otherness of 
the mataphyBieal world, an inaccessible and 
incompréhensible otherness; it would be a thing 
with negative eharaeteristics. Even if the 
existence of such a world were proved beyond 
doubt, it would still certainly be the most 
irrelevant of all knowledges even moï’e irrele­
vant than the knowledge of the chemical analysis 
of water would be to the seaman facing the 
hazard of a gale.34
So, the breakdown of the distinction between appear- 
anoe and reality, and the disappearance of all absolute 
standards is not a cause for lament. On the contrary, 
it offers us the opportunity to see life as chaotic, 
that is, lacking any given order or purpose, and to under­
stand its essentially pei'^spectival nature; in short, it 
allows us to view life, not as a unit, but as a plurality, 
with endless possible interpretations. Granted, this 
is a shocking picture for anyone accustomed to thinking 
of life as an ordered whole, guided by some purpose.
XThere is, of course, the possibility of adroitly avoid­
ing the consequences of this view by adopting it and then
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opting for no perspective « This possîbilitvf' Nietzsche 
calls the '"liberal** or "’broacl^ rairided*' approach! But 
it is^ on the other hancl^  also 15.berating and exhilara*^ 
tinge As Nietzsche admits^ **In truth.; interpretation 
itself is a means of becoming master of something/*
--a thought bearing similarity to the belief expressed 
in the creation story in Genesis 2 that by giving the 
animals a nama^ Adam gained control over them«
After this brief digression into N i e t z s c h e per"" 
spectlvisaig perhaps irie ai^ e in a position more favorable 
to an approach to that othe:c extreme of his eternal 
recurrence^mentioned at the outset of this chapter *
We notAi have some idea %hy he himself believed the theory 
of the eternal recurrence of all things to be "the most 
scientific of all hypotheses;,but it remains to be 
asked tf^hy he %as convinced of the importance of a belief 
in it. Concerning belief;, in general^, Nietzsche vjrote 
in The Gay Sciences .the inner happiness and misery 
of men have oome to them through their belief in this 
or that motive - not through that which was really the 
motive!"38 He is not saying that motives are of no 
importance I but he is saying] that the belief in a thing 
is move important for living than the thing itself.
And he knew from bis own experience that eternal recur-" 
rencOjs '"the most abysmal thought/* could become^ If be™
3 2 1
lievedj, "the hlg;hest formula of affirmation that can 
ever be attained,"^
As we have seen^ , there oanté mhigher or better
life in another world;, but only here, Nietzsche is
concerned solely with this life^ , the here and now. And
he is convinced that it is precisely in the hare and
now that the good life;, the life™affirmlng life^ the
joyful life;, is possible.
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? Q my 
frlends;; then you said Yes too to all woe* All 
things are entangled;, ensnared^ enamored3 if 
ever you wanted one thing twicOg if ever you 
said;, "You please me^ happiness! Abida^ moment!'* 
then you wanted al„l back* All aneW;, all eter­
nally all entangledj ensnared g enamored - 
oh^ then you loved the world* Eternal ones, 
love it eternally and evermore ; and to woe too, 
you say: go, but return! ,For all loy. wants “
eternity.'^ a;
This is beautiful - but will it work? Such a blunt 
question mast be put to Nietzsche’s teaching of eternal 
recurrence. Indeed, he surely would have expected it, 
pragmatist that he was. Is not such a view of life ™ 
immersion in the present, affirmation of the moment - 
necessarily terribly naive with regard to, say, suffering?
We cannot avoid this problem, nor can we assume 
that Nietzsche was personally anaoquainted with suf™ 
faring. He knew it well, as even the most cursory 
look at his life will show* It can hardly be disputed
that there Is a certain ennobling quality in suffering, 
which Nietzsche rightly emphasizes. There is, however, 
also a devastating quality in it which, pi’obably more 
often than not, simply drains its victim of any will 
to will anything* At his best, as in his teaching of 
amor fati (to which we are about to turn our attention), 
Nietzsche realizes this and takes it into account* 
Nevertheless, he does now and then indulge, however 
momentarily, in a glorification of pain and suffer!rig 
which is characteristic of the very ascetic morality he 
was attempting to overcome* And for this indulgence be 
must be severely criticized. On the whole, he is on the 
right track; but the fact remains that we muât be able 
to live through pain before we can rejoice in the moment 
and desire its return. And there are degrees of pain 
and depths of suffering that cannot be endured. In 
other words, before the Kingdom of God can come on earth, 
evil spirits must be driven out and broken bodies must 
be made whole  ^one of the most potent, though least 
tlBelt upon, aspects of Jesus* entire healing ministry* 
This criticism nctwithstanding, it is still pos­
sible to claim that Nietzsche’s teaching of eternal 
recurrence provides a way to the highest affirmation of 
this earthly, bodily existence attainable. And without 
the faintest intention of making the atheist of atheists
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a "Chri3tlarr“at™heart," It is possible to make the 
further claim that Nietzsche*b teaching of eternal re­
currence is not unlike Jesus’ teaching of the Kingdom 
in the Sermon on the Mount*
If this seems an extravagant claim, its apparent 
extravagance doubtless derives from the fact that the 
symbol of the Kingdom has been deprived of its radical 
content by theologians anxious to accommodate it to our 
common sense. But it is as common sensical a teaching 
as Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence’ In the New Testament 
alone, the Kingdom is interpreted a nwAer of different 
ways* It is mysteriously e^lusive; it is here, and yet 
it is not fully here, Christians have variously prayed 
for its coming, worked to establish it, and acknowledged 
its hidden presence*
Before looking at Jesus’ teaching about the Kingdom 
in the Sermon on the Mount, attention should be drawn to 
the two explicit references to the Kingdom of God in the 
Gospel of John, In chapter 3 Jesus tells Nicodemus that 
unless one is born anew, one can neither see nor enter 
into the Kingdom of God, Nicodemus, despite his expertise 
in matters religious, gets bogged down in a literal inter­
pretation of Jesus’ words about birth and thus misses 
his point altogether about repentance and newness.
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In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus Is more explicit 
about what he means by the Kingdom* That is to say, in 
ethical terms, he describes in some detail Just who is 
a citizen of this kingdom. First coma the beatitudes, 
which are not to be allegorized or rationalized, but 
taken as they stand, The citizens of the Kingdom are 
the poor in spirit, those who mourn, the meek, those who 
hunger and thirst for righteousness, the merciful, the 
pure in heart, the peacemakers, and those who are perse­
cuted for righteousness* sake. Furthermore, the Christian, 
far from longing for another life, is the salt of the, 
he is, in fact, the light of the woudd,, and he 
should so shine thatiimen may s^e his good works - 
which means no more than it says, i.e. not * do good 
works in order that men may see them* (Matthew 6:1-6: 
"Beware of practicing your piety before men..."; "when 
you give alms, sound no trumpet before you...do not let 
your left hand know what your right hand is doing.*."i 
"when you pray, go into youz^  room and shut the door and 
pray..."), but do good works, don’t hide them, and don’t 
be afraid of letting them be seen* Then comes the pas­
sage in which Jesus, so to speak, puts teeth into the 
law by prefacing a commandment with the words "You have 
heard that it was said," and then interpreting it for
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the Christian - "But I say to you.,.." This is the 
section that ends with the words; "You, therefore, 
must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."
(v. 48) Again, an admonition that does not lend itself 
well to rationalisation. There la also the oft-repeated, 
but nevertheless important, portion of the Lord's Prayer 
in which Jesus instructs his disciples to pray for the 
coming of the Kingdom qji earth, and for the fulfillment 
of daily, bodily needs. Beware of allowing "things," 
possessions to gain control over you, do not be anxious, 
do not be hypocritical, ask and expect an answer, and 
judge a man according to his works, not his words.
The purpose of this extended paraphrase of the 
Sermon on the Mount is meant as a reminder that Jesus' 
description of the citizens of the Kingdom revolved 
around concrete and personal and earthy things such as 
bread and fear and belongings. And it is precisely 
here that the Kingdom and eternal recurrence are most 
similar.
To be sure, there are many differences, but both 
are sublime symbols of an affirmation of this life and 
a rejoicing in it. Both involve a choice, neither can 
be coerced. The Kingdom must be'chosen by those who 
wish to be its citizens I the keys of the Kingdom are
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forgiveness {Matthew i6 î19), and the one stipulation 
for remaining a citizen is perfection, that is, attending 
to the earthly needs of yourself and your neighbor 
(John 3*11-13).
Eternal recurrence must be chosen, that is, it must 
be willed. The will must destroy revenge and recreate 
all "it was" into a "thus I willed it," Zarathustra 
tells us*
Will - that is the name of the liberator and 
Joy-brlngarj thus I taught you ray friends.
...the will is a creator. All "it was" is a 
fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident - 
until the creative will says to it, "But thus 
I willed it." Until the creative will says to 
it, "But thus I willed it| thus shall I will 
It."41
we may recall from our previous discussion of will to powe: 
that Nietzsche's conception of "will is by no means a 
superficial desiring-and-therefore-doing. His confidence 
in the creative and liberating capacities of the will do 
not spring from the pious belief in the will as something 
either simple and free or simple and bound, but from his 
deep appreciation for it as something infinitely complex 
and powerful enough to change and condition life and 
exult in it - by willing its eternal return. Nietzsche 
is not addressing something "other," something "beyond," 
when he affirms : "For I love you, 0 eternityI"42 And we 
err if we see in this, as Karl jaspers does, evidence
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that Nietzsche was aiming for "a godless philosophy of 
unhlstorioal transcendence,"43 Nothing could be wider 
of the mark. Godless, it most certainly is, but also 
radically historical and radically immanent'. The eternity 
that Nietzsche loves is life itself, and his declaration 
of love is a "yes" to life in the shape of a willing of 
its eternal return.
Let us listen to this hymn to life, which is one 
of Nietzsche's most ecstatic - and revealing - expressions 
of eternal recurrence^ "The Other Dancing Song." Life, 
Zarathustra's coquettish lover, is speaking thoughtfully 
and softly.
"0 Zarathustra, you are not faithful enough to 
me. You do not love me nearly as much as you 
say; I know you are thinking of leaving me soon. 
There is an old heavy, heavy growl-bell that 
growls at night all the way up to your cave; 
when you hear this bell strike the hour of mid­
night, than you think between one and twelve - 
you think, 0 Zarathustra, I know it, of how 
you want to leave me soon."
"Yes," I answered hesitantly, "but you also 
know - " and I whispered something into her 
ear, right through her tangled yellow foolish 
tresses.
"You know that, 0 zarathustra? Nobody knows 
that."
And we looked at each other and gazed on the 
green meadow over which the cool evening was 
running just then, and we wept together. But 





0 man, take cape I
Two I




'From a deep dream I woke and swears 
Five I 
'The world is deep.
Six I
'Deeper than day had been aware.
Sevan!
Deep is its woe’
Eight!
^Joy— deeper yet than agony;
Nine Î 
'Woe Implores s Go!
Ten!
'But all joy wants eternity—
Eleven!
'Wants deep, wants deep eternity/'
Twelve!44
Nietzsche has prepared us for this dancing song by 
telling US that the path of eternity Is bent,^5 and 
that the moment. Now, is but a point on the well-worn 
path which stretches both before us and behind us.^^
Still earlier we were given a taste of what was to 
reach its climax hare* It was during Zarathustra’s 
Journey to :mn, his toIup: under, when he met the old 
saint in the woods who advised him not to go down to 
man, "’Why, ’ asked the saint, ’did I go into the forest 
and the desert? Was it not because I loved man all-too- 
much? Now I love God; man I love not. Man is for me too 
imperfect a thing* Love of man would kill me’" "But
3 2 9
whan Zarathustra was alone, he spoke thus to his hearts 
'Could It be possible? This old saint in the forest has 
not yet heard anything of this, that Cod la dead'. ' " Then 
Zarathustra contlnudd his descent to man, and began to 
teach the
I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to 
tb@. eaz'th. and do not believe those who e,eak 
to you of other-worldly hopes I Polson-rolxars 
are they, whether they know it or not. Desplsers 
of life are they, decaying and poisoned them­
selves, of whom the earth Is weary: so let
them go.
Once the sin against God was the greatest slni 
but God died, and those sinners died with him.
To sin against the earth Is now the most dread­
ful thing, and to esteem the entrails of the 
unknowable higher than the meaning of the 
earth.47
One obvious question remains to be asked. What Is 
to be our attitude to eternal recurrence? If we take 
Nietzsche's perepectlvlsm as seriously as he took It, 
his InterpreSatlon must be taken as only one of many 
possible Interpretations « Exactly'. This objection 
must be levelled, but It by no means detracts from 
Nietzsche's teaching. As he wrote In Beyond Good and
"Granted, that thlB 1b only one interpretation - 
and you will be eager enough to raise that objection? - 
well, all the better." ^ 8^ only proper way to pose
the question is to ask, as we did earlier, whether it
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Will work. Nietsscha’o answer - and the answer of this 
treatment of eternal reciirronce “• is afflrtiiatlve.
At any rate, the way to interpretation is open
again* Whatever our particular perspective, regardless
how strongly we believe in our interpretation of life,
the liberating fact remains that the possibilities are
many. As Metssohe put it in The Gav Sciences
We cannot see around our corner : it is hopeless
curiosity to want to know what other kinds of 
intellect and perspective there mif>:ht be....
But I think we are today at least far from the 
ridiculous presumptuousness of decreeing from 
our corner that one pap have perspectives from 
this corner only. On the contrary, the world 
has become infinite to us once mores Insofar 
as we cannot dismiss the possibility that it 
3-jO£lnlte • once more
the great horror grasps us “ but who would want 
to deify thiq monster of an unknown world in the 
old way again? And perhaps worship the unknown 
as "the unknown person?" Oh, there are too many 
unmod£y possibilities of interpretation included 
in this unknown, too much devilishness, stupidity, 
foolishness of Interpretation " our own human, 
all-toorhuman interpretation itself, which we 
know...
III
Closely related to Nietzsche’s teaching of eternal 
recurrence and Incomprehensible apart from it is his 
formula qmp,t^, fati. "My formula for greatness in man is 
amor fatj."^^ Such a statement is apt to seem strange, 
even absurd, coming from a man who conceives of U f a  as
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will to power. For by thus associating fate and will 
to poi'jer Nietzsche would seem to be doing no more than 
confronting us anew with the proverbial dilemma of the 
compatibility or Ineompatlbllity of deteaminlsm and 
free will. This, however, turns out to be a false first 
Impression, And yet Nietzsche is not merely playing at 
paradoxes. In order to arrive at some clarity as to 
what ha suggesting with this eeemingly strange juxta­
position, we mist first ask how exactly ha is using the 
word "fate," which should in turn throw soma light on 
the relation of agog, fati to the ethical significance 
of eternal recurrence.
Nietzsche broached the subject of fate as early as
1862 in two short essays, "Fate and History," and "Free™
dom of the Will and Fate.
Free will appears to be unfettered, capricious; 
it is the infinitely free, roving spirit. Fate, 
however, is a necessity.,.. Fate is the infin­
ite power of resistance to free will. Free 
will without fate is just as unthinkable as 
spirit without substance, good without evil.
For it is just the antithesis that creates the 
characteristic.51
In the second essay Nietzsche continues to ruminate,
but now more explicitly psychologically.
In that fate is mirrored to man by his own 
personality, individual freedom of the will and 
individual fate appear as two equally-matched 
opponents,...
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Free will is but an abstraction which expresses 
the capacity to act consciously, whereas fate 
is understood as the principle which guides our 
unconscious actions. Action, as such, is always 
expressive of a simultaneous inner action, an 
aim of the will of which we need not be conscious. 
When acting consciously, we m y  allow ourselves 
to bo guided by impressions just as much as when 
acting unconsciously, or just as little....
If, then, we take the concept of unconsclous 
action to bo more than a mere being-actuated by 
peevious impressions, the rigid distinction 
between fate and free will disappears, and both 
concepts merge into the idea of individuality...
For the individual, the principle of individuali­
zation, of separation from the whole, of abso­
lute limitlassness, is grounded in freedom of the 
will; fate, however, places mti back into or­
ganic contact with the collective development 
and compels him, in that it tries to control 
him, to a fi»ee re-action. Absolute freedom of 
the will, void of fate, would make man into a 
god I the fatalistic principle, into an auto™
maton,52
While it is not possible to require of these early
essays a mature formulation of the problem (Nietzsche
was 17 at the of their writing), they do afford some
insight into how Nietzsche understands fate. The notes
that are struck here - that fate is necessity, and that
the rigid distinction between fate and free will is a
spurious one - are sounded again and again throughout
Nietzsche’s later works, and especially in conjunction
with aragr fati.
My formula for greatness in man is amor fati: 
that one wants nothing to be different, not in 
the future, not In the past, not in all eternity.
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Not simply to bear the necessary, still less 
to conceal it...but to Xpjie it.53
Amor fatio loving one’s fate, is not to be confused 
with fatalism. Nietzsche has this to say in a late un­
published note on the doctrine of Providence :
Even fatalism...is still a result of that
lotmast belief in divine providence, an uncon­
scious result; as if it did not depend on 
how everything happens ™ as though we could 
simply allow things to run their course, every 
individual no more than a mode of the absolute 
Reality.54
Earlier on, near the beginning of the third book of 
‘The ,goiepc„e. in a passage we have already encountered, 
Nietzsche had warned his readers of the danger of failing 
to distinguish between necessity, law and order, and 
chance.
The total character of the world*..is to all 
eternity chaos^ m l  IXi ââïîââ Qt Ibm âkaâosa 
QÂ œSâSSlÈJL» rather the absence of order,
structure, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever 
else our aesthetic human categories are called. 
...Let us beware of saying that there are laws 
in nature. Sh§m. §£§. O M X  there
is no one x^ h^o commnds, no one who obeys, no 
one xiho transgi^esses. When you knox^  that there 
are no goals, then you knox^  too that there is 
no chance; for only in a world of goals has the 
word "chance" a meaning.55 (my italics)
There is no predetermined order in nature (and conse­
quently no chance), but only necessity. What order 
there is depends on us and the shape x^ e give the chaos 
that is the world. Again, it behooves us to remind our­
selves that this is not merely so much paradoxical
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muffibo-junt>Q. Nietzsche is saying something quite compre­
hensible, albeit not via a continuous reasoned argument 
but by a kind of intuitive sign-language. More about this 
presently.
are we to take the second of the notes struck
in the ea%\ly essays *“ that fate and free will are, despite
(or perhaps because of) their opposition, in fact, not
two but one? At the end of the first of the 1862 essaya
Nietzsche had stated that free will without fate is un™
thinkable, that "it is just the antithesis that creates
the characteristic," and he entertained the notion that
"free will (is) nothing but the highest potency of fate,"
He leaves the notion undeveloped, except to concludes
The history of the world is, then, the history 
of nmtter, if one stretches the meaning of this 
word to infinity. For there must be still 
higher principles in which all differences flow 
together in one great unity, in the face of which
all development is a succession of sèeps; every­
thing flowing toward one enormous ocean in which 
all the stages of the evolution of the world 
are rediscovered, reunited, melted together, a 
great unity.56
For assistance in reading these signs, reasoned 
argument will not suffice. Only other signs can help.
For this let us look to Heraclitus, who x^rotes "The 
Lord (x^ ho is the oracle) at Delphi neither speaks nor 
conceals, but gives a sign" ; 57 Heraclitus, x^ hose inf lu-
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ence la felt already at this very early stage In 
Hietasche's life and only Increases with time. It 
would, in fact, not he an exaggeration to say that among 
the pre~socratlcs who were of such great significance 
for Nietzsche, none was more highly praised, even con­
sciously Imitated, than Heraclitus.5®
Heraclitus has as his royal possession the 
highest power of Intuitive thinking} while to­
ward the other type of thinking, the one carried 
on with concepts and logical combinations. In 
other words toward reason, he reacts coolly. 
Insensitively, even hostllely, and seems to feel 
pleasure when he can contradict it with a truth 
arrived at intuitively,59
Significantly, Heraclitus begins by recommending
to his readers, "Not on my authority, but on that of
truth, it is wise for you to accept the fact that all
thlnK^ are aga.' (my italics) Significant, because
this claim links Heraclitus to his Milesian predecessors,
Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxemlnes, who, each In his
own way, sought to express their common belief that all
things are one. Nietzsche put It this way in his lectures
on the pre-Sooratlos:
Greek philosophy seems to begin with a nonsensical 
notion, with the proposition that water la the 
origin and woWb of all things. Is it really 
necessary to stop here and take this seriously?
It is, and for three reasons. First, because 
the proposition says something about the origin 
of all things. Second, because it does this 
without image or fatale. And finally, third, be­
cause in it is contained the thought. If only 
embryonically, that "all things are one." The
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first reason still leaves Thales in the company 
of the religious and superstitiousj the second, 
however, takes him out of their company and 
shows him as a natural scientist ; but on account 
of the third reason, Thales is the first Greek 
philosopher. ...Thales did not overcome the 
primitive level of physical insight of his time 
with the presentation of the unity-conoopt as 
his water-hypothesis, but rather leapt beyond 
its horizon. ...that which drove him to it was 
a metaphysical belief which owed its origin to 
a mystical intuition and which we encounter in 
every philosophy along with renewed attempts at 
a more suitable expression - the proposition that 
"âli thipgg a££ sm.''6l
Anaximander takas Thales at his word; but, though
"all things are one" is an adequate "physical" solution
to the problem of the origin of the universe, it raises
ethical questions not answered by Thales.
Thales expressed the desire to simplify the 
realm of the many and to reduce it to a mere 
unfolding or masking of the one and only existing 
quality, water. Anaximander advances two steps 
beyond him. First of all, he asks himself; "How
is the many even possible, if there is but one s
eternal unity*? He takes the answer from the 
self"contradictory, self-consuming and self- 
negating character of the many. Its existence 
becomes for him a moral phenomenon; it is not 
justified, but expiates itself constantly through 
its passing. But then the second question occurs 
to him: "Why has all that came into being not
long since passed away, since an eternity of 
time has already passed? Whence the ever-renewed 
stream of becoming*? And he can save himself 
from this question only through a mystical pos­
sibility; eternal becoming can have its origin 
only in eternal being; the conditions for the 
fall from that being to a becoming in injustice 
are always the same; the constellation of things 
is such that no end to the emergence of the indi­
vidual from the won#) of the "indefinite" can be 
conceived. Here Anaximander stopped....62
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In his Intellectual history of the pre~Socratios,
Nietzsche now moves directly to Heraclitus,
Into the midst of this mystical night in which 
Anaximander's problems were shrouded walked 
Heraclitus of Ephesus and illuminated them by 
a divine stroke of lightning. "I look at 
'becoming,'" he calls, "and no one has watched 
this eternal rolling of waves and rhythm of 
things as attentively as I. And what did I see? 
Order, unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits 
of lawfulness,... Not the punishment of what 
has come to be, but the justification of bécoming 
I see....
From this intuition Heraclitus inferred two 
interrelated negations, which only oome to light 
when compared to the doctrines of his predecessor. 
First, he denied the duality of totally diverse 
worlds, a position which Anaximander had been 
forced to assume. He no longer distinguished a 
physical from a metaphysical world, a realm of 
definite qualities from a realm of Indefinable 
Indefiniteness. Now, after this first step, he 
could not be held back from a still greater bold­
ness of negation; he denied being altogether.
For this one world which he retained - sheltered 
by eternal unwritten laws, flowing back and forth 
with a brazen rhythmic beat - shows nowhere a 
persistence, an Indestructibility, a bulwark in 
the stream. Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus 
proclaimed; "I see nothing but becoming. Do 
not be deceived I It is in your near-sightedness, 
not in the nature of things, if you think you 
see firm land somewhere in the sea of becoming 
and passing away. You use names for things as 
though they possessed a fixed permanence; but 
even the stream into which you step a second 
time is not the same one you stepped into the 
first time."63
The two negations - of duality and of being - are rendered 
positive by two ideas ; the one, as we have seen, taken 
over from the Milesians, that "all things are one" (in
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the oa^e of Hemolitus^ the "one” isj» of coureoy fires 
"All things are exchanged for fire, and fire for all 
t h i n g s . I  the other, original with Heraclitus, 
that "All things take place by strif.e." Once again, 
it would seem, we are confronted with a paradox. If 
it is not possible to "step twice in the same riversS 
for other and yet other waters are ever flowing on" 
if there is only becoming, how can it be said that "war 
is father of all and king of all...,"°7 that "...war is 
general and that justice is strife ; all things arise and 
(pass away) through strife"?G8 po not war and strife 
presuppose at least two participants?
Heraclitus conceived of the process of becoming
and passing away as a polarity, as the splitting of one
force into two qualitatively different and opposed forces
that strive to reunited
one quality continually separates tnto two and 
contends against itself; continually these op­
posites struggle to reunite. ...Out of the 
struggle of the opposites arises all becoming. 
The definite qualities which appear fixed to us 
express only the momentary predominance of one 
partner; taut the battle is not ended, the con­
test continues eternally. Everything happens 
in conformity with this struggle, and precisely 
this struggle reveals eternal justice. It is 
a wonderful idea, drawn from the purest springs 
of Hellenism, which regards strife as the con­
tinuing sovereignty of a unified and strict 
justice, bound to eternal laws. Only a Greek 
was capable of finding such an idea at the basis
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of a cosmology. It is Hesiod's good Erls de­
clared to be the ruling principle of the world;
It is the idea of the contest of the individual 
Greek and the Greek state, taken over from the 
gymnasium and the palestra, from the artistic 
arcon. from the struggling of the political 
parties and cities with one another, and applied 
universally so that now the wheals of the cosmos 
turn on it,69
Agon does not require two participants. What is more, 
"Opposition unites. From what draws apart results the 
most beautiful harmony."70 That this is puzzling 
Heraclitus was aware: 'Men do not understand how that
which draws apart agrees with itself; harmony lies in 
the bending back, as for instance of the bow and of the 
lyre." 71
The many observable qualities are neither 
eternal substances nor fantasms of our senses 
(Anaxagoras is later to imagine the former, 
Parmenides the latter); they are neither rigid, 
authoritarian being nor fleeting seablances in 
human minds. The third possibility, for Her­
aclitus the only possibility, cannot be guessed 
by dialectical shrewdness and calculation. For 
what he here invented Is a rarity even in the 
realm of mystical incredibilities and unexpected 
cosmic metaphors. The world is the game Zeus 
plays; or, expressed in physical terms, of the 
fire with itself. The one is in this sense only, 
simultaneous with the many,72
Or, to put it in Heraclitus' own words, which call to
mind Jesus' teaching about the children, that "to such
belongs the kingdom of God": "Lifetime is a child
playing draughts; the kingdom is a child's."73
Earl1er,74 we quoted the entire text of Zarathustra's
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speech on the three metamorphoses of the spirit from
"Thou Shalt," to "I will," to "I am/' the final stage
being symbolized by the playing, yea-saying child.
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new 
beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a 
first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game 
of creation, my brothers, a sacred ’’Yes" is 
needed... .75
It is in this sense that we are to take Nietzsche’s
words, "My formula for greatness in man ia amor fati."7^
One further attempt to achieve clarity with regard
to this easily misapprehended teaching may be in order
hero, before passing on to its ethical implications.
Now that we have some idea of Nietzsche’s conception of
fate as necessity, we can speak of amor fati as loving
necessity, that is, the givanness of life. How are we
to understand this?
In the second book of HumanAll -too-Human Nietzsche
offers his hypothesis as to "how the doctrine of the
freedom of the will came into being."
over one person stands necessity in the form 
of his passions, over another as the habit of 
listening and obeying, over a third as logical 
conscience, over a fourth as whimsy and mis™ 
chiavous pleasure in evasions* Yet each of 
these four 0111 seek the freedom of his will 
precisely there where he is bound most securely* 
It is as though the silkworm were to seek the 
freedom of his will in spinning. Why is this? 
Evidently because everyone considers himself
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freest where his ggaj. IMM.
Is strongest; that Is, as I said, now in the 
passions, now in dutjr, now in knowledge, now 
in mischievousness. That wherein a man is 
strong, wherein he feels himself most alive, 
he believes autooatioally must also always be 
the element of his freedom..,.78
This would seam no more than a negative argument for a
rigid determinism, as, indeed, would these words of
praise :
Schopenhauer makes that admirable distinction 
with which he proved more right in the end than 
he himself could have known: "the insight into
the strict necessity of human actions is the 
demarcation line which separates the philosophi' 
.Çâl winds from others." He thwarted this 
mighty insight, to which he was open at times, 
with that moral prejudice which he still shared 
with moral men (not moralists) and which he 
quite hawalessly and piously expressed thus: 
"the final and true explanation of the inner 
being of the whole of things must necessarily 
be closely connected to that of the ethical 
significance of human actions" - which is by 
no means "necessary," but rather refuted on 
the basis of that proposition concerning the 
strict necessity of human actions, that is, the 
absolute un-freedom and un-responsibility of 
the will. ...To be sure, the escape hatches 
which the "philosophical minds," Schopenhauer 
included, left themselves must be recognized 
as useless. None leads Into the open, into 
the clear air of the free will; each through 
which one has slipped up to now revealed be­
hind it once again the brazen, blinking wall 
of fate, we are in prison; we can only dream. 
not make, ourselves free.79
However much determinists might like to claim Nietzsche
for their own, in the end, he will elude them and prove
himself too complicated for such easy pigeon-holing.
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For him^ the very argument concerning free versus
determlnisE'i rests on a false presupposition*
Oriental fatalism is based on the error that 
sets iKJan and fat© as tmo separate things over 
against each other. Man, it says, can struggle 
against fate, try to frustrate it, but ultimately 
it t'tflll alï'^ iays be triumphant ; therefore it is 
most reasonable either to resign oneself or to 
live as one pleases* In truth, every man is a 
piece of fate* If he thinks he struggles against 
fate as stated above, fate fulfills itself even 
in this struggle* The struggle is imagined, but 
so is resignation in fate; all of these illusions 
are included in fate* The fear which most people 
have about the doctrine of the unfreedom of the 
will is fear of oriental fatalism* They think 
man will become weak, resigned and will stand 
before the future with folded hands because he 
is incapable of changing it. Or, on the other 
hand, that he will lot loose all his capricious- 
ness, because even this cannot make worse what 
is already determined. The folly of man is as 
much a part of fate as is his cleverness. Even 
that fear of belief in fate is fate.80
Every man is a piece of fata; and fatalism is based on
an error. A paradox? Mo, because of Nietzsche’s con™
caption of fate in terms of necessity. Amor fati is not
an appeal to "resign oneself to one’s fate.' The very
word "resign” suggests the false dichotomy posed by
fatalism. There are no prerei*dained, established laws -
neither in the religious-metaphysical sense of providence
nor in the na titrai-biological seme of determinism:
"There are only necessities." Even in that early
essay on "Fat© and History," Nietzsche had wondered
whether free will could not be understood to be "the
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highest potency of f a t e . " I n  the context, then, of 
Nietzsche's will to power' monism. If there are only 
necessities (reads fate), that is, if life is fate, 
then mill M
The final (ethical) question is : how are we to
take our will to power which is our fate? In short, 
what are we to do with our bodies and our earth? Amor 
fati “ to love it. Not resignation, not acquiescences 
this option is no option - spurious. Illusory, There 
are only necessities, there is g.piy. fate, there is only 
will to power.
And yet, this is not a thing to be lamented 
(Nietzsche would say that even this lament is a piece 
of fatal). Nor is it to say that man is not responsible. 
He la responsible, but not for the old reasons. Fatal­
ism (belief in Providence, determinism) was criticized 
by Nietzsche precisely on these grounds, namely for its 
unsupported and unaupportablo belief that the shape of 
things and the course they take does not depend on us,
"as though we could simply allow things to run their 
course, every Individual no more than a mode of the ab­
solute Reality."®3 Yet how can a roan be both a piece 
of fate and still respnnsible?
For an answer to this question we must draw upon
fUiour previous analysis of will to power, bearing in
mind always that fate 1^ will to power. Nietzsche's 
will to power monism, we said, is a diatomic monism, 
a txiio-ln-onaness, a breaking off and turning against 
itself of will to power, echoes of which we have just 
heard from Heraclitus.^ That portion of will to power 
which breaks away at birth becomes, with time, em-bodied 
(ainverleibt  ^as the instinct of conscience, a "memory of 
the will," the ability "to be responsible and with pride, 
and thus also M m  âMllÈS. %& SM. llzml to onegglf." 
and thus also M m  âMllÈS. %& SM. llzml to onegglf." be 
molded and shaped; it must be taught this memory, it 
must develop this ability. Life is fata, is will to 
power, is one, conceived of, however, dynamically; not 
as the union of the opposites ("how can opposites be in 
harmony except unwillingly?"), but, as in Heraclitus,
"an attuneraant of opposite tensions, like that inaa 
bow...a continuous tug-of-war...,"®7 aKon. the contest, 
strife.
It is against this background that we may appreciate
the ethical impact of amor fati. To learn to see the
necessary as the beautiful, and not merely to accept It
but to love it, is to beautify it,
I want more and more to learn to see the neces­
sary in things as the beautiful - thus will I 
be one of those who makes things beautiful, «o 
Amor fati. that is to be my love from now on.
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Clearly^ Hietssche 1b not advocating that vje love ever y  
that comes (this imuld betray a belief In a 
8tralght"forward, rigid d$terminlem% but that i^ e love 
the necessary in whatever comas. i\nd just as elearlyg 
he believes it possible to bestoK beauty on a thing by 
loving it.
Remain faithful to the earthy my brothers,,
■with the poMer of your virtue. Let your gift- 
giving love and your knowledge serve the mean­
ing of the earth* Thus I beg and beseech you.
Do not let them fly away from earthly things 
and beat #ith their wings against eternal walls. 
Alasj thei»e has always been so much virtue that 
has flown away. Lead back to the earth the 
virtue that flaw away^  ^ as 1 do - back to the 
body* back to life* that it may give the earth 
a meaning* a human meaning.89
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IV, The tlbarmepscb and the. Neighbor
9* Dionysus versus the Crucified
Behold* I teach you the Cbermensch.
The fjbgrmenqch is the meaning of the 
earth.1
"'-^ arathustra
My philosophy is aimed at a gradation. 
not, at an individualistlo ethic.2
--^ Nietzsche
I
"Has anyone understood me? - Diohysua versus the 
prucifled."3 With this almost plaintive question* 
Nietzsche both virtually sums up his work in capsule 
form and brings it to a close* The question is plain­
tive because so much depends on its answer* For if we 
do not understeind the formula* "Dionysus versus the 
Crucified*" we do not understand Nietzsche. It is as 
simple as that. Who is "the Crucified"? Who* indeed^ 
is "Dionysus"?
ii
To take the first question first* "the Crucified" 
is the Christ* God on the Cross; and "God on the Cross 
is a curse on lifa..,."^' Nietzsche has prepared us for 
this judgment with his analysis of guilt and toad con­
science^ which culminated in the discovery of "the para­
doxical and ghastly expedient which brought temporary 
relief to suffering humanity* Christianity’s stroke
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of genius: Ood saerlflolng himself for tnan...."“ In
short, God on the Cross Is the logical and necessary 
outcome of what Nietzsche called "slave revolt in
morals."7
In Chapter 6, in which we dealt with Nietzsche's 
analysis of the origin of morality and conscience, we 
sought to avoid getting trapped into a facile disregard 
of this highly unlikely (at any rate, unprovabla) his­
torical hypothesis which claimed to have traced the 
origins of our value judgments to a primal horde of 
masters and slaves, by drawing attention to its useful­
ness as a psychological hypothesis. We may now take 
one further step - still being guided by Nietzsche's ad­
mission that the "two basic types" can be found "even 
within the same man, within one soul"® - and ask how 
the slave revolt in morals works itself out in history, 
in society, we know where it leads - to a curse on life,
God on the Cross. But what path was followed by those 
men - not ideal types, not "slaves" as opposed to "masters"'* 
but ordinary flesh-and-blood men with both master in­
stincts and slave instincts warring within them? It was 
the path of ressentiment.9
The slaves' revolt in morals begins with this,
that resaentiment itself becomes creative and
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gives birth to values? the resaentiment of 
those Mho are denied the real reaction, that of 
the deed, and who compensate with an imaginary 
revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out 
of a triumphant affirmation of oneself, slave 
morality immediately says No to what comes from 
outside, to what is different, to what is not 
oneself? and this No is its creative deed. This 
reversal of the value-positing glance - this 
necessary direction outward instead of back to 
oneself - is of the nature of ressentiment a to 
come into being, slave morality requires an out­
side world, a counterworld | physiologically 
speaking, it requires external stimuli in order 
to react at alls its action is at bottom always 
a reaction.
Slave morality is typified by the fact that it rests upon
a "no"; its creative act is a re-aotlon. Slave morality
Is aasâtls. morality.
The ressoptiment of the noble man, if it occurs 
in him at all, discharges and expends itself in 
an immediate reaction, and therefore does not
Master morality is chatracteriaed by its spontaneity, by 
a "yes" resulting from a fullness, an overflow of life. 
Master morality is a morality of affirmation and ful­
fillment. Here, then, is Nietzsche's view of (Jewish) 
Ohrlstian-Platonic morality, and his own alternative.
Lot us recapitulate briefly. Life is one, a will
to power monism; But, in man, it is to be understood
as a diatomic monism, a two-in-ononess, in that man as
will to power la forced to turn in upon himself so that
he may learn to live with his fellows; That part of 
will to power which breaks away and turns upon Itself
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at birth becomes em-bodled (elnverlelbt) as an instinct, 
the Instinct of conscience. This new instinct functions 
to guide the will to power as it rushes forward and 
reaches out to incorporate and give form to all that it 
encounters, its unceasing attempt at self-affirmation.
Of course, man encounters obstacles and is thwarted in 
this attempt by other men and things. The instinct of 
conscience seeks to canalize man's self-affirmation.
But how? In what direction? Along what path?
Theoretically, there are as many paths as there are
consciences. However, every conscience is formed by the
environment in which it grows. Thus, practically, the
conscience of each child begins to be molded by what Freud
called "the parents' influence," that is,
not merely the personalities of the parents 
themselves but also the racial, national and 
family traditions handed on through them as well 
as the demands of the immediate social milieu 
which they represent. In the same way, an in­
dividual's super-ego in the course of his dev­
elopment takes over contributions from later 
successors and substitutes of his parents, such 
as teachers, admired figures in social life or 
high social ideals.
We noticed already^S that up to this point, Nietzsche'a
theory of conscience and Freud's theory of super-ego
correspond exactly. We also noticed, however, that
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here thetr paths diverge in radically different directions 
Freud's leading to heightened restraint In the form of a 
restrictive, no-saying super-ego, and thus ultimately 
to pessimismj Nietzsche's leading to a new affirmation 
of the body and the earth which formed the basis for a 
conscience based on integrity, a remissive conscience.
The difference is not in the form or the function of the 
controlling mechanisms of super-ego and conscience, but 
rather in the content, in the end they serve. The former 
deflects, denies gratification; the latter canalizes - 
toward the body and the earth, toward gratification.
The former is the ascetic formula, the latter the formula 
of fulfillment.
Perhaps the best metaphor, aside from "canalizing," 
for expressing Nietzsche's meaning is "bridling;" It 
is not a question of a choice between Freud's bridled id 
and Nietzsche's unbridled will to power, though this 
is the Impression that still haunts all too m n y  inter­
pretations of Nietzsche, (Nietzsche criticized Schop­
enhauer' s concept of the will precisely because of its 
alleged blindness, its absolute abandon and goallossness.) 
As we have tried to show, he never advocated "turning 
loose" one's will to power. Indeed, he would have consid­
ered such a program nonsensical and, for that matter, im-
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possible to Implement, The controlling mechanism of 
eoneclenee is, after all, an inescapable part of the 
human "equipment," Conscience, as Nietzsche understood 
it, is an integral part of man, not to be wished away by 
the longing to return to nature or the glorification 
and imitation of the primitive,^4 "Bestiality" with 
reference to man is a misnomer. Man's Inhumanity to 
man is not a regression to animality* As we are begin­
ning to discover, animals lojow better.Conscience is 
that part of will to power which serves aa its canal- 
Izer, its bridle. Nietzsche is not saying "no" to 
conscience and morality, but to a conscience baaed on 
oontinenen and an ascetic morality.
Niatzsoho's critique of the continence and asceti­
cism which are our heritage is, on the whole, just and 
to the point. The shriller his polemic becomes, however, 
the wore apparent becomes his omission of one important 
positive aspect of asceticism in the past which deserves 
mention here. John Nren-Lewls has written of it in this 
fashion;
The fallacy lies in the implicit assumption that 
because purltanism and flight from the flesh are 
seen as neurotic today, the mood was therefore 
always neurotic. ,..ours is the first culture
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In human history in whloh it is possible to 
avoid Puritanism and world denial without sao-
As long as the earth was something over against man,
incalculable, violent, uncontrollablei as long as the
body was a burden, it was gratuitous to ask men to affirm
the earth and their bodies. That Is to say, as long as
personal values and organic values were necessarily at
odds and considered unalterable, an affirmation of "life,"
of "reality," in short, of personal life, entailed, just
as necessarily, a denial of organic values *■ the earth
and the body. Only in our time, only, one might say,
since Nietzsche, has it been possible to say "yes" to
the Leib (Leban). the unity of body-and-soul (person)*
Lebansuhilosouhié would have been unthinkable before this*
The vital thing is that the scientific and tech­
nological revolution has brought about an entirely 
new attitude to physical life, in that today we 
take itfor granted that evil physical conditions 
can be remedied. whereas in all previous, civil­
izations it was taken for granted that they were 
part of the unalterable pattern of nature*i7
It seems almost incredible that this psychological 
force could have eluded a psychologist of Nietzsche's 
stature* But obviously it did* Nevertheless, his funda­
mental insight into the detni-mental effects of asceticism 
la jWm remains unassailable* And he did offer a
positive altei^native (as that other master psychologist.
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Freud, did not - only more aaoetloism). Denial of the 
earth and the body Is not only expendable today, it is 
neurotio. This brings us back to ressentiment and its 
effects.
Will to power, aggression (in the psychological 
sense) is "natural"j indeed, without it there would be 
no life. F^ssentimant. rancorous, envious aggression, 
is neurotic; it is the "most dangerous explosive" which 
"steadily accumulates and accumulates."^® It cannot be 
denied, however, or wished away. If it finds no release, 
it poisons its bearer (msoohlsm) ; if it is finally dis­
charged after long repression, its issue is vehement and 
venomous (sadism).
The originators and bearers of ascetic morality 
(Nietzsche's "ascetic priests") intuited that man is a 
problem to himself. They did not know why. There was 
no psychological analysis of main such as we have seen 
done by Nietzsche to guide them. Yet they sensed what 
we now know, namely, that "All instincts which do not 
discharge themselves outwardly turn inward. This is 
what I call man's introJcctlon (VarinneyliohupK)
And this introjection of instincts, this turning in of 
will to power upon itself is "natural" ~ as long as the 
new Instinct of conscience to which this introjection
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gives birth does not subserve a repressive morality.
But, as we have just seen, asceticism was a necessary 
component of life-afflrmation until only relatively re­
cently in our past; and aacetieisra, by its very nature, 
is repressive. Refused satisfaction, man's Instincts 
seethe and sirattier and become what they otherwise are 
not - explosive. This is the dilemma which the ascetic 
priest faced and sought to untangle.
To discharge this explosive in such a way that 
it does not blow up the flock and the shepherd, 
that is his real feat as well as his highest use­
fulness, Were one to sura up the value of priestly 
existence in a simple formula, one could says the 
priest is the diygi±g% of resBentiment.^Q
Ascetic morality both creates reaqantlment and directs
it to a new outlet, albeit a dangerous outlet,
"I suffer; someone must be responsible for that." 
So thinks the ailing sheep. But his shepherd, 
the ascetic priest, says to him, "You are right, 
my sheepÎ Someone must be responsible. But you 
yourself are that someone; you alone are to blame.
êlmm m m  la W & m m  mum§l£V' That is 
quite daring, quite false. But at least one 
thing is thus achieved - the direction,of ressent­
iment is, as I said, thereby changed.21
This reversal of ressentiment gave rise, as we know
from a previous d i s c u s s i o n , to bad conscience and guilt,
Man was preserved, but at the high cost of the sacrifice
of his body and this earth.
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So that It could say No to everything on earth 
that represents the ascending tendency of life, 
to that which has turned out well, to power, to 
beauty, to self-afflrnatlon, the instinct of 
rossqntlmept. which had here become genius, had 
to Invent another world from whose point of view 
this affirmation Jl£a appaared as evil, as 
the reprehensible as such.S3
Nietzsche's doctrine of the body, with its affirmation 
of the oneness of life, is expressly designed to counter­
act this split in life. And his alternative to ascetic 
roan, epitomized for him by the image of "the Crucified," 
is the ftberroensah. ayrtbolized by Dionysus.
Ill
Who is Dionysus? Nietzsche has already provided us 
with one answer to this question.®^ In The Birth of 
Tragedy Dionysus was introduced as the companion and op­
ponent of Apollo. This early work was designed to Ig­
nore morality; or, rather, it was meant as "a valuation 
and doctrine of life diametrically Apposed to it, a 
purely artistic, antichrist doctrine. ...1 called It 
Dionysian. " I n  an effort to clarify his use of these 
images, Nietzsche speaks of Apollo in terms of dream 
and of Dionysus in terras of intoxication (Sânasà).
Apolionian-Bionysian. There are two condi­
tions in which art itself appears in man like a 
natural force and has man at its disposal whether 
he wishes it or not; first, as the compulsion
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to vision, and, on the other hand, as the oora- 
ppliBion to orgy. Both conditions are played out 
in everyday life, only weaker? in dream and in 
intoxication.
But the same opposition endures between dream
and Intoxication, Both release in us artistic
powers, each, however, different ones ? dream, 
those of seeing, connecting, poetizing; intox­
ication. those of gesture, passion, song and 
dance.27
Nietzsche attempts to explain the birth of tragedy
(Apollonian art) out of the spirit of music (Dionysus),
out of the contest (aaon( between Dionysus and Apollo.
We concluded earlier on®® that Nietzsche is operating
with a dualistic hypothesis in The Bjrth of Tragedy.
And, indeed, this conclusion still holds. He speaks
several times of the struggle between the two deities
as being between "two hostile principles,"®9 Still
more explicit are these words :
In contmst to all who are intent upon deriving 
the arts from one principle as the necessary 
fountainhead of every work of art, I keep ray gaze 
fixed on those two artistic deities of the Greeks, 
Apo&lo and Dionysus, and perceive them to be the 
lively and vivid representatives of two realms of 
art, dissimilar in their deepest being and high­
est goals.30
This dualism goes to the very roots of Nietzsche's early 
aesthetics.
And yet, as we also noted previously, the monism 
which becomes more explicit in the later works is already
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her© in embryo. It eannot stand alone at this early 
stage for two reasons. First, Nietzsche has as yet 
been unable to free himself from the thought-world of 
Schopenhauer and Kant, dominated, as it is, by a 
strict dualism of will and idea, phenomena and noumena 
(Dionysus and Apollo). Second, as long as Dionysus is 
conceived of as intoxication, formlessness, loss of in­
dividuality; in short, as unbridled will to power, Apollo, 
regardless how repressive he may be - and the order he 
Imposes is strict and ruthless - must hold him in check. 
However, as soon as it becomes clear that Dionysus is 
not the titan, the baiharian, the demon he was thought 
to be - and this is the liberating consequence of 
Nietzsche's psychological investigations - there is no 
longer any need for Apollo. Indeed, to hold to him after 
making such a discovery would be both foolish and cruel. 
This is but another way of saying what we have already 
said in the preceding sections denial of Dionysus - of 
the body, the earth, will to power - however necessary for 
the Greeks, is not necessary today; it is neurotic. For 
them, it served a positive purpose ; for us, it impedes 
that purpose. As Apollo was seen by Nietzsche to be 
superfluous, he receded into the background and ulti­
mately out of view. The Dionysus of the late works and
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of the formula, "Dionysus versus the Crucified," both is 
and is not the Dionysus of The Birth of Tragedy. In 
that ha is seen to be guided by his own inner "bridle" 
(consolence), he is that same Dionysus. In that he is 
inextricably bound to a repressive taskmaster outside 
himself (Apollo), he is not the same. As on® recent 
commentator has put it, to see in the Dionysus of the 
late Nietsache "a synthesis of Apollo and Dionysus is to 
sacrifice insight for peace of mind,"31
"The Crucified" is the syaJjol of extreme denial and 
curtailment of life - for the purpose of praservinK life, 
to be sire,3® but ascetic in its very essence nonetheless. 
"Dionysus," on the other hand, symbolizes affirmation 
and fulfillment of life: "it is explicable only in terms
of an excess of energy" i33 " m  the Dionysian syct»ol, the 
greatest affirmation possible is attained."34 "The 
Crucified" is the symbol of a morality whose creative 
act is a "no" to life; "Dionysus," a "yes." with this 
last statement, we have moved back once again from the 
realm of images and symbols and metaphors to the ethical 
world. And to speak of ethics is to speak of men; or, 
in this instance, of Dbermensohen.
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IV
We do Nietzsche and ourselves an injustice if we 
shy away from treating his concept of the
with seriousness because of Its alleged iraplauslbility 
or its checkered past In the hands of propagandists.
We have endeavored throughout to show that each of the 
key positive (as opposed to critical) concepts in 
Nietzsche's work - will to power and conscience, the 
body and the earth, eternal recurrence and amor fatt - 
was concerned with man. The Dionysian Dbermansoh is 
no exception.®^ Indeed, it can be said to be the culmina 
tlon of all that has gone before. If "Dionysian is 
Nietzsche's symbol for his positive alternative to "the 
Crucified," the Dbermenach is its ethical counterpart.
Looking back on his masterpiece, Thus Sooke Zapa-
thustra. Nietzsche wrote; "My concept 'Dionysian' here
achieved its highest embpdimept."36 garathustra is the
teacher of the Dbermensch. Here is the beginning of his
first speech to the people gathered in the marketplaces
X  W a h  y m  Man is something
that shall be overcome. What have you done to 
overcome him?
All beings so far have created something 
beyond themselves; and do you want to be the 
ebb of this great flood and even go back to the 
beasts rather than overcome man? What is the
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ape to nan? A laughingstock or a painful em­
barrassment. And man shall be just that for the 
tibermenaoh : a laughingstock or a painful em­
barrassment. You have made your way from worm 
to man* and much in you is still worm. Once you 
were apes, and even now, too, man is more ape 
than any ape.
Whoever is the wisest among you is also a 
mere conflict and cross between plant and ghost. 
But do 1 bid you become ghosts or plants?
Behold, I teach you the t'ibermansoh. The 
%epmen8ch is the meaning of the earth. Let your 
will says the ifearmensoh shall be the meaning of 
the earths I beseech you, my brothers, remain 
SââbÊlîl Æa ms&h* and do not believe those 
who speak to you of otherworldly hopes I Poison- 
mixers are they, whether they know it or not. 
Desplacrs of life are they, decaying and poisoned 
themselves, of whom the earth is weary; so let 
them go.
once the sin against God was the greatest sin; 
but God died, and these sinners died with him.
To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful 
thing, and to esteem the entrails of the unîcnow- 
able higher than the meaning of the earth.
Once the soul looked contemptuously upon the 
body, and then this contempt was the highest; she 
wanted the body meager, ghastly, and starved.
Thus she hoped to escape it and the earth. Oh, 
this soul herself was still meager, ghastly, and 
starved; and cruelty was the lust of this soul. 
But you, too, my brothers, tell me: what does
your body proclaim of your soul? Is not your 
soul poverty and filth and wretched contemtment?
Verily, a polluted stream is man. One must 
be a sea to be able to receive a polluted stream 
without becoming unclean. Behold, l teach you 
the tibeymensch: he is this sea; in him your
great contempt can go under.
What is the greatest experience you can have?
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It Is the hour of the great contempt. The hour 
In which your happiness, too, arouses your dis­
gust, and even your eeason and your virtue.
The hour when you say, "What matters my 
happiness? It is poverty and filth and wretohed 
contentment. But my happiness ought to justify 
existence."
The hour when you say, "What matters my reason? 
Does it crave knowledge as the lion his food?
It is poverty and filth and wretohed contentment."
The hour when you say, "What matters my virtue?
As yet it has not made me rage. How weary I am 
of my good and my evlll All that is poverty and 
filth and wretched contentment,"
The hour when you say, "What «matters my justice?
I do not see that I am flames and fuel. But the 
just are flames and fUel,"
The hour when you say, "What matters my pity?
Is not pity the cross on which he is nailed who 
loves man? But my pity is no crucifixion."
Have you yet spoken thus? Have you yet cried 
thus? Oh, that I might have heard you cry thus'.
Not your sin but your thrift cries to heaven; 
your meanness even in your sin cries to heaven.
Where is the lightning to lick you with its 
feongue? Where is the frenzy with which you 
should be inoculated?
Behold, I teach you the tibermsnpch; he is this 
lightning, he is this frenzy.37
The doctrine of the libermensch is, admittedly, a
doctrine, an ethical ideal; but not in the sense of being
a figment of Nietzsche's imagination, a construction
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from the whims a W  wishes of one man which other men are 
expected to live up to. On the contrary.
The word Ubermenaoh as the mark of type of man 
who has turned out beat, in contrast to "modern" 
man, "good" men, to Christiana and other nihi­
lists,, .has been understood almost invariably 
with complete innocence in terms of the values 
the exact opposite of which were embodied in 
the figure of garathustra; that is, as an 
"idealistic" type of a higher kind of man, half 
"saint," half "genius,"38
The ÜbarménBoh is not to be mistaken for an "idealistic" 
saint/genius. Hor should this doctrine be confused with 
Carlyle's great-men theory, which Wietasche more than 
once disdainfully rejects as a "hero cult,"39 a prostra­
tion before the hero and the g e n i u s , a n  interesting 
parallel in The Antichrist, which will receive our at­
tention in the following chapter, Nietzsche rejects, no 
less disdainfully, Renan*s attempt to see Jesus as a 
hero and a g e n i u s ) B u t  if the Rbermonsch is not a 
hero or a genius, neither are those whom Zarathustra calls 
"higher men" tibarmensoheri.
Verily, you who are good and just, there is 
much about you that is laughable, and especially 
your fear of that which has hitherto been called 
the devil. What is great is so alien to your 
souls that the tibertninsch would be awesome to you 
in his kindness. And you who are wise and know­
ing, you would flee from the burning sun of that 
wisdom in which the Bbermensch joyously bathes 
his nakedness. You highest men whom my eyes 
have seen, this is my doubt concerning you and
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my secret laughters I guess that you would call 
my tîbermenaah - devil,
Alas, I have wearied of these highest and best
men: from their "height" I longed to get up
out, and away to the
f
If these are all things the ijfbermenaeh.is not,
what, then, is ha? Man Is a certain kind, of being, a
human being (Menaoh), The human being is a step "beyond"
the animal! not "higher than," in the sense of progress,
nor merely "different from," but "beyond" in the non-
judgmental sense of more highly developed, more complex.
The iibertnensch - literally, over-man, above-man, beyond-
raan, raore-than-raan - is beyond man, but jja the distinct
sense that man is beyond animals, and no other. The
fiber,mepsch is a kind of Mehsch (man), just as man is a
kind of animal.
Has there, in fact, ever been an Ubermensch?
Sarathustra says no.
Never yet has there been an Ubermensch.
Naked 1 saw both the greatest and the smallest 
man: they are still all-too-sirallar to each
other. Verily, even the greatest I found all- 
too-small.^S
Nevertheless, some five years later Nietzsche was to 
write in
Goethe - not a German event, but a European 
one; a magnificent attempt to overcome the 
eighteenth century by a retnrn to nature, by 
an ascent to the naturalness of the Renaissance
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a kind of self-overcoming on the part of that 
century. Ha bore its strongest instincts within 
himselfs the sensibility, the Idolatry of nature, 
the anti-'historic, the idealistic, the unreal 
and revolutionary (the latter being merely a form 
of the unreal). He sought help from history, 
natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, 
but, above all, from practical activity; he 
surrounded himself with limited horizons; he did 
not retire from life but put himself into the 
midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as 
much as possible upon himself, over himself, into 
himself, What he wanted was totality; he fought 
against the sundering of reason, sensuality, 
feeling, will (preached with the most abhorrent 
scholasticism by Kant, the antipode of Goethe); 
he disciplined himself to wholeness, he 
himself.
« ft.Goethe conceived a human being who would be 
strong, highly educated, skillful In all bodily 
matters, self-controlled, reverent toward him­
self, and who might dare to afford the whole 
range and wealth of being natural, being strong 
not from wealsness but from strength, because 
he knows how to use to his advantage, even that 
from which the average nature would perish; the 
man for whom there is no latnger anything that is 
forbidden - unless it be weakness. whether called 
vice or virtue.
Such a spirit who has become free stands amid 
the cosmos with a joyous' and trusting fatalism, 
intthe "is“the highest of all possib***
52 I  ^ u have baptized it with the name of* 
the whole ______   ______    i a
faith, however, is the highest of all possible
faiths ; I.have baptized it with the name of
Without wishing to ignore Zarathustra's denial that 
there has ever been an tfeermensch. it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that here in this portrait of Goethe
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Is Included all that Nietzsche claimed for his Dionysian 
j&bqrmensch. T© equate the two - Goethe and the tibermensch 
- without this portrait, however, is apt to be mis­
leading j Goethe means different things to different 
people, Nietzsche is pointing to Goethe as a kind of 
living model of the iijbermensch. of his conviction that 
"great man arise from the presence of opposites and a 
consciousness of them ~
Finally, then, Nietzsche is saying: two things with 
regard to his ethical Ideal. First, the evolution of 
man cannot be spoken of as "progress," The "higher men," 
the good and just, the wise and Imowlng, those who 
supposedly represent the best that man can do, Zara- 
thustra calls all-too-human. Second, there is, however, 
the real possibility of man overcoming his all-too- 
humanness.
Mankind does not represent a development 
toward something better or stronger or higher 
in the sens© accepted today. .«.further devel­
opment is altogether not according to any neces­
sity in the direction of elevation, enhancement, 
or strength.
In another sense, success in individual cases 
is constantly encountered in the most widely 
different places and cultures; here we really do 
find a higher which is, in relation to
mankind as a hhole, a kind of Sbermensoh. Such
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fortunate acoidentB of great bucoobo have aliyagrs 
heon poBBlbla a;id ^,^1,1 porhapa always be pos* 
Bible. And even whole families^ tribes^ or 
peoples may occaalonally represent sueh a MllJü'
The oreatlon of the %©ro^epaeh is a human possibility.
In the quotation immediately preceding we are 
faced, however, with the social-historical misconception 
which has detracted fYom this decisive aspect of Nletzisohe* E 
work and generally raised havoc with his whole positive 
ethical alternative to the ascetic ideal* It is what 
might be called Nietzsche's aristocratic bias, expD^essed 
in this terse notes "Mot Vmankind» (t^ enschheit^. but the 
Ulmrmensch Is the goal
V
In the course of a caustic polemic directed at
Hegel and the Hegelians, Nietzsche wrote, in his early
essay on the value of history for life, "According to
him (Hduard von Hartmann), we are approaching ’that
ideal condition in which the human race makes its history
with full consciousness’; ...If we once reach it, the
word ’world-process’ will never pass any man’s lips again
without a smile/' He continues:
There will come a time when we will wisely ab­
stain from all constructions of the world-process 
as well as of the history of mankind, a time in 
which one will no longer regard the masses at all, 
but once again individuals, who build a kind of 
bridge across the wild stream of becoming. They 
do not continue a process, but live timelessly
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and contierapoi?an0ously.,.. It ia the task of 
history to act as messenger for them, thus con­
tinually providing occasion for and lending 
strength to the creation of great men. No, the 
goal og mankind cannot lie in its and, but only
la I M  iiial?aat
It is not possible to glean Nietzsche's aristocratic 
bias from this passage. The point here is a more con­
ventional one, namely, that greatness, of whatever kind 
(Nietzsche is not specific here), is to be found in in­
dividuals rather than among the many. The emphasis is 
less on who the great men are than on where they are apt 
to appear, if and when they do appear. And Nietzsche's 
conviction is, contra Hegel and the Hegelians, not at 
the end. of a process, "but only ijn Itg, highest examples.. 
Here is the precedent for the claim already cited^O 
which appeared fourteen years later in The Antichrist.
Who, then, are these Individuals, these highest 
examples?
These are the real iaœja beings, the no-longer- 
âBlmlj., the philosophers, ag&i&tg. and actjnts.
In their appearance and through their appear­
ance, nature, lihioh never leaps, makes it sole 
leap, and it is a leap of joy. For It senses 
that it has, for the first time, raached its 
goal, there, namely, where it comprehends that 
it must learn not to have goals, and that it 
has raised the stakes of the game of life and 
becoming too high.51 {
It would seem that Nietzsche is herewith excluding all
but a very few from the possibility of ever becoming
"no-longer-aniraals"j only a handful of "such fortunate
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accidents" can become "truly human beings," thereby 
gaining entry into the phllosopher-artist-saint elite. 
This is partially true. We must, however, not content 
ourselves with naming these "higher types"; we must ask 
Why Nietzsche considers each of them "a himher type. 
which is, in relation to mankind as a whole, a kind of
The philosophea? and the artist serve the same pur­
pose. Mature needs them^ #s :lt ware^
for a metaphysical purpose, namely, for its own 
enlightenment concerning itselfj so that finally 
it will be confronted with a pure and finished 
image of that which it never was able to see 
clearly in the turbulence of Its becoming - in 
short, for its own self-knowledge.53
Nietzsche is not speaking of philosophers and artists 
in a générait vague sense. He is, in fact, operating 
with a very specific criterion: only those human beings
who hold a mirror up to nature to facilitate self-know­
ledge are truly philosophers and artists* The saint, 
too, is a truly human being, though his function is 
different from that of the philosopher and the artist*
..•finally, nature needs the saint, in whom the 
ego fuses completely and ceases partially or 
wholly to experience its ailing life as indivi­
dual, but rather as the most intense feeling of 
solidarity, of compassion, of oneness with all 
that is alive ** the saint^ in whom that miracle 
of transformation occurs, on whom the game of 
becoming never descends, this final and highest 
incarnation toward which all nature strives for 
its redemption from itself.54
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Whereas the philosopher and the artist are defined by 
their ability to lead us to self-knowledge, to see our­
selves as separate, as Individual egos, the saint re­
presents the next and final step - unthinkable without 
first achieving self-knowledge - the step to "the most 
Intense feeling of solidarity, of compassion, of oneness 
with all that is alive... ,"^5 \jith this delineation of 
the functions of philosophers and artists, on the one 
hand, and saints, on the other, as the midwives of self- 
knowledge and fellow-feeling, respectively, we may better 
understand why it is only partially true to say that the 
phllosopher-artlst-salnt elite is limited to the very few.
There is no doubt, we are all related and bound 
to him (the saint), just as we are related to 
the philosopher and the artist.,,,56
Only when we ourselves, in this life or a future 
one, gain admission to that noble order of the 
philosopher, the artist, and the saint, will we 
be given a new goal for our love and our hate. 
Meanwhile, we have our task and our sphere of 
duties, our hate and our love,57
We are all related to tibermensohen: what is more, we are
ourselves potentially tibermensohen. Until we become
fibermanachen ourselves, we have our own tasks and duties.
And what do these consist of?
Above all, one thing is certain. These new 
duties are not the duties of a solitary. Rather, 
one belongs with them in a mighty mutuality 
wWch is held together, not by outward forms and
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rules but by a fundamental idea* It is the 
fundamental idea of culture, insofar as it sets 
every one of us but one tasks to promote the
ÆSg§MoB s£ SM,|2^ âaÈ» sMSisMnfc HlÊMn âEâ ag& # mmæk .W W , ol mbmâ.58
Once again, Nietzsche makes it clear that our task en­
tails promoting the creation (Nietzsche’s word is 
Irzeu^uni^ - procreation) of the philosopher, the artist 
and the saint within ourselves and without*
Nevertheless, his belief that only a few would ever 
actually attain this status of the truly human, no- 
longer "^animal, is equally clear* Why is this?
We have drawn attention to Nietzsche’s conviction, 
deriving from Heraclitus and the Greek conception of 
agon, that "great man arise from the presence of pppo- 
sites and a consciousness of them - the tautlv-smnned 
vie saw that thèse truly human beings could be 
conceived only singly, as individuals. That is, becoming 
an bbermensch is an Individual feat, not a group activity, 
which is,however, not to say that Obermensehen are solip­
sists - a not uncommon criticism of Nietzsche by hostile 
and friendly commentators a l i k e . Ubermensohen can 
only come into being and continue to exist in depend­
ence both on their fellow-Ife©rmensohen and on the rest 
of mankind (Megschjejn) * what is more, the ultimate 
"stage" in the development of the uberipensoh is, as we
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have just seen, represented hjr the saint. In whom Is 
achieved, not solitude, but "the moat intense feeling 
of solidarity, of compassion, of oneness with all that 
is alive..
Nietzsche's psychological analysis, culminating In 
the discovery of the instinct of conscience, indigenous 
to every man from birth, would seem to corroborate his 
claim that becoming an tlbermensoh is an individual but 
not isolated achievement, in that every individual, 
every conscience, is shaped by those on whom one depends 
from birth. But it would also seem to follow that this 
dependence is personal and Interpersonal, i.e. mutual, 
and that the road to becoming an Übermenseh is open to 
every hum n  being. Why, then, did Nietzsche not draw 
these conclusions? Why, if every man Is potentially an 
Übermenseh. did Nietzsche speak in terms of anelite?
His elitist ethic is a consequence of his aristocratic 
bias.
It is not that Nietzsche has no theory of society.
On the contrary, he has worked one out in some detail.
It would be well to have it before us.
The order a£ ÇjtpJeiâ, the supreme, the dominant 
law, is merely the sanction of a natural order. 
a natural lawfulness of the first rank, over 
which no arbitrariness, no "modern idea" has
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any power, in every healthy society there are 
three types which condition each other and gravi­
tate differently physiologically; each has its 
own hygiene, its own field of work, its own 
sense of perfection and mastery. Nature, not 
Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual 
ones, those who are pre-eminently strong in 
muscle and temperament, and those, the third 
type, who excel neither in one respect nor in 
the other, the mediocre ones 6 the last as the 
great majority, the first as the elite.
The highest caste - I call them the fewest - 
being perfect, also has the privileges of the 
fewest : among them, to represent happiness,
beauty, and graciousness on earth, only to the 
most spiritual human beings is beauty permitted : 
among them alone Is graoiousness not weakness, 
JEuMtemi sal P.amo.?jgja, homlnum; the good is a 
privilege. On the other hand, there is nothing 
that they may be conceded less than ugly manners 
or a pessimistic glance, an eye that makes ugly 
- or indignation at the total aspect of things. 
Indignation is the privilege of the chandalasj 
pessimism too.
m i a â  is. perfect" - thus says the instinct 
of the most spiritual, the Yes-saying instinct; 
"imperfection, whatever is beneath us, distance, 
the pathos of distance - even the ohandala still 
belongs to this perfection." The moat spiritual 
man, as the strongest, find their happiness 
where others would find their destruction; in 
the labyrinth, in hardness against themselves 
and others, in experiments; their Joy is self- 
conquest; asceticism becomes in them nature, 
need, and instinct. Difficult tasks are a 
privilege to them; to play with burdens which 
crush others, a recreation. Knowledge - a form 
of asceticism. They are the most venerable kind 
of man; that does not preclude their being the 
most cheerful and the kindliest. They rule not 
because they want to but because they are: they 
are not free to be second.
The second ; they are the guardians of the law, 
those who see to order and security, the noble
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warriors, and above all the king as the highest 
formula of warrior, judge, and upholder of the 
law. The second are the executive arm of the 
most spiritual, that which is closest to them 
and belongs to them, that which does everything 
gross in the work of ruling for them - their 
retinue, their right hand, their best pupils.
In all this, to repeat, there is nothing arbi­
trary, nothing contrived; whatever is different 
is contrived - contrived for the ruin of nature. 
The order of castes, the order of rank, merely 
formulates the highest law of life; the separa­
tion of the three types is necessary for the 
preservation of society, to make possible the 
higher and the highest types. The ineeualltv of 
rights is the first condition for the existence 
of any rights at all.
A right is a privilege. A man's state of being 
is his privilege. Let us not underestimate the 
privileges of the mediocre. As one climbs 
hlKher. life becomes ever harder; the coldness 
increases, responsibility increases.
A high culture is a pyramid ; it can stand only 
on a broad base; its first presupposition is a 
strong and soundly consolidated mediocrity. 
Handicraft, trade, agriculture, science, the 
greatest part of art, the whole quintessence of 
professional activity, to sum it up, is compat­
ible only with a mediocre amount of ability and 
ambition; that sort of thing would be out of 
place among exceptions; the instinct here re­
quired would contradict both aristocratlsra and 
anarchism. To be a public utility, a wheel, a 
function, for that one must be destined by 
natures it is not society, it is the only kind 
of happiness of which the great majority are 
capable that makes intelligent machines of them. 
For the mediocre, to be mediocre is their happi­
ness; mastery of one thing, specialization - a 
natural instinct.
It would be completely unworthy of a more pro­
found spirit to consider mediocrity as such an 
objection. In fact, it is the very first
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necessity If there are to be exceptions ; a 
high culture depends on It. When the excep­
tional human being treats the mediocre more 
tenderly than himself and his peers, this is 
not mere politeness of the heart - it is 
simply his duty.62
Hera we have an extension of the earlier master/slave 
hypothesis in accordance with which Nietzsche analyzed 
the various moral codes of past and present,"3 Here 
also is further evidence against Nietzsche's alleged 
solipsism and for the interdependence of the castes - 
their arrangement in a hierarchy, an order of rank and 
a division of labor most advantageous to the thriving 
of the community as a whole. What is most striking about 
this passage, however, is its similarity to Nietzsche's 
description of his hierarchical-relational theory of 
the living organism.Indeed, so similar are the two 
descriptions that we are justified in seeing the former, 
the theory of society, as exactly analogous to the lat­
ter, the theory of the psyche. As a psychologist, 
Nietzsche is a master; as a theorist of society, he is 
unreliable. This is, of course, not new, but merely a 
restatement of the criticism already voiced in our ana­
lysis of Toward a Genealogy of Morals.65 Just as we 
were left unconvinced by Nietzsche's claim to have traced 
our value judgments to an original pre-historlo value- 
bestowing horde of masters and slaves, so also is our
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suspicion confirmed in the passage above (note 62) that 
he believed in the "naturalness" of an elitist organi­
zation of society.
Nietzsche t^ as intent on restoring psychology to its
rightful place as "queen of the sciences...."^^ We are,
therefore, not justified in requiring of him a theory
of society or a political theory. On the other hand, it
is equally unjustifiable, on the basis of Nietzsche's
own confession that he is "the last antioolitical German."
to relegate him to an ineffectual supra-histor1ca1, supra-
go
social realm. It has been our contention throughout 
that Nietzsche was concerned with men and the values by 
which they live - ethics. Indeed, Nietzsche's own most 
persistent question to morality and science and history 
and whatever else he encountered was : what is its value
for life? While admitting that he was no sociologist 
or political philosopher, it is doubtful that he would 
have wanted his own philosophy to be Judged by any but 
the most telling critical standards; "The only possible 
way to criticize a philosophy and the only one that 
proves anything, namely, to see whether it is possible 
to live by it...."^9
To the question - is It possible to assent to 
Nietzsche's formula, "Dionysus versus the Crucified,"
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and to live by his positive ethical alternative to the 
life-denying Christian-Platonic ideal? - we are con­
strained to return a negative answer. Neither "the 
Cruelfled" nor "Dionysus" providesan adequate ethical 
guide; the former, for the many reasons which make up 
Nietzsche's own critique; the latter, because of its 
one-sidedness, its total lack of mutuality. This la not 
to fly in the face of our previous defence of Nietzsche 
against the charge of solipsism. His "society" is based 
on interdependence, to be sure; it crutdJles away if any 
one caste is missing or weak. But this dependence is not 
mutual, it is hierarchical. Those who constitute this 
"society" are not parsons, not neighbors, but function­
aries of a particular caste. "A high culture," we heard 
Nietzsche say, "is a pyramids it can stand only on a 
broad base; its first presupposition ia a strong and 
soundly consolidated mediocrity."79 As long as society 
is thought to exist for the purpose of producing "higher 
types," and as long as "higher types" are defined as 
"exceptions," as those who, so to speak, stand on the 
shoulders of the many, then keeping the many mediocre
OJ
will be Indispenslble to the continued life of the society 
In Nietzsche's own words, "The inequality of rights is 
the first condition for the existence of any rights at
71all." But as soon as it beoomes apparent that the 
achieving of "height" does not entail standing on the 
shoulders of others, as soon as it can be shown that 
all men are potentially ^ermenschen ~ and, ironically, 
it would be difficult to imagine a more democratic theory 
of the human psyche than Nietzsche’s - the order of rank 
is seen to be redundant. Genuine mutuality becomes 
possible for the first time.
Nietzsche's aristocratic bias led him to character­
ize relations between members of society in terms of 
domination, control, ruling, governing, mastering, in 
the case of relations between the elite and the mediocre; 
and in terras of respect in the case of relations between 
members of the elite. The former relations stand out 
for their ona-sidedness (the ruled do not react, as far 
as the rulers are concerned, but are only "ruled"), the 
latter for their lack of mutuality (no member of the 
elite receives, but only "acts").
No must continually remind ourselves that it is not 
malice on Nietzsche's part, but a misuse of his other­
wise valid and valuable ogycholoKioai insights into 
man's behavior which causes his model of society to be 
so inadequate. But for all his skillful exposure of the 
ulterior motives buried behind much pity and meekness.
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real human goodness, meroy, love and self-denial are 
conspicuous for their absence from his "society." We 
might say of Nietzsche what he, in his polemical essay 
on the BildunEsnhilister said about David Strauss; "it 
should have been his task seriously to explain and de­
rive the phenomena of human goodness, mercy, love and 
self-denial, which after all exist as a matter of fact, 
from his...presuppositions...,"7® Nietzsche was unable 
to account for these phenomena on the basis of his own 
presuppositions. That is, they were not derivable from 
his aristocratie ethic of the Dionysian tlbermensoh. My 
own contention is, however, that he did, in the end, 
account for them, in his puzzled and puzzling treatment 
of Jesus.
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Walter Kaufmann has, in his translation of Thus ^noke 
Zarathustra. rendered übermenseh as "overman."This 
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ed'— it is a re-experiencing of the emotion Itself, a
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implies that the quality of this emotion is negative, 
i.e., that it contains a movement of hostility. Per­
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the essential meaning of the term. 'ïfânoor' is just 
such a suppressed wrath, independent of the ego's 
activity, which moves obscurely through the mind. It 
finally takes shape through the repeated reliving of 
intentionalltles of hatred or other hostile emotions.
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tention, taut it nourishes any nustoer of such intentions. 
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of Mietzache that "He confused freedom and solitude^ 
as do all proud spirits/’ (SUbJS!^^# trans* Anthony 
Bo^ 'jer (Vintage Books paperback ed* ; Hew Yorks Random 
House, 1959), P. 15).
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(Meridian Books paperback ed.j Cleveland: The World
Publishing Co., June I963), p, 104*!
Nietzsche and Hegel were both primarily con­
cerned about the realm of Absolute Spirit, i.e. 
art, religion, and philosophy, and both evalu*" 
a ted the state in terms of its relation to 
these higher pursuits* Hegel had praised the 
State because he thought that it alone mûe 
possible these supra-social enterprisesj 
Nietzsche condemned the state as their arch­
enemy. Each considered customary morality 
essentially social and hence bracketed it with 
the State* Hence Hegel affirmed it, while 
Nietzsche criticized it, but they agreed in 
their firm opposition to Kant’s doctrine of 
the primacy of moral values.
Kaufmann’s view is that "For Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche 
•"-no less than Schopenhauer and Burckhardt--history is 
decidedly not the ground of happiness," (Ibid., p. 121), 
an assumption diametrically opposed to the assumption 
on which this interpretation is based.
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10, Jesus
Discord wusfc be chained to concord, 
strife must become the slave of unity 
and love.X
— Wayland Young
And goodness is achieved not in a 
vacuum, but in the company of other 
men, attended by love,2
— Saul Bellow
"Christianity" has become something entirely 
different from that which Its originator did 
and wanted.3
"What to do. In order to have faith?" - an 
absurd question. What is missing in Christian­
ity.,is precisely everything that Jesus bid one
û & r
Christianity is a praotloe. not a doctrine.
It tells us how we are to act, not what we 
should believe.5
Christians have never done the deeds which 
Jesus prescribed for them....
The Buddhist acts dlfferentljfrom the non- 
Buddhlst; iM. Christian actq like everybody 
elqe and has a Christianity of ceremonies and 
asadsL.®
The exemplary life consists of love and 
humility; depth of feeling, which excludes not 
even the lowliest; of absolute renunciation of 
self-justification, self-defence and victory, 
in the sense of personal triumph; of the belief 
in happiness here on earth in spite of need, 
resistance and death; of forgiveness, the ab­
sence of anger and contempt; of not desiring 
to be rewarded; of being bound to no one; of 
being a slave to no man, in the most spiritual 
sense; a very proud life, intent upon poverty 
and service.?
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In these random quotations from the unpublished notes, 
we have virtually a sununary of Nietzsche's views on 
Jesus and Christianity. The emphasis is on action, a 
way of life. Praxis, deeds - Jesus' deeds. As the final 
quotation shows, Nietzsche is explicit about what he 
Considers the Christian life to consist of. Yet, how­
ever useful this cursory summing up may be toward set­
ting the stage for this chapter. It will not stand alone 
without the likelihood of being misunderstood. Before 
we can hope to appreciate the radicallty of Nietzsche's 
views, we must ask, quite simply: who, for Nietzsche,
was Jesus?
II
Nietzsche, while being practically illiterate 
theologically,° was, perhaps by virtue of his training 
in philology, not unaware of the problems involved in 
any attempt to discover who Jesus was. We know from 
his own admission that he had read the lives of Jesus 
of both Strauss and Renan (whom he calls "that buffoon 
ia PsyobolQgiflis" for introducing "the two most inappro­
priate concepts possible into his explanation of the 
Jesus types the concept of neniug and the concept of 
the herq.. . .  But neither was it the philological 
problem, as such, presented by the Gospels which con­
cerned him.^®
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What oonoerns me la the psyohologleal type of 
the Redeemer. After all, this could be con­
tained in the Gospels, however mutilated or 
overloaded with alien features* as Francis 
of Assisi is preserved in his legends, despite 
his legends. Wot the truth concerning what he 
did, w M t  he said, how he really died ; but the 
question whether his type can still be exhibited 
at all, whether it has been ”transmitted."H
In his first $,if^ . of Jeaup (1835-36), "Strauss made 
everything, without exception, historically uncertain, 
to cite Karl Barth's unequivocal judgment. Nietzsche 
took Strauss's critical findings seriouslyj in fact, so 
seriously, that what were for Strauss historically un­
certain documents became for Nietzsche "saints' legends," 
and the application of scientific methods to them "mere 
scholarly idleness."^3 As early as 1866 Nietzsche 
wrote, in a letter to his fdend, von Gersdorff: "If
Christianity means 'faith in a historical event or in a 
historical person,' then I have nothing to do with this 
Christianity, on the other hand, if it means simply to
14
be in need of redemption, then I can esteem it highly...." 
This early emphasis on redemption will prove significant 
later on. Indeed, it is the first clue to Nietzsche's 
conception of the Redeemer type.
If redemption is a clue to Nietzsche's view of 
Jesus, let us asks redemption from what? What does it 
mean to be in need of redemption?
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We know a state In which the sense of touch 
is pathologically excitable and shrinks from 
any contact, from grasping a solid object, one 
should translate such a physiological habitus 
into its ultimate consequence,.
Zbâ W&fGd o£ sgâUÈS;: a conse­
quence of an extreme capacity for suffering and 
excitement which no longer wants any contact at 
all because it feels every contact too deeply.
IW. m pl m W  slS. a m
hQ.BMia,ty, a m  gg mvlsiom. inmman'-s.
feelings : the consequence of an extreme capa­
city for sufering and excitement which experi­
ences any resistance, even any compulsion to 
resist, as unendurable disoleasure (that la, as 
harmful, as something against which the instinct 
of self-preservation warns us); and finds bless­
edness (pleasure) only in no longer offering any 
resistance to anybody, neither to evil nor to 
him who is evil - love as the only, as the last 
possible, way of life.
These are the two physioloeleal realities on 
which* out of which, the doctrine of redemption 
grew. ...The fear of pain, even of infinitely 
minute pain - that can end in no other way than 
In  a re lig io n , ojg la m . 15
Nietzsche's answer to the question about redemption la
a psychological answer (he calls it, true to his "bodily"
approach, "physiological"). To be in need of redemption
is, in short, to be neui*otlc; it is the direct consequence
of a pathological inability to bear even the minutest
pain. It is, in Nietzsche's terminology, decadent; that
is, a symptom of declining, waning life.
But Nietzsche Is doing more than answering the 
question about redemption. The conclusions he has drawn
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from his reading of the Gospels amount no longer to the 
mere possibility of gleaning the psyohologleal type of 
the Redeemer from these "saints' legends" in spite of 
them, but to an affirmation that the Redeemer type is, 
in fact, preserved there, though "only in extensive dis-
1 g
tortion. Nietzsche is quick to admit that the type
might have been preserved without distortion, which is 
to say that "as a type of decadence, the type might
17
actually have been peculiarly manifold and contradictory." 
Though possible, Nietzsche considers it unlikely, for in 
order for this to be the case, two equally unlikely as­
sumptions would have to be mdei that the record is 
absolutely trustworthy, and that the type shows no "traces 
of the milieu in which he moved as a foreign figure."^"
On the trustworthiness of the record, we have already 
heard Nietzsche's view; as to the milieu in which Jesus 
moved ;
That queer and sick world into which the Gospels 
introduce us - as in a Russian novel, a world 
in which the scum of society, nervous disorders, 
and "childlike" idiocy seem to be having a ren­
dezvous - must at all events have coarsened the 
type; In order to be able to understand anything 
of it, the first disciples, in particular, first 
translated into their own crudity an existence 
which was wholly embedded in symbols and incom­
prehensibilities - for them the type did not 
exist until it had been reshaped in better-known 
forms. The prophet, the Messiah, the future 
judge, the moral teacher, the miracle man, John 
the Baptist - each another chance to misconstrue 
the type.
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...It Is regrettable that a Dostoevsky did 
not live near this Most interesting of all 
decadents - I mean someone who would have known 
how to sense the very stirring charm of such a 
mixture of the sublime, the sickly and the 
childlike,
.«.Meanwhile there is a gaping contradiction 
between the semonizer on the mount, lake, and 
meadow, whose appearance seems like that of a 
Buddha on soil that is not at all Indian, and 
that fanatic of aggression, that mortal enemy 
of theologians and priests, whom Renan's malice 
has glorified as la m M .  SB. irgnie,. I
myself have no doubt that the generous dose of 
gall (and even of esprit) first flowed into the 
type of the Master from the excited state of 
Christian propaganda....
To repeat, I am against any attempt to intro­
duce the fanatic into the Redeemer type,19
The coarsening of the Redeemer type by the milieu 
in which Jesus moved was, according to Nietzsche, a para­
digm of what was to come: "the history of Christianity,
beginning with the death on the cross, is the history of 
the misunderstanding, growing cruder with every step, of 
an original symbolism."®*^ Here is a further clue to what 
was hinted at above in the reference to Jesus' life as 
"an existence which was wholly embedded in symbols and 
incomprehensibilities,"®! namely that redemption, and 
thus the Redeemer type, are conceivable and explicable 
only symbolically : the problem is one of symbolism, and
Jesus is "a symbolist par excellence,.,,"
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If I understand anything about this great 
symbolist, it is that he aooepted only inner 
realities as realities, as "truths" - that 
ha understood the rest, eveiything natural, 
temporal, spatial, historical, only as signs, 
as occasions for parables.23
Symbolism is, indeed, the second major key to 
Nietzsche's conception of Jesus as a psychological 
Redeemer type, For this type, inner realities are the 
only realities; being a Christian is thus a mtter of 
the heart.
The "glad tidings" are precisely that there 
are no longer any opposites; the kingdom of 
heaven belongs to the children....24
In the whole psychology of the "evangel" the 
concept of guilt and punishment is lacking; 
also the concept of reward. "Sin" - any 
distance separating God and man - is abolished;
BSaslaalX. âbla Xsl "g l M  Msüim." Blessed­
ness is not promised, it is not tied to con­
ditions; it is the only reality - the rest 
is a sign with which to speak of it.^5
The deep instinct for how one must live, in 
order to feel oneself "in heaven," to feel 
"eternal," while in all other behavior one 
decidedly does not feel oneself "in heaven" - 
this alone is the psyohologleal reality of 
"redemption," A new way of life, not a new 
faith,^
Blessedness is the only rmility, and the purpose of 
living a Christian life, of "evangelical practice," 
is, in the language of the theological tradition asso­
ciated with Paul, Augustine and Luther, justification; 
in Nietzsche's words, "that one feels 'divine,'
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'blessed,' 'evangelical,' at all times a 'child of
(joa.'"®7 Nhioh is not to say, however, that this inner
reality has no outward and visible manifestation. On
the contrary.
The consequence of such a state projects it­
self into a new practice, the genuine evangeli­
cal practice. It is not a "faith" that dis­
tinguishes the Christian: the Christian acts. 
he is distinguished by acting differently : by
not I’esistlng, either in words or in his heart, 
those who treat him ill; by making no distinc­
tion between foreigner and native* between Jew 
and non-Jew ("the neighbor" - really the core­
ligionist, the Jew); by not growing angry with 
anybody, by not despising anybody; by not per­
mitting himself to be seen or involved at courts 
of law ("not swearing"); by not divorcing his 
wife under any circumstances, not even if his 
wife has been proved unfaithful. All of this 
at bottom one principle; all of this, consequences 
of one instinct.28
Thus, the evangelical practice is two-pronged : it is 
both the way blessedness, the inner reality - justi­
fication; and a oonsgouenoe of it, outward - in the 
theological language of the Reformation, sanctification, 
Nietzsche himself says as much. Nevertheless, he also 
insists with regard to the outward manifestation of the 
inner reality that "one should beware of finding more 
than a sign language in this, a semelology, an occasion 
for parables."®® However much we might wish to derive 
an ethic from Nietzsche's "doctrine of sanctification," 
we can do so only by doing violence to his conception 
of a very private psychological type of the Redeemer.
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This "bringer of glad tidings" died as he had 
lived, as ha had taught - not to "redeem men" 
but to show how one must live. This praetiee 
is his legacy to mankinds his behavior before 
the judges, before the eatchpoles, before the 
accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn - 
his behavior on the cross. He does not resist, 
he does not defend his right, he takes no step 
which might ward off the worst; on the contrary, 
he provQkea it. And he begs, he suffers, he 
loves with those, jja those, who do him evil.
The words to the thief on the cross contain the 
entire Gospel, "That was truly a aodlikg man, 
a child of God," says the thief. "If this is 
what you feel," answers the Redeemer, "then you 
are in paradise, you are a child of God." Not 
to resist, not to be angry, not to hold respon­
sible “ but to resist not even the evil one - 
to laXâ him.30
All this, however, not for others, but solely for himself, 
that is, for his own redemption. For Nietzsche, the only 
valid way to speak of an ethic with regard to Jesus is 
in the context of symbolism. That is to say, Jesus is 
not to be understood as living for others in any conven­
tional religious or> ethical sense (he neither died for 
othersSl nor lived Sps others), but as living and dying 
befope others - as a model, in short, as a type. The 
ethical inference, if indeed it can be called that, 
being this : as he lived and felt himself "redeemed,"
"in paradise," so should you live if you desire to feel 
yourself "redeemed." Jesus' example is his legacy, but 
only in this distinct sense.
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...only Christian nractloe. a life such as h© 
lived who died on the eross, is Christian,
Such a life is still possible today, for certain 
people even necessary* genuine original Christ­
ianity will be possible at all times.
Not a faith, but a doing; above all, a not 
doing of tmny things, another state of being,.32
What are the"glad tidings"? True life, eternal 
life, bas been found - it is not promised, it 
la here, it la ia you* as a living in love, in 
love without subtraction and exclusion, without 
regard for station, Everyone is the child of 
God " Jssus definitely presumes nothing for 
himself alone - and as a child of God everyone 
Is equal to everyone»o3
Not a being for others, but a state of blessedness -
these are the glad tidings. And the bringer of these
tidings is neither hero nor genius, but "a symbolist par
excellence* *• "Spoken with the precision of a phyeio^
logietj even an entirely different word would atill foe
more fitting here " the word idiot#"35
III
In what possible way could Nietzsche be using the 
word ’’idiot"? Solely for its shook value? As Walter 
Kaufmann has written# "I’hat the book (The Antichrist) 
is meant to foe shockingly blasphemous scarcely needs 
saying,"36 the use of the word "idiot" in referring
to Jesus did Indeed shock# not hia readers# however# but 
his sister# who suppressed the phrase# "the word idiot#" 
when she published the book in 1895 (Nietzsche had pre- 
pared it for publication In 1888)# Not until 1931 was
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the phrase made public,37 and then, as evidence that 
Nietzsche was insane when he wrote The Antichrist. Then, 
in 1938, Karl Jaspers mentioned In a lecture "Nietzsche 
means idiot in the sense In which Dostoevsky calls his 
Prince Myshkin an idiot."^ Though he leaves this convic­
tion unsubstantiated, Jaspers surely has a point, Walter 
I^ufmann has since drawn attention to the sudden signi­
ficance which the word "idiot" assumes in Nietzsche's 
work after his discovery of Dostoevsky in early 1887.39 
Although it is impossible to know for certain whether 
Nietzsche ever, in fact, read The Idiot, there was a 
French translation of the novel available at this tlme,^® 
in his letters, beginning with one dated Nice, 23 February 
1887, references to Dostoevsky and works other than The 
Idiot appear with frequency. Having discovered a French 
translation of in a bookstore,
Nietzsche writes to Overbeoks "The instinct of kinship 
(or what should I call it?) expressed Itself at once; I 
was overjoyed." Less than two weeks later he writes 
to Pater Oast about his recent discovery, praising Dos­
toevsky both as psychologist (specifically, in hla The 
ISBââJSjLÈMJMâ) ania as artist (in
iBjiœSâ), and calling 2MJBfflse..jQ£_th,e.^ead "one of the
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•most human books’ that existso" Here again# he men*
tlons "the sudden sense of having encountered a
b r o t h e r F o r  Nietzsche to admit having found a
DsycholoElst îôhQ is his peer is rare indeed | but he
goes even further# which is nothing short of astonishing*
In Tw 11 ightQthg, _Xdp,lhe confesses that Dostoevsky,
'‘this prof ou lid human being," is "the only psychologist,
incidentally, from whom X had something to learn# * * *"^3
And from Turin, short3.y before his collapse, Nietzsche
writes Georg Brandes (20 October 1888), thanking him for
his efforts to introduce his works to a wider audience
Oh how diligent you are! And I, idiot, do not 
even understand DanishI That one can, as you 
say, "come to life again in Russia," I have no 
doubt* I count some Russian book or other, above 
all Dostoevsky (in French translation, for 
heaven's sake, not German!I), among my greatest 
reliefs*45
It is true, as Walter icaufmann has said, that Nietzsche’s 
"whole attitude toward Jesus hinges upon ’something’ 
which he ’learned’ from Dostoevsky*"^'*’® Further, on the 
basis of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence here 
assembled, it is surely possible to claim that that 
"something" was the psychological type of the Redeemer 
- in the person of Prince Myshkin.
We have it from Dostoevsky himself that his intention 
in writing Tfoe Idiot was "to depict a positively good man." 
Therein lie both the strength of the novel as a x^hole and
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the magnificenae of Myshkin as a oharaoter# on the one
hand# and, on the other, the failure of the prince as
an ethical guide*
I have long been haunted by a cei^tain idea# but 
I was afraid of making a novel out of it, be­
cause the idea is very difficult and I am not
ready for it* The idea is * M  a jQmXr
,goo.d laîî. 47
"A certain idea" - If it is possible to pick out one motif 
wblch informs Bostoevslty’s work from beginning to end# it 
must surely be the recurring motif of "the idea." One 
critic has written of it as Dostoevsky’s "fundamental 
equations œn=idea." That is to say# the dominant fig­
ures in his novels "face us not as theorizing individuals
but as personified ideas in action, or to use the French
philosophical form, as Ictaes-forces* * .their psychological 
life ‘appears entirely adapted and subordinated to a 
fixed idea, as it were."^8 That they do not appear as 
mere phantoms but as human beings, alive, aware and 
acting, is due to the massive achievement of Dostoevsicy’s 
art. Prince Myshkin is, to be sure, the personification 
of an idea ; his creator says as much in the letter cited 
above. But, thanks to Dostoevsky’s artistry, he is also 
a man. Indeed, Dostoevsky has been so successful in 
cx’satlng "a positively good man" as to leave us with but 
one convictions if this is positive goodness, we shall
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have to reject It. But is it positive goodness? From 
what did Dostoevsky derive hia idea of goodness? "There 
is only one positively good man in the world - Christ,.,"^9 
To facilitate a proper appraisal of Nietzsche’s conception 
of Jesus as the psychological type of the Redeemer, let 
us look at Dostoevsky’s conception of Christ as the only 
one positively good man in the world.
Prince Myshkin is variously described to us as being 
simple "^hearted# absent-minded, naive# meek# gullible, un­
suspicious# aw Ward# honest# innocent# inarticulate# 
noble# childlike# boundlessly trust:ft;il# morbidly sensitive# 
as having no sense of proportion but a seemingly infinite 
capacity for bearing persecution and for forgiveness - 
whatever the misdeed and regardless whether it was in­
nocently performed or maliciously premeditated. In the 
words of Princess Byaloveky to Dizaveta Frokofyevna as 
she took leave after that scandalous incident in which 
Myshkin broke the valuable china vase and fell victim to 
a fit of epilepsy; "Well, there’s good and bad in him.
And if you care to know my opinion, there’s more bad than 
good. You can see for yourselves what he is# a sick man!"5^
In a passage which George Steiner has called "one of 
the very great passages in The Idiot - indeed# in the 
history of the novel#"51 get a glimpse of the prince
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at his beat. Varya has Just denounced Nastasya Filippovna
as a "shameless woman" for announcing that she has no
intention of marrying her brother# Ganya# but goading
him nevertheless into offering to pay one hundred thou*"
sand roubles for hers
Everything danced before Ganya’s eyes# and# 
completely forgetting himself, he struck at his 
slater with all his might. He would have hit her 
on the face# but suddenly another hand caught 
Oanya’s. Myshkin stood between him and his sister
"Don’t# that’s enough," he brought out insist­
ently# though he was shaking all over with violent 
emotion 4,
"Are you always going to get innmy way?" roared 
Oanya. Ho lot go Varya’s arm and# mad with rage# 
gave Myshkin a violent slap in the face with the 
hand thus freed.5^
And yet this episode is so powerful and rings so true 
virtually because it is here wrenched out of its context.
In the body of the novel# as the awareness of Myshkin’s 
"goodness" mounts# it is accompanied by an oppressive 
tension. Those around him cannot endure this kind of 
perfection, Aglaia reveals something to Myshkin which 
impresses him ao much that he vows to remeiAer it and 
"thing it over":53 "You have no tenderness# nothing but 
truth# and so you Judge u n j u s t l y . "54 Aglaia is certainly 
too harsh in accusing Myshkin of lacking in all tender­
ness# as we shall see in some scenes below# but she has
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touched on something important In the second part of her 
indictment. Earlier on# before reciting the poem about 
the "poor* knight," Aglaia had spoken of her deep respect 
for the poem because it "simply describes a man who is 
capable of an ideal# and what’s more# a man who having 
once set an ideal before him has faith in it# and having
faith In it# gives up his life blindly to it."^5 pre­
cisely this# Myshkin’s blind faith in the Ideal of com­
passion# "the fundamental idea of C h r i s t # "56 what 
causes him to be unjust and# ultimately# to destroy 
those he loves.
We are discussing Dostoevsky’s conception of Christ.
Myshkin# taking leave of Bogozhin one evening and wanting
not to leave him in a gloomy and irritable mood (they had
been looking at a copy of a Holbein portraying Jesus Just
after he had been taken from the cross) blurted out "As
to the question of faith....#" and proceeded to recount
in rapid succession four conversations he had had in two
days the previous week. Of the final one# he said:
...when I was going back to the hotel# I came 
upon a peasant woman with a tiny baby in her arms. 
She was quite a young woman and the baby was about 
six weeks old. The baby smiled at her for the 
first time in its life. I saw her crossing her­
self with great devotion. "What are you dofung# 
my dear?" (I was always asking questions in those 
days.) "God has Just such gladness every time he 
sees from heaven that a sinner Is praying to Him 
with all his heai’t# as a mother has when she sees
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the first smile on her baby’s face." That was 
what the woman said to me almost in those words, 
this deep, subtle and truly religious thought - a 
thought in which all the essence of Christianity 
finds expressionI that is the whole conception of 
God as our Father and of God’s gladness in man, 
like a father’s in his own child - the fundamental 
idea of ChristI5?
The fundamental idea of Christ is love, as pity,58 as
compassion. The prince thought to himself, "Compassion
was the chief and perhaps only law of all humn existence.%
With these few sentences Dostoevsky has set the stage for
much of what follows.
An impo-rtant part of what follows is Myshkin’s love 
for Nastasya, the "shameless w o m a n , a n d  its inoompati-* 
bility with his love for Aglaia. From his fi?rst glimpse 
of Nastasya in the portrait, Myshkin is captivated by her, 
but in a strange way. Near the end of the raucous scene 
in which the men assentoled Jest and several of them hag­
gle over Nastasya, Myshkin declares with grave seriousness 
his desire to marry her.
"Nastasya B^illppovna," said Myshkin softly and 
as it were with compassion, "I told you Just now 
that I would take your consent as an honour, and 
that you are doing me an honour, not I you. You 
smiled at those words, and I heard people laughing 
about us. I may have expressed myself very ab­
surdly and have bean absurd myself, but I thought 
all the time that 1...understood the meaning of 
honour, and I am sure I spoke the truth. You 
wanted to ruin yourself Just now Irrevocably; for 
you’d never have forgiven yourself for it after­
wards, But you are not to blame for anything.
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...¥ou are proud# Nastasya Fillppovm# but perhaps 
you are so unhappy as really to think yourself to 
blame. You want a lot of looking after# Nastasya 
Pilippovna. 1 will look after you. ...I shall 
respect you all my life# Nastasya Filippovna."Gl
Myshkin wants to marry Nastasya because he sees that she
needs to be respected# ahe needs to be locked after. We
are reminded of "the fundamental idea of Christ."
The prince Is more explicit latei? on. He tells 
Hogozhins ".,,to my mind, she needs great care...I don’t 
loV0 her with love# but with p i t y , " A n d  Hogozhin admits 
in frustration, "...I can’t make it out. One might al­
most believe that your pity is greater than my l ove,"®3  
Just as Myshkin loved the young girl in the Swiss village 
who had been seduced by a French salesman - "I was not in 
love with Marie, but simply very sorry for her"®4 - now 
he loved Nastasya, "That face, even in the photograph# 
had aroused in him a perfect agony of pity: the feeling
of compassion and even of suffering over this woman never 
left his h e a r t ^ p o r  him there seemed no conflict 
between his love for Nastasya and his love for Aglaia whom, 
indeed, he was to marry. They were, to him# "two different 
sorts of love."®® But# of course# Aglaia could not be 
expected to see It that way. Her natural reaction was to 
arrange the fateful meeting at which she would confront 
Nastasya with the letters she had addressed to Aglaia,
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urging her to marry Myshkin, and charge her xnlth deceptive 
meddling and mtoh-maklng. At the meeting Aglaia slips all 
too quickly into name-calling and abuse, "Aglaia was 
absolutely carried away by the impulse of the moment, as 
though she were falling down a precipice and could not 
resist the dreadful joy of vengeance,"8? At last, Nastasya 
can bear no more. She turns and bursts Into a violent
tirade :
"Hera he Isl Look at hiraj" she cried to Aglaia, 
pointing to Myshkin, "If he doesn't come to me 
at once, if he does not take me, and doesn't give 
you up, take him for yourself, I give him up, I 
don't want him."
Both she and Aglaia stood, as it were. In suspense 
and both gazed like mad creatures at Myshkin, But 
he, perhaps, did not understand all the force of 
this challenge} in fact, it's certain that he 
didn't. He only saw before him the frenzied, 
despairing face, which, as he had once said to 
Aglaia, had "stabbed his heart for ever," He 
could bear no more and he turned, appealing and 
reproachful to Aglaia, pointing to Nastasya 
Filippovna.
"How can youl You see what an,,,unhappy creature 
she is',"
But he could utter nothing more, petrified by the 
awful look in Aglaia's eyes. That look begrayed 
such suffering and at the same time such boundless 
hatred that, with a gesture of despair, he cried 
out and ran to her, but it was already too late. 
She could not endure even the instant of his hesi­
tation. She hid her face In her hands, cried,
"Oh, my üodl" and ran out of the room..,.68
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The prince stayed to comfort Nastasya who was, by now, 
hysterical.
In the ensuing fortnight he repeatedly, though un­
successfully, attempted to see Aglaia in the firm conviction 
that she would understand. But she left pavlovsk with her 
family shortly thereafter without seeing him. Onethe day 
of her departure, Yevgeny Pavlovltch paid a visit to Myshkin 
to inform him of the fact. In the course of their conver­
sation, pavlovltch uttered what Dostoevsky's narrator calls 
"some forcible and psychologically deep words"
"If you like, I will analyse you to yourself on 
ray fingers, I will show you to yourself as in a 
looking-glass, I know so exactly how it all was, 
and why It all turned out as it did. As a youth 
in Switzerland you yearned for your native country, 
and longed for Russia as for an unknown land of 
promise. You had read a great many books about 
Russia, excellent books perhaps, but pernicious 
for you. You arrived In the first glow of eager­
ness to be of service, so to say; you rushed, you 
flew headlong to be of service. And on the very 
day of your arrival, a sad and heartrending story 
of an injured woman Is told you, you a virginal 
knight - and about a womanI The very same day you 
saw that woman, you were bewitched by her beauty, 
her fantastic, demoniacal beauty (I admit she's a 
beauty, of course). Add to that your nerves, 
your epilepsy, add to that our Petersburg thaw 
which shatters the nerves, add all that day, in 
an unknown and to you almost fantastic town, a 
day of scenes and meetings, a day of unexpected 
acquaintances, a day of the most surprising reality, 
of meeting the three Spanchln beauties, and Aglaia 
among them; then your fatigue and the turmoil In 
your head, and then the drawing-room of Nastasya 
Filippovna, and the ton© of that drawing-room, 
and,..what could you expect of yourself at such a 
moment, what do you think?" ".,.Good heavens, of
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coursa, one can understand It. But that's not the 
point, dear prince, the point is whether there wae 
reality, whether there was genuineness in your 
emotions, whether there was natural feeling or 
only intellectual enthusiasm. What do you think; 
in the temple the woman was forgiven - just such s 
woman, but she wasn't told that she'd done well, 
that she was deserving of all respect and honour, 
was she?..."
"Yes, all that may be so. Maybe you're right 
..." Myshkin muttered again, "she certainly is 
very much irritated, and you're right, no doubt, 
but.,."
"Deserving of compassion? That's what you mean 
to say, my kind-hearted friend? But how could 
you, out of compassion# for the sake of her 
pleasure, put to shame another, a pure and lofty 
girl, humiliate her in those haughty, those hated 
yyos? What will compassion lead you to next?
It's an exaggeration that passes belief I...."
"Yes, yes, you're right, Ach, I feel that I am 
to blame I" Myshkin replied, in unutterable 
distress.
"But is that enough?" cried Yevgeny pavlovitch, 
indignantly. "Is it sufficient to cry outs 'Aoh. 
I'm to blame?' You are to blame, but yet you 
perslstl And where was your heart then, your 
* Christian' heart?...."
"Oh, yes, I am to blaroel Most likely it's all 
my fault. I don't know quite how, but I am to 
blame.... There's something in all this I can't 
explain to you, Yevgeny pavlovltch. i can't find 
the words, but...Aglaia Ivanovna will understand'. 
Oh, I've always believed that she would understand
"No, prince, she won't understand. Aglaia Ivanovo 
loved you like a woman, like a human being, not 
like an abstract spirit. Do you know what, my 
poor prince, the most likely thing Is that you've 
never loved either of theml"70
Aglaia could not understand; she was destroyed by y^shkin's
attempt to love "two at once."^!
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But, of course, the destruction does not end here,
The wedding is arranged; to the last, Myshkin Is intent 
upon caring for Nastasya, "His conviction of Nastasya 
Filippovna's condition did not waver...ho loved her truly 
and sincerely, and in his love for her there was an element 
of tenderness for some sick, unhappy child, who could not 
he left to shift for itself."*^® Not until it is too late, 
not until the prince is Informed that Nastasya has, on 
the way to the church, run away with Rggozhin, does he 
begin to realize what he has done. He hurries to Peters­
burg the following day in a frantic attempt to locate 
Nastasya and Rogozhin. With the passing of each hour, 
his search becomes more frenzied until late in the evening, 
aimlessly wandering through the streets, he feels his 
elbow nudged and hears the whisper, "'Lyov Nikolayavitoh, 
follow me, brother, I want you.* It was Rogozhin."73 
They go together and in secret to Rogoshin's rooms where 
the prince la shown the lifeless body of Nastasya.
RogoBhin insists that the two friends sleep the night 
side by side, and makes up a bed of cushions beside the 
deathbed,
«..when after many hours the doors were opened 
and people came In, they found the murderer 
completely unconscious and raving. Myshkin was 
stttlng beside him motionless on the floor, and 
every time the delirious man broke into screaming 
or babble, he hastened to pass his trembling hand
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softly over M s  hair and cheeks, as though cares­
sing and soothing him. But by now he oould under­
stand no questions he was asked and did not re­
cognize the people surrounding him; and if 
Schneider himself had come from Switzerland to 
look at his former pupil and patient, rement>ering 
the condition in which Myshkin had sometimes been 
during the first year of his stay in Switzerland, 
be would have flung up his hands in despair and 
would have said as he did then, "An idlot!"7#
Once before already, at the close of the scene of the clash
between Nastasya and Aglaia, we saw the prince
sitting by Nastasya Filippovna, with his eyes 
fastened upon her, stroking her head and cheeks 
with both hands, as though she were a little 
child. lie sighed in response to her laughter and 
was ready to cry at her tears. He said nothing, 
but listened intently to her broken, excited, in­
coherent babble. He scarcely took it in, but 
smiled gently to her, and as soon as he fancied 
she was beginning to grieve again, or to weep, 
to reproach him or complain, he began at once 
stroking her head again, and tenderly passing his 
hands over her cheeks, soothing and comforting 
her like a child, 75
This scene, in turn, was prefigured in Nastasya's "picture."
Artists always paint Christ as He appears in the 
Gospel stories. I would paint Him differently.
I would imagine Him alone. His disciples must 
have sometimes left Him alone, I would leave only 
a little child beside Him, The child would be 
playing beside Him, perhaps be telling Him some­
thing in his childish words. Christ has been 
listening, but now He is thoughtful. His band still 
resting unconsciously on the child's fair little 
head. He is looking into the distance at the 
horizon; thought, great as the whole world, dwells 
in His eyes. His face is sorrowful. The child 
leans silent with his elbow on Christ's kness, his 
cheek on his little hand and his head turned up­
wards, and looks intently at Him, pondering as 
little children sometimes ponder. The sun is set­
ting.,.. That is my picture,76
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These scelles# standing ottt as they do# and containing 
a single motif which recurs again and again, point to "the 
fundamental idea of Christ"”*^ t\thioh it ms Dostoevsky's 
Intention to make flesh in the person of Prince Myshkin.
That he succeeded, we do not wish to dispute. On the 
contrary. But, Us we suggested at the outset of this sec­
tion, the success of the novel in portraying positive 
goodness, in Dostoevsky's sense, speftls simultaneously the 
failure of Myshkin as an ethical guide.
Nicholas Berdyaev has written, "Dostoevsky understood
Christianity as the religion of love that it is,..of un-
bounded love."' But Dostoevsky has honest enough to make
his drama of unbounded love a tragedy. Ne err, however, if
we see The Idiot as an indictment of love; it is unbounded
love that is tragic. In short, the protective, pitying love
and the indiscriminant, undlstlngulshing forgiveness of the
prince, which cause one critic to see Myshkin laboring under
a "psychosis of humility."^®
"Everyone deceives you like a,..like a...And 
aren't you ashamed to trust him? Surely you must 
see that he's cheating you all round?"
"Ikknow very well ho does deceive me some­
times," Myshkin brought out reluctantly in a 
low voice, "and he knows that I know it..." and 
he broke off.
"Knows it and goes on trusting him! That's the 
last straw!"8o
Again, It Is not his trust that is reprehensible, but 
that he trusts, loves, and persists in offering for­
giveness boundlessly and in spite of the fact that he 
knows he Is being deceived and used,
John Middleton Murry, calling Myshkin "the incar­
nation of pity," says of him, "He is perfect man, but 
this perfection is a denial of humanity."^! Berdyaev 
writes, in a similar veins
It is he who explains all the riddles, especially 
those of two women, Aglaia and Nastasya Filip­
povna; he helps them, ho is full of prophetical 
foresight and intuitive clearsightedness, and he 
gives himself up entirely to human relationship. 
The storm whirls around him, but he lives in a 
rapture of quietness, 82
Both Nastasya and Aglaia fear Myshkin, a revealing fact 
in that it suggests that Dostoevsky himself was aware 
that the prince would have to share some of the re­
sponsibility for the havoc raised by his perfection."3 
Aglaia tells him during the outing to the Pavlovsk band­
stand, "I am afraid of y o u . . , . "34 in the stillness
of the room, beside Nastasya's deathbed, Rogozhln, though 
not comprehending, related to Myshkin, "it was you she 
was afraid o f , " “ 5  Aglaia was doubtless merely frightened 
by his "strangeness"; Nastasya, however, oould not tolerate 
his pity for her. In the end, it is her words which re­
mind us of Pavlovltch* 0 "deep words" to Myshkin®® and
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which m y  stand as a judgment on this "perfect man" ;
Can one love every one# all men# all one's neigh­
bors? I have often asked myself that question.
Of course not. It's unnatural indeed. In ab­
stract love for humanity one almost always loves 
no one but oneself,87
This brings us back to the psychological type of the
Redeemer and a statement of Nietzsche's which suggests
yet another poâsible meaning of the word "idiot."
Christianity Is possible as the most private form 
of existence. It presupposes a narrow# withdrawn# 
completely unpolitical society - It belongs in 
the convent.88
This allusion to Christianity - and here Nietzsche means 
Christianity in the positive sense, as "a practice, not 
a doctrine"®® - as something private oould be taken to 
mean "subjective#" were it not for the subsequent quali­
fying statement which defines "private" as withdrawn, in 
the send© of "unpolitical." This opens the way to an­
other us© of the word "idiot" first pointed out in a 
little-known essay by Martin Dibelius.
We should remcBtoer that the Greek word, idiotes. 
that was taken over into Latin as idiots, denotes 
the private person in contrast to the statesman, 
the layman in contrast to the artist, the ignorant 
in contrast to the learned. ...the word idiot has 
been understood and passed on as signifying a man 
without culture.90
And, more specifically, with regard to the psycho­
logical type of the Redeemer : Jesus, he who was
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Infected with an Instinctive hatred of all 
reality, who resisted not, who proclaimed that 
the kingdom of heaven is in us, who was a stranger 
to the state, to culture, to society ~ this Jesus 
could very well have been called an "idiot" by 
Nietzsche in the (above) sense....91
Mbelius's reminder casts a revealing light on Nietzsche's 
use of the word "Idiot." That Nietzsche juxtaposes 
"private" and "political" in this way and implies their 
mutual exclusiveness, suggests that he is taking for 
granted, not the modern but the ancient, specifically,
Greek distinction between private and political (or 
public). This would not seem a far-fetched claim to 
make of Nietzsche, student of Greece that he was. And 
it would fit into place beside his social, or, to sub­
stitute the ancient equivalent for this modern term, 
political theory of a hierarchical caste system which is 
essentially Platonic in structure.®® Finally, in a 
similar instance in The Antichrisj. Nietzsche describes 
the Jewish-Ohristian community out of which Jesus (this, 
according to Nietzsche, supremely private man) emerged 
and which survived him as "an mbmurdiz uonoiiticai. com­
munity" 93 (that is to say, in the Greek sense, a com­
munity centered around the home and the family rather 
than around the public (political) institutions based on 
ties other than kinship, in which the part of life which 
is uniquely human, as opposed to thetraerely necessary and
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usefïil, is lived), Hannah A rend t writes of this ©reek 
notion 5
...a life spent in the privaoy of "one's own" 
(idion^. outside the world of the common, is 
"idiotic" by definition.... In ancient feeling 
the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the 
word Itself, was all-important| it meant literally 
a state of being deprived of something, and even 
the highest and most human of man's capacities.94
In this sense, Hletzsche is saying, Jesus lived "the most
private form of existence."And as long as he romained
within the narrow confines of his own "absurdly unpolitical
community/* 96 in m  danger. But x^ hon he croBsed
over into the public (political) realm of Home, he became
"a political criminal,*,Thla brought him to the orosB,*,/*^
Similarly, one can i#igine Kietssche seeing the seeds of th#
tragedy of Prince Myshkin in the introduction of this
private parson into a pQ,litl,cal community* Christianity ie
possible, as Kiet^sche put it, oply **in the convent,'*^® not
In the world,
The kini^ :dom heaven is a state of the heart 
(it is said of the children, "for theirs is the 
kingdom of heaven"); not something that is"above 
the earth/* The Kingdom of God is not "to coma" 
chronologically-’-historlcally^ not according to 
the calendar, something that would bo there one 
day but not the previous day. Rather, it Is a 
"change of heart in the individual,*! something 




Thera 1b a very great deal in Nletîssobe^s picture of 
Jeaue that is Intriguing, even enticing* And we can aer-* 
tainly agree with the principle which guides it throughout, 
"that the real human being ia t^ orth much more than the 
M J^ished for* human being of any prevailing i d e a l , I t  
is undoubtedly this "realness" of Jesus as a human being 
which makes Wiet^sche*a picture so appealing, Overbaek 
said of its
All previous attempts to make a human figure of 
him (Jesus) appear ridiculously abstract and as 
no more than an illustration of rationalistic 
dogmatics beside Miet%8Che*s achievement and the 
way in which, in It, that which is human in the
man springs forth out of that which is peculiar,101
It is true. Nevertheless, we must, in the end, however
reluctantly, register our "no" to this Jesus as being
identical to the Jesus of the N m  Testament peoord. But 
there must be reasons for this "no,"
It is difficult to fault Nietzsche's account of x^ ho 
Jesus was because, contrary to all other authors of "lives 
of Jesus," he claimed no histqrical authenticity for his 
picture. After admitting that he does not approach the 
Gospels as a critical philologist,Nietzsche adds s
What do I care about the contradictions in the 
"tradition"? Now can one call saints* legends 
"tradition" in the first placet The biographies 
of saints are the most amlDiguous kind of litera­
ture there isî to apply acientific methods to
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them, :in w&mmmsâ a f êm. sÆîiâs
strikes me aa doomed to failure from the start -
mere scholarly idleness,103
Similarly, in a letter of the aamie period, Nietzsche
writes Overbeck that he has read Hemn's Orif^clneB, only
to wonder "whether history is even Dosaible. What does
one wish to establish? Something that, even at the time
of its oecu3^rence, was not ' e s t a b l i s h e d * W e  can
perhaps detect in Nietzsche's way of putting the question
echoes of Jacob Burckhardt's reaction against the eon-
oeption of history as scientific historiography being
given currency by his mentor, I^eopold von Ranke. That is
to say, when Nietzsche wonders "whether history is even
n p s p i b l e he is doubting that it is possible to show
what actually happened (WA m  êiEm!^JML
With regard to the question of who Jesus was, Nietzsche
is subscribing to the findings of Strauss's first |^ ife of
Jesus* findings which were, by and large, unaccepted in
theological circles well into the twentieth century .3.06
What concerns him is "got the truth concerning what
he did, what he said, how he really died" /.Of the
"life of Jesus," of which he writess '*The attempts I
knox^  to read the hlXifejqi’X   ^ 'soul' out of the Gospels
108
aeem to me proof of a contemptible psychological frivolity*" 
His interest in the psychological type of the Redeemer is
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thus not aimed at reoonstruotlng Jesus' Dsvche out of the 
Gospels but at getting at the Jesus by, as It were, 
reading between the lines of the Gospelsj that is, by 
taking into account the ascription to Jesus on the part 
of his followers and admlre^ j^ s of words and characteristics 
which x^ ere very likely alien to the man himself* This 
psychological type, we have already heai^ d Nietzsche say, 
"could be contained in the Gospels despite the Gospels, 
however mutilated or overloaded with alien features*"^^9 
Such an approach, needless to say, does not facilitate a 
"presuppositionless" reading of the Gospels any more 
than any other approach* And the phrase, "the psycho­
logical type of the Redeemer," reveals the three assump*" 
tiens on which Nietzsche's reading is based, the first 
being negative, the latter two, positives that the 
element of aggressive fanaticism was "introduced" into the 
tradition by Jesus' followers;3.10 that it was the x^,ay 
Jesus lived and died that is significant ("only Christian 
pz»a,qticq, a life such as be Ijj^ ed who died on the cross, 
is Christian") and that both the key to this way of 
life and its consequence is redemption (thûs, "the He- 
deemer"). The way of life he found to he "Not a faith, 
but a doing j above all, a not doing off many things... ."3.19 
And redemption he called "a state of the heart..Ja change
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of heart in the Individual. '"3.13 the gamine
OhriBtlaxi way of life Is also "the most ^orm of
existence/* 3-14
In spite of himself, Nietzsche has, with this last 
Judgment, denied Jesus full humanity. For to be fully 
human is to be active; and action, "the capacity of be­
ginning something a n e w ,  "3.15 that uniquely human activity 
(in contrast to labor and work) requires plurality, that 
is, other men * Finally, "this plurality is the condition 
- not only the ^ n d l M a  g j m  a m  mü; but the ogMlÈÂJl BM. 
guam - of all political llfe/'3.l6 denying the life 
Jesus lived, the Christian way of life, a public (poli­
tical) existence to be lived alongside and In conjunction 
with its private existence, Nietzsche has flox^ n in the 
face of his own efforts to see Jesus as fully human*
This is in keeping with his overall view that Jesus 
was a decadent, in the sense of waning life - "neurotic, 
epileptic, visiona^ j^ y. * * Nietzsche calls Jesus'
commandment, "'resist not evil' - the most profound word 
of the Gospels, theix'^  key in a certain s e n s e . "3*3*2 hqvj-* 
ever, this wag not really construed by Nietzsche as a 
matter of choice, but as "the inability for resistance... 
not b.qlng qble to be an enemy."3-3*9 Ha also emphasizes
120
that "the kingdom of heaven belongs to the "
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but; this he qonogives as "an infantilism that has ue~ 
ceded into the spiritual,"121 a case of retarded puberty. 
"Not to resist, not to be angry, not to hold responsible - 
but to resist not even the evil one - to love him,"^^®
But again, there is no alternative; it is merely "love 
as the only, the last possible, way of life."^^3 it is 
as though Nietasohe'a descriptions of Jesus are true to 
the Mew Testament record, whereas his reasons for these 
descriptions bear no resemblance whatever to the Jesus 
whose story is told there.
What Nietzsche could not allow, and what must be
allowed if Jesus is not to be deprived of his full
humanity, is that there is such a thing as goodness
which is of value in Itself and is not derivative of
some ulterior motive. For him, "altruistic acts are
only a spec-lei^  of egoistic ones" good deeds, as such,
are unthinkable. Thus, a significant aspect of Jesus'
action, of the newness of his way of life, Nietzsche is
unable to concede.
Qoodness in an absolute sense, as distinguished 
from the "good*-for" or the "excellent" in Greek 
and Roman antiquity, became known in our civi­
lization only with the rise of Christianity,
Since then, we know of good works as one impor­
tant variety of human action.125
And goodness is achieved not in a vacuum, but 
in the company of other men, attended by love. 126
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In characterising Jesus' way of life as "the 
private form of existence,"^^7 Nietzsche has forfeited 
his right to the claim that "such a life is still pos­
sible today, for certain people even necessary? genuine, 
original Christianity will be possible at all times,
The two claims are mutually exclusive. It is true that 
genuine goodness does not seek to display itself. "The 
one activity taught by Jesus in word and deed is the 
activity of goodness, and goodness obviously harbors a 
tendency to hide from being seen or h e a r d , J e s u s  
said, "Beware of practicing your piety before man in 
order to be seen by them,.."^3® But he also said, "Let 
your light so shine before gen, that they may sea your 
good works and give glory to your Father who Is in 
heaven,"^31 There is a difference between vainglorious 
vaunting of oneself and visible goodness, and it is a 
crucial one. That a good deed is witnessed does not 
detract from its goodness. In spite of the fact that 
Nietzsche saw the visibility of Jesus' way of life as 
being purely symbolic in nature, he did make a valid 
deduction from his assumption that Christianity is a 
way of life, namely that Christians should have some­
thing to show for their Christianity, that they should 
act differently.^32
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îîistzaohQ was eértain that it was Jesus' way of 
acting that was new. And yet, by condemning it to 
privacy, he denied it precisely what it must have to 
survive - other men. He succeeded with his picture of 
Jesus only in portraying a kind of negative g o o d n e s s , ^33 
goodness aa a last resoi’t. All the clues to positive 
goodness are contained in Nietzsche's thought, but he 
did not develop them in connection with J e s u s . ^34
Action, understood as "the capacity of beginning 
something a n e w ,  "^35 despite its uniquely human char­
acter, implicated in the predicament of all life, a pre­
dicament which inevitably involves two risks - the risk 
of unpredictability and the risk of irreversibility.
Even non-human higher animals are at the mercy of the 
unpredictability and Irreversibility of the life process. 
In our analysis of Nietzsche's theory of the origin of 
conscience,13^ we stressed the fact that that which dis­
tinguishes man from all other animals is his ability to 
make and keep promises; the faculty by which, in certain 
instances, the natural, healtiydevice of animal forget­
fulness may be suspended. Vfe sought to show that this 
was conceived by Nietzsche, not as a passive imabllity 
to be done with something, but "an active not wishing to 
be done with something, a veritable memory of the will
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...."^37 This memory of the will is the result of a
138
long, cruel training in "the custom character of morality, 
which prepared the way for "this liberated one who really 
can m k e  p r o m i s e s " ^39 first of all, curing him of 
his unpredictability. It was by virtue of this new pre­
dictability that there arose in man "the extraordinary 
privilege of reaaonsibility...this power over himself and 
his f a t e . . . . "^40 Here, in this description of man as he 
who has earned "the right to make p r o m i s e s , " ^41 Nietzsche 
has discovered a remedy against one of the risks involved 
in all action - unpredictability, what is more, this 
remedy arises out of the action itself; it need not be 
sought and imposed from outside the realm of human action.
The second of the clues to positive goodness con­
tained in Nietzsche's work is his exposure of, dn the 
one hand, ressentiment as the negative, rancorous desire 
for revenge; and, on the other hand, punishment as com­
pensation for wrong done.^®® The positive counterpart to 
Nietzsche's uncovering of ressentiment and punishment is 
forgiveness. which he found in Jesus' way of life.
...in retrospect one understood Jesus to have 
been Is existing order.
Until then this warlike, this No-saying, No-doing 
trait had been lacking in his image; even more, 
he had been its opposite.
Evidently the small community did not understand 
the main point, the exemplary character of this
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kind of death, the freedom, the superiority 
over any feeling of ressentiment ; a token of 
how little they understood him altogether^
After all, Jesus could not intend anything with 
his death except to give publicly the strongest 
exhibition, the proof of his doctrine. But 
his disciples were far from forgiving this 
death - which would have bean evangelic in the 
highest sense - or even from offering themselves 
for a like death in gentle and lovely repose of 
the heart. Precisely the most unevangelical 
feeling, revenge, came to the fore again. The 
matter could not possibly be finished with this 
death: "retribution" was ndeded, "judgment"
(and yet, what could possibly be more unevan- 
gelical than "retribution," "punishment," "sit­
ting in judgment"I). Once more the popular 
expectation of a Messiah came to the foreground; 
a historic moment was envisaged: the "kingdom
of God" comes as a Judgment over his enemies.
But in this way everything is misunderstood; 
the "kingdom of God" as the last act, as a 
promise I After all, the evangel had been pre­
cisely the presence, the fulfillment, the reality 
of this "kingdom." Just such a death was this 
very "kingdom of God," Now for the first time 
all the contempt and bitterness against the 
Pharisees and theologians were carried into the 
type of the Master - and in this way he himself 
was made into a Pharisee and theologian* On 
the other hand, the frenzied veneration of these 
totally unhinged souls no longer endured the 
evangelic conception of everybody's equal right 
to be a child of God, as Jesus had taught; it 
was their revenge to elevate Jesus extravagantly, 
to sever him from themselves - precisely as the 
Jews had formerly, out of revenge against their 
enemies, severed their God from themselves and 
elevated him. The one God and one Son of God - 
both products of ressqntlmebt.143
Whether or not we agree with the details of this view
of Jesus' death (gentle and lovely repose of the heart?)
and the reaction to it, Nietzsche's main point is a
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forceful one: fortd-vewegs was the clue. Thus, the
reasentiment and everything to which it gave birth was, 
"forgive the expression - like a fist in the eye ~ oh, 
what an ©ye* “• of the e v a n g e l , . . . "^44 forgiveness, as
an active not-desii^ing-retribution, is the remedy to 
the second risk involved in all genuine action - irre­
versibility. And it too does not descend upon human 
affairs from outside them, but arises out of them.
We began by claiming that all the duos to positive 
goodness are contained in Nietzsche's thought, though 
left undeveloped in connection with Jesus. Goodness, 
that action which was new in Jesus, has been discussed 
here in terms of binding and loosing, promising and for­
giving, undoing the past, thereby making the future pos­
sible. The former is to be found in Nietzsche's con­
ception of conscience as that which bridles, canalizes, 
binds; in short, as that which makes a man predictable, 
in the sense of worthy of trust. The lattex* is the pos­
itive correlate of his critique of ressentiment and pun­
ishment as the human emotion and activity which forbid 
the release of victims of wrongs committed.
The possible redemption from the predicament 
of irreversibility - of being unable to undo 
what one has done though on© did not, and could 
not, have known what he was doing - is the 
faculty of forgiving. The remedy for unpre-
* •
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dictablllty, for the chaotic uncertainty of 
the future. Is contained in the faculty to 
make and keep promises. The two faculties 
belong together in so far as one of them, for­
giving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, 
and the other, binding oneself through promises, 
serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, 
which the future is by definition, islands of 
security without which not even continuity, let 
alone durability of any kind, would be possible 
in the relationships between men.
Without being forgiven, released from the con­
sequences of what we have done, our capacity 
to act would, as it were, be confined to one 
single deed from which we could never recover; 
we would remain the victims of its consequences 
forever.,..Without being bound to the fulfil­
ment of promises, we would never be able to 
keep our identities,... Both faculties, there­
fore, depend on plurality, on the presence and 
acting of others, for no one can forgive him­
self and no one can feel bound by a promise 
made only to himself; forgiving and promising 
enacted in solitude or isolation remain without 
reality and can signify no more than a role 
played before one's self.145
These words of Hannah A rendt could have been wMtten by
Nietzsche himself, except for the fact that he relegated
Jesus and his way of life to privacy.
Nietzsche's picture of Jesus as anti-realist, 
symbolist, witness only to inner truths, "a mixture of 
the sublime, the sickly, and the childlike";146 ip 
short, as idiot, has the effect of clearing the air 
surrounding the question as to who Jesus was. Ultimately, 
we must confess that neither the Redeemer type nor 
Prince Myshkin can be identified with the Jesus of the
- 4  3 2
Hew Testament record. But we make our confession 
humbly, knowing that our "no" is in no small measure 
contingent upon and conditioned by these two magnificent 
attempts to steer us toward asking the right questions, 
questions of value, ethical questions, and toward the 
man, Jesus.
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Conclusion,
We began where Nietzsche began - with the death of 
God. And we followed him to its consequences, allowing 
ourselves to be guided by Camus's claim that Nietzsche's 
atheism is "constructive and radical,"! Constructive, 
in the sense of creating positive alternatives; and 
radical, in the literal sense of beginning at the be­
ginning, going back to the roots. Again and again we 
heard what might be called the refrain of Nietzsche's 
philosophy !
...there is no alternative; we must again do 
everything for ourselves, and only for ourselves. 
(We must), for example, measure science against 
ourselves with the question: what is science
JtS. us? Not, however: what «re we to science?^
And not only science, but also truth, art, history,
morality - what is the value of each of these things
■for life? Not, what are we to them? - as though we were
but so much grist for the mill of such endeavors. But,
what are they jjo us? - a scale, of priorities which Informs
Nietzsche's work throughout and which goes a long way
toward explaining his asvcholoKical approach to man as a
problem. If we are to measure things against ourselves,
we must know who we are, what man is.
Nietzsche found man to be a strange mixture of
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"spontaneous, aggressive, assailing, interpretive, direct­
ive, shaping powers,"3 and forces of "self-denial, self­
consumption, self-contradiction."4
...with the phenomenon of an animal turned in 
upon itself, taking sides against itself, some­
thing so new and deep, so unprecedented, puz­
zling, confusing and promising appeared on earth 
that the earth itself was substantially altered.
...he (man) aroused an interest, created a tension 
a hope, almost a certainty, as though something 
were being heralded in him, something prepared; 
as though man were not a goal, but a way, an 
episode, a bridge, a great promise.5
There are, jji map. Nietzsche is saying, grounds for hope. 
Not the facile, strained and jubilant optimism of the 
Bildungsnhilister who mistake the debunking of onoe-strong 
beliefs for freedom, but an interest, a tension, a hope, 
almost a certainty based pji man - what he is, and what 
he can become by virtue of what he is. The grounds for 
hope lie in the fact that the human being, as distinct 
from all other beings, and because of his new "memory of 
the will,"6 his "extraordinary privilege of responsibility'.^ 
in short, his conscience, is capable of action, of be­
ginning something anew.
But say, my brothers, what can a child do that 
even the lion could not do? why must the preying 
lion still become a child? This child is in­
nocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, 
a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a 
sacred "Yes," For the game of creation, my 
brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed....“
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And this new beginning, this ability to be responsible 
by making and keeping promises, is not a formless, blind 
Sehopenhauerian striving which must be contained and 
guided by some limiting authority imposed from outside 
itself, but, by virtue of its "built-in" bridle, contains 
within itself its "criterion of values as well."9 What 
that criterion is depends on the dominant values of the 
"environment" into which the child is born. The liber© 
atlng fact remains, nevertheless, that those values are 
not given in an absolute sense and, thus, immutable. On 
the basis of this discovery, Nietzsche made his plea for 
a moral demand system and a conscience directed towai'd 
fulfillment rather than the eontinenco of the ascetic 
ideal.
Alongside this hopeful doctrine of man runs Nietzsche* 
master/slave theory of morality, his obigarehlcal theory 
of the body, and his casts theory of society (ichd "body" 
politic) - all, essentially, Platonic,apd all, in truth, 
a m  theory.
...Platonic rulership, whose legitimacy rested 
upon the domination of the self, draws its guiding 
principles - those which at the same time justify 
and limit power over others - from a relationship 
established between be and myself, so that the 
right and wrong of relationships with others are 
determined by attitudes toward one's self, until 
the whole of the public realm is seen in the image 
of "man writ large," of the right order between 
marl's individual capacities of mind, soul, and body.
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This throws a revealing light on Mfletsaoho's puaalement 
over Jesus and his inability to see the goodness of his 
way of life as anything but negative* The whole theory 
of self»overoomlng, self-diselpllne* harshness toward 
oneself, is conspicuous not only for being conceived in 
terms of a relationship "between roe and myself," but also 
for its emphasis on mastery and domination, power over 
oneself. It stands as well as perhaps the prime example 
of the pernicious effect of the method of analogy on 
Kietsache's work, in that self-mastery became, by extension 
of necessity, domination of others - precisely that dom­
ination which is no longer necessary after Niatssohe's 
discovery of man's instinct of conscienceI This es­
sentially medieval method,12 together with NlatBsche's 
medieval version of the theory of the body politic,^3 
made it virtually impossible for what we have just called 
his hopeful doctrine of roan to develop. A doctrine of 
BKin which holds that there develops in every man a con­
science, a potentiality for action, that la, for making 
and keeping promises, in short, for reaaonsibilitv - 
this doctrine of man la incompatible with one which holds 
that "The g s W  o£. SâalâS., the supreme, the dominant 
law, la merely the sanction of a natural order, a natural
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lawfulnass of the first rank...."14 Wletasohe's positive 
efforts contain hits of both of these Irreconoilables,
The latter was a part of his intellootual heritage, and 
he believed it instead of criticizing it. The former 
he discovered in the course of his psychological experi­
mentation, and 3.t is the beginning, however fragmentary, 
of a doctrine of man and an ethio - after the death of God, 
Perhaps the most fruitful approach to Nietzsche's 
positive work is a paraphrase of his own words about 
Thales' water-Uypotheaiss^-5 Nietzsche's philosophy 
seems to begin with a nonsensical notion, with the pro­
position that will to power la the origin and womb of all 
things. Is it really necessary to stop here and take this 
seriously? It is, because in it is contained the thought, 
however erobryonically, that "all things are one." Niet­
zsche intuited what Heraclitus (and his Milesian precursor^ 
and the Hebrews before him had sensed. This monism had 
flowered in the West as HebrewChrlstian monotheism, 
subsequently degenerating into what Nietzsche once called 
the "pitiful god of Christian monotono-theista,"^^ and 
ending with the death of God. NletzsehefeDionysian monism 
stands in this tradition, at its best. He came to see 
that both the classical dualistlc way of conceiving life
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the excluslvaly iiJonlBtie way were useless for explain­
ing adequately human conduct, including man's ability to 
be responsible and his propensity to destruction " of self 
and others. Accordingly, we saw him move from a dualism 
in which Apollo imposed his "control" on Dionysus from 
"outside," and at the price of Dionysus' life itself 
(redemption by illusion, repressive sublimation), to a 
will to power monism in which Dionysus could do without 
Apollo (the ascetic ideal) because he was seen to carry 
within himself the seeds of a built-in bridle, eanallaer, 
capable of giving order to Dionysus' impulsiveness a a- 
different (non-repressive, remissive) order from that 
imposed by Apollo, but order nonethelesss not chaos, as 
the preachers of continence had held. Hero in Dionysus 
is the synthesis of the best of Western monism and Western 
dualism, in a diatomic monisms all things are one, and 
all things take place by strife - ant-agon-ism.
However, this is not the final step in this hepeful 
development. We have just said that in Nietzsche's dia­
tomic monism are the seeds of responsibility. Every man 
is potentially responsible, that is, he has, from birth, 
as a part of his "human equipment," a conscience, in 
embryo. But, as we have attempted to show,^ 'i^  it must 
develop. Under the tutelage of the ascetic ideal, it
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developed In the direction of a clonlal of life a dev*^  
elopmetrt neeeesary for the pyeaei*vatlon ,,of life in the 
past ^hiah> in the presentg works for its destruction*
Yet, Hietssohe could clalm^ "A converse endeavor is 
conceivable.. , He left us with this claim and his 
fragmentary attempt to take the final step-, to work out 
this converse endeavox% His Dionysian monism, grounded 
in this life, this world, our bodies, and the earth 
(eternal recurrence, amor fati). is immensely helpful 
as far as it goes. It will not suffice i^ithout being 
coupled with an inverted version of his portrayal of 
negative goodness in Jesus.
The significance of Jesus* way of life rests, indeed, 
as Hietgîsche knew, in the i#y he lived. But that way was 
not a way to the "feeling redeemed’* of those who followed 
it, not was it an exclusively private way, as Nietzsche 
believed.
The noral code.,.inferred from the faculties of 
forgiving and of making promises, rests on 
periencea which nobody could ever have with him"* 
self, which, on the contrary, are entirely baaed 
on the presence of others*19
This way of life is, of course, diametrically opposed,
indeed, the only alternative we have, to the domination
of self and others.
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...readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to 
make promises and to keep them.. These moral 
precepts are the only ones that are not applied 
to action from the outside, from some supposedly 
higher faculty or from experiences outside action’ 
own reach. They arise, on the contrary, directly 
out of the will to live together with others in 
the mode of acting and speaking, and thus they 
are like control mechanisms built into the very 
faculty to start new and unending processes.^0
The death of Clod is not necessarily a liberating 
event. That it can have nihilistic consequences, that 
men may abdicate the right to responsibility which now 
falls to them as a consequence of the death of God, goes 
without saying. But: there will probably never be a 
shortage of those who will be eager to remind us of the 
possible perils involved. Nietzsche, while by no means 
ignorant of those perils, has sought to anticipate them 
and "defuse" them by pointing the way to the possibility 
of appuMing. this new right. God’s death means that men 
are on their own - for good and for ill. Again, not a 
neoessarllv liberating fact. But Nietzsche has given us 
cause to hope and shown us that the way to responsibility, 
that uniquely human privilege, lies in the rearing of 
conscience to integrity and in the creation of new values 
aimed at the affirmation, fulfillment, and enhancement of 
life I in short, in a x'^ aadlness to make and to keep promises 
To this must be added what Nietzsche was able to account 
for only negatively, namely, a readiness to forgive and 
to be forgiven.
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